Bibliography of matching and market design

by Alvin E. Roth

 

This bibliography began life as the bibliography of

Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Econometric Society Monograph Series, Cambridge University Press, 1990. (Winner of the 1990 Lanchester Prize.) Paperback edition, 1992.

I've updated it sporadically (most recently 9/1/09), and would be glad to hear of missing references.

 

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Yeon-Koo Che and Yosuke Yasuda, "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The 'Boston' Mechanism Reconsidered, August 2009.

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila , Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth, "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95,2, May, 2005, 364-367.

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila , Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth, "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match,'' revised, April, 2008.

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sonmez, The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95,2, May, 2005, 368-371.

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Tayfun Sonmez [1998], "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, 66, 3, May, 689-701.

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth, '' Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match ,'' American Economic Review , forthcoming.

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sonmez, "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," January, 2006, this revision May 2006.

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Tayfun Sonmez [1999], "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, 88, 233-260.

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Tayfun Sonmez [1999], "Ordinal Efficiency and Dominated Sets of Assignments," Journal of Economic Theory, 112, 157-172.

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Tayfun Sonmez [2002], "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, 93, 729-747.

Abeledo, Hernan G. and Yosef Blum [1996]"Stable Matchings and Linear Programming," Linear Algebra and Its Applications, 245, 321-333.

Abeledo, Hernan G., Yosef Blum and Uriel G. Rothblum [1996], "Canonical Monotone Decompositions of Fractional Stable Matchings, " International Journal of Game Theory, 25, No. 2, 161-176.

Abeledo, Hernan G. and Garth Isaak [1991], "A Characterization of Graphs which Assure the Existence of Stable Matchings," Mathematical Social Sciences, 22, 93-96.

Abeledo, Hernan G. and Uriel G. Rothblum [1994], "Stable Matchings and Linear Inequalities," Discrete Applied Mathematics, 54: 1-27.

Abeledo, Hernan G. and Uriel G. Rothblum [1995], "Courtship and Linear Programming," Linear Algebra and its Applications, 216: 111-124.

Abeledo, Hernan G. and Uriel G. Rothblum [1995b], "Paths to Marriage Stability," Discrete Applied Mathematics, 63, 1-12.

Abraham, D., Blum, A., and Sandholm, T. 2007. Clearing Algorithms for Barter Exchange Markets: Enabling Nationwide Kidney Exchanges. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC).

Abraham, D., K. Cechlarova, D. Manlove, K. Mehlhorn, Pareto optimality in house allocation problems, Lecture Notes in Comp. Sci. 3341, Algorithms and Computation, ISAAC 2004, Hong Kong, December 2004, Eds. R. Fleischer, G. Trippen, 3-15 (2004).

Adachi, Hiroyuki, "On a Characterization of Stable Matchings," Economic Letters, 2000, volume 68, pp 43--49.

Adachi, Hiroyuki [2003]: "A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility," Journal of Economic Theory, 113, 182-198.

Alcalde, Jose [1995], "Substitutability is Also Necessary for Stability in Job Matching Markets," mimeo, Universitat d'Alacant.

Alcalde, Jose [1995} Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets," Economic Design, 1, December 1995, 275-287.

Alcalde, Jose [1996], "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, 69, 240-254.

Alcalde, Jose and Salvador Barbera [1994], "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to the Marriage Problem," Economic Theory, 4, 417-435.

Alcalde, Jose, David Perez-Castrillo, and Antonio Romero-Medina [1998], " Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, 82, 469-480.

Alcalde, Jose and Pablo Revilla, "The Role of Unions in Hiring Procedures for Job Markets," Economics Letters 62, 189-195 (1999).

Alcalde, Jose and Pablo Revilla, Researching with Whom? Stability and Manipulation, Journal of Mathematical Economics 40, 869-887 (2004).

Alcalde, Jose and Antonio Romero-Medina [2000], "Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, 31,2, May, 294-302.

Alcalde, Jose and Antonio Romero-Medina "Sequential Decisions in the College Admissions Problem," working paper, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 1999.

Alcalde, Jose and Antonio Romero-Medina "Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems," working paper, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 1999.

Alcalde, Jose and Antonio Romero-Medina "Coalition Formation and Stability," working paper, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2000.

Alcalde, Jose and Antonio Romero-Medina "Sequential Decisions in the College Admissions Problem," Economics Letters 86, 153-158 (2005).

Aldershof, Brian and Olivia M. Carducci [1996], ``Stable Matchings with Couples," Discrete Applied Mathematics, (68)1-2 (1996) pp. 203-207.

Aldershof, Brian and Olivia M. Carducci [1999], "Stable Marriage and Genetic Algorithms: A Fertile Union," Journal of Heuristics, 5, 29-46. [with and without couples]

Alkan, Ahmet [1988], "Nonexistence of Stable Threesome Matchings," Mathematical Social Sciences, 16, pp207-209.

Alkan, A., "Existence and computation of matching equilibria", European Journal of Political Economy, 1989, pp 285 - 296

Alkan, A., G. Demange and D. Gale, "Fair allocation of indivisible goods and criteria of justice", Econometrica, 1991, pp 1023 - 1039,

 

Alkan, A., "Equilibrium in a matching market with general preferences", Equilibrium and Dynamics. Essays in Honour of David Gale, " edited by M. Majumdar, The MacMillan Press Ltd, London, 1992, pp 1-16

Alkan, A., "Monotonicity and envyfree assignments", Economic Theory, 1994, pp 605616

Alkan, A., 1999, On the Properties of Stable Many-to-Many Matchings under Responsive Preferences, Current Trends in Economics Theory and Applications, edited by A. Alkan, C.D. Aliprantis, N.C. Yannelis. Springer Verlag.

