

**Polity Data: Persistence and Change in Political
Systems, 1800-1971**

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*INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH*

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**Comparative Studies of Political
Conflict and Change:
Cross National Datasets**

**Civil Strife Events
Conflict Magnitudes
Conflict and Society
Polity Persistence and Change**

**Principal
Investigator**

**Ted Robert Gurr
and
Associates**

Northwestern University

COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF POLITICAL
CONFLICT AND CHANGE:
CROSS NATIONAL DATASETS

Civil Strife Events, 1955-1970
(ICPSR 7531)

Conflict Magnitudes, 1955-1970
(ICPSR 7465)

Conflict and Society
(ICPSR 7452)

Polity Persistence and Change, 1800-1971
(ICPSR 5010)

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PREFACE

This book contains descriptive information on four distinct but related datasets developed by Ted Robert Gurr in his study of political conflict and change. The four studies are Civil Strife Events, 1955-1970; Civil Conflict Magnitudes, 1955-1970; Conflict and Society; and Polity Persistence and Change, 1800-1971. These data were collected by Professor Gurr and his associates at Princeton University and Northwestern University between 1965 and 1975.

The book is divided into seven parts. In addition to descriptive information on the four separate studies, there is an introduction, codebook information, and appendices.

The introduction contains an original essay by Ted Robert Gurr describing the development of his research design and the data base. Also included is a bibliography of the investigator's published work using the data. Following that is the codebook information section with a variable description, variable format sections of each study, and a discussion of the file structure for each dataset.

The parts of the book that describe each of the four studies are comparable to each other in content. Each part has a description of the particular study, a description of each variable in the dataset, and lastly, the presentation of the variable format.

The first study in the book is Civil Strife Events which contains data on events that are variously called "internal conflict behavior", "internal war", "insurgency", or "political violence". Events included are any collective, non-governmental attack on people or property that occurs within the boundaries of a political system. The data were collected for up to 115 polities for 1955-1970.

The second study is Conflict Magnitudes. The data here are aggregations of the strife events data measuring magnitude and intensity of civil conflict during 1955-1970 in up to 115 countries.

The third part on Conflict and Society consists of indicators of social, economic, and political conditions in 86 countries, based on coded and aggregate data, which were used by the investigator in testing models of the causes of conflicts.

The last study to be described in the book is Polity Persistence and Change. Here the unit of analysis is the "polity" or political system: the basic political arrangements by which national political communities govern their affairs. The study covers 428 polities which functioned in 144 nominally different nation states during the 19th and 20th centuries.

The final part of the book consists of seven appendices. Appendix A identifies the country codes used in the four studies and also indicates which countries are included in the data for each study and for which years. Appendices B through E contain information that supplements the variable information in the main text.

Appendix F is a sample copy of the coding form used for collecting the Civil Strife Events data. This is not contained in the machine readable version of this book. The final Appendix is a microfiche containing summary descriptions of each of the 428 polities in the Polity data file. The microfiche is not included in the machine readable version of this book.

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INTRODUCTION

by

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This introduction is a guide to four datasets which were collected to test hypotheses about the causes of conflict within contemporary nations, and about the correlates of institutional change. Three of the datasets focus on civil conflict during the 1960's. The CIVIL STRIFE EVENTS dataset comprises coded information on the who, what, when, where, and why of conflict episodes as reported in the world press for as many as 115 countries. These events data provided information for the construction of the CONFLICT MAGNITUDES dataset, which consists of measures of the properties of conflict aggregated at the national level. Examples of the measures included are man-days of participation by dissidents, deaths in conflict, and proportions of man-days mobilized by different kinds of social groups. The CONFLICT AND SOCIETY set provides mostly-original data on political and socio-economic variables that theoretically are correlated with magnitudes of conflict. The fourth dataset, called POLITY PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE, is quite different in subject and temporal domain. It consists of coded descriptions of the political structures of 144 of the world's countries between 1800 (or their founding, if later than 1800) and 1971. The unit of analysis is not the "event" or nation, but rather the "polity": a political structure, separated from others in a country's history by abrupt institutional changes. The circumstances of each abrupt change -- each "birth" and "death" of a polity -- are specified; most of them resulted from internal or foreign conflict.

In this introduction, I first sketch briefly the kinds of questions that led to the collection and refinement of these datasets. This should help the potential user to understand why they include what they do, and why other concepts and variables do not appear. Then each of the four datasets is discussed in more detail.

The question which initiated this line of inquiry in 1964 was why some new nations of the 1950's and 1960's had little or no internal conflict while others broke out after independence in a rash of riots, rebellions, and coups d'etat. I assumed at the onset that the answer lay in the varying capacity of political and socio-economic institutions to satisfy changing popular expectations. A general theory was sketched out, building on Karl Deutsch's ideas about social mobilization and on socio-psychological theory about the sources and consequences of aggression. These ideas were used to integrate a variety of other arguments and evidence about the causes of riots and revolution. The basic idea was that certain patterns of socio-economic change created popular expectations, which, if unsatisfied, caused widespread discontent. Depending on the nature of a country's political culture and its private and public institutions, collective discontent could provide the impetus for a variety of forms of violent confrontations with the state. The argument was developed first in a dissertation (Gurr, 1965), then in an article on the psychological basis of the theory (Gurr, 1968a), and still later in a book which revised and extended the theory in the light of fresh evidence (Gurr, 1970a). By this time, the initial question was left far behind, to be explained -- only in part -- by a more general theory of "why people rebel." This movement toward ever-more-general theory continues with work in progress in 1978 that essays a formalized, axiomatic theory of the causes of manifest political conflict that should apply not only to nation-states, but to any complex social system (Gurr and Duvall, 1976; Gurr and Duvall, in preparation).

The theory and its terminology have changed considerably over the years, but the core idea can be expressed in a simple equation:

$$\begin{array}{rclcl} \text{Magnitude of} & & \text{Justifications} & & \text{Balance of strength} \\ \text{political} & = & \text{for conflict} & \times & \text{between dissidents} \\ \text{conflict} & & \text{behavior} & & \text{and regime} \\ & & & & \end{array}$$

In the initial theoretical and empirical work, this basic relationship was portrayed as an additive rather than a multiplicative one. Its simplicity was obscured by several operational problems. "Discontent" and "justifications" each had to be represented indirectly, using a battery of indicators of their (theoretically-specified) causes at the group and societal level of analysis. Discontent, for example, was represented in causal models by composite indicators called "persisting deprivation" and "short-term deprivation." The "balance" variable posed no levels-of-analysis problem, but it too required a battery of indicators which tapped different observable aspects of the organizational strength of dissidents and regimes. (Concepts and indicators were developed interactively, a process that can be traced in Gurr with Rutenber, 1967; Gurr 1968a, 1968b, 1968c; and Gurr, 1970a, 1970b.) The most recent theoretical statements zero in precisely on the basic multiplicative relationship (Gurr and Duvall, 1976) and the most recent empirical work confronts it more directly with data (Gurr and Duvall, 1973; Gurr and Lichbach, in preparation). Discontent and justifications continue to be represented in these studies by aggregate data, but this is less a problem than critics have claimed because we have explicit and detailed theories that link each of these unobserved concepts to observables at the group and societal level (Gurr, 1970a; Gurr and Duvall, in preparation).

Most of the indicators contained in the first three codebooks which follow were designed to represent components of the four basic variables in the equation above. Our cases were countries and colonies ("polities," as they were called in early publications) and we sought data on all those whose population exceeded one million in 1963. They numbered 119 at the outset, but were successively winnowed to 86. The casualties were the Asian Communist states and the smallest Third-world Countries, all for want of sufficient reliable data. The observant reader may be puzzled that some datasets here include 86 countries, others 87. The answer is that in the "Civil Strife Events" dataset, Northern Ireland is treated as an entity separate from Great Britain, while in all other datasets they are reported as a single entity, the United Kingdom.

Let me survey briefly the scope, uses, and limitations of each of the four datasets, beginning with those on conflict.

CIVIL STRIFE EVENTS

To estimate magnitudes of conflict for the equation shown above, it was necessary to compile information on episodes of conflict. At the outset, I rejected the "event-count" approach that had recently been pioneered by Rummel (1), believing that it was a poor way to represent magnitudes: my theory was concerned with explaining the varying scope and intensity of political violence, not numbers of events. In our first effort, therefore, Charles Ruttensburg and I used summary coded measures which were analogous to ones devised three decades earlier by Pitirim Sorokin (2). We covered 119 countries and colonies for the years 1961-1963 (see Gurr with Ruttensburg, 1967). Soon we concluded that we could and should do better than these imprecise, judgmental codings. Charles Tilly's concurrent work on the measurement of political disorder in France provided a model (3). We devised a coding sheet for recording categorized information on such variables as the kinds and numbers of people who participated in an episode of conflict; the groups which mobilized them; their apparent motives or objectives; their targets of action; the specific form of conflict behavior; the nature of coercive response by the regime; the casualties and damage which resulted; and the extent of direct foreign intervention. This information was systematically coded for all reported episodes of conflict in 115 countries for 1961-65, using the NEW YORK TIMES and several more specialized sources for Third-world regimes. For a brief review of the coding procedures and an example, see Gurr, 1972, pp. 92-99. The coded data form part of the "civil strife events" dataset, below.

Later, in the early 1970's, I decided to extend this data collection. The coding sheet was expanded to include more precise categories regarding government response and casualties. Under the supervision of Jean Dose, 87 of the original 115 countries were coded for 1966-70. A sample of 10 countries was coded for 1955-60 as well. The sample of 10 is a stratified sample designed to represent countries at different levels of economic development, in different world regions, of different types of political systems. Their conflict data is being used in a series of postdictive "forecasting" tests of the conflict model (Gurr and Lichbach, in preparation).

The user should understand that an "event" in this data collection is not necessarily equivalent to an "event" in other data collections. Another major collection of event data, in the WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS, second edition (1972), makes no attempt to identify or distinguish specific conflicts like the Vietnam war, the 1968 rising of students and workers in France, or civil rights demonstrations in the United States. Instead, its data consist of counts of specific armed attacks, separate days of rioting and demonstrations, and so forth, without distinguishing among the groups involved or the issues of conflict. Our "civil strife events" dataset, by contrast, consists of coded information on "episodes" of conflict, with the boundaries of each episode determined from contextual and historical materials. For example, each year of the Vietnam war is summarized on one coding sheet. So are most of the events of the abortive French revolution of 1968. Information on all civil rights demonstrations in the United States in each year, 1961

through 1970, is aggregated on annual coding sheets (see Gurr with Dose, 1979, chapter I.2, for more detailed information). So "event counts" constructed from the HANDBOOK data will not be comparable to the measures of conflict properties constructed from the "civil strife events" dataset -- with one exception. The HANDBOOK reports deaths from conflict, the country totals for which are approximately equivalent to those aggregated from our strife events.

How accurate are these data on conflict events? The question is commonly asked, and the answer that they are the best global data one can obtain, while it is true, is not a sufficient answer. Dose and I have addressed the question at length (in Gurr with Dose, 1979, Chapter I.2), and this is the gist of our response. First, we know that not all conflict events are reported in the world press. The smaller and less violent an event, the more remote its locale, the less its political impact, then the less likely it is to surface in the press (or anyplace else). So while the events dataset includes virtually every civil and guerrilla war, every successful coup d'etat, and most major political riots in the countries surveyed, it can be assumed that only a sampling of lesser events is included. Second, news accounts are not necessarily complete or accurate. Journalists report some data with ritual regularity: deaths, insofar as they can be estimated; the type of action (riot, bombing, political strike, etc.); the groups of dissidents involved and the motives attributed to them. Numbers of participants usually are estimated, but with a wide margin of error. Duration of a conflict episode usually can be determined with some precision. None-the-less, there is considerable guesswork in the specifics of news accounts and in the judgments of our coders.

The bottom line is this. The events data should be accurate enough to map the general contours of conflict in a country, and to distinguish among the general properties of conflict from one country to another. They are also accurate enough to trace gross variations over time within countries. And they permit reliable statements that country X did or did not have internal wars or rebellions of a particular type in a particular year. But they are not accurate enough to say that country X had precisely X number of deaths in conflict in a year, or that it had precisely, or even approximately, Z man-days of protest over a particular political issue.

Potential users should also be aware that the 1955-60 and 1966-70 events data are probably better than those for 1961-65. Ambiguous elements in the coding manual were identified and clarified. All coding sheets were systematically screened by the coding supervisor and uncertain or dubious codings checked against the original source and, where possible, other sources. So, at a minimum, the 1955-60 and 1966-70 data are internally more consistent than those for 1961-65. Various quality-control checks were used on the latter, too, but not as consistently.

The data on civil strife events and episodes provided information for several descriptive studies which ask, for example, what kinds of groups participate in what kinds of conflict, and with what motives. These studies document the existence of sharp differences in the types and extent of political conflict from one world region to another, between less-developed and wealthy countries, and between democracies and autocracies (see Gurr, 1969; Gurr with Dose, 1979; Gurr, 1979). One study focuses specifically on "terrorism," operationally defined by reference to certain event types, and describes its characteristics and world distribution during the 1960s (Gurr, 1978). No comparable studies have been made of the distribution of other specific forms of conflict. In general, the conflict events data have been analyzed in a very partial and selective way, and offer many opportunities for secondary analysis.

