This bibliography began life as the bibliography of (my) Chapter 4 of
The Handbook of Experimental Economics, John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, editors, Princeton University Press, 1995.
I have since updated it somewhat, and would be glad to hear of further updates I should make.
Bibliography of Bargaining Experiments (and related papers)
Albers, Wulf and Gisela Albers [1983], "On the Prominence Structure of the Decimal System," Decision Making under Uncertainty, R.W. Scholz, editor, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 271-287.
Ashenfelter, Orley [1987], "A Model of Arbitral Behavior," American Economic Review, 77, May, 342-346.
Ashenfelter, Orley and David Bloom [1984], "Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, 74, 111-125.
Ashenfelter, Orley, and David Bloom [1990], "Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," mimeo.
Ashenfelter, Orley and Janet Currie [1990], "Negotiator Behavior and the Occurrence of Disputes," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 80, May, 416-420.
Ashenfelter, Orley, Janet Currie, Henry S. Farber, and Matthew Spiegel [1992], "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Econometrica, 60, November, 1407-1433.
Axelrod, Robert [1970], Conflict of Interest, Chicago, Markham.
Babcock, Linda, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, and Colin Camerer [1995], "Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining," American Economic Review, 85, 5, December, 1337-1343.
Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe [1995], "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social Norms," Games-and-Economic-Behavior, July 1995. 10(1): p. 122-42.
Binmore, Ken, Peter Morgan, Avner Shaked, and John Sutton [1991], "Do People Exploit Their Bargaining Power?: An Experimental Study," Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 3, pp295-322.
Binmore, Ken, Avner Shaked, and John Sutton [1985], "Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study," American Economic Review, vol. 75, pp1178-1180.
Binmore, Ken, Avner Shaked, and John Sutton [1988], "A Further Test of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: Reply," American Economic Review, 78, 837-839.
Binmore, Ken, Avner Shaked, and John Sutton [1989], "An Outside Option Experiment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 753-770.
Blinder, Alan S. and Don H. Choi [1990], "A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1003-1015.
Blount, Sally [1995], "When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 63, No. 2, August, 131- 144.
Blount, Sally and Max H. Bazerman [1996], "The inconsistent evaluation of absolute versus comparative payoffs in labor supply and bargaining," J. ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION, Volume 30, issue 2, pages 227-240.
Boden, Leslie [1989], "Dispute Resolution in Worker's Compensation: The Role of Adversarial Experts," mimeo, Boston University.
Bolton, Gary [1991], "A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, December, 81, 1096-1136.
Bolton, Gary E. [1993], "The Rationality of Splitting Equally," J. ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION, Volume 32, issue 3, pages 365-381.
Bolton, Gary E. "Bargaining and Dilemma Games: From Laboratory Data Towards Theoretical Synthesis," mimeo, May 1998.
Bolton, Gary E, Elena Katok and Rami Zwick, "Dictator game giving: rules of fairness versus acts of kindness," International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, 27,269-299.
Bolton, Gary E. and Axel Ockenfels [2000], "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition, American Economic Review, 90, 1, March, 166-193.
Bolton, Gary E. and Rami Zwick [1992], "Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining," working paper, Pennsylvania State University. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 1, July 1995, 95-121.
Burrows, Paul and Graham Loomes [1990], "The Impact of Fairness on Bargaining Behavior," mimeo, Centre for Experimental Economics, University of York.
Cameron, Lisa A. [1999], Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia," Economic Inquiry, 37,1,January, 47-59.
Card, David [1988], "Strikes and Wages: A Test of a Signalling Model," mimeo, Princeton University.
Card, David [1990], "Strikes and Bargaining: A Survey of the Recent Empirical Literature," American Economic Review, 80, May, 410-415.
Carter, John R. and Michael D. Irons [1991], "Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 171-177.
Carter, John R. and Shannon A. McAloon[1996], "A test for comparative income effects in an ultimatum bargaining experiment" J. ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION Volume 31, issue 3, pages 369-380.
Chatterjee, Kalyan, and William Samuelson [1983], "Bargaining under incomplete information," Operations Research, 31, 835-851.