Alkan, A., "On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings", Review of Economic Design, 2001, pp 99-111

Alkan, A., "A class of multipartner matching models with a strong lattice structure", Economic Theory 2002, pp 737-746

Alkan, Ahmet, and David Gale [1990], "The Core of the Matching Game," Games and Economic Behavior, 2, pp203-212.

Alkan, A. and D. Gale, "Stable Schedule Matching Under Revealed Preferences" , Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, Vol 112, pp 289-306

Allison, Lloyd [1983], "Stable Marriages by Coroutines," Information Processing Letters, 16, pp61-65.

American Medical Students Association and Public Citizen Health Research Group [1995], ``Report on Hospital Bias in the NRMP," http://pubweb.acns.nwu.edu/~alan/nrmp2.html [accessed 1/6/96].

Anantham, Siva and Jennifer Stack, Wage Formation Under Early Contracting, working paper, Harvard University, 2006

Anderson, Kimberly D., Donald M. Jacobs, and Amy V. Blue [1999], "Is Match Ethics an Oxymoron?" The American Journal of Surgery, 177, March, 237-239. [survey of Kentucky, Michigan State, and Minnesota grads in '98 match--34% of respondents were asked by programs how they would rank them.]

Arenson, Karen W. [1996], "Top Colleges Fill More Slots with those Applying Early," New York Times, Wednesday, February 4, CXLV, No. 50,337, pp1, B8.

Arrow, Kenneth J. [1951], Social Choice and Individual Values, Wiley, New York, 2nd edition 1963, Cowles Foundation Monograph, Yale University Press.

Ashenfelter, Orley [1989], "How Auctions Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives," 3, pp23-36.

M. Atlamaz and B. Klaus (2005): "Endowment Strategy-Proofness in an Exchange Market with Indivisible Goods," UAB Working Paper 598.03.

Aumann, Robert J. [1964], "Markets with a continuum of traders," Econometrica, 32, pp39-50.

Avery, Christopher, Andrew Fairbanks and Richard Zeckhauser [2001], "What worms for the early bird? Early Admissions at Selective Colleges," working paper, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Avery, Christopher, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner, and Alvin E. Roth, "The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks" University of Chicago Law Review, 68, 3, Summer, 2001, 793-902.(online at SSRN) 

Avery, Christopher, Jolls, Christine, Posner, Richard A. and Roth, Alvin E., "The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks" . University of Chicago Law Review, 74, Spring 2007, 447-486.

Helmuts Azacis [2004], Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint," mimeo.

Mourad Baou and Michel Balinski, The stable admissions polytope, Mathematical Programming 87 (2000) 427-39.

Mourad Baou and Michel Balinski, Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry), Discrete Applied Mathematics 101 (2000) 1-12..

Mourad Baou and Michel Balinski, The stable allocation (or ordinal transportation) problem, Mathematics of Operations Research 27 (2002) 485-503 ; corrected version Mathematics of Operations Research 27 (2002) 662-680..

Mourad Baou and Michel Balinski, Admissions and Recruitment, American Mathematical Monthly 110 (2003) 386-399..

Mourad Baou and Michel Balinski, Student admissions and faculty recruitment, Theoretical Computer Science 322 (2004) 245-265..

Michel Balinski, Les enjeux du recrutement, Pour la science (October 2001) 64-70..

Balinski, Michel and David Gale [1990], "On the Core of the Assignment Game," Functional Analysis, Optimization, and Mathematical Economics: A Collection of Papers Dedicated to the Memory of Leonid Vital'evich Kantorovich, Lev J. Leifman, editor, Oxford University Press, 274-289.

Michel Balinski and Guillaume Ratier, Of stable marriages and graphs, and strategy and polytopes, SIAM Review 39 (1997) 574-604..

Michel Balinski and Guillaume Ratier, Graphs and marriages, American Mathematical Monthly 105 (1998) 430-445.

Balinski, Michel and Tayfun Sonmez [1999], "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, 84, 73-94.

Banerjee, Suryapratim, Hideo Konishi, and Tayfun Sonmez [2001], Core in a simple coalition formation game, Social Choice and Welfare, 18, 135-153. (applies an algorithm similar to Gales top trading cycle algorithm to hedonic coalition formation)

Barbera, Salvador and B. Dutta [1995], "Protective Behaviour in Matching Models," Games and Economic Behavior 8, 281-296.

Barron, Greg, and Felix Vardy. "The Internal Job Market of the IMF's Economist Program." IMF Staff Papers 52, no. 3 (2005): 410-429.

Bartholdi, John J. III, and Michael A. Trick [1986], "Stable Matching with Preferences Derived From a Psychological Model," Operations Research Letters, 5, pp165-169.

Bartholdi, John J. III, Craig A. Tovey, and Michael A. Trick [1989], "The Computational Difficulty of Manipulating an Election," Social Choice and Welfare, 6, pp227-241.

Becker, Edward R., Stephen G. Breyer, and Guido Calabresi [1994], "The Federal Judicial Law Clerk Hiring Problem and the Modest March 1 Solution," 104, Yale Law Journal, 207-225.

Becker, Gary S. [1981], A Treatise on the Family, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

Ben-Shoham, Assaf, Roberto Serrano, and Oscar Volij [2004], The evolution of exchange, Journal of Economic Theory, 114, 310-328.