CONFLICT MAGNITUDES

The events dataset was used to construct aggregate measures of "magnitudes" of political conflict which served as dependent variables in a series of correlation and regression tests of various theoretical arguments: Gurr 1968b; Gurr 1968c; Gurr 1970b; Gurr 1972; Gurr and Duvall 1973; Gurr with Dose, 1979; and Gurr and Lichbach, in preparation. The basic procedure is to aggregate a conflict property over all (or some subset of) events in a country, for example, total number of participants or total casualties. Annual aggregations have been calculated and included in the "magnitudes" dataset, but all published studies have used data aggregated for five-year periods, mainly for 1961-65. The 1966-70 measures of magnitudes have not yet been used in any tests of hypotheses. The "magnitudes" dataset includes many alternative aggregations, only some of which have been treated in published empirical studies. It is important to note that the pre-1975 empirical studies cited above used somewhat different aggregations than those in the present "magnitudes" dataset. Published and forthcoming analyses since 1972 use man-days of participation per 100,000 population and deaths per 10 million, aggregated separately for protest and rebellion. Non-political and anti-foreign conflict events are excluded from these aggregations. Earlier studies used separate aggregations of conflict duration in days and participants rather than man-days. Some of them also included non-political and foreign conflict, and they also distinguished between two species of rebellion: conspiracy and internal war. Moreover, since 1974, some corrections and revised estimates have been incorporated in the current datasets on "events" and "magnitudes."

Another kind of aggregation of events data makes use of coded information on types of mobilizing groups and types of motives for dissident action. Each event has an estimate of man-days of participation and is coded for type of mobilizing group. This information has been aggregated by country, for successive five-year periods, and expressed in proportional terms. It enables us to say what proportion of all man-days of dissident action in a country were accounted for by each general category of mobilizing group: communal groups, economic groups, clandestine political groups, conventional political groups, and so forth. The same kinds of aggregation are given in the "magnitudes" dataset for different categories of MOTIVES for dissidence. Similar aggregations could be made for variables such as numbers of participants and deaths, and for subsets of conflict events, for example, for protest and rebellion separately.

The aggregate measures of conflict magnitudes and properties have been analyzed descriptively along with tabulations of event data in Gurr, 1969, Gurr, 1979, and Gurr with Dose, 1979. They also have been used in mapping of the world distribution and concentration of behavioral vs. structural violence, in combination with other kinds of data (see Gurr and Bishop, 1976).

The reliability of most of the measures of magnitude of conflict is greater than the reliability of the events data from which they are aggregated. It is important to understand why. Remember that the events data are presumed to be incomplete because they do not include many small-scale, non-violent episodes of conflict. But when calculating magnitudes based on man-days and deaths, the "missing" events are too small to add significantly to the totals. If we were simply to count events, the absence of a large but unknown number of small events would seriously distort the totals. But when magnitudes are used, the distortion is much less because the larger and more deadly the event, the more likely it is to be in our dataset -- and the more likely it is to be reported accurately and in detail. Even so, some of our data on numbers of participants and deaths, duration, mobilizing groups, and motives is subject to guess-work and less-than-perfect coding reliabilities. The errors from these sources probably are random, which means that in the aggregation process they tend to offset one another. Therefore, on this ground too, the comparison of conflict properties should be more reliable than comparisons of numbers of events. There is one significant qualification to this principle, which is that aggregations for countries with only one or a handful of conflict events are potentially more subject to error than for countries with more numerous events.

CONFLICT AND SOCIETY: THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The development of satisfactory conflict measures was paralleled by the evolution of a set of indicators of its theoretical causes: discontent, justifications, and balance of strength. The best and most useful of these indicators are incorporated in the "conflict and society" dataset. Generally, I have included only those indicators which are not readily available elsewhere. Those whose reliability is open to serious challenge are excluded -- though some users no doubt will have questions about both the reliability and validity of some indicators which are retained. Also excluded are various ad hoc rescalings and combinations of indicators used in published studies: the indicators are reported here in their simplest, most disaggregated form, so that users can rescale and combine them in whatever ways suit their methodological tastes and theoretical interests. Many of the indicators reported here have proved to be strongly and consistently correlated with conflict; many others are not. (See especially Gurr with Dose, 1979, Part II.) The indicators that failed of their immediate purpose remain intrinsically interesting and, of course, are potentially useful for the empirical study of other kinds of questions than the causes of conflict.

The date of reference for almost all the "conflict and society" indicators is 1960, because the research design of all our empirical studies specified a time-lagged relationship between cause and conflict. Therefore, the size of unions and the government budget were measured as close to 1960 as possible; the loyalty of the military was coded as of 1960; and so forth. There are a few exceptions, such as measures of economic fluctuations and political sanctions, which are reported for the early 1960's. All "conflict and society" data are reported here for 86 countries. Some of them, including indicators of separatism, discrimination, and union size, are available for up to 119 countries and are tabled in Gurr with Ruttenberg, 1967; but I think the reliability of the data for the additional 33 countries is somewhat lower than the reliability of the 86-country data. Their sources often were poor and the indicators have not been further checked and corrected as have many of the 86-country data.

Measures of the societal determinants of DISCONTENT (and relative deprivation, its immediate socio-psychological cause) have had a checkered career in our studies. At first, we concentrated on indicators of changing expectations (mass education, communication, urbanization) balanced against measures of institutional capacity to satisfy expectations (economic growth and fluctuations, size and growth of governmental budget, employment opportunities). When these were correlated with magnitudes of conflict, the results, by and large, were disappointingly weak and inconsistent. Much more consistent in their effects were indicators of structural conditions associated with persisting pockets of discontent: group discrimination, political separatism (see Gurr, 1966; Gurr with Ruttenberg, 1967, 1968). In later work the structural sources of discontent were expanded to include religious cleavages and economic dependency. We also found that depriving government policies and actions -- redistributive policies, sanctions against political opposition -- had the short-run effect of intensifying dissident action (see Gurr, 1968b, 1968c, 1970b; Gurr and Duvall, 1973). Most of these indicators were constructed from data collected especially for these studies, and most are included in the "conflict and society" dataset.

The measures of group discrimination and separatism should prove of special interest because they represent aspects of inequality and cleavage that are tapped poorly or not at all by such aggregate-data indicators as inequality in income distribution and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The original codings identified separatist regions and discriminated groups by name and proportional size in each country's population as of 1960 (Gurr, 1966). The "conflict and society" dataset distinguishes between economic and political discrimination and provides codings of "intensity" of separatism and discrimination for each group, also for 1960. The planned third edition of the WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS will include the same variables recoded by Erika Gurr for 1975, based on a thorough country-by-country search of social science, historical, and statistical sources.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONFLICT BEHAVIOR, like discontent, are measured by reference to some of their presumed causes. Historical patterns of conflict and stability are assumed to be the main sources of contemporary attitudes toward the desirability of conflict behavior. Consistently our studies have found that the historical extent of conflict in a society and dissidents' success in past conflict predict to high levels of contemporary conflict. On the other hand, countries with stable political institutions that developed indigenously have lower magnitudes of conflict, other things being equal, than others. The theoretical argument which dictated the use of measures of stability is that a history of political stability contributes to widespread acceptance of governmental legitimacy, which in turn inhibits dissidence. Indicators of these historical conditions are included in the "conflict and society" dataset.

DISSIDENT AND REGIME STRENGTH are represented by numerous indicators of organizational size (of dissident unions, communist parties), cohesiveness (of communal dissidents), institutionalized support and monetary resources (of governments), and military and police capacity (of governments). The state's military and police capacity (called "social control" and "coercive potential" in early studies) proved to have complex and inconsistent relations with conflict (Gurr with Ruttenberg, 1967; Gurr, 1968c) and both theory and indicators have been modified as a result. In recent empirical work they have been treated as an aspect of political stress (Gurr and Duvall, 1973; Gurr with Lichbach, in preparation). The indicators of organizational strength have been substantially improved during the course of empirical research, culminating in a new general theoretical argument about the components and determinants of organizational strength (Gurr and Duvall, in preparation, chapter 5). This theory has guided the construction of composite indicators from the component measures included in the "conflict and society" dataset (see Gurr and Lichbach, in preparation).

The "conflict and society" dataset also includes indicators of several exogenous variables which affect the strength of dissident groups and regimes. The extent of foreign intervention on behalf of dissidents and regimes in on-going conflict is measured with data aggregated from the "civil strife events" dataset. Indicators of the extent of political democracy, autocracy, and anocracy in each country as of 1960 are constructed from information in the "polity persistence" dataset that is discussed below.

The relationships of the indicators in the "conflict and society" data with measures of conflict in 1961-65 have been very thoroughly explored in a series of published and unpublished correlations, regression, and graphic analyses. The analyses have been done for all countries and for various subsets or "clusters" of them (Gurr with Ruttenberg, 1967; Gurr, 1968b, 1968c, 1969, 1970b, 1972; Gurr and Duvall, 1973; Gurr and Bishop, 1976; Gurr with Dose, 1979; Gurr and Lichbach, in preparation). No systematic attempt has been made to correlate these independent variables with others' measures of conflict, or with magnitudes of conflict at other points in time. (Since all the independent variables are subject to change over time, they cannot be expected to correlate as significantly with conflict in the 1950's or 1970's.) They have been used little in analyses of subjects other than conflict and afford many opportunities for further analysis.

POLITY PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE, 1800-1971

The "polity persistence" dataset was gathered to study the other side of the question of "why people rebel": Why do some political institutions perform well and persist in response to challenges and crises, while others change abruptly? The theoretical orientation for this work was provided by Eckstein's "congruence theory" of political stability and performance (summarized in Eckstein and Gurr, 1975, chapter 16). An initial study used data on 12 countries for two different time periods (1927-36, 1957-66) to test a model of the relationship among different aspects of political performance (Gurr and McClelland, 1973). The data are not included here because of their small n, but are available in tabular form on request from the author. Another study attempted to assess the extent and impact of crises, including conflict, on political stability (Gurr, 1973b).

One lesson of these early efforts was that a more precise operational conceptualization of "political stability" was needed. The salient characteristics of a "political system" had to be specified and exact guidelines were needed to determine what constitutes abrupt change (instability). The salient characteristics of political systems were described in terms of the dimensions of authority patterns proposed by Eckstein (Eckstein and Gurr, 1976, Part II). We defined "instability" in terms of abrupt change, of specified kinds and degrees, on these dimensions. When sufficient change occurred on these dimensions, the old polity was said to have ended -- and in most cases was followed by a new one with different authority patterns. The detailed coding guidelines are included in the codebook. A summary explanation is given in Gurr, 1974.

Six concrete characteristics of authority patterns were coded: the method by which chief executives are selected; characteristics of the executive (collective or individual); limitations on the executive's scope of action; the extent of political competition; the distribution of authority (centralized or decentralized); and the scope of governmental functions. Later these codings were rescaled to form indicators of five dimensions of authority: the openness of recruitment, decision constraints, participation, directiveness, and complexity. The general dimensions are described in Eckstein and Gurr, 1974, Part II. The same information was also used to construct more conventional indicators of the degree to which each polity was Autocratic, Democratic, and Anocratic. (A highly anocratic polity is uninstitutionalized; it resembles what Samuel Huntington has called the "Praetorian state.") A dichotomous indicator was constructed of "coherence": a "coherent" polity is one which is consistently democratic OR autocratic, rather than a mixture of inconsistent authority traits. All of these indicators are included in the "polity persistence" dataset.

The procedures sketched here were applied to the political histories of a large number of countries, beginning in 1800. At the outset, the universe of analysis comprised the 82 nations which Singer and Small identified as being members of the international system at any time between 1817 and 1940 (4). Their political systems were coded for all periods between 1800 and 1970 during which they had internal autonomy. Later we coded the polities of all new nations established between 1941 and 1965. A total of 428 separate polities were identified and coded in the 144 countries surveyed. The accompanying codebook includes a comprehensive list of the countries and the dates on which each new polity was established.

The coding procedure was to survey historical sources for a country and to code its polity in 1800, or its first polity if the country was established after 1800. The circumstances under which the polity was established also were coded. A narrative sketch of the polity's political history was prepared, identifying the timing and circumstances of adaptations. When (and if) an abrupt change in authority patterns brought the polity to an end, this too was described. The polity's authority profile at its death was coded along with the circumstances of its passing. The polity's life-span in years was calculated, providing a measure of its "persistence." The number of gradual political changes during its lifespan also was counted, giving a measure of the polity's "adaptability." All coding was carried out by Erika Gurr and the codings were reviewed by the author. Since all coding was done by one coder using the same (pretested and revised) set of guidelines, the data have a high degree of internal consistency. No inter-coder reliability tests have been used. All the coded data and indicators generated from them are included in the "polity persistence" dataset. The narrative summaries for each polity have been typed and are available in microfiche from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. These summaries cite the principal sources consulted for each polity.

Only one published study using these data has appeared (Gurr, 1974). It analyzes 336 polities, exclusive of those in the new nations. It reports descriptive information on the world distribution of polities, their prevailing authority characteristics (by historical era and world region), and their modal persistence and adaptability. In addition, it tests some hypotheses about the relative persistence of polities with different authority structures. None of the authority dimensions, or democracy or autocracy, are consistently correlated with polity persistence across all regions and in both the 19th and 20th centuries. But in all comparisons, the "coherent" polities proved to be more persistent and adaptable.

Two substantial unpublished analyses of the polity data have been made. One, by Robert Harmel, "A Research Note on Gurr's 'Persistence and Change in Political Systems'" (unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, 1975), considers the effects of redefining "polity change" in a more constrained way. The effect is to reduce the number of polities and increase their average life-span. Most of the results are consistent with those in Gurr, 1974, but it is also found that polities which had a modicum of democratic traits have been consistently more adaptable and durable than any others, including autocracies. A second study is Mark Lichbach, "Building Polities: Authority Patterns and Political Performance" (dissertation in progress, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, 1978), which analyzes sequences of polity change.