Contini, Bruno [1968], "The Value of Time in Bargaining Negotiations: Some Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, 58, pp374-393.
Cooper, David J., Nick Feltovich, Alvin E. Roth, and Rami Zwick, "Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games," Experimental Economics, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2003, 181-207.
Cooper, Russell, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W. Ross [1989], "Communication in the battle of the sexes game: some experimental results," RAND Journal of Economics, 20, 568-587.
Cooper, Russell, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, and Thomas W. Ross [1990], "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," American Economic Review, 80, 218-233.
Costa-Gomes, Miguel and Klaus G. Zauner [1997], "A Social Utility Explanation of Results in Experimental Ultimatum Bargaining Games," Working Paper 97-021, Australian Graduate School of Management, University of New South Wales.
Coursey, Don L. [1982], "Bilateral Bargaining, Pareto Optimality, and the Empirical Frequency of Impasse," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, pp243-259.
Cramton, Peter C. and Joseph S. Tracy [1992], "Strikes and Delays in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," American Economic Review, March, 82, 100-121.
Crawford, Vincent P. "Explicit Communication and Bargaining Outcomes," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 80, May 1990, 213-219.
Croson, Rachel T.A. [1996], "Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study," J. ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION Volume 30, issue 2, pages 197-213. Abstract
Currie, Janet [1989], "Who Uses Interest Arbitration? The Case of British Columbia's Teachers 1947-1981," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 42, 363-379.
Currie, Janet and Sheena McConnell [1989], "Strikes and Arbitration in the Public Sector: Can Legislation Reduce Dispute Costs?," mimeo, UCLA.
Daughety, Andrew F. [1993], "Socially-Influenced Choice: Equity Considerations in Models of Consumer Choice and in Games," Working paper #93-01, Department of Economics, University of Iowa.
Dawes, Robyn M [1990], "Social Dilemmas, Economic Self-Interest, and Evolutionary Theory," in Research in Psychology: Frontiers of Mathematics, Essays in Honor of Clyde H. Coombs, New York, Springer.
Deutsch, Morton and Paul Kotik [1978], "Altruism and Bargaining," Bargaining Behavior, Contributions to Experimental Economics 7, Heinz Sauermann (editor), J.C.B. Mohr, Tubingen, 20-40.
Eckel, Catherine C. and Philip Grossman [1992a], "Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games," working paper, Virginia Polytechnic Institute.
Eckel, Catherine C. and R. Gilles [1997], "Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining with Outside Options: Experimental Evidence," working paper VPI
Eckel, Catherine C. and Philip Grossman [1996], "The Price of Fairness: Gender Differences in a punishment game," J. ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION, Volume 30, issue 2, pages 143-158. Virginia Polytechnic Institute.
Eckel, Catherine C. and Philip Grossman [1996], "Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games," Games and Economic Behavior, 16:181- 191.
Eckel, Catherine C. and Philip Grossman [1997], "Are Women Less Selfish Than Men?: Evidence from Dictator Games," Economic Journal, forthcoming.
Farrell, Joseph [1987], "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, 18, 34-39.
Fehr, Ernst, Georg Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl [1993a], "Does Fairness prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, xx, xxx.
Fehr, Ernst, Georg Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl [1993b], "Gift Exchange and Ultimatums in Experimental Markets," mimeo, University of Technology, Austria.
Fehr, Ernst, and Klaus M. Schmidt [1997], "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," mimeo.
Fershtman, Chaim and Daniel J. Seidmann [1993] "Deadline Effects andd Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
Festinger, Leon, Stanley Schachter, and Kurt Back [1950], Social Pressures in Informal Groups: A Study of Human Factors in Housing, Stanford University Press.
Foddy, Margaret "Information Control as a Bargaining Tactic in Social Exchange," Advances in Group Processes, 1989, 6, pp139-178.
Forsythe, Robert, John Kennan and Barry Sopher [1990], "Dividing a Shrinking Pie: An Experimental Study of Strikes in Bargaining Games with Complete Information," in R. Mark Isaac (ed.), Research in Experimental Economics, Greenwich CT, JAI Press, forthcoming.
