

Text as Data

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Ideological Scaling

1) Task

- Measure political actors' position in policy space
- Low dimensional representation of beliefs

2) Objective function

- Linear Discriminant Analysis (ish) \rightsquigarrow Wordscores (today)
- Item Response Theory \rightsquigarrow Wordfish
- Item Response Theory + Roll Call Votes \rightsquigarrow Issue-specific ideal points (12/2)

3) Optimization

- Wordscores \rightsquigarrow straightforward, based on training texts
- Wordfish \rightsquigarrow EM, MCMC methods

4) Validation

- What is the goal of embedding?
- What is the **gold standard**?

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Scaling \rightsquigarrow placing actors in low-dimensional space (like principal components!)

Estimating Ideal Points: Roll Call Data and the US Congress

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 - Extensible: insight of IRT allows model to be embedded in many forms
 - Widely used: hard to write a paper on American political institutions with ideal points

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 - Bonica (2013, 2014) \rightsquigarrow estimate ideology from donations (but not everyone donates)

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Healthy skepticism!

Our plan

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- 2) Wordfish \rightsquigarrow single dimension

Wordscores \rightsquigarrow Big in Europe

Wordscores, Like the Hoff ~> Big in Europe



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$\mathbf{x}_i \rightsquigarrow$ aggregation across documents.

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
Applied to the Senate Press Releases

L = Ted Kennedy


C = Tom Coburn

Apply to other senators.

Applying to Senate Press Releases \rightsquigarrow Gold Standard Scaling from NOMINATE



Applying to Senate Press Releases \rightsquigarrow WordScores



Supervised Scaling

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- Sensitive to who is chosen
- False prediction problem \rightsquigarrow speech accomplishes many goals, only some of which are ideological

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To be fair: fast, nonparametric, and novel [trailblazing] method for scoring documents (starts conversation)

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Simplest model: Principal Components

Application of Principal Components in R

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
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
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`prcomp(dtm)` applies principal components

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 - b) **Makes clear how to extend models**

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Monroe and Maeda (2005) and **Sloppin and Proksch** (2008) develop similar algorithms

WordFish Objective Function

Suppose we have legislator i .

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“Regression” of x_{ij} on ideal points θ_i , where we have to learn θ_i

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
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Wordfish package in R



Applications: German Party Manifestos

Wordfish and German Platforms



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Wordfish and Senate Press Releases



The Problem with Text-Based Scaling

What does validation mean?

- 1) Replicate NOMINATE, DIME, or other gold standards?
- 2) Agreement with experts
- 3) Prediction of other behavior

Must answer this to make progress on pure text scaling