The three studies mentioned here scarcely scratch the surface of the "polity persistence" dataset. It offers innumerable opportunities for studies of other questions such as paths of political development and decay, the socio-economic conditions under which various forms of government arise and endure, the non-political determinants of persistence and change (as well as further studies of political determinants), relations between internal and external conflict, etc.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The collection and processing of these datasets required a great many man- and women-days of arduous work by my students and assistants at Princeton and Northwestern Universities. The principal coders for the main datasets have been identified above: Charles Ruttenberg for the 1961-65 strife events data, Jean Dose for the remainder; and Erika Gurr for the polity data. I coded a significant portion of the events for 1961-65 and also was responsible for collecting or coding almost all the "conflict and society" indicators. Two people other than those already mentioned played a major role in generating indicators from raw datasets. Robin Gillies developed the present measures of conflict magnitudes and also extensively analyzed the properties of conflict events; earlier versions of the indicators of magnitudes of conflict were constructed by Charles Ruttenberg, Norman Jacknis, and Raymond Duvall. The summary measures of polity persistence and change were prepared by Herman Weil. The final cleaning and documentation of the datasets for distribution through the Consortium was principally the work of Vaughn Bishop, Jean Dose, and Robin Gillies.

Little of this work could have been accomplished without the support of several sponsors. Initially it was funded by the Center for Research in Social Systems of The American University, and then by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense. Since 1969, the research has been supported by a series of grants from the National Science Foundation, which also provided funds for documenting and archiving these datasets. I have had ample time to design and direct the research, to reflect on it, and to write up its results, in part because of a Ford Foundation Faculty Fellowship (in 1970), a Guggenheim fellowship (in 1972-73), and a Common Problems Senior Fellowship from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (in 1976). No less credit is owed to the institutional support provided by the Center of International Studies at Princeton University, from 1965 through 1969, and by Northwestern University, from 1970 to the present.

Finally, thanks are due Robert Beattie and the ICPSR staff for their Herculean labors in cleaning the datasets and preparing the study descriptions and codebooks for distribution.

NOTES

1. Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," GENERAL SYSTEMS YEARBOOK 8 (1963), 1-50, pioneered the contemporary use of event counts. The current collections of greatest scope are Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS, second edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), which covers 136 political entities from 1948 to 1967; and Arthur S. Banks, CROSS-POLITY TIME-SERIES DATA (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971), whose current dataset (not all tabled in his book) covers 109 entities from 1919 to 1970.
2. Pitirim Sorokin, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS, VOL. III: FLUCTUATIONS OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, WAR AND REVOLUTIONS (New York: American, 1937), 409-475.
3. Charles Tilly and James Rule, MEASURING POLITICAL UPHEAVAL (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 19, 1965).
4. J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System, 1815-1940," WORLD POLITICS 18 (January 1966), 236-282.

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SAMPLE VARIABLE DESCRIPTION INFORMATION

The codebook which follows is intended to present seven basic pieces of information about each variable in the subset. The seven are (1) the variable number, (2) the variable label or name, (3) a description or explanation of the variable, if it is not self-evident (or, in many cases, the exact wording of the question which was asked), (4) the code values which this variable assumes, (5) the interpretation of each code value, (6) the number of respondents whose responses fell into each code category, and (7) which code value, if any, is treated as "missing data." The use of this information can be illustrated by the following example WHICH DOES NOT REFER TO A VARIABLE IN THIS SUBSET:

V96	DO PUBLIC OFFICIALS TREAT YOU FAIRLY
	PEOPLE SOMETIMES TELL US THAT PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN THIS COUNTRY DON'T ALWAYS TREAT THEM AS FAIRLY AS THEY OUGHT TO. HOW ABOUT YOU--WOULD YOU SAY THAT IN GENERAL, PUBLIC OFFICIALS TREAT YOU VERY FAIRLY, FAIRLY ENOUGH, NOT VERY FAIRLY, OR NOT FAIRLY AT ALL?
442	1. VERY FAIRLY
1147	2. FAIRLY ENOUGH
336	3. NOT VERY FAIRLY
105	4. NOT FAIRLY AT ALL
134	9. NOT ASCERTAINED

(1) This variable is number 96 in the subset; users would reference it in most statistical programs as "V96".

(2) The label associated with this variable is "DO PUBLIC OFFICIALS TREAT YOU FAIRLY". This label, or a slightly shorter version of it, will be printed as part of the output of most statistical programs.

(3) The actual wording of the question which each respondent was asked is shown just beneath the label: "PEOPLE SOMETIMES TELL US" If the variable has been recoded from its original form, or if it represents a "derived" index of several questions, that fact will be reported here.

(4) This variable has data values which range between 1 and 4, plus some respondents with code 9.

(5) Codes 1 through 4 correspond to the choices offered the respondent, from VERY FAIRLY (1) through NOT FAIRLY AT ALL (4). Some statistical programs will include these labels as part of their output.

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION INFORMATION
(continued)

(6) The number of respondents choosing each answer ranged from a low of 105 for code 4 (NOT FAIRLY AT ALL) to a high of 1,147 for code 2 (FAIRLY ENOUGH). The frequency with which each response was given is indicated in the left-most column. The sum of all these frequencies is the total number of cases or respondents included in the study (in this example, it is 2,164).

(7) Code value 9 (NOT ASCERTAINED) is separated from the other code values by a blank line to indicate its status as the "missing data code." Such codes cannot be used in the same fashion as the others for most analytic purposes. The missing data category is customarily used to indicate the responses of individuals who refused to answer the question, those who specified a response which could not be coded like the others, those who "didn't know" or had no feeling about the question, or those for whom the interviewer neglected to note the response given. In some cases, questions are asked only of a limited group of respondents (for example, respondents who had no children would not be asked the year of birth of their oldest child). In such cases, the question is deemed "inappropriate," and the missing data value is recorded. Most statistical programs will automatically recognize the missing data codes as categories to be treated specially because of the control cards supplied with the data by ICPSR.

NOTE that this is not Variable 96 from any of the following datasets. This sample information about "V 96" is included only to illustrate the format and use of the following codebook.

VARIABLE FORMAT INFORMATION

The Variable Format section lists the variables by name and number and supplies for each the starting tape location of the variable in the OSIRIS dataset, the width of the variable, and the missing data code, if any. To access this information, the user need only locate the variable number in the left margin of the variable description and then refer to the corresponding number in the variable format. The information about the card-image format includes the card and column location, the width of the variable, and the number of decimal places.

The format information is intended for both OSIRIS and non-OSIRIS users. Listed below are the meanings of the terms found in the variable format heading:

- COLUMNS** = The columns occupied by the variable on this particular card of the card image version of the data.
- VARIABLE NAME** = A name for the variable up to 24 characters. The name is used on most printed output of OSIRIS to label the variables, making it easier to check which variables have been referenced.
- VAR #** = The Variable number. This number identifies the specific variables. The first variable is usually denoted V1, the second V2, and so forth. Variables are usually referenced by this number when they are to be used in an OSIRIS program.
- WIDTH** = The width of the field containing the variable.
- TLOC** = The starting byte location of the field containing the variable in a logical record format. Variable with TLOC 251 begins at the two hundred and fifty first byte.
- NODEC** = The number of decimal places implicit in the variable
- MDCODE1**
MDCODE2 = Missing data codes. Two types of data codes may be used in the data. These indicate which of the code values in the data do not represent true data values. These are labeled "1" and "2" in the format information. For the first, any value in the data EXACTLY equal to the missing data code value is considered missing. The second missing data value, however, denotes the beginning of a range of values. If MD2 is positive then any data value equal to or greater than MD2 is treated as missing data. If MD2 is negative, then any value equal to or less than MD2 is treated as missing data.
- In general, missing data should not be included in statistic calculations. If a case has missing data on a variable, the case should be omitted from the calculations involving the variable.

FILE STRUCTURE

The data for each of the following studies are available in two formats: a card image file and an OSIRIS dataset. The card image file for all of the studies is organized on a format based on 80-column punched cards.

The file for CIVIL STRIPE EVENTS contains four decks per event, and is sorted by event code, variable 92.

The files for the five year aggregations of CONFLICT MAGNITUDES contain six decks per country and are sorted by the numeric country code, Variable 2.

The files for the annual aggregations of CONFLICT MAGNITUDES contain one deck of information, and are sorted by numeric country code, Variable 2, and year, Variable 3.

The file for CONFLICT AND SOCIETY contains seven decks per country and is sorted by numeric country code, Variable 2.

The file for the POLITY study contains three decks per polity, and the data are sorted by numeric country code, Variable 2; the year the polity was established, Variable 3; and the month the polity was established, Variable 5.

There are two components in each of the OSIRIS datasets: the OSIRIS dictionary and the OSIRIS datafile. The OSIRIS dictionary gives the format, variable name and number, tape location, width and missing data values for each variable. The dictionary is used in conjunction with the OSIRIS software package.

The datafile for CIVIL STRIPE EVENTS has a logical record length of 227.

The datafiles for five year aggregations of CONFLICT MAGNITUDES have a logical record length of 389.

The datafile for annual aggregations of the CONFLICT MAGNITUDES has a logical record length of 67.

The datafile for CONFLICT AND SOCIETY has a logical record length of 453.

The datafile for POLITY has a logical record length of 190.

OSIRIS data can be accessed directly by software packages which do not use the OSIRIS dictionary by specifying the tape location of the desired values indicated in the section of the codebook designated as "variable format".

The data and codebooks for this study were processed by Claire Jeanette, Margaret Bailey, Beth Weems, Beverly Firestone, Laura Bradley, and Margareth Miller.

CIVIL STRIKE EVENTS

(ICPSR 7531)

Principal Investigators

Ted Robert Gurr
Charles Ruttenger
Jean Dose

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ICPSR ASSISTANCE

All manuscripts utilizing data made available through the Consortium should acknowledge that fact as well as identify the original collector or the data source. The ICPSR Council urges all users of ICPSR data facilities to follow some adaptation of this statement with the brackets indicating items to be filled in appropriately or deleted by the individual user.

The data [and tabulations] utilized in this [publicaticn] were made available [in part] by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for Civil Strife Events were originally collected by Ted Robert Gurr, Charles Ruttenberg and Jean Dose. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations represented here.

In order to provide funding agencies with essential information about the use of archival resources, and to facilitate the exchange of information about ICPSR participants' research activities, each user of ICPSR facilities is expected to SEND TWO COPIES OF EACH COMPLETED MANUSCRIPT (or thesis abstract) to the Consortium. Please indicate in the cover letter which data were used.

STUDY DESCRIPTION FOR CIVIL STRIFE EVENTS DATASET

Summary of Coding Procedures for Civil Strife Dataset

The Civil Strife Coding Sheet (Appendix F) was designed for systematic recording of comparable information about events that are variously called "internal conflict behavior", "conflict events", "internal war", "instability events", or "political violence." The generic term used here is "civil strife." The coding sheet was generally designed to record information on ANY OVERT COLLECTIVE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND/OR PUBLIC GROUPS THAT OCCURS WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM. Most contemporary strife involves political regimes and their opponents; some involves contending private groups. Operationally the definition is qualified by the exclusion of non-violent strikes in the private sector, and by inclusion of symbolic, non-violent actions aimed at governments such as demonstrations and political strikes. Anti-government plots also are included. The coding sheet makes provision for "purges" but they have been excluded from the dataset because conceptually they represent government policies of control, not open conflict per se.

The coding sheet is thus APPLICABLE to events as diverse as intertribal warfare, demonstrations, anti-government plots, mutinies, and guerrilla war. It is equally applicable to any more restricted universe of events, for example all civil strife that has specifically political components, or all events whose participants demand changes in social structures, or all events that entail violence. Such universes may be delimited operationally by eliminating from a set of coded events all those that do not fall in certain coding categories. If the universe of theoretical interest is VIOLENT civil strife, for example, one may select out just those events for which some damage (variable 36) or some casualties (variable 37) are specified.

The initial use of the coding system was the recording of all reported civil strife events for 115 polities for the years 1961 through 1965, based on a screening of the NEW YORK TIMES INDEX and the TIMES itself; THE ANNUAL REGISTER OF WORLD EVENTS, volumes for 1961-65; annual cumulations of FACTS ON FILE (Title varies), 1961-65; HISPANIC-AMERICAN REPORT, volumes for 1961-65; AFRICAN RESEARCH BULLETIN, 1964-65; AFRICAN DIGEST, 1961-66; ASIAN RECORDER; EAST EUROPE: A MONTHLY REVIEW OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS; and EASTERN EUROPE. When these sources collectively provided inadequate information for major events, recourse was made to specialized studies when available.

Later the coding system was used to record civil strife events in 87 countries for 1966-70 and 10 countries for 1955-60, using a somewhat larger set of sources. The NEW YORK TIMES was the primary source throughout and provided most of the coded information. The original coding sheets specify the sources.

Despite use of multiple sources it was evident that the resultant data were NOT an unbiased representation of all civil strife events. One can be certain that all coups d'etat and major guerrilla wars were found by such a procedure. It is equally certain that the data include only a small and biased sampling of clashes between hostile communal groups and rural banditry, and that some riots, local rebellions, and demonstrations in Communist states and in the smaller developing countries went unreported. These are caveats to be kept in mind by both coders and users of civil strife data.

The following data were collected under the direction of T. R. Gurr at Princeton University in 1966-68 and at Northwestern University in 1971-73. Coding supervisors were Charles Ruttenberg the former period and Jean Dose during the latter. Coding was carried out by the project director, the coding supervisors, and coders: Joel Prager, Ellen Belzer, Anthony Miller, and Bruce Weissman. The original coding sheets are at Northwestern University. Some narrative information is given on each code sheet. The minimum is the specific type of event and its locale (a "headline") and the source(s).

General Instructions Used by Coders

Distinguishing Among Reported Events: A separate code sheet was ordinarily used for each event or complex of events. When dealing with a complex event, such as waves of demonstrations or bombings, summary reports were used in preference to reports of single component events. Similarly, summary reports were used on continuing events such as prolonged riots and guerrilla wars in preference to day-to-day reports of action, when possible. If adequate summary reports were not available, component events were recorded separately and from them were derived cumulative totals for the larger events.

If two or more separate reports were available on a given event, either each report was recorded on a separate coding sheet for later comparison and cumulation, or they were combined directly into a single coding sheet. If two or more estimates were given of the number of participants, casualties, or other quantitative measures, those said by an unbiased source to be erroneous (if any) were discarded, and the remainder were averaged.