Forsythe, Robert, John Kennan and Barry Sopher [1991], "An Experimental Analysis of Bargaining and Strikes with One Sided Private Information," American Economic Review, 81, 253-278.
Forsythe, Robert, Joel L. Horowitz, N.E. Savin, and Martin Sefton "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," 1994, Games and Economic Behavior, 6, 347-369.
Fouraker, Lawrence E. and Sidney Siegel [1963], Bargaining Behavior, New York, McGraw Hill.
Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine [1993a], "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, 61, 523-546.
Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine [1993b], "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, 61, 547-573.
Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine [1993c], "Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David K. "Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games," Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXII, May 1997, 507-536.
Fudenberg, Drew, David K. Levine, and Jean Tirole [1985], "Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information," in Game-theoretic Models of Bargaining, A. E. Roth, editor, Cambridge University Press, 73-98.
Gale, John, Kenneth G. Binmore, and Larry Samuelson [1993], "Learning to be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game," Games and Economic Behavior 8 (1995), 56-90.
Gneezy, Uri, Ernan Haruvy, and Alvin E. Roth, "Bargaining Under a Deadline: Evidence from the Reverse Ultimatum Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Special Issue in Honor of Robert W. Rosenthal, 45, 2, November 2003, 347-368.
Grammer, Karl, Wulf Schiefenhovel, Margret Schleidt, Beatrice Lorenz, and Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt [1988], "Patterns on the Face: The Eyebrow Flash in Crosscultural Comparison," Ethology, 77, 279-299.
Grosskopf, Brit, and Alvin E. Roth, "If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, Should you accept? An Investigation of Contract Design," Games and Economic Behavior, Special Issue in Honor of Martin Shubik, forthcoming.
Guth, Werner [1988] "On the behavioral approach to distributive justice: A theoretical and experimental investigation," in S. Maital, editor, Applied Behavioural Economics, New York University Press, Vol. 2, p703-717.
Guth, Werner [1995], "On ultimatum bargaining experiments--A personal review," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27, 329-344.
Guth, Werner [1997], "Ultimatum Proposals--How Do Decisions Emerge?" CentER Discussion Paper 9740, Tilburg University.
Guth, Werner, Steffen Huck, and Wieland Muller (2001), The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games,� Games and Economic Behavior, 37, 161-169.
Guth, Werner, Steffen Huck, and Peter Ockenfels [1996], "Two- Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, 106, May, 593-604.
Guth, Werner, Maria Vittoria Levati, and Boris Maciejovsky (2001), �Deadline Effects in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study of Concession Sniping with Low or no Costs Delay,� working paper, Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Jena.
Guth, Werner, Schmittberger, R and Schwarz, B [1982], "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 367-88.
Guth, Werner and Tietz, Reinhard [1988], "Ultimatum bargaining for a shrinking cake--An experimental analysis," in Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets, R. Tietz, W. Albers, R. Selten (editors), Springer, Berlin.
Guth, Werner, and Reinhard Tietz [1990], "Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results," Journal of Economic Psychology, 11, 417-449.
Guth, Werner and Menahem Yaari [1990a], "An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in a Simple Strategic Game," mimeo.
Guth, Werner and Menahem Yaari [1990b], "Incomplete Information about Reciprocal Incentives: An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior," mimeo.
Harrison, Glenn W., "Risk Aversion and Preference Distortion in Deterministic Bargaining Experiments," Economics Letters, 22, 1986, 191-196.
Harrison, Glenn W., "Risk Aversion and the Nash Solution in Stochastic Bargaining Experiments," Economics Letters, 24, 1987, 321-326.
Harrison, Glenn W [1990], "Rational Expectations and Experimental Methods," in B.A. Goss (editor), Rational Expectations and Efficiency in Futures Markets, London, Routledge, xxx-xxx.
Harrison, Glenn W [1992], "Flat Payoff Functions and the Experimentalists: Reply to the Critics," mss., February, University of South Carolina.
Harrison, Glenn W, and Hirshleifer J. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods", Journal of Political Economy, 1989, vol. 97:201-225.