Benjamim, A.T., C. Converse, and H.A. Krieger (1995) "How Do I Marry Thee? Let Me Count the Ways," Discrete Applied Mathematics, 59, 285-292. [exponential number of stable matchings as a function of n on a side]

Bennett, Elaine [1988], "Consistent Bargaining Conjectures in Marriage and Matching," Journal of Economic Theory, 45, pp392-407.

Bennett, Elaine [1995], "Entry, Divorce and Re-marriage in Matching Markets," in The Economics of International Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency and Stability. Essays in Honor of Stanley Reiter, J. Ledyard, ed., Boston, Kluwer, 1-10.

Bergstrom, Carl T. and Leslie A. Real [2000], "Toward a Theory of Mutual Mate Choice: Lessons from Two Sided Matching," Evolutionary Ecology Research, in press.

Bergstrom, Theodore and Richard Manning [1982], "Can Courtship be Cheatproof?, " (personal communication).

Bergstrom, Ted and Mark Bagnoli [1993], "Courtship as a Waiting Game," Journal of Political Economy, 101, pp185-202.

Bird, Charles G. [1984], "Group Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisible Goods," Economic Letters, 14, pp309-313.

Birkhoff, Garrett [1973], "Lattice Theory," American Mathematical Society Colloquium Publications, XXV, Providence, Third Edition.

P�ter Bir�, Katar�na Cechl�rov�: Inapproximability of the kidney exchange problem. Inf. Process. Lett. 101(5): 199-202 (2007)

Blair, Charles [1984], "Every Finite Distributive Lattice is a Set of Stable Matchings," Journal of Combinatorial Theory (Series A), 37, pp353-356.

Blair, Charles [1988], "The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners," Mathematics of Operations Research, 13, pp619-628.

Blum, Y., A.E. Roth, and U.G. Rothblum "Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, 76, 2, October 1997, 362-411.

Blum, Yosef and Uriel G. Rothblum [2002], " 'Timing is Everything' and Marital Bliss," Journal of Economic Theory, 103, 429-443.

Bodin, Lawrence and (Rabbi) Aaron Panken [1999], "High Tech for a Higher Authority: The Placement of Graduating Rabbis From Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion," Interfaces , Volume: 33 | Issue: 3 Cover date: May - Jun. 2003, 1-11.

Bogomolnaia, Anna, Rajat Deb, and Lars Ehlers [2005], "Strategy-Proof Assignment on the Full Preference Domain," Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.

Bogomolnaia, Anna and Herve Moulin [2001], "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, 100, October, 295-328. {"eating rates"}

Bogomolnaia, Anna and Herve Moulin [2004], "Random matching under dichotomous preferences," Econometrica, 72, 257-279.

Brams, Steven J. and Philip D. Straffin, Jr. [1979], "Prisoners' Dilemma and Professional Sports Drafts," American Mathematical Monthly, 86, pp80-88.

Brissenden, T.H.F. [1974], "Some Derivations from the Marriage Bureau Problem," The Mathematical Gazette, 58, pp250-257.

Bulow, Jeremy and Jonathan Levin, Matching and Price Competition, American Economic Review, 96,3,June 2006, 652-668.

Cantala, David [2004], Restabilizing matching markets at senior level, Games and Economic Behavior, 48,1-17.

Cantala, David [2004], Matching Markets: The Particular Case of Couples, Economics Bulletin 3, 1-11

Cassady, Ralph Jr. [1967] Auctions and Auctioneering, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Cechlarova, Katarina [2001], "Randomized matching mechanism revisited," Working paper, Department of Geometry and Algebra, P.J. Safarik University, Slovakia. (cechlarova@duro.science.upjs.sk)

Cechlarova, K., J. Hajdukova, "Stability testing in coalition formation games," Proc. SOR99, Preddvor, Slovenia, Eds. V. Rupnik, L. Zadnik-Stirn, S. Drobne, 111-116 (1999).

Cechlarova, K., J. Hajdukova, "Computational complexity of stable partitions with B-preferences," International Journal of Game Theory, 31 (2002) 3, 353364.

Cechlarova, K., A. Romero-Medina, "Stability in coalition formation games," International Journal of Game Theory, 29, 2001, 487-494.

Cechlarova, Katarina, Tamas Fleiner, and David Manlove [2005], "The Kidney Exchange Game," Proc. SOR '05 (2005), Eds. L. Zadnik-Stirn, S. Drobne, 77-83.

Cechlarova, Katarina and Vladim?r Lacko, THE KIDNEY EXCHANGE PROBLEM: HOW HARD IS IT TO FIND A DONOR?, working paper, June 2006, P.J. Safarik University, Jesenna 5, 041 54 Kosice, Slovakia

Chambers, Christopher P. [2004], Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 40, 953-962.

Checker, Armand [1973], "The National Intern and Resident Matching Program, 1966-72," Journal of Medical Education, 48, pp106-109.

Chen, Yan and Tayfun Sonmez [2002], "Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, 92, 5, December, 1669-86

Chen, Yan and Tayfun Sonmez. An Experimental Study of House Allocation Mechanisms. Economics Letters, vol. 83, Issue 1 (April 2004): 137-140.

Chen, Yan and Tayfun Sonmez. School Choice: An Experimental Study. Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.

Chung, Kim-Sau [1997], "A New Proof of a Sufficient Condition for Stable Matching" mimeo (November 1997), University of Wisconsin (also http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~kchung/file/oddring.ps)

Chung, Kim-Sau [1997], "Some Tantalizing Relations Between Stable Matchings and the Voting Paradox (November 1997), University of Wisconsin (also http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~kchung/file/smdr.ps)

Chung, Kim-Sau [2000], "On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, 33, 206-230.