Reports Requiring Single or Multiple Coding Sheets

If all the events described in a single report were of the same type and characteristics, such as simultaneous food rioting in several cities, a single coding sheet ordinarily was prepared. If many or most participants in a symbolic attack, such as a demonstration, became riotous, a single code sheet for the more violent behavior was prepared, comprising data on the event as a whole. If violence occurred INCIDENTALLY TO an otherwise-nonviolent strife event, for example fighting by a few participants in a demonstration, or stoning of buses during a political strike, a single code sheet was typically prepared for the larger, nonviolent event.

If several distinct and unrelated types of events were described in a report, such as a food riot and a bombing, a separate coding sheet was prepared for each. If two private groups are engaged in distinct but interacting types of attack behavior, for example attacks by students on political demonstrators, ordinarily a separate code sheet was prepared for each action: one for the demonstration, one for the student-initiated political clash, but participants, casualties, or damage were not counted twice. If in doubt, events were coded separately and cumulated later, if necessary.

If a group of initiators engaged in changing patterns of civil strife over time, the different types of action were coded as different events. For example, the Hukbalahap guerrilla war in the Philippines can be said to have ended in the mid-1950's with the surrender of its leaders. Subsequent reports of sporadic acts of "Huk" banditry or terrorism were coded as such, not as a continuation of the guerrilla war. Similarly, the Vietnam war in its final phase began no earlier than 1959 or 1960. Large-scale guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam ended in 1954. Viet-minh and Viet-cong activity

during 1955-59 would be more appropriately coded as terrorism or small-scale guerrilla war.

Additional Coding Information: Civil strife events were sometimes reported in a single sentence in the context of a discussion on a different subject, or mentioned incidentally after a description of a more dramatic strife event. **GENERALLY COUNTRY REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS OF SPECIFIC EVENTS WERE EXAMINED CAREFULLY FOR SUCH INCIDENTAL REPORTS.** If the incidentally-reported event was not previously coded, it was coded from such information even if fragmentary.

Judgments and inferences based on contextual knowledge of the civil strife event and of its social setting were generally permissible. If no corroboration or additional information on a reported event was likely from other sources, such inferences were made insofar as possible. If further information WAS likely to be obtained, only unambiguous information was coded, for subsequent cumulation with data from other reports.

The vocabulary of the NEW YORK TIMES, or other sources, was not identical with that used in coding the data. What the TIMES described as a "riot" was not necessarily coded as a riot. According to the definitions used in the study, which are listed below, it may have been coded as a political clash or a general strike instead.

If characteristics of events did not fit perfectly into the specified categories, coders were instructed to use contextual materials to make judgments and estimates. "No basis for judging" was coded only when this was not possible.

Strife events for 1961-65 are coded on variables 1-45 and 71-85 only. Events for 1955-60 and 1966-70 were coded on an expanded coding sheet which includes variables 46-70 and contains information from which variables 86 through 91 are constructed.

Notes on Multiple-Year Events

Events lasting two years or more, such as the revolutionary war in South Vietnam, were coded separately for each year in which conflict was in progress. Estimates of casualties are highly variable from year to year; numbers of participants often vary also. Coded motives, targets, social groups and organizations involved, etc., are less likely to change. Short-lived events which begin in one year and end in the next are represented as a single case.

Long-lived episodes of protest, such as the 1960's civil rights marches in the United States, are treated in the same way as protracted internal wars. All information on each year's specific events are cumulated onto a single summary coding sheet for the full year.

One-year summaries of multiple-year episodes of conflict can be identified in several ways. Each event which continues into the following year has an ending date code of 12 on Var. 7 and 31 on Var. 8 (i.e., December 31). The last year of a multi-year conflict cannot usually be so distinguished, however, because it probably will have ended before December 31. These cases can be identified by comparing Var. 5, "year event began," with Var. 6, "year event ended." If the values for the event are different by two or more then the coding summarizes one year of a multi-year conflict; and if its ending-date code is other than 12/31, it is the concluding year.

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION FOR CIVIL STRIKE EVENTS DATASET

- V1 Three Letter Country Identifier (COUNTRY)
Alphabetic country code, see Appendix A for complete list
- V2 Numeric Country Code (C*CODE)
See Appendix A for complete list.
- V3 Population of Country, in 100,000's (POP)
From the U.S. DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK, for the year in which the event occurred.
- V4 Character of Reported Event (REPORT)
These categories were used for record keeping purposes during the coding process. "Single reports" are events coded from a single news item. "Cumulative reports" are summaries and aggregations of 2 or more news items.
1. Single report, current period, continuing event
 2. Single report, all of continuing event, to date
 3. Single report, concluded event
 6. Cumulative report, current period, continuing event
 7. Cumulative report, continuing event, to date
 8. Cumulative report, concluded event
9. No basis for judging
- V5 Year Event Began (BEGAN)
Last two digits of the year in which the event began.
- V6 Year Event Ended (YEAREND)
Last two digits of the year in which the event ended.
- V7 The Month in Which the Event Ended (MTHEND)
1. January
 2. February
 3. March
 4. April
 5. May
 6. June
 7. July
 8. August
 9. September
 10. October
 11. November
 12. December
99. No basis for judging

V8 Day on Which the Event Ended (DAYEND)

IDENTITY OF INITIATORS

V9-V13

A record of the principle socioeconomic class(es) represented in the groups which challenged the status quo. In conflict events which involved the government, those who opposed the government are coded as "initiators." This includes dissidents who were the targets of government sanctions, such as peaceful demonstrators and people accused of plots, as well as dissident members of the regime who became involved in mutinies and coups. In conflicts between private groups, the "initiators" were the group which took the first overt action.

V9 Lower Classes (LOCLASS)

0. No or insignificant lower class participation: The groups specified below appeared to constitute less than one-tenth of all initiators.
1. Farmers/peasants: Subsistence, cash-cropping, and tenant farmers; herdsmen; and their families. Tribesmen acting in rural areas are also so classified.
2. Rural wage laborers: Rural and village workers, including craftsmen and seasonal workers when employed, and their families other than those specified under 1.
3. Urban wage laborers: Unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled workers and craftsmen in towns and cities including those voluntarily on strike, and their families.
4. Unemployed: Urban or rural peoples specifically said to be unemployed, landless, or otherwise uprooted from regular means of subsistence. Also included here are seasonal and occasional workers when out of work.
5. Farmers, peasants, and wage laborers: Substantial participation by both farmers or peasants and wage laborers.
6. Wage laborers, unemployed: Substantial participation by members of both classes.
7. Farmers, peasants, wage laborers, and unemployed: Substantial participation by members of all three classes.
8. Some, undifferentiable: Lower and rural class participation was inferred from characteristics of the event — for example, movements involving whole communities or regions, revolutionary or guerrilla armies, or food riots -- but more precise categorization cannot be made from available information.
9. Other: Distinct groups not specifiable above, for example, "market women" or "sports fans."
- 9. No basis for judging

V10 Higher Classes: (HICLASS)

0. No or insignificant higher class participation: The groups specified below appeared to constitute less than one-tenth of all initiators and less than one-third of their leadership.
 1. Students: Secondary and/or college students.
 2. Petite bourgeoisie: Small shopkeepers, self-employed artisans, white-collar workers, independent traders, and their families.
 3. Professionals: Lawyers, physicians, school teachers, engineers, businessmen, priests, professional intellectuals, organizers, and their families.
 4. Students and petite bourgeoisie: Substantial participation by members of both groups.
 5. Students and professionals
 6. Petite bourgeoisie and professionals
 7. All three: Members of all three groups are known to have participated.
 8. Some, undifferentiable: Higher class participation was inferred from the character of the event, for example, a plot by a banned political party with higher class clientage, but more precise specification cannot be made from available information.
 9. Other
- 9. No basis for judging

V11 Regime Classes (ELITES)

0. No or insignificant regime participation: No consequential members of the regime were known to have participated illicitly in the event.
 1. Military/police: Current or former members or units of the regime's military or internal security forces when taking action against the regime.
 2. Public employees: Civil servants below the highest administrative levels.
 3. Political elite: Members of the ruling elite, other than those under 1, including high officials of executive and judiciary branches, representatives to national assemblies, and high officials of parties that typically support the regime.
 4. Military/police and public employees: Substantial participation by members of both groups.
 5. Political elite and public employees
 6. Military/police and political elite
 7. All three: Substantial participation by members of all three regime classes.
 8. Some, undifferentiable: Participation by regime classes is inferred, for example, in some purges, but more precise specification is not possible.
 9. Other: Distinct regime classes not specifiable above, for example, traditional leaders in modernizing states.
- 9. No basis for judging

V12 Domestic Initiators, Summary (CLASSUM)

A summary of information coded under variables 9 to 11, specifying which broad class grouping(s) participated substantially in the event:

0. None or insignificant
1. Lower classes only
2. Higher classes only
3. Regime classes only
4. Lower and higher classes
5. Lower and regime classes
6. Higher and regime classes
7. All domestic classes

-9. No basis for judging

V13 Resident Alien Initiators (ALIENS)

A record of whether some or all of the initiators of a civil strife event were civilian aliens who were temporary or recently-arrived residents in the country. Military units operating under foreign control were not specified here. If such units were assisting domestic initiators they were comprised below under "External Support for Initiators" (vars. 41, 43). Examples given in the category definitions refer to the mid-1960's.

0. No or insignificant resident aliens: The groups specified below appeared to comprise less than one-tenth of all initiators.
1. Pastoral migrants: Tribesmen following new or customary migration routes that take them across international boundaries, for example, tribesmen from the Somali Republic in Ethiopia.
2. Foreign workers: Foreign laborers or salaried personnel who are expected to return to their country or colony of origin, for example, Algerian workers in France, Ivory Coast clerks in Dahomey, and Italian workers in Belgium.
3. Foreign students: Self-explanatory.
4. Refugees: Recent, unassimilated refugees, such as Cubans in the United States and Vietnamese in Thailand. Long-term refugees who were largely assimilated into the dominant population, such as East German refugees in West Germany, were categorized above according to domestic class identification, not here.
5. Political exiles: Political activists, tacitly or openly given shelter by the country of residence, who were expected to return to their homeland, for example, Spanish trades union leaders in France and Angolan rebels in Tunisia.
6. Foreign clandestine groups: Groups proscribed by both country of origin and country of residence, usually because of their involvement in civil strife, for example, Malay Communist guerrillas in southern Thailand and OAS terrorists in Switzerland.
7. Several of the above: Any two or more of the above categories of resident alien initiators.
8. Other: Other distinct classes of resident aliens.

-9. No basis for judging

V14 Number of Initiators, Proximate (NUMEST)

Those who challenged the status quo were counted here, not their victims or police who attempted to suppress them. If the report distinguished between continuously and sporadically active initiators, the total figure was used. People said to give frequent assistance to initiators also were counted as initiators. If two private groups engaged in a riot, each attacking the other, the total membership of both groups was used.

This scale was used for recording proximate estimates of initiators (as distinct from guess-estimates recorded under Var. 15 below). We used a scale, not exact numbers, because numbers of dissidents rarely can be counted with precision. Even figures which appear precise are usually only informed guesses. If more than 110,000 persons were said to be involved, a calculated scale value was used, e.g. 150,000 was coded as 7500.

If the number of initiators could not be distinguished as closely as the scale required, "00000" for Variable 14 was coded and the estimate-scale interval, Variable 15, was coded instead.

A comparable approach to coding number of participants is used by Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Cross-National Data Bank of Political Instability Events (Code Index)," San Diego: Public Affairs Research Institute, San Diego State College, January 1965 (mimeo).

Interpolated values were used in some cases when the established categories seemed too imprecise. Interpolations were especially used for events which were particularly long, large, and/or deadly; and for events which had particularly precise information.

NOTE: The proximate scale is a rounded geometric progression with a base of 2. Multiplying the interval designation by 20 gives the approximate midpoint of the interval. Midpoint values were used when aggregating event data.

00000 Next heading coded (NUMGUESS)

1	1 to 40 initiators
3	41 to 80 initiators
8	81 to 240 initiators
16	241 to 400 initiators
32	401 to 900 initiators
64	901 to 1,700 initiators
128	1,701 to 3,500 initiators
250	3,501 to 6,500 initiators
500	6,501 to 14,000 initiators
1000	14,001 to 27,000 initiators
2000	27,001 to 55,000 initiators
4000	55,001 to 110,000 initiators

99999 No basis for judging

V15 Number of Initiators: Estimate (NONGUESS)

If the estimate has been fitted to the proximate scale (see Variable 14 above), "0000" (previous heading coded) was coded here. If there was no basis for even a rough judgment about the number of initiators, "99999" was coded for Variable 14 and "9999" for Variable 15. In most cases, however, it was possible to make an informed guess. Interpolated values were used in some cases. See Variable 14 for a complete explanation.

Convention: If such or all of a community (territorial, ethnic, religious, communal) was said to be engaged in a rebellion or civil war, and no better estimate of active and supportive participants was made, the number of initiators is 15% of the community's population (as determined by reference to statistical or other source material).

NOTE: Multiplying the coded value by 10 gives the values 40, 400, etc.--which were used when aggregating event data.

0000 Previous heading coded (NUMEST)
 4 Less than 100 initiators
 40 101 to 1,000 initiators, "hundreds", "many"
 400 1,001 to 10,000 initiators, "thousands"
 4000 10,001 to 100,000 initiators
 9999 No basis for judging

**GROUP AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
 V16-V17**

V16 Initiators Acting As Members Of:...(GROUP)

The type of social grouping which mobilized initiators for action. The social context is not necessarily a function of the class of initiators.

The guidelines specified below are followed:

If the event was a clash between two private groups, or between members of the governing hierarchy acting illicitly and a private group, the category numbers of the two groups were coded in the spaces for "clash between two of above." For example, rioting between Hindus and Moslems, both of them communal groups, would be coded 4 4. Note that two groups are coded ONLY IF BOTH engage in attack behavior. If members of a political group attack members of a religious congregation, but meet with no resistance or merely defensive action, 6 would be coded for the political group; the religious members are targets of the action, not initiators. If the religious group actively counterattacks, however, code numbers of both groups, 3 6, were specified, with the lower number first.