Harrison, Glenn W, Elizabeth Hoffman, E.E. Rustrom, and Matthew L. Spitzer [1987], "Coasian Solutions to the Externality Problem in Experimental Markets," Economic Journal, 97, 388-402.
Harrison, Glenn W, and McCabe, Kevin A. [1991], "Testing Non- Cooperative Bargaining Theory in Experiments," Working paper B-91-03, College of Business Administration, University of South Carolina, and forthcoming in R. Mark Isaac (ed.), Research in Experimental Economics, volume 5, Greenwich CT, JAI Press, 1992.
Harrison, Glenn W, and McCabe, Kevin A. [1992b], "Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment," working paper B-92-10, September, University of South Carolina.
Harrison, Glenn W, and McKee, Michael, "Experimental Evaluation of the Coase Theorem," Journal of Law and Economics, 28, 1985, 653-670.
Harsanyi, John C. [1967-8], "Games with incomplete information played by 'Bayesian' players. Parts I-III," Management Science, 14, 159-182, 320-334, 486-502.
Harsanyi, John C. and Reinhard Selten [1972], "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, 18, 80-106.
Hart, Oliver [1989], "Bargaining and Strikes," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 25-44.
Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat, and Vernon L. Smith [1991], "Preferences, Property Rights and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," mimeo, December, University of Arizona, revised June 1992.
Hoffman, E., K.A. McCabe, and V.L. Smith [1996] "On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games," International Journal of Game Theory, 25, Issue 3, 289-302.
Hoffman, E. and M.L. Spitzer [1982] "The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental tests," Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 25, pp73-98.
Hoffman, E. and M.L. Spitzer [1985] "Entitlements, rights, and fairness: An experimental examination of subjects' concepts of distributive justice," Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 14 no. 2, pp259-97.
Hoggatt, Austin C. [1969], "Response of Paid Student Subjects to Differential Behaviour of Robots in Bifurcated Duopoly Games," Review of Economic Studies, 36, pp417-432.
Hoggatt, Austin C., Hermann Brandstatter, and Peter Blatman [1978], "Robots as Instrumental Functions in the Study of Bargaining Behavior," in Bargaining Behavior, Contributions to Experimental Economics 7, H. Sauermann, editor, Tubingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 179-210.
Hoggatt, Austin C., Reinhard Selten, David Crockett, Shlomo Gill, Jeff Moore [1978], "Bargaining experiments with incomplete information," in Bargaining Behavior, Contributions to Experimental Economics 7, H. Sauermann, editor, Tubingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 127-178.
Kagel, John H., Chung Kim, and Donald Moser [1996], "Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, 13, 100-110.
Kahn, Lawrence M., and J. Keith Murnighan [1993], "A General Experiment on Bargaining in Demand Games with Outside Options" American Economic Review, 83, December, 1260-1280.
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler [1986a] "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics," Journal of Business, vol. 59, no. 4 pt 2, ppS285-S300.
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard Thaler [1986b] "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, vol. 76, pp728-741.
Kandori, Michihiro [1992], "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, 59, 63-80.
Kennan, John [1980], "Pareto Optimality and the Economics of Strike Duration," Journal of Labor Research, 1, 77-93.
Kennan, John and Robert Wilson [1990a], "Theories of Bargaining Delays," Science, 249, 7 September, 1124-1128.
Kennan, John and Robert Wilson [1990b], "Can Strategic Bargaining Models Explain Collective Bargaining Data?" American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 80, May, 405-409.
Kennan, John and Robert Wilson [1993], "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of Economic Literature, 31, 45-104.
Kihlstrom, R. and Roth, A.E., "Risk Aversion and the Negotiation of Insurance Contracts," Journal of Risk and Insurance, 49, 1982, 372-387.
Kihlstrom, R., Roth, A.E. and Schmeidler, D., "Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, eds., Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1981, 65-71.
Kravitz, David A. and Samuel Gunto [1992], "Decisions and Perceptions of Recipients in Ultimatum Bargaining Games," Journal of Socio-Economics, 21, 65-84.