Simon Clark (2006) "The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings," Contributions to Theoretical Economics: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1, Article 8. Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/contributions/vol6/iss1/art8 .

Collins, Susan M. and Kala Krishna [1991], "The Harvard Housing Lottery: Rationality and Reform," mimeo, Department of Economics, Harvard University.

Crawford, Vincent P. [1991], "Comparative Statics in Matching Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, 54, pp389-400.

Crawford, Vincent P. "The Flexible-Salary Match: A Proposal to Increase the Salary Flexibility of the National Resident Matching Program," forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. http://dss.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/21Mar05FlexibleSalaryMatch.pdf

Crawford, Vincent P. and Elsie Marie Knoer [1981], "Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers," Econometrica, 49, pp437-450.

Crawford, Vincent P. and Sharon C. Rochford [1986], "Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets," International Economic Review, 27, pp329-348.

Cremer, Jacques and Richard P. McLean [1985], "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent," Econometrica, 53, pp345-361.

Curiel, Imma J. [1988], Cooperative Game Theory and Applications, doctoral dissertation, Katholieke Universiteit van Nijmegen.

Curiel, Imma J. and Stef H. Tijs [1985], "Assignment Games and Permutation Games," Methods of Operations Research, 54, pp323-334.

Dam, Kaniska and David Perez-Castrillo (2006) The Principal-Agent Matching Market , The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 2: No. 1 (Frontiers), Article 1.

Damiano, Ettore, and Ricky Lam [2004], Stability in dynamic matching markets, Games and Economic Behavior, 52,1, July 2005, 34-53.

Danilov, V.I. [2003]: Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems, Mathematical Social Sciences, 46, 145-148.

Dasgupta, Partha, Peter Hammond, and Eric Maskin [1979], "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, 46, pp185-216.

Debreu, Gerard and Herbert Scarf [1963], "A limit theorem on the core of an economy," International Economic Review, 4, pp235-246.

Demange, Gabrielle [1982], "Strategyproofness in the Assignment Market Game," mimeo, Laboratoire d'Econometrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique, Paris.

Demange, Gabrielle [1987], "Nonmanipulable Cores," Econometrica, 55, pp1057-1074.

Demange, Gabrielle and David Gale [1985] "The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, 53, pp873-888.

Demange, Gabrielle, David Gale, and Marilda Sotomayor [1986] "Multi- Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, 94, pp863-872.

Demange, Gabrielle, David Gale, and Marilda Sotomayor [1987] "A Further Note on the Stable Matching Problem," Discrete Applied Mathematics, 16, pp217-222.

Diamantoudi, Effrosyni, Eiichi Miyagawa, and Licun Xue, Random paths to stability in the roommate problem, Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 48, (1), 18-28.

Diamond, Peter and Eric Maskin [1979], "An equilibrium analysis of search and breach of contract, I: Steady states," Bell Journal of Economics, 10, pp282-316.

Diamond, Peter and Eric Maskin [1982], "An equilibrium analysis of search and breach of contract, II: A non-steady state example," Journal of Economic Theory, 25, pp165-195.

D. Dimitrov, C.-J. Haake, and B. Klaus (2005): "Bundling in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods," working paper.

Dubins, L.E. and D.A. Freedman [1981], "Machiavelli and the Gale- Shapley Algorithm." American Mathematical Monthly, 88, pp485-494.

Dutta, Bhaskar and Jordi Masso [1997], "Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences Over Colleagues," Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 75, No. 2, August, 464-475.

Edgeworth, F.Y. [1881], Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences, London, Kegan Paul.

Eeckhout, Jan [2000], On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings, Economics Letters, 69, 1-8.

Ehlers, Lars Hermann [2001], "Collective Decision Making in Economic Environments: Deterministic and Probabilistic Approaches," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maastricht.

Ehlers, Lars [2002], "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, 105, 298-317.

Ehlers, Lars [2004], "Monotonic and Implementable Solutions in Generalized Matching Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, 114, 358-369.

Ehlers, Lars [2004], "In Search of Advice for Participants in Matching Markets which use the Deferred-Acceptance Algorithm," Games and Economic Behavior, 48, 249-270.

Ehlers, Lars [2004], "In Search of Advice for Physicians in British Entry-Level Medical Markets, " mimeo.

Ehlers, Lars [2005], "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems," mimeo.

Ehlers, Lars, and Bettina Klaus [2003], "Coalitional Strategy-Proof and Resource-Monotonic Solutions for Multiple Assignment Problems," Social Choice and Welfare, 21, 265-280. .

Ehlers, Lars, and Bettina Klaus [2003], "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems," International Journal of Game Theory, 32, 545-560. .

Ehlers, Lars, and Bettina Klaus [2005], "Efficient Priority Rules," Games Economic Behavior, forthcoming.

Ehlers, Lars, and Bettina Klaus [2005], "Consistent House Allocation," METEOR research memorandum RM/05/008. .

Ehlers, Lars, Bettina Klaus, and Szilvia Ppai [2002], "Strategy-Proofness and Population-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38, 329-339. .

Ehlers, Lars and Jordi Masso [2004], Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets, CREA Working Paper number 147.