0. Unstructured crowds: Only when the conflict event occurs with apparent spontaneity among crowds of diverse people who have gathered for some other purpose. Examples are market-day crowds and audiences of apolitical public occasions or entertainments who are precipitated into riots by a chance event.
1. Territorial group: Initiators acting primarily as members of a neighborhood, town, city, or region. Representative events include localized peasant land seizures

- in Peru; North Vietnamese village uprisings against government policies; secession of several central Vietnamese cities from the South Vietnamese government in 1966; the attempted secession of the Southern states that occasioned the American Civil War; and the Hungarian uprising. This category is distinguished from the following three by one or both of two characteristics: the initiators are representative of most or all ethnic and religious groups in the area, or are not markedly distinguishable in social composition from the population of adjacent regions.
2. **Ethnic/linguistic group:** Initiators acting primarily as members of an ethnic or linguistic group, not in a specifically territorial context. Examples are spontaneous attacks by white Southerners on civil rights workers (whether Negro or white or both); U.S. urban race riots that involve both white and Negro neighborhoods; rioting between Ceylonese Tamils and Sinhalese; protest marches by Waloons in Belgium; Negro-East Indian terrorism in British Guiana; and riots between Israeli immigrant groups of diverse origins.
 3. **Religious group:** Initiators acting primarily as members of religious movements, organizations, or denominations. Examples are protest marches by Vietnamese Buddhists and Spanish priests; violent millennial religious movements; and Protestant riots against Catholics.
 4. **Communal group:** Initiators acting as members of groups that are distinct on two or more of the above three characteristics: territory, ethnicity or language, and religion. Examples include the rebellion of Lumpa Church members against the African regime in Zambia (regional and religious); the rebellion of the southern Sudan against the north (group hostilities on ethnic, regional, and religious lines); Sikh demonstrations for a separate state (linguistic, regional facets); terrorism by Mizo tribesmen demanding regional autonomy (ethnic, regional); and the Watts riot (ethnic, and confined to the Negro ghetto).
 5. **Apolitical student group:** Initiators acting primarily as members of APOLITICAL student groups. A riot whose initiators are solely students and which has no evident political motive is coded here. If a POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED student organization appears involved, the organization was coded as a political group (below). (NOTE: Student political protest events can be distinguished by reference to Var. 10, above, which identifies student participation.)
 6. **Political group:** Initiators acting primarily as members of open (as distinct from clandestine) political organizations, including political parties and interest groups with primarily political objectives; and crowds at political meetings. Clashes between competing political groups; attacks by groups demanding the franchise or preventing others from voting; and violent conflict within political groups were also coded here.

7. Economic group: Initiators acting primarily as members of organizations or associations of workers, the unemployed, craftsmen, traders or employers. Demonstrations or civil violence by members of labor unions, peasant leagues, professional associations, cooperatives, consumers' groups, and comparable organizations were coded here.
8. Governing hierarchy: Initiators acting primarily as members of the executive, administrative, or legislative structure of government, including military and police units; the official party in one-party states; the civilian bureaucracy itself; or legislative assemblies. Representative events coded here were coups and putsches by military men and/or senior bureaucrats; political strikes by civil servants; purges of party and/or administrative officials; and some mutinies.
9. Clandestine groups: Initiators acting primarily as members of organizations engaged in PROSCRIBED political or terroristic activity. Examples of events so coded are terrorism by the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan; reported plots by banned political groups; the violence perpetrated by the Secret Army Organization (OAS) in France and Algeria in 1961-62; operations of rebel and revolutionary armies and of guerrilla bands generally (if not primarily territorial or communal) and demonstrations by proscribed trade-unions.
- ** Clash between two of above: See introductory remarks under Variable 16, above.
99. No basis for judging: The identity and group affiliations of initiators are not specified and cannot be inferred.

V17 Social Area of Conflict (SOCAREA)

Estimated area encompassed by the event(s) at their maximum extent. The scale is from Pitirim A. Sorokin, "Social and Cultural Dynamics, III: Fluctuation of Social Relationships, War, and Revolution," (New York: American Book Company, 1937), pp. 393-394. In distinguishing between social and geographic area, he points out that "generally, disturbances in the main cities of a given country, which are the centers of interaction and influence, are much more weighty than in small cities or in villages that lie upon the periphery of the nation's life..." (p. 393).

1. Rural village or county
3. Several villages, counties or a small town
5. A large town
10. Several towns, or a city, or a small state
20. Large state, or part of the capital city
40. Several large states or several cities, or the entire capital city
60. Several states or cities and the capital city
80. Almost the entire polity
100. The entire polity, other
999. No basis for judging

TYPOLOGY AND DURATION OF ACTION
V18 - V24

The specific type of event(s) in Variable 18, 19 or 20. "None" was coded for the headings that were not relevant. An event might have been coded as a turmoil event only; a conspiracy event only; an internal war event only; or as a turmoil or conspiracy event in the context of an internal war. If the event was of the last type, the appropriate turmoil or conspiracy event was coded and the type of internal war event was also coded. Any turmoil or conspiracy event that occurred within a polity while an internal war was in progress, and which was apparently perpetrated by groups that had not previously been initiators in the internal war, was said to occur "in the context of" the internal war. It was possible for several internal war events to occur simultaneously, such as private war and civil war in South Vietnam in the context of a large-scale guerrilla war. If a turmoil or conspiracy event occurred in the context of TWO OR MORE internal wars, the "contextual" internal war coded was that of the longer duration.

An event was not coded for both turmoil and conspiracy, or for more than one type of event under a heading. Also, small-scale terrorism and small-scale guerrilla war was not coded as occurring in the context of large-scale terrorism or large-scale guerrilla war respectively. The latter two categories respectively assume the existence of the first two.

This typology and the definitions below are adapted from Rudolph J. Rummel, "A Field Theory of Social Action with Application to Conflict Within Nations," General Systems Yearbook, I (1965), pp. 205-11.

V18 Turmoil Events (TURMOIL)

0. Event is not turmoil.

1. Demonstration: Any peaceful, public gathering or series of gatherings of at least one hundred people for the primary purpose of displaying opposition to governmental policies or authority. This did not include political strikes or political party rallies. Student strikes aimed at the government were considered demonstrations. A demonstration which involved use of force by the initiators was categorized as a riot. A demonstration whose participants were attacked by others, but which did not draw significant retaliatory violence by the demonstrators was a demonstration. Demonstrations on successive days by the same class(es) of initiators were counted as single, continuous events.

2. Political strike: Any strike of rural, industrial, or service workers that involved more than one employer and that was aimed at governmental policies or authority. A strike was not considered general unless at least 1,000 workers were involved. General strikes did not include strikes against public or private employers for the purpose of improving wages or working conditions.
3. Riot: A violent demonstration of at least one hundred initiators. A mob or crowd of people clashing with police or troops, or attacking domestic or foreign persons or property, was a riot, except that riotous clashes between rival political groups, non-political groups, and similar events were coded under "clashes," below. Riots on successive days by the same class(es) of initiators were counted as single, continuous events.
4. Localized rebellion: A local revolt, other than by members of the police or military, against the established order. Peasant uprisings and secessionist activity by groups or communities with populations under 100,000 were coded here.
5. Banditry/raiding: Sporadic or continuous looting and robbery by organized bands living off the countryside, including raids by members of one tribe or village against another, whose major aim appears to be seizure of goods.
6. Political clash: Any violent clash between members of rival political groups or parties, including violence between competing factions within the regime if not part of an attempt to seize power.
7. Non-political clash: Any violent clashes between any two private religious, ethnic, communal, economic, and/or apolitical student groups.
9. Missing data

V19 Conspiracy Events (CONSPIRE)

0. Event is not a conspiracy.
1. Plot: Any discovery of plans to overthrow the central government or to assassinate its leaders, except when such plans involve only one or two initiators acting apolitically. Included were government announcements of the discovery of such plots.
2. Purge: The systematic elimination by the political elite either of opposition within their ranks or of opposition within the country by jailing or execution. "Elimination" refers to the arrest, jailing, exiling, or execution of opposition leaders. The arrest or execution of non-leaders of opposition groups did not constitute a purge. Any elimination of opposition leaders incident to the take-over of the government by a new elite was also a purge.

3. **Assassination:** The politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a prominent government official or politician, or other public figure, domestic or foreign. Among high officials were included governors of states or provinces, mayors of large cities, members of cabinets and national legislatures, and chief executives. High politicians include members of the inner core of the ruling party or group, and opposition leaders. Leaders of major associational, ethnic, or religious groups constitute "other public figures."
4. **Bombing:** Any politically motivated use of explosives to damage or destroy property or to wound or kill individuals, if not part of a larger terrorist or guerrilla campaign.
5. **Small-scale terrorism:** Occasional varied terroristic acts, such as arson, sabotage, bombings, assassination of minor officials, sniping, harassment, and underground activity apparently involving fewer than 1000 people. Terrorism directed at individuals by virtue of their economic, ethnic, religious, or comparable characteristics was not recorded here, but under 9, "other," below. Terrorism by the government as a form of repression was not recorded here, nor did it constitute civil strife as defined here.
6. **Small-scale guerrilla war:** Armed activity by bands of citizens or irregular forces numbering less than 1,000 and aimed at the overthrow of the political regime. Characteristic forms of such activity were sporadic attacks on police posts, small villages, government patrols, military barracks, or transportation routes. Guerrilla war is distinguished from terrorism by the existence of bands of men operating more or less continuously as units.
7. **Coup/putsch:** Any successful (coup) or unsuccessful (putsch) attempt by military or police officers, and/or members of the ruling elite, to overthrow the central government or replace its executive through the use of force or the threat of force. The characteristic that distinguishes coups from revolts is the nature of leadership.
8. **Mutiny:** Any revolt against higher authorities by the police or military whose aim is not overthrow of or secession from the central government, but achievement of better pay, dismissal of officers or officials, or comparable limited demands. Mass disobedience of orders not to pillage was also counted as mutiny.
9. **Other:** Including small-scale terrorism against private individuals because of their economic, ethnic or religious characteristics. If more than 1,000 initiators were involved, code under "private war," below.

-9. Missing data

V20 Internal War Events (IWAR)

0. Event is not an internal war.

1. Large-scale terrorism: More or less continuous acts of terrorism, as defined above under "small-scale terrorism," which were systematic, organized, and involved more than 1,000 people.
2. Large-scale guerrilla war: Continuous guerrilla activity, as defined above under "small-scale guerrilla war." Large-scale means that the action was more or less continuous, and that the number of guerrillas exceeded 1,000. Areas of the polity may be under direct control of the guerrillas.
3. Civil war: Any armed successful or unsuccessful attempt on the part of a segment of the population of more than 100,000 people to secede from the central government and form an independent or autonomous government.
4. Private war: Violent and more or less continuous clashes between two or more non-governmental groups involving more than 1,000 people and taking place by virtue of their membership in religious, ethnic, linguistic, tribal, or comparable groups. Continuous terrorism by members of one such social group against another was also coded here.
5. Large-scale revolt: Any successful or unsuccessful attempt by more than 100,000 citizens, non-members of the established order, to overthrow the central government through the use of force. Nationalistic wars specifically aimed at overthrowing an alien (colonial) political hierarchy were coded here. Some military units of the regime or marginal members of the political elite may participate in such revolts, as in the Hungarian uprising and the Dominican revolution of 1965.
6. Turmoil/conspiracy event is part of internal war: If the event coded under turmoil or conspiracy was part of an internal war, in the sense that it was carried out by internal war initiators, and the event was to have been cumulated with other such events to develop full data on the internal war as a whole, this category was coded instead of the specific type of internal war. (Any such events which are included in the ICPSR dataset should be treated according to their primary code under Var. 18 or Var. 19.)

9. Missing data

V21 Summary of Form of Event (TYPESUM)

A summary of the general form of the event specified under the preceding three headings. If turmoil alone, "turmoil" was coded; if turmoil in the context of, or part of, an internal war, "turmoil and internal war" was coded; etc. If the event fits none of the given categories, it was coded "other."

1. Turmoil
 2. Conspiracy
 3. Internal war
 4. Turmoil in the context of internal war
 5. Conspiracy in the context of internal war
 6. Other
9. Missing data

V22 Number of Actions (ACTNUM)

These categories refer to the number of occurrences of the event coded. All internal wars and most rebellions, political strikes, and comparable events are single occurrences, i.e., only one such event was coded. A week-end of anti-Ibo rioting in each of four Northern Nigerian cities, however, if summarized on a single coding sheet, would be coded "riot" under "Turmoil Events" and "4" under "Number of Actions." Events such as bombings, assassinations, and demonstrations may occur in large numbers. Note that if the type of event is "small-scale terrorism," the number of actions coded ordinarily will be "single occurrence," not the component sniping, arson, bombings, etc., that collectively constitute terrorism.

1. Single occurrence
2. Two, "several" occurrences
3. Three, "some" occurrences
4. 4-6 occurrences
5. 7-11 occurrences
6. 12-20 occurrences
7. 21-35 occurrences
8. 36-60 occurrences
9. 61 or more occurrences

-9. No basis for judging

V23 Incidence of Action (ACTINCID)

If "single occurrence" was coded under Variable 22, the same category was coded here. If more than one action was specified under Variable 22, the coder indicated here whether the actions occurred discontinuously (multiple sporadic), for example a series of bombings over several weeks' time, or more or less simultaneously (multiple simultaneous); for example, the wave of anti-Ibo rioting cited under Variable 22.