Lamm, Helmut [1978], "Group-Related Influences on Negotiation Behavior: Two-Person Negotiation as a Function of Representation and Election," Bargaining Behavior, Contributions to Experimental Economics 7, Heinz Sauermann (editor), J.C.B. Mohr, Tubingen, 284-309.
Leininger, W., P. Linhard, and R. Radner [1989], "Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, 48, 63-106.
Loewenstein, George F., Leigh Thompson, and Max H. Bazerman [1989], "Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 426-441.
Michael Manove [1993], "Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control," Econometrica, 61, 1313-1339.
Malouf, M. and Roth, A.E., "Disagreement in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25, 1981, 329-348.
Marwell, Gerald and David R. Schmitt [1968], "Are `Trivial' Games the Most Interesting Psychologically?," Behavioral Science, 13, 125-128.
McConnell, Sheena [1989], "Strikes, Wages and Private Information," American Economic Review, 79, 801-815. {43}
Mehta, Judith, Chris Starmer, and Robert Sugden [1990], "Focal Points in Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation," mimeo, Economics Research Centre, University of East Anglia.
Mitzkewitz, Michael and Rosemarie Nagel [1993], "Envy, Greed and Anticipation in Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study," Discussion paper B-181, March, Universitat Bonn, International Journal of Game Theory, 22, 171-198.
Mnookin, Robert et al. [1989], "Private Ordering Revisited: What Custodial Arrangements are Parents Negotiating?," mimeo, Stanford University.
Murnighan, J.K. and Roth, A.E., "The Effects of Communication and Information Availability in an Experimental Study of a Three Person Game," Management Science, 23, August 1977, 1336-1348.
Murnighan, J.K. and Roth, A.E., "Large Group Bargaining in a Characteristic Function Game," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22, 1978, 299-317.
Murnighan, J.K. and Roth, A.E., "The Effect of Group Size and Communication Availability on Coalition Bargaining in a Veto Game," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 1980, 92-103.
Murnighan, J.K., Roth, A.E., and Schoumaker, F., "Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 1, 1988, 101-124.
Myerson, Roger and Mark Satterthwaite [1983], "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Journal of Economic Theory, 29, 265-281.
Neale, Margaret A. and Max H. Bazerman [1991], Cognition and Rationality in Negotiation, New York, The Free Press.
Neelin, Janet, Hugo Sonnenschein, and Matthew Spiegel [1988], "A Further Test of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: Comment," American Economic Review, 78, pp824-836.
Nydegger, Rudy V. and Guillermo Owen [1975], "Two Person Bargaining: An Experimental Test of the Nash Axioms," International Journal of Game Theory, 3, pp239-349.
Ochs, J. and Roth, A.E., "An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining," American Economic Review, 79, 1989, 355-384.
Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro, and Andrew Postlewaite [1990], "Social Norm in Random Matching Games," mimeo.
Osborne, Martin J. and Ariel Rubinstein [1990], Bargaining and Markets, San Diego, Academic Press.
Ponsati-Obiols, Clara [1989], "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: A Theoretical Note," mimeo, Bellcore.
Prasnikar, Vesna, and Roth, Alvin E. [1989], "Perceptions of Fairness and Considerations of Strategy in Bargaining: Some Experimental Data," preliminary draft.
Prasnikar, V. and Roth, A.E., "Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data From Sequential Games," Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1992, 865-888.
Rabin, Matthew [1993], "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, 83, December, 1281-1302.
Radner, Roy and Andrew Schotter [1989], "The Sealed Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study," Journal of Economic Theory, 48, 179-220.
Rapoport, Amnon, Ido Erev, and Rami Zwick [1994], "An experimental study of buyer-seller negotiation with one-sided incomplete information and time discounting," Management Science, forthcoming.
Rapoport, Amnon, James A. Sundali, and Richard E. Potter [1992], "Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information: Effects of the Variability of the Pie Size," mimeo, University of Arizona.
Rapoport, Amnon, James A. Sundali, and Darryl A. Seale [1996], "Ultimatums in two-person bargaining with one-sided uncertainty: Demand games," J. ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION, Volume 30, issue 2, pages 173-196.
Rapoport, Amnon, Eythan Weg, and Dan S. Felsenthal [1990], "Effects of Fixed Costs in Two-Person Sequential Bargaining," Theory and Decision, 28, 47-72.