Echenique, Federico "Counting Combinatorial Choice Rules" (Caltech SS Working Paper 1199), 2004

Echenique, Federico and Jorge Oviedo [2003]," "A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets" (Caltech SS Working Paper 1185),

Echenique, Federico and Jorge Oviedo `Core Many-to-one Matchings by Fixed Point Methods'' Journal of Economic Theory. Volume 115, Issue 2, April 2004, Pages 358-376

Erdil, Aytek and Haluk Ergin What's the Matter with Tie-breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice , MIT working paper, October 2005.

Ergin, Haluk, "Consistency in House Allocation Problems," August 2000, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 34(1), 77-97

Ergin, Haluk, "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," November 2002, Econometrica, 70(6), 2489-2497

Ergin, Haluk and Tayfun Sonmez "Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism " , forthcoming in Journal of Public Economics.

 

Eriksson, Kimmo, Johan Karlander, and Lars-Erik Oller [2000], "Becker's assortative assignments: stability and fairness," Mathematical Social Sciences, 39, 109-118

Eriksson, Kimmo and Jonas Sjostrand (2007), ''On Two Theorems of Quinzii and Rent Controlled Housing Allocation in Sweden,'' International Game Tehory Review, 9,3,515-525.

Fagebaume, Alexis and David Gale [1990], "A Note on the Job Assignment Problem," mimeo.

Featherstone, Clayton and Muriel Niederle, "Ex Ante Efficiency in School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation," December 2008

Feder, Tomas [1989], "A New Fixed Point Approach for Stable Networks and Stable Marriages," Proc. 21st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp513-522.

Fleiner, Tamas [2003], "A Fixed-Point Approach To Stable Matchings and Some Applications," Mathematics of Operations Research, 28, 1, February, 103-126.

Fleinter, Tamas:

Fleiner, Tamas "On stable matchings and flows," August 2009.

Francis, N.D. and D.I. Fleming [1985], "Optimum Allocation of Places to Students in a National University System," Bit, 25, pp307-317.

Frechette, Guillaume, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver, "Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls," Rand Journal of Economics, 38, 4, Winter 2007, 967-982, with an online appendix).

Gale, David [1960], The Theory of Linear Economic Models, New York, McGraw Hill.

Gale, David [1968], "Optimal Assignments in an Ordered Set: An Application of Matroid Theory," Journal of Combinatorial Theory, 4, pp. 176-180.

Gale, David [1984], "Equilibrium in a Discrete Exchange Economy with Money," International Journal of Game Theory, 13, pp61-64.

Gale, David and Lloyd Shapley [1962], "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly, 69, pp9-15.

Gale, David and Marilda Sotomayor [1985a] "Some Remarks on the Stable Matching Problem," Discrete Applied Mathematics, 11, pp223-232.

Gale, David and Marilda Sotomayor [1985b] "Ms Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem," American Mathematical Monthly, 92, pp261-268.

Gan, Li and Qi Li, "The Efficiency of Thin and Thick Markets," Sept. 2004, NBER Working Paper #10815

Gardenfors, Peter [1973], "Assignment Problem Based on Ordinal Preferences," Management Science, 20, pp331-340.

Gardenfors, Peter [1975], "Match Making: Assignments Based on Bilateral Preferences," Behavioral Science, 20, pp166-173.

Garey, M.R. and D.S. Johnson [1979], Computers and Intractability, Freeman, San Francisco.

Gibbard, Alan [1973], "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, 41, pp587-601.

Gillies, D.B. [1953a], "Some Theorems on N-Person Games", Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University.

Gillies, D.B. [1953b], "Locations of Solutions", Report of an Informal Conference on the Theory of N-Person Games, Princeton University.

Graettinger, J. S. and Elliott Peranson "Sounding boards. The matching program", New England Journal of Medicine, 304, May 7, 1981, 1163 1165.

Graham, Daniel A. and Robert C. Marshall [1984] "Bidder Coalitions at Auctions," Duke University Department of Economics, mimeo.

Graham, Daniel A. and Robert C. Marshall [1987] "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single Object Second Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, 95, pp1217-1239.

Graham, Daniel A., Robert C. Marshall, and Jean-Francois Richard [1987a], "Auctioneer's Behavior at a Single Object English Auction with Heterogeneous Non-Cooperative Bidders," Duke University Institute of Statistics and Decision Sciences, Working paper #87-01.

Graham, Daniel A., Robert C. Marshall, and Jean-Francois Richard [1987b], "Differential Payments within a Bidder Coalition and the Shapley Value," American Economic Review, 80, June 1990, pp493-510.

Granot, Daniel [1984], "A Note on the Room-Mates Problem and a Related Revenue Allocation Problem," Management Science, 30, pp633-643.

Green, Jerry R. and Jean-Jacques Laffont [1979], Incentives in Public Decision-Making, North-Holland, Amsterdam.

Gretsky, Neil E., Joseph M. Ostroy and William R. Zame, "The Non-atomic Assignment Model," ET 2 (1992), 103-127.

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Haruvy, Ernan, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver, ''The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market,'' Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 30, 3 , March 2006, Pages 457-486. (With appendices and experimental instructions here.)

Haruvy, Ernan, and M. Utku Unver [2004] "Equilibrium Selection in Business-to-Business Matching Markets"

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Kagel, John H. and A.E. Roth, "The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 2000, 201-235.

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Kara, Tarik and Tayfun Sonmez [1997], "Implementation of College Admissions Rules," Economic Theory, 9, 197-218. Abstract

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Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn, and Jordi Masso [2003], Some Things Couples Wanted to Know about Stable Matchings (but Were Afraid to Ask), CREA Working Paper number 78.

B. Klaus and F. Klijn (2006): "Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching," Economic Theory, 27(2), 431-447.