1. Single occurrence
2. Multiple sporadic occurrences
3. Multiple simultaneous occurrences

9. No basis for judging

V24 Duration of Action (DAYS)

Time elapsed in the period covered by the report(s) being coded, whether the event(s) are continuous or discontinuous. If the entire event was coded, the time elapsed from its onset to end was specified. If the report(s) coded were for either "current period, continuing event" or "all of continuing event, to date," the time-span covered, not the total duration of the event(s) was specified. For conspiracy and internal war events composed of discontinuous incidents, such as a series of armed attacks or bombings, the entire period from first to last incident is specified. For WAVES of turmoil events, the duration coding depends on how Var. 23, Incidence of Action, is coded. If Incidence of Action was "multiple simultaneous" then the duration recorded should be THE LENGTH OF THE AVERAGE EVENT. This last rule was consistently applied to 1955-60 and 1966-70 turmoil events; some inconsistencies may be found in 1961-65 turmoil events. The inconsistencies will have these characteristics: Var. 18 will be coded demonstration, riot, or clash; Var. 22 will be coded 2 or more; Var. 23 will be coded 2, multiple sporadic; and Var. 24 will be coded 10 or more. These inconsistent cases can be adjusted by recoding Var. 24 to 3.

If the period covered falls exactly at a category boundary, for example, one month, it was coded for the lesser of the two categories, "two weeks to one month" in this example. If an event lasts less than 24 hours, but spans two calendar days, for example, a riot beginning one afternoon and ending the next morning, it was coded as "1 to less than 2 days." "One-half day or less" was coded for such events as a single bombing, and riots and demonstrations said to last less than twelve hours.

(NOTE: The duration scale is an adjusted geometric progression. Multiplying the interval designation by 0.3 gives the approximate midpoint of the interval in number of days. By this procedure, scale category 1217 is precisely equivalent to one year.)

Conventions: For plots, the duration of the event is "no basis for judging." For purges, the length of time the series of government arrests continues, if known.

- 1. 1/2 day or less
- 3. 1/2 day to less than 1 day
- 5. 1 to less than 2 days
- 10. 2 to less than 4 days
- 20. 4 days to less than 1 week
- 40. 1 to less than 2 weeks
- 80. 2 weeks to less than 1 month
- 160. 1 to less than 2 months
- 320. 2 to less than 4 months
- 640. 4 to less than 9 months
- 1217. 9 to less than 15 months
- 2000. 15 months to less than 2 years
- 4000. 2 to 4 1/2 years
- . Other (actual value recorded)
- 9999. No basis for judging

**ACTION DIRECTED AT
V25-V27**

The primary target or targets attacked. If non-Muslim storefronts were damaged incidentally in an attack on Muslims, or if military vehicles were damaged in a terrorist attack on their occupants, "none" was coded under property targets: the primary targets are the actors. Similarly, if civilian bystanders were killed in an attempted assassination of a premier, the primary target was nonetheless the premier; "major domestic" was coded under Political Actors and "none" under Non-political Actors.

V25 Property Targets (PROPERTY)

0. None or negligible: Attacks on property secondary or insignificant, or not specified but unlikely.
1. Foreign public property: Including embassies, information offices, trade missions, foreign military installations and vehicles, etc.
2. Foreign private property: Including offices, vehicles, and business establishments leased or owned by foreign nationals, if attacked in the knowledge that they are in foreign hands.
3. All foreign: Significant attacks on both types of foreign property.
4. Domestic and public property: Including any government owned buildings, facilities, land, and equipment; military installations and equipment; public transportation systems; public industries; public monuments; etc.
5. Domestic private property: Including all domestically-owned property and goods not regarded as public.
6. All domestic: Significant attacks on both public and private domestic property.
7. Foreign and domestic: Significant attacks on one or both types of both foreign and domestic property.
9. No basis for judging

V26 Political Actors (POLACTOR)

0. None or negligible: Attacks on political actors secondary or insignificant, or not specified but unlikely.
1. Major domestic: Chief executives and cabinet officers; national legislators; governors of states or provinces; mayors of large cities; leaders of the ruling political party in a one-party system and their families. If the initiators march on the presidential palace or national legislative buildings, their action was usually directed at the occupants of the buildings, namely major domestic political actors.
2. Minor domestic: Elected and appointed public officials, civil servants, and members of the ruling party in a one-party system, at all levels other than those specified above, and their families.
3. Military/police, domestic: Members of all ranks of domestic military, paramilitary, and police forces, individually or collectively.

4. Private political group: Leaders and members of any political party, interest group, or political demonstration or gathering, but not members of the ruling party in a one-party system.
 5. Several of the above: Two or more of the above domestic political actors. If demonstrators marching on the presidential palace become involved in a riot with the police, category 5 would be coded.
 6. Undifferentiable domestic: The instigators apparently were attacking political actors, but the report contains insufficient information to specify which ones. Briefly-reported plots and purges might have been coded here, as would a passing reference to "political unrest," accompanied by violence, in rural Ethiopia.
 7. Foreign public: Any foreign official or public representative.
 8. Foreign military: Members and officials of foreign military units, individually or collectively.
 9. Domestic and foreign actors: Attacks on both foreign and domestic actors.
- 9. No basis for judging

V27 Non-Political Actors (PRIVACTR)

0. None or negligible: Attacks on non-political actors are secondary or insignificant, or not specified but unlikely.
 1. Random actors: Victims selected apparently at random, without reference to political or other group affiliations, for example, victims of some kinds of random terrorism and banditry.
 2. Ethnic actors: Persons attacked because of their membership in groups distinguished on basis of language, ethnicity, or both. If such actors are confined in residence to a specific territory that is ethnically distinct from the surrounding territory, then "communal actors," below was coded.
 3. Religious actors: Persons attacked because of their religious affiliation or beliefs.
 4. Communal actors: Persons attacked because of their membership in groups distinguished on two or more of these bases: ethnicity or language; territory; and religious belief.
 5. Economic actors: Persons attacked because of their status as employers, competing workers, trades union leaders or members, shopkeepers, producers, etc.
 6. Several of the above: Any two or more of the above categories of non-political actors.
 7. Undifferentiable: Events with inferred but unspecified non-political actors as targets.
 8. Foreign non-political actors: Tourists, refugees, and other foreigners attacked for apparently-apolitical reasons.
 9. Other: Domestic non-political actors other than specified above.
- 9. No basis for judging

STATED OR APPARENT MOTIVES
V28 - V30

In many instances, motives were articulated by the initiators of civil strife, are attributed to them in the report, or can be inferred directly from the circumstances of action. Provision is made for specification of each of three general classes of motive under the heading political, economic, and social.

Single or multiple coding: If the initiators specifically evidence major motives of a particular class, for example, a demonstration against a chief executive ("oppose specified domestic political actor" under the Political heading) that becomes a riot against palace guards who shoot at the demonstrators ("retaliation," also under the Political heading), "several political motives" was coded. In the 1955-60 and 1966-70 events coding, a supplementary coding sheet was added to permit separate recording of "several" motives. This is done in vars. 57 to 70 below.

If the initiators specifically articulate major motives of different classes, they were coded under two or three headings as appropriate. Japanese demonstrators asking for peace in Vietnam and protection of workers' rights have two clearly distinct motives, coded respectively "promote/oppose foreign nation's policy or actors" under the Political heading and "increase social goods" under Social.

In many cases, economic or social demands were politicized, for example, rioters demanding government control of food prices, or armed attacks on government troops by tribesmen seeking autonomy for their tribe's region. Such cases also involve multiple coding, the first example being coded both "promote/oppose specific domestic policy" (Political) and "change distribution patterns" (Economic); the second coded "seize political power" and "promote/oppose community."

Specification of motives under two or more headings is acceptable only when the several motives are distinct and approach equality of importance, or are inextricably interrelated. Motives were not inferred. If there was uncertainty about the specific motive, though it was known to be generally political (or social, or economic), "diffuse... motives" was coded under the appropriate heading. For example, the bombing of the Nelson Column in Dublin, since it occurred in the context of IRA terrorism elsewhere in Ireland, can be coded as having "diffuse political motives," but not more specifically (on the basis of published information) as one or both of "promote/oppose foreign nation's policy or actors" (Political) and "promote/oppose community" (Social).

V28 Political Motives (POLMOTIV)

0. None: Political motives among initiators, as specified below, are insignificant or not specified, but unlikely.
 1. Retaliation: Initiators act in direct responses to real or rumored attack by domestic political actors or domestic military/police. An example is a riot set off by police firing into a crowd.
 2. Seize political power: Initiators seek to obtain full control of their political affairs by overthrowing the political regime as a whole, supplanting its major actors, or gaining autonomy or independence from a political regime.
 3. Increase political participation: Initiators seek or demand increased participation in or influence over an existing political regime, short of overthrowing it or replacing its major actors. Initiators of riots and demonstrations demanding publicly-guaranteed rights -- civil liberties, the franchise.
 4. Injure/suppress competing political group: Initiators attempt to minimize the efficacy or influence of opposing non-government political actors and groups.
 5. Promote/oppose specific domestic policy or action: Initiators promote a threatened public policy or law dealing with a restricted range of behavior, or oppose an undesirable policy or action of similar range. Examples are demonstrations for maintenance of price controls; riots against new taxation; demonstrations against political arrests; and riots against the initiators' own nation's foreign policies.
 6. Promote/oppose specific domestic political actor(s): Initiators attack a specific political figure, either because of his inherent characteristics or as a symbolic agent of an undesirable policy or condition. Examples include a general strike of French port workers against a visit by President de Gaulle, and assassinations of political actors if not part of a campaign to seize political power. These motives are distinguished from the preceding category by their focus on a specific political actor.
 7. Oppose foreign nation's policy or actors: Attacks motivated by opposition to public or private actors or policies of a foreign nation, whether or not specifically political. Attacks on colonial regimes are not coded here, but under the appropriate category above or below.
 8. Several of the above: Any two or more of the above political motives, each apparent among a substantial proportion of initiators.
 9. Diffuse political motives: Events whose initiators have apparent but unspecifiable political motives.
- 9. No basis for judging

V 29 Economic Motives (ECOMOTIV)

0. None: Economic motives among initiators, as specified below, are insignificant or not specified but unlikely.
1. Retaliation: Action by initiators in direct response to explicitly threatened or actual deprivation of economic goods or well-being. Examples are burning of shops of merchants held responsible for hoarding; mob attacks on tax collectors; and terrorism against strike-breakers.
2. Seize economic goods: Initiators attempt to acquire economic goods directly by violent means. Examples are peasant seizures of land; tribal raiding for cattle; banditry for economic gain; and extensive looting in the context of race riots.
3. Change distribution patterns: Initiators demand or attempt to impose better wages, lower prices, an end to inflation, an improved position in the economic system, better housing, confiscation of private property, etc., but do not directly seize economic goods.
4. Oppose specific economic actor(s): Initiators attack a specific non-public economic actor, collective or individual, either for his/their inherent characteristics or as a symbolic agent of an undesirable economic policy or condition (but not in direct retaliation for a specific economic deprivation, specified above). Examples are African rioting against Indian shopkeepers as symbols of economic repression (also coded "promote/oppose community" under the Social heading); demonstrations against a domestic or foreign concern; attacks on a competing group of workers; and assassination of union officials.
5. Several of the above: Two or more of the above economic motives, each evident among a substantial proportion of initiators. Rioters who attack a number of foreign merchants, and also seize large food stores, would be checked for "seize economic goods" and "oppose economic actor" and coded here.
6. Diffuse economic motives: Events whose initiators have apparent but unspecifiable economic motives.
7. Other: Specific economic motives not classifiable above.
9. No basis for judging

V30 Social Motives (SOCMOTIV)

0. None: Social motives among initiators, as specified below, are insignificant or not specified but unlikely.
1. Retaliation: Initiators attack in direct response to known or rumored attacks by others. Examples are Hindu rioting against Sikhs because of reports that Sikhs killed Hindu children, and lynching of Negroes because of rape accusations.

2. **Promote/oppose belief system:** Initiators defend, or attempt to impose, a system of beliefs or values. Violent attempts to impose Christianity, Mau Mau, kimbanquisme, or Communism on other members of the community are examples. Coups or revolts inspired in part by a desire to end "corruption" or "immorality" by elected officials are coded here, as are efforts to defend belief systems in general or in their specific characteristics, such as peasant opposition to government attempts to impose new inheritance laws, and riots by Muslims against the abolition of the fez or enforced female equality. These motives are distinguished from "promote/oppose community," below, by a specific focus on the belief system rather than the community in which it may be embodied.
3. **Promote/oppose community:** Attacks motivated by the desire to maintain or oppose a specific regional, ethnic, religious, and/or linguistic community, for example, demonstrations by Basques demanding restoration of the Basque language; riots against Negroes attempting to integrate white neighborhoods; and civil war to establish an autonomous Kurdistan.
4. **Increase social goods:** Initiators demand or seek more of a specific social good such as more or better education, removal of symbolic social barriers to status advancement, rights of association or free movement, etc. Examples are student riots against tightened academic standards, South African riots against pass laws, and demonstrations by untouchable castes for elimination of caste barriers.
5. **Several of the above:** Two or more of the above social motives, each evident among a substantial proportion of initiators.
6. **Diffuse social motives:** Events whose initiators have apparent but unspecifiable social motives.
7. **Other:** Specific social motives not classifiable above.
9. **No basis for judging**

PUNITIVE ACTION
V31 - V35

V31 Role of Punitive Forces (RPROLE)

The character of suppressive responses, if any, by military, and/or police units (as defined under Variable 32) to the event. Only one category was coded. If several types of punitive units were involved and acted in diverse ways, then the most suppressive type of action taken was coded.