Rapoport, Anatol, Oded Frenkel, and Josef Perner [1977], "Experiments with Cooperative 2x2 Games," Theory and Decision, 8, 67-92.
Roth, A.E., "Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem," Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 2, February 1977, 64-65.
Roth, A.E., "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 16, 1977, 247-251.
Roth, A.E., "Toward a Theory of Bargaining: An Experimental Study in Economics," Science, 220, 13, May 1983, 687-691.
Roth, A.E., "A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining," Econometrica, 53, 1985, 207-211.
Roth, Alvin E. [1985], "Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining", Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, A.E. Roth, ed., Cambridge University Press, 259-268.
Roth, A.E., "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics," Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress, Truman Bewley, editor, Cambridge University Press, 269-299, 1987.
Roth, A.E., "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview," Economic Journal, 98, 1988, 974-1031.
Roth, A.E., "Risk Aversion and the Relationship between Nash's Solution and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Sequential Bargaining," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 2, 1989, 353-365.
Roth, Alvin E. and Ido Erev [1995], "Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term," Games and Economic Behavior, Special Issue: Nobel Symposium, vol. 8, January 1995, 164-212.
Roth, A.E. and Malouf, M.K., "Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining," Psychological Review, Vol. 86, 1979, 574-594.
Roth, A.E., and Malouf, M., "Scale Changes and Shared Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 3, 1982, 157-177.
Roth, A.E., Malouf, M., and Murnighan, J.K., "Sociological Versus Strategic Factors in Bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 2, 1981, 153-177.
Roth, A.E. and Murnighan, J.K., "The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, 50, 1982, 1123-1142.
Roth, A.E. and Murnighan, J.K., "Information and Aspirations in Two Person Bargaining," Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making, R. Tietz, ed., Springer, 1983.
Roth, A.E., Murnighan, J.K., and Schoumaker, F., "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, 78, 1988, 806-823.
Roth, A.E., Prasnikar, V., Okuno-Fujiwara, M., and Zamir, S., "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, 81, December 1991, 1068-1095.
Roth, A.E. and Rothblum, U., "Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games With Risky Outcomes," Econometrica, 50, 1982, 639-647.
Roth, A.E. and Schoumaker, F., "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, 73, 1983, 362-372.
Rubinstein, Ariel [1982], "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, vol. 50, pp97-109.
Salop, Steven C. and Lawrence J. White, [1988], "Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and Framework," in Private Antitrust Litigation, L.J. White, editor, Cambridge, MIT Press.
Schelling, Thomas C. [1957], "Bargaining, communication, and limited war," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1, 19-36.
Schelling, Thomas C. [1960], The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Schotter, Andrew "Bad and Good News About the Sealed-Bid Mechanism: Some Experimental Results," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 80, May 1990, 220-226.
Schotter, Andrew, Blaine Snyder, and Wei Zheng [1992], "Bargaining Through Agents: An Experimental Study," mimeo, New York University, October.
Schotter, Andrew, Avi Weiss, and Inigo Zapater [1996] "Fairness and survival in ultimatum and dictatorship games," J. ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION, Volume 31, issue 1, pages 37-56.
Selten, Reinhard [1967], "Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eigeschrankt rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments," in Beitrage zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, H. Sauermann, editor, J.C.B. Mohr, Tubingen, 136-168.
Selten, Reinhard [1975], "Bargaining under Incomplete Information: A Numerical Example," in Dynamische Wirtschaftsanalyse, O. Becker and R. Richter, editors, Tubingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 203-232.
Shogren, Jason F. [1989], "Fairness in Bargaining Requires a Context: An experimental examination of loyalty," Economics Letters, 31, 319-323.
Shogren, Jason F. [1992], "An Experiment on Coasian Bargaining over Ex Ante Lotteries and Ex Post Rewards," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, (Special issue on Experimental Economics), 17, 153-169.
Shogren, Jason F. [1997],"Self-interest and equity in a bargaining tournament with non-linear payoffs," J. ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION, Volume 32, issue 3, pages 383-394
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