B. Klaus (2005): "The Coordinate-Wise Core for Multiple-Type Housing Markets is Second Best Incentive Compatible," METEOR research memorandum RM/05/019.

Klaus, Bettina and Flip Klijn (2005): "Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples," UAB Working Paper 604.04.

Klaus, Bettina and Flip Klijn (2004): "Median Stable Matching for College Admission," UAB Working Paper 632.04.

Klaus, Bettina and Flip Klijn (2004): "Corrigendum to ''On Randomized Matching Mechanisms'' [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]," UAB Working Paper 628.04.

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Klaus, Bettina and Flip Klijn (2004): "Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples," UAB Working Paper 616.04.

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Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms  (2008), with  Yeon-Koo Che , forthcoming , Econometrica.

Axioms for Deferred Acceptance  (2007), with  Mihai Manea , conditionally accepted,  Econometrica.

Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets  (2009), with  Parag A. Pathak ,  American Economic Review 99, pp 608�27.

Incentives in the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism  (2007), with  Mihai Manea ,  forthcoming , Journal of Economic Theory

Risk-Dominance and Perfect Foresight Dynamics in N-Player Games  (2006),  Journal of Economic Theory 128, pp 255-273.

Group Incentive Compatibility for Matching with Contracts  (2007), with  John William Hatfield , forthcoming,  Games and Economic Behavior.

Random Assignment of Multiple Indivisible Objects (2007), forthcoming, Mathematical Social Sciences.

Matching with Contracts: Comment (2008), with John William Hatfield American Economic Review  98, pp 1189- 1194 .

Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism with General Priority Structures (2007),  Social Choice and Welfare  31, pp 357-365.

The Law of Aggregate Demand and Welfare in the Two-Sided Matching Market (2007),  Economics Letters  99, pp 581-584.

When can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? Maximal Domain Results (2007),  The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (contribution) , Article 32.

Matching and Price Competition: Comment (2007),  American Economic Review 97, pp 1027-1031.

Random Paths to Pairwise Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems: A Study on Market Equilibration (2006), with M. Utku Ünver International Journal of Game Theory 36, pp 473-488 (the Special Issue in Honor of David Gale).

Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-Intern Markets (2006),  Social Choice and Welfare 27, pp 25-28. 


 

 

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Li, Hao, Ettore Damiano and Wing Suen, "Unraveling of Dynamic Sorting" forthcoming Review of Economic Studies

Li, Hao and Ettore Damiano, "Price Discrimination and Efficent Matching"

Li, Hao and Ettore Damiano, "Competing Matchmaking"

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Ma, Jinpeng [2002], Stable Matchings and the Small Core in Nash equilibrium in the College Admissions Problem, Review of Economic Design, 7, 117-134.

Manea, Mihai [2009-06-09]: "Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship," Theoretical Economics

Manea, Mihai Random Serial Dictatorship and Ordinally Efficient Contracts , International Journal of Game Theory 2008.

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Ruth Martinez, Jordi Masso Alejandro Neme, and Jorge Oviedo [2001], On the Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings for a Many-to-one Model, Optimization 50, 439-457.

Ruth Martinez, Jordi Masso Alejandro Neme, and Jorge Oviedo [2004], On Group Strategy-proof Mechanisms for a Many-to-one Matching Model, International Journal of Game Theory 33, 115-128. .

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Niederle, Muriel, Deborah D. Proctor and Alvin E. Roth, ��What will be needed for the new GI fellowship match to succeed?��, Gastroenterology, 130, January 2006, 218-224.

Niederle, Muriel , Deborah D. Proctor and Alvin E. Roth, � The Gastroenterology Fellowship Match � The First Two Years ,� Gastroenterology , 135, 2 (August), 344-346, 2008.

Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth, "Relationship Between Wages and Presence of a Match in Medical Fellowships," JAMA, Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 290, No. 9, September 3, 2003, 1153-1154.

See also Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth, "Effect of a Match on Salaries for Medical Fellows' Reply," JAMA, Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 290, No. 18, November 12, 2003, 2408.

Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth, "Unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market: Gastroenterology with and without a centralized match," Journal of Political Economy, 1. 111, no. 6, December 2003, 1342-1352. .

Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth, "The Gastroenterology Fellowship Match: How it failed, and why it could succeed once again," Gastroenterology, 127, 2, August 2004, 658-666.

Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth, "The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should there be a Match?," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95,2, May, 2005, 372-375.

Niederle, Muriel, Deborah D. Proctor and Alvin E. Roth, ��What will be needed for the new GI fellowship match to succeed?, Gastroenterology, 130, January 2006, 218-224.

Niederle, Muriel , Deborah D. Proctor and Alvin E. Roth, The Gastroenterology Fellowship Match : The First Two Years , Gastroenterology , 135, 2 (August), 344-346, 2008.

Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth,''The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job placement, Wages, and Hiring Practice'' , in Labor Market Intermediation, David Autor, Editor, NBER, forthcoming.

Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth "Market Culture: How Norms Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance,"

Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez, ''Matching and Market Design'', The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, 2008.

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Pais, Joana [2004], On Random Matching Markets, mimeo.

Papai, Szilvia "Unique Stability in Simple Coalition Formation Games ," Games and Economic Behavior , 48, 337-354 (2004).

Papai, Szilvia "Groves Sealed Bid Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects with Fair Prices ," Social Choice and Welfare , 20: 371-385 , 2003.

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Papai, Szilvia "Strategyproof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments ," Journal of Public Economic Theory , 3: 257-271 , 2001.