0. Not committed; committed after end of action: Such statements as "police were not in evidence at the scene of the demonstration," "militia units arrived after the rioters had dispersed," or "terrorists fled before police arrived." This category is also coded if no mention is made of the presence of punitive forces at the scene of a bombing, assassination, or guerrilla attack on civilians.
1. Victims: Members of the punitive forces are victims only, without opportunity to take defensive actions, for example, in the bombing of a military barracks or the assassination of a police official.
2. Present but passive: Punitive forces specifically said to be present as observers of the event but have taken no or minimal action.
3. Defensive action: When punitive forces act primarily to defend themselves and/or threatened persons or property. Examples are responses of static military and police forces to guerrilla attack, statements that "police attempted to restrain the demonstrators," and police efforts to protect civil rights demonstrators from would-be attackers. The posting of additional police or military personnel to a threatened area, or area experiencing waves of terrorism, also constitutes defensive action.
4. Moderate suppressive action: If punitive forces make limited and selective use of force at their disposal to deter or punish initiators. Examples are the breaking up of riots and demonstrators by selective use of arrests, tear gas, and water hoses and also active patrolling of rebellious areas or riotous neighborhoods. The statement that police "dispersed" a crowd, without further detail, is coded here.
5. Extreme suppressive action: If punitive forces use most or all means of force at their disposal to deter or punish initiators. Examples are indiscriminate beatings of rioters, mass arrest or execution of participants, repeated firing into mobs, and full-scale military operations against rebels.

6. **Provoke action:** If punitive forces initiate collective violence by unwarranted assaults on peaceful demonstrators or others acting in a legal, non-violent manner. Examples are police assaults on peaceful marchers; unauthorized shooting by troops into crowds; and rural uprisings when government troops attempt to impose control in an area not previously under government authority. Police assaulted by ethnic mobs while making normal arrests are not said to have initiated violence. Rebellious or mutinous troops acting against the regime are specified under the "initiators" heading, not here; loyalist units defending the regime are categorized above, 0 to 5, according to their role.
9. **No basis for judging:** No action by punitive forces specified: type of punitive action cannot be inferred.

V32 **Type of Punitive Forces (RFTYPE)**

The type or types of punitive forces said to have been involved at any state of the event.

0. Only if 0 is coded under Variable 31.
1. **Police:** Municipal, regional, and national police forces, including gendarmerie, carabinieri, riot police, and militia (in Communist states); and also investigative, limited-duty, and non-uniformed secret police forces.
2. **Domestic military units:** Units or members of the army, navy, and air force on active duty, and paramilitary units mobilized especially to meet civil violence, for example, village defense forces, the U.S. National Guard, and comparable reserve or volunteer units.
3. **Police and domestic military units:** Substantial involvement of both types of forces specified above.
4. **Foreign military units:** Any foreign military formations, including United Nations troops, and foreign troops acting at the request of the threatened regime or on their own discretion.
5. **Domestic and foreign:** Substantial involvement of any domestic forces plus foreign units.
9. **No basis for judging**

V33 **Number of Punitive Forces (EPNUM)**

The reported or estimated number of police or troops employed at the time of their maximum commitment. If punitive forces were known to have been committed but no estimate is given, it was sometimes possible to make an estimate from the context of the event. For example, if a gendarmerie unit was called out to quell a riot by 5,000 students in a large city, one could reasonably infer that at least 100 but less than 1,000 gendarmes were involved. If there was substantial uncertainty about the approximate number committed, "no basis for judging" was coded.

Reports on military units were often given in organizational terms. One or several companies were coded 3, a regiment 4, and a division 5.

0. None
1. 1 to 10
2. 11 to 100
3. 101 to 1,000
4. 1,001 to 10,000
5. 10,001 to 100,000
6. 100,001 to 1,000,000
7. More than 1,000,000
9. No basis for judging.

V34 Arrests and Detentions (ARRESTS)

The number or estimate of initiators arrested, detained, or imprisoned by the police or military was recorded on the coding sheet but not punched. The appropriate category below was coded. "None" was coded in two circumstances only: if the report specifically stated that no arrests were made, OR if no violence was associated with the reported event (e.g. a peaceful demonstration), and there was no mention of arrests.

0. None
1. 1 to 10
2. 11 to 100
3. 101 to 1,000
4. 1,001 to 10,000
5. 10,001+
9. No basis for judging.

V35 Executions (EXECUTE)

Any reported or estimated number of executions of initiators (including purge victims) by the regime was recorded on the coding sheet and the appropriate category below was coded. "None" was coded if this was a reasonable inference, even if no specific statement was made. Reports of executions may constitute the only evidence of such events as plots and purges. Note that executions of participants in attempted coups or revolts may be reported some months after the events itself. Executions were also counted under "Deaths," Variable 38.

0. None
1. 1 to 10
2. 11 to 100
3. 101 to 1,000
4. 1,001 to 10,000
5. 10,001+
9. No basis for judging.

EXTENT OF VIOLENCE

V36 - V40

V36 Damage in the Affected Area (DAMAGE)

The relative amount of damage incurred in the area affected by the event. When damage has clearly occurred but was not explicitly reported in the source, an estimate of the likely level of damage from other, explicitly-reported indicators of violence was coded.

- 00. No damage or presumed negligible: Events in which damage is negligible in relation to the scale of the action and area involved. A few bricks or bottles thrown or windows broken incidental to a day-long demonstration of 10,000 students would be coded here. Demonstrations ordinarily were coded here, since by definition they entail little or no deliberate destruction.
- 01. Slight: Examples of damage coded here are minor breakage, pillaging of a few homes or shops, attacks on or destruction of a few autos, easily-repaired damage to transportation systems, a single bombing, killing of a few cattle, limited arson. Note that some events, such as mutinies or rural rebellions, may result in substantial loss of life but still entail only slight damage to property.
- 03. Moderate: Substantial damage to a number of buildings or vehicles, multiple bombings, widespread looting in the area encompassed by the event; destruction of several villages in the context of a large-scale rebellion; etc.
- 07. Extensive: Widespread damage and destruction in the affected area; for example, fire and bomb damage to or destruction of a large portion of buildings, extensive destruction of crops, major damage to public facilities such as transportation systems and power stations.
- 10. Massive: Complete or nearly complete devastation of whole rural areas or communities, or of large districts of one or several cities, depending on the scale of the event.
- 99. No basis for judging

V37 Who Are Casualties? (VICTIMS)

Persons reported killed OR injured in the course of or incidental to any civil strife event are casualties. The group(s) suffering casualties were specified:

INITIATORS are defined above, Variables 12-14. PUNITIVE FORCES are defined above, Variable 32. VICTIMS are individuals or groups assembled for peaceful purposes who are attacked but do not counterattack or in other ways continue the violence. Examples are theatergoers injured by a terrorist bomb; railroad workers attacked by rural bandits.

0. None, none likely
1. Initiators
2. Victims
3. Punitive forces
4. Initiators, victims
5. Initiators, punitive forces
6. Victims, punitive forces
7. All three
8. Some, unspecified
9. No basis for judging.

V38 Number of Deaths, Proximate (DTHEST)

The number of deaths suffered by all of the above groups was totaled and recorded on the coding sheet under this heading, but not punched. The appropriate coding category, below, was then coded. For example, "310 deaths" would be coded "256" and "about 100 deaths" would be coded "64." If more than 16,000 deaths were reported, the equivalent scale value was determined and coded. If 90,000 deaths were reported, for example, the scale value coded was 60,000.

In Indonesia 1965 the number of deaths reported exceeded the field size. The solution was to record the maximum possible on this variable (150,000 deaths coded 99,999), then to code a second "event" with the basic information and the additional deaths. In a few other events, excess deaths from DTHEST were recorded under Var. 39, below.

If no deaths were reported and the character of the event, or the otherwise-explicit detail of the report, suggested that none were likely, "zero, none likely" was coded.

If several estimates of deaths were given, those said by the source to be unreliable (if any) were eliminated, and the remaining estimates under "Number reported" were averaged and coded. If the source states unequivocally that many more or less deaths occurred than the reported estimate, but makes no corrected estimate, the reported number and how much it is in error, in what direction, it is thought to be, was recorded but not coded; corroboration was sought in other sources.

Convention: If "casualties" only are reported, without distinguishing between death and injuries, 20% are coded as deaths, 80% as injuries. (NOTE: The death scale is an adjusted geometric progression. Multiplying the interval designation by 1.5 gives the approximate midpoint of the interval. These midpoint values were used when aggregating deaths information.) If the established categories seemed too imprecise for the data, interpolated values were used. Interpolations were especially used for events which were particularly long, large, and/or deadly; or for which there was particularly precise data.

- 0. Zero, none likely
- 1. 1 to 2
- 3. 3 to 6
- 8. 7 to 16
- 16. 17 to 32
- 32. 33 to 64
- 64. 65 to 130
- 128. 131 to 250
- 256. 251 to 500
- 500. 501 to 1,000
- 1000. 1,001 to 2,000
- 2000. 2,001 to 4,000
- 4000. 4,001 to 8,000
- 8000. 8,001 to 16,000
- Other (calculated scale values for deaths exceeding 16,000)

-0009. No basis for judging.

V39 Number of Deaths, Estimate (DTHGUESS)

If no information could be coded under the preceding heading, a judgment on the basis of contextual materials was attempted. If information was coded or recoded under Variable 38, above, "0" was coded here.

If the report is too vague or ambiguous for any judgment about number of deaths, code "no basis for judging" under both headings. Interpolations were also used for certain events. See explanation under variable 38. When aggregating deaths information, the coded values were used.

- 0. Zero, none likely
- 4. 10 or less, "few"
- 40. 11 to 100, "scores", "many"
- 400. 101 to 1,000
- 4000. 1,001 to 10,000

-009. No basis for judging.

V40 Number of Injuries (HURT)

See comments under Variable 39, above. This variable records the source's reported number or estimate of injuries. If none were reported, "0" was coded. If some, unspecified, were mentioned, a judgment on the basis of other characteristics of the event was coded. For large internal wars injuries were rarely reported and were not estimated. Interpolations were also used for certain events. See explanation under variable 38.

- 0. None, none likely
- 4. 10 or less, "few" injuries
- 40. 11 to 100, "scores", "many" injuries
- 400. 101 to 1,000, "hundreds" of injuries
- 4000. 1,001 to 10,000 of injuries

9999. No basis for judging

EXTERNAL SUPPORT
V41 - V44

The maximum level of foreign support for initiators of civil strife and for regimes attempting to control civil strife, and the number of foreign regimes providing such support. Note that any additional support provided by a metropolitan power for a colony after the onset of civil strife constitutes external support, as does support provided by private foreign groups and by the United Nations. For the purposes of counting number of nations, the U.N. and forces under its aegis were counted as one.

V41 Degree of Support for Initiators (REBHELP)

For scaling purposes, each category under this heading was assumed to reflect a greater degree of foreign commitment to initiators than the preceding categories. The category was coded which represented the most extensive degree of support provided by any foreign source.

0. None apparent: No external support for initiators is mentioned; none is likely.
1. Arms, supplies: Use of foreign arms and supplies by initiators; knowledge or interception of shipments destined for them; and discovery of caches of foreign arms and supplies.
2. Provision of refuge: Tacit provision of an external haven for leadership cadres and/or substantial numbers of the rank-and-file initiators of civil violence. This is only coded if refugees do or are expected to return to their country to continue or re-initiate conflict. Tribesmen who cross a border for raiding and retreat back across it were also coded here, unless their own regime actively attempted to deter or punish them.
3. Provision of facilities, training: Provision of bases or organized training programs on foreign soil for substantial numbers of initiators. Distinguished from "provision of refuge" by the organized nature of assistance provided.
4. Military advisors, mercenaries: Foreign government or government approved provision of 100 or more military or quasi-military personnel to serve as advisors or small tactical units for service in the initiator's country. If mercenary units of diverse national origins are involved, the countries counted under Var. 43, below, included only those that actively facilitate participation by substantial numbers of their nationals.

5. **Military units:** Active and regular participation of 1,000 or more foreign troops as integral units in an internal war, or separately-serving mercenary units numbering more than 1,000. Service of such troops in non-combatant or support roles is coded under "military advisors...."
9. No basis for judging. If contextual material suggests that there MAY be foreign support, but provides no clear evidence.

V42 Degree of Support for Regime (REGHELP)

See "Degree of Support for Initiators," Variable

41. General economic or military assistance to a regime was not counted here, but only such assistance in specific response to the outbreak of civil strife.

0. None apparent: Regime receives no external support specifically for controlling the event in question; no such support is likely.
1. Non-military aid: Any substantial amounts of non-military economic or material aid provided a regime for the purpose of assisting the control of ONGOING civil strife. Included here are both outright aid and special loans, barter arrangements, etc.
2. Military material: Any substantial amounts of military equipment and supplies provided a regime for the purpose of suppressing ONGOING civil strife. Included are both outright aid and special financial arrangements designed to facilitate the provision of such aid.
4. Personnel, facilities: Provision of foreign training, military advisors, and/or military bases to a threatened regime for the purpose of facilitating its suppression of ONGOING civil strife.
5. Military units: Participation of 1,000 or more foreign troops as integral units in the attempted suppression of ongoing civil strife. Mercenary units numbering more than 1,000 from a single country constitute military units.
9. No basis for judging. If contextual material suggests that there MAY be foreign support, but provides no clear evidence.

V43 Number of Nations Supporting the Initiators (NREBHELP)

The identity and number of nations supporting the initiators at any of the levels of support above.

A nation which provides several types of support was counted only once. "Metro. power" signifies a metropolitan power providing support for one of its threatened colonial regimes.

- 9. No basis for judging

V44 Number of Nations Supporting the Regime (NREGHELP)
(See V43 for definitions)

-9. No basis for judging.

V45 Reliability of Report (RELIAB)

0. Unclassified: No contextual reasons to doubt the credibility of the report.
1. Unknown: Unconfirmed events reported second- or third-hand, or in passing, in sources or by parties having no apparent reason for bias. Examples are newspaper references to otherwise-undetailed "unrest" in Ethiopia's Eritrean region during 1963, and a brief, unconfirmed New York TIMES report of tribal rebellion in Mozambique in 1962. Also coded here are events about which there are widely contradictory but otherwise-credible reports regarding participants, objects and/or severity of consequences; for example, reported genocidal massacres of Tusi in Rwanda in 1962.
2. Questionable: Reports by parties or in sources whose biases are so great that there is substantial doubt about the occurrence of the reported event. Examples are plots reported by authoritarian regimes that are then used to justify some new domestic or foreign policy; reports by exile organizations of large-scale uprisings in their country of origin without other confirming evidence; authoritative communiques on internal unrest by regimes known to have good reason for minimizing (or magnifying) its extent and/or causes; etc. Source statements that events are "alleged" to have occurred often warrant coding the report as questionable.