Papai, Szilvia "Strategyproof Single Unit Award Rules ," Social Choice and Welfare , 18: 785-798 , 2001.

Papai, Szilvia "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange ," Econometrica , 68: 1403-1433 , 2000.

Papai, Szilvia "Strategyproof Multiple Assignments Using Quotas ," Review of Economic Design , 5: 91-105 , 2000.

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Prasad, Kislaya [1987], "The Complexity of Games II: Assignment Games and Indices of Power," mimeo, Department of Economics, Syracuse University.

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Pycia, Marek, Many-to-One Matching without Substitutability , MIT working paper, 2005. ("pairwise alignment"!)

Pycia, Marek , One-Sided Matching - General Stability Results and a Theory of Coalition Formation, MIT working paper, 2005.

Quinn, Michael J. [1985], "A Note on Two Parallel Algorithms to Solve the Stable Marriage Problem," Bit, 25, pp473-476.

Quint, Thomas [1987a], "Elongation of the Core in an Assignment Game," Technical report, IMSSS, Stanford.

Quint, Thomas [1987b], "A Proof of the Nonemptiness of the Core of Two Sided Matching Markets," CAM report #87-29, Department of Mathematics, UCLA.

Quint, Thomas [1988a], "An Algorithm to Find a Core Point for a Two-Sided Matching Model," CAM report #88-03, Department of Mathematics, UCLA.

Quint, Thomas [1988b], "The Core of an m-Sided Assignment Game," Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 3, November 1991, 487-503.

Quint, Thomas [1990a], "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Balancedness in M-Sided Assignment Games," mimeo, Department of Mathematics, U.S. Naval Academy.

Quint, Thomas [1990b], "Characterization of Cores of Assignment Games," International Journal of Game Theory, 1991, 19, 413-420.

Quint, Thomas, "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Balancedness in Partitioning Games", Mathematical Social Sciences 22 (1991), pp. 87-91.

Quint, Thomas,"The Lattice of Core Submatchings in a Two-Sided Matching Market", Mathematics of Operations Research 19, no. 3 (1994), pp. 603-617.

Quint, Thomas,"On One-Sided vs. Two-Sided Matching Games", Games and Economic Behavior, 16 (1996), pp. 124-134.

Quint, Thomas,"Restricted Houseswapping Games", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 27, 1997, 451-470

Quinzii, Martine [1984], "Core and Competitive Equilibria with Indivisibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, 13, pp41-60.

Rebick, Marcus E. "The Importance of Networks in the Market for University Graduates in Japan A Longitudinal Analysis of Hiring Patterns." Discussion paper 1816, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London. [networks seem to be most important in screening students from less prestigious faculties than the firm normally hires from...]

Rees, Michael A., Jonathan E. Kopke, Ronald P. Pelletier, Dorry L. Segev, Matthew E. Rutter, Alfredo J. Fabrega, Jeffrey Rogers, Oleh G. Pankewycz, Janet Hiller, Alvin E. Roth, Tuomas Sandholm, Utku Ünver, and Robert A. Montgomery, � A Non-Simultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor Chain ,� New England Journal of Medicine , 360;11, March 12, 2009, 1096-1101.

Rochford, Sharon C. [1984], "Symmetrically Pairwise-Bargained Allocations in an Assignment Market", Journal of Economic Theory, 34, pp262-281.

Romero-Medina, Antonio [1998], "Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market", Review of Economic Design, Volume 3 Issue 2 (1998) pp 137-147 Abstract

Ronn, Eytan [1986], "On the Complexity of Stable Matchings With and Without Ties", Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University.

Ronn, Eytan [1990], "NP-Complete Stable Matching Problems," Journal of Algorithms, 11(2):285-304, June 1990.

Roth, A.E., "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives," Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 7, 1982, 617-628.

Roth, A.E., "Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisible Goods," Economics Letters, Vol. 9, 1982, 127-132. 

Roth, Alvin E. [1984a], "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, 92, pp991-1016.

Roth, A.E., "Misrepresentation and Stability in the Marriage Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 34, 1984, 383-387.

Roth, A.E., "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching," Econometrica, 52, 1984, 47-57.

Roth, A.E., "The College Admissions Problem is not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 36, 1985, 277-288.

Roth, A.E., "Common and Conflicting Interests in Two-Sided Matching Markets," European Economic Review, (Special issue on Market Competition, Conflict, and Collusion) Vol. 27, 1985, 75-96.

Roth, A.E., "Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions," Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 10, 1985, 379-389.

Roth, A.E., "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, 54, 1986, 425-427.

Roth, Alvin E. (editor) [1987], Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Roth, Alvin E. [1988a], "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview," Economic Journal, 98, pp974-1031.

Roth, A.E., "Two-Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others' Preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 1, 1989, 191-209.

Roth, A.E., "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the U.K.," American Economic Review, vol. 81, June 1991, 415-440.

Roth, A.E. "New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization," Science, 250, 1990, 1524-1528.

Roth, Alvin E. [1995], ``Proposed research program: Evaluation of changes to be considered in the NRMP algorithm," Consultant's report, http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~aroth/nrmp.html .

Roth, A.E. "The NRMP as a Labor Market," Journal of the American Medical Association, 275, April 3, 1996, 1054-1056.

Roth, A.E. Report on the design and testing of an applicant proposing matching algorithm, and comparison with the existing NRMP algorithm, Consultant's report, http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~aroth/phase1.html .

Roth, A.E. Game Theory as a Tool for Market Design, Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory, Fioravante Patrone, Ignacio Garca-Jurado, Stef Tijs, editors, Kluwer, 2000, 7-18.

Roth, Alvin E., "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Fisher-Schultz Lecture, Econometrica, 70,4, July 2002, 1341-1378.

Roth, Alvin E., "The origins, history, and design of the resident match," JAMA. Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 289, No. 7, February 19 2003, 909-912.

Roth, Alvin E. "Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21:3, Summer, 2007, pp. 37-58.

Roth, Alvin E. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions, International Journal of Game Theory, Special Issue in Honor of David Gale on his 85th birthday, 36, March, 2008, 537-569.

Roth, Alvin E. "What have we learned from market design?" Hahn Lecture, Economic Journal, 118 (March), 2008, 285-310.

Roth, Alvin E. �The Art of Designing Markets,� Harvard Business Review, October, 2007, 118-126.

Roth, A. E. and Elliott Peranson, "The effects of the change in the NRMP matching algorithm," Journal of the American Medical Association, 278, 9, September 3, 1997, 729-732.

Roth, A. E. and Elliott Peranson, The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design American Economic Review, 89, 4, September, 1999, 748-780.

Roth, A.E. and Postlewaite, A., "Weak Versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 4, August 1977, 131-137.

Roth, A.E. and U.G. Rothblum "Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants," Econometrica, 67, January 1999, 21-43.

Roth, A.E., Rothblum, U.G., and Vande Vate, J.H., "Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming," Mathematics of Operations Research, 18, 1993, 803-828. (An extended summary of these results, without proofs, appears as "Stable Marriages: Substituting Linearity for Discreteness," Linear Algebra and Its Applications, vol. 167, 1992, 252-257.)

Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez, and M. Utku Unver, "Kidney Exchange," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 2, May, 2004, 457-488. (Originally published as NBER Paper w10002, September 2003).

Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez , and M. Utku Unver, "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, 125, 2, December 2005, 151-188. (Originally published as NBER Paper w10698, August 2004.)

Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez , and M. Utku Unver, "A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England" American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95,2, May, 2005, 376-380.

 Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez and M. Utku Unver, ''Kidney Paired Donation With Compatible Pairs,'' American Journal of Transplantation, (letter to the editor) 2007, 7:1.

Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez, M. Utku Unver,  Francis L. Delmonico, and Susan L. Saidman, ''Utilizing List Exchange and Undirected Good Samaritan Donation through 'Chain' Paired Kidney Donations," American Journal of Transplantation, 6, 11, November 2006, 2694-2705.

Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez , and M. Utku Unver, "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences,"  (May, 2005. NBER Paper w11402),  American Economic Review,  97, 3, June 2007, 828-851.

Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor "Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 45, 1988, 85-101.

Roth, A.E. and Sotomayor, M., "The College Admissions Problem Revisited," Econometrica, 57, 1989, 559-570.

Roth, Alvin E. and Marilda Sotomayor Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Econometric Society Monograph Series, Cambridge University Press, 1990. (Winner of the 1990 Lanchester Prize.) Paperback edition, 1992.

Roth, Alvin E. and Marilda Sotomayor [1992], "Two-Sided Matching," Handbook of Game Theory, volume 1, R.J Aumann and S. Hart, editors, Elsevier, 485-541.

Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor "Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: A Unified Treatment," Revista de Econometria, The Brazilian Review of Econometrics, 16, 2, Novembro de 1996, 1-24.

Roth, A.E. and Vande Vate, J.H., "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, 58, 1990, 1475-1480.

Roth, A.E. and Vande Vate, J.H., "Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms," Economic Theory, 1991, Vol. 1, No. 1, 31-44.

Roth, A.E. and X. Xing "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, 84, September, 1994, 992-1044.

Roth, A.E. and X. Xing "Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists," Journal of Political Economy, 105, April 1997, 284-329.

Rothblum, U.G. [1992], ``Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope'', Mathematical Programing 54, 57-67.

Saidman, Susan L., Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Snmez, M. Utku nver, and Francis L. Delmonico, " Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation By Matching for Two and Three Way Exchanges," Transplantation, ,81, 5, March 15, 2006, 773-782.

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Sasaki, Hiroo [1996], Consistency and Monotonicity in Assignment Problems," International Journal of Game Theory, 24, 373-397. .

Sasaki, Hiroo [1995], "One-Sided Externalities of Two-Sided Matching Problems," mimeo, School of Commerce, Waseda University, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, Japan 169-50.

Sasaki, Hiroo and Manabu Toda [1996], "Two-Sided Matching Problems with Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, 70, 93-108.

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Sonmez, Tayfun [1997], "Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, 77, 1, November, 197-204. {no stable mechanism makes it a dominant strategy never to under-represent capacity...}

Sonmez, Tayfun [1997], "Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems, Games and Economic Behavior, 20, n 2, August, 169-176.

Sonmez, Tayfun [1999], "Can Pre-Arranged Matches be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets?" Journal of Economic Theory, 86, 148-56. {no, and hospital-optimal matching is more vulnerable than student optimal...}

Sonmez, Tayfun and M. Utku Unver [2005], House Allocation with Existing Tenants: An Equivalence, Games and Economic Behavior, 52, 1, July 2005, 153-185.

Sonmez, Tayfun and M. Utku Unver [2003], "Course Bidding at Business Schools"

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Sotomayor, Marilda [1999], "Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem," Mathematical Social Sciences Vol. 38 (1) pp. 55-70, Abstract

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Sotomayor, Marilda [1999], "The Strategy Structure of the College Admissions Stable Mechanisms," mimeo, Universidade de Sao Paulo; Departamento de Economia.

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