9. No basis for judging

NOTE: Vars. 46 through 70 are coded for 1955-6) and 1966-70 events only. For 1961-65 events they are "missing".

V46 Status of Loyal Coercive Forces at Onset of Event (RFSTATUS)
Refers to the status of loyal military and internal security forces at the onset of an act of strife. The "onset" can be identified for operational purposes as the initial act of violence, or, for non-violent strife, the time at which concerted action is first taken. "Loyal" forces are those defending the regime, if any.

"Routine numbers" means that the normal number of personnel are on duty in the area in which strife begins. Operationally, numbers are "routine" if there is no indication that forces have been increased recently for any reason.

"Routine activity" refers to normal patrolling, guard, or garrison duty.

"Increased numbers" includes any increase in numbers of personnel in an area prior to the onset of strife, for any reason -- in anticipation of strife, extension of government control to a new area, etc.

"Deterrent activity" refers to action designed to deter strife; e.g., increased patrolling, increased security checks.

"Retaliatory or suppressive activity" includes punitive actions in response to real, suspected, or imagined transgressions, whether or not technically illegal. Examples range from harrassing arrests of nonconformists and beatings of suspected sympathizers of an unpopular political movement to assaults on settlements and groups because of their past conflicts with the military or police.

- 0. Absent
- 1. Routine activity, routine numbers
- 2. Routine activity, increased numbers
- 3. Routine numbers, deterrent activity
- 4. Increased numbers, deterrent activity
- 5. Retaliatory or suppressive activity
- 9. No basis for judging

V47 Regime Forces as Precipitators of Event (RFBEGIN)
Refers to the activity of loyal military and internal security forces at the onset of an act of strife. (See Variable 46 for further information.)

- 0. No precipitating role
- 1. Initial objects of attack
- 2. Initiate first act of violence; for example, taking a suspect by violence or assaulting an otherwise peaceful crowd.
- 9. No basis for judging

V48 Rapidity of Commitment of Regime Forces (RFCOMMIT)

0. Absent or minimal contact throughout
1. First major contact after peak (midpoint) of event
2. First major contact before peak (midpoint) of event
3. Major contact from onset
9. No basis for judging

V49 Variations in Regime Forces' Response (RFRESPON)

0. Absent or minimal contact throughout
1. Withdrawal/defeat/defection refers to any gradual trend toward, or early termination of strife by, any of these responses by loyal coercive forces.
2. Fluctuating or inconsistent responses includes alternating buildups and withdrawals, commitment of forces in some accessible areas and not others, alteration between policies of defensive and punitive responses.
3. Gradual buildup to high levels relative to scale
4. Rapid buildup to high levels relative to scale
9. No basis for judging

V50 Quality of Response of Regime Forces (RFLETHAL)

0. Corrective: Coercive forces promise, or actually institute on their own behalf, redress of grievances of the initiators; e.g., granting mutineers' demands, releasing prisoners in response to crowd demands.
1. Absent throughout
2. Present but passive: Coercive forces are known to be present, but take no action either to deter initiators or to protect their targets.
3. Defensive: Coercive forces protect targets from initiators, but take punitive action against initiators only when they attack the targets or the coercive forces themselves.
4. Dispersive: Coercive forces use non-violent, non-punitive methods to deter initiators; e.g., promises of amnesty, demands that initiators disperse on pain of sanctions, certain kinds of street-clearing operations, etc.
5. Non-violently punitive: Arrests, detentions, quarantine of initiators, with minimum use of force.
6. Violently but non-lethally punitive: Use of physical force, chemical agents, etc., designed to injure but not kill initiators.
7. Lethally punitive, restrained: Selective, equivalent use of lethal force; e.g., "Shoot only when shot at."
8. Lethally punitive, unrestrained: Use of most or all force at the coercive forces' command without reference to magnitude of initiators' actions and/or their guilt; e.g., indiscriminate shooting of looters, saturation shelling of suspected Viet Cong villages, etc.
9. No basis for judging

IDENTITY OF CASUALTIES

What groups are most likely to be killed or injured in conflict events? The set of indicators from Variable 51, Number of Coercive Forces Killed in the Event; to Variable 56, Number of Victims Injured in the Event; is designed to give the analyst information on the directionality of violence. The three group categories are regime forces (the military, police, and foreign military supporters, if any); "initiators" (private groups engaged in dissident action, including regime supporters who participate in conspiracies and rebellions); and victims (all others, including non-participant bystanders and targeted victims). Such information is only partially reported in news sources, and deaths are reported more often and precisely than injuries.

The categories represented in Variable 51, Number of Coercive Forces Killed in the Event; Variable 52, Number of Coercive Forces Injured in the Event; Variable 53, Number of initiators Killed in the Event; Variable 54, Number of Initiators injured in the Event; Variable 55, Number of Victims Killed in the Event; and Variable 56, Number of Victims Injured in the Event; all information reported or directly inferable from the source was listed. Note that 0 is a real value, based on a clear inference from the source that no casualties occurred in the category, while 99999 signifies missing data. Almost any combination of 9999's, 0's, and non-zero values can appear in this set of six coding categories. For example, a sketchy account of a riot may include only the statement that "no deaths were reported". In this instance, all three DEATH categories are coded 0 and all three injury categories 99999. It cannot be assumed, simply because no deaths were reported, that there were no injuries. In a second example, a demonstration was said to have resulted in 12 injuries to police and about 50 to demonstrators, but no reference was made to the deaths. In this case all the DTH categories are coded 0., on the assumption that if a report is thorough enough to mention injuries to groups involved, it would report any deaths that had occurred. Variable 52, Number of Coercive Forces Injured in the Event is coded 12, and Variable 54, Number of Initiators Injured in the Event is coded 50, and Variable 56, Number of Victims Injured in the Event is coded as missing 999999 not 0, because it is likely in clashes of this sort that some passers-by were injured, even though not specifically identified in a news report.

Variable 86, Regime Death Ratio; Variable 87, Initiator Death Ratio; Variable 88, Victim Death Ratio; Variable 89, Regime Injury Ratio; Variable 90, Initiator Injury Ratio; and Variable 91, Victim Injury Ratio; are ratios calculated from Variables 51-56 insofar as data are available. Each group's DEATH ratio is a percentage of the total deaths incurred in that event; each group's INJURY ratio is its percentage of total injuries. An index-construction procedure was followed which maximized the use of available information, though with some potential loss of accuracy. A ratio was calculated for each event in which at least two of the three component variables (for regimes, initiators, victims) had non-missing values, and at least one had a non-zero value. These are some consequences of this procedure:

--if all three components are 0, then all three ratios should be -9; it is conceptually inappropriate to score injury or death ratios 0 if no injuries or deaths occurred in any group.

--if all three components are missing, then all three ratios should be -9.

--if two of the three components are missing but one has a non-zero datum, all three ratios should be -9. Information is too scanty to assume that the non-zero group alone sustained all the casualties.

--if one component is missing, one is zero, and one is greater than zero, (or if two are greater than zero), THE MISSING COMPONENT IS TREATED AS 0 AND RATIOS ARE COMPUTED FOR ALL THREE INDICES. The -9 component thus is converted into a 0 ratio. In this instance information is sufficient to assume that the non-zero group(s) sustained most, if not quite all casualties. The procedure introduces a small potential bias to the ratios but results in less information loss than a more rigorous procedure which required non-missing values on all three components. If the last procedure was used, ratios could not be calculated for a large portion of the events for which they are now calculated.

V51 - V56

Recorded here are the reported or estimated number of dead and injured among three groups: the COERCIVE FORCES (police + military); the INITIATORS (the groups who initiate the strife event; e.g., terrorists, guerrillas, rioters, demonstrators); and VICTIMS (individuals or groups assembled for peaceful purposes who are attacked but do not counterattack or in other ways continue the violence).

V51 Number of Coercive Forces Killed in Event (RFDTH)

99999. No basis for judging

V52 Number of Coercive Forces Injured in Event (RPHURT)

99999. No basis for judging

V53 Number of Initiators Killed in Event (INITDTH)

999999. No basis for judging

V54 Number of Initiators Injured in Event (INITHURT)

99999. No basis for judging

V55 Number of Victims Killed in Event (VICDTH)

999999. No basis for judging

V56 Number of Victims Injured in Event (VICHURT)

999999. No basis for judging

MULTIPLE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MOTIVES FOR THE EVENT
V57 - V70

If political, economic, or social motives (vars. 28-30) are coded 'several of the above' the specific motives are coded 1 here. The coding was done only for the 1955-60 and 1966-70 events. For 1961-65 the "several" motives can be ascertained only by inspection of the original coding sheets.

- V57 Political Motives: Retaliation (POL1)
1. Present
0. Not present
- V58 Political Motives: Seize Power (POL2)
1. Present
0. Not present
- V59 Political Motives: Increase Participation (POL3)
1. Present
0. Not present
- V60 Political Motives: Injure Competitors (POL4)
1. Present
0. Not present
- V61 Political Motives: Oppose Policy (POL5)
1. Present
0. Not present
- V62 Political Motives: Oppose Politician (POL6)
1. Present
0. Not present
- V63 Political Motives: Oppose Foreign Nation (POL7)
1. Present
0. Not present
- V64 Economic Motives: Seize Economic Goods (EC2)
1. Present
0. Not present

- V65 Economic Motives: Change Distribution Pattern (EC3)
1. Present
 0. Not present
- V66 Economic Motives: Oppose Economic Actor (EC4)
1. Present
 0. Not present
- V67 Social Motives: Retaliation (SOC1)
1. Present
 0. Not present
- V68 Social Motives: Promote/Oppose Belief System (SOC2)
1. Present
 0. Not present
- V69 Social Motives: Promote/Oppose Community (SOC3)
1. Present
 0. Not present
- V70 Social Motives: Increase Social Goods (SOC4)
1. Present
 0. Not present
- V71 Economic Cluster of Country (ECOCLU)
1. High (developed)
 2. Medium (transitional)
 3. Low (low)
 9. No basis for judging
- V72 Geocultural Cluster of Country (GEOCLU)
1. Africa: South of the Sahara
 2. Asia: excluding Islamic Nations of the Middle East
 3. Europe: including Israel and European settled countries of North America, the Pacific, and Southern Africa
 4. Islamic
 5. Latin: including Spain, Portugal, and Puerto Rico
 9. No basis for judging

V73 Political Cluster of Country (POLCLU)

1. Centrist
2. Elitist
3. New democracy
4. Old democracy
5. Personalist

9. No basis for judging

V74 General Form of the Event (EVENTFOR)

1. Turmoil
An event was regarded as a turmoil if Var.21, (Summary of the form of Event) was coded as 1: TURNOIL, 4: TURMOIL & INTERNAL WAR, OR 9: MISSING.
2. Rebellion
An event was regarded as a rebellion if Var.21, TYPESUM was coded as 2: CONSPIRACY, 3: INTERNAL WAR, or 5: CONSPIRACY & INTERNAL WAR.

9. No basis for judging

V75 Violent Nature of the Event (VIONOVIC)

1. Non-violent event
A non-violent event is one for which Var.36, (Damage), was coded 00, none or negligible; and for which Var.37, was coded 0, or none likely.
2. Violent event
A violent event is one for which Var.36, was coded any non-zero value or Var. 37, was coded any non-zero value.

9. No basis for judging

V76 Anti-Foreign Nature of the Event (ANTIFCRM)

1. Exclusively anti-foreign
An event was considered "exclusively anti-foreign" if Var.28, POLMOTIV(Political motives of initiators), was coded 7, oppose foreign nation's policy or actors.
2. Other than exclusively anti-foreign
An event was considered "other than exclusively anti-foreign" if Var.28, POLMOTIV(Political motives of initiators), was coded any value other than 7 including 0.

9. No basis for judging

V77 Political Nature of the Event (POLIEVEN)

1. Non-political event
An event was considered "non-political" if Var.28, (Political motives of initiators), was coded 0, none or minor.
2. Political event
An event was considered "political" if Var.28, (Political motives of initiators), was coded any value 1 through 9.
9. No basis for judging

V78 Degree of External Support for Initiators (EXINS)

The degree of external support equals the product of the degree of external support (Variable 41) times the number of nations supporting the initiators (Variable 43).

$$EXINS = REBHELP \times NREBHELP$$

V79 Degree of External Support for Initiators (EXREG)

The degree of external support for initiators equals the degree of external support for the regime (Variable 42) times the number of initiators supporting the regime (Variable 44).

$$EXREG = REGHELP \times NREGHELP$$

V80 Event Magnitude: Sum of All Initiators of Event (MEN)

This variable is the sum of the number of initiators, proximate (Variable 14) times 20, plus the number of initiators, estimate (Variable 15) times 10.

$$MEN = [20 (NUMEST) + 10 (NUMGUESS)]$$

V81 Event Magnitude: Duration of the Event in Days (NDAYS)

This variable is 0.3 times the duration of the action measured in days (Variable 24).

$$NDAYS = 0.3 \times DAYS$$

V82 Event Death (NDTHS)

Event magnitude: sum of all deaths in event.

$$NDTHS = [1.5 \times DTHST] + [DTHGUESS]$$

V83 Man-Days Proportional to Population (per 100,000) (MDAYPOP)

$$MDAYPOP = (MEN \times NDAYS) / POP$$

V84 Deaths Proportional to Population (per 10 million) (DTHPOP)

$$DTHPOP = DTHS / (.01 \times POP)$$

V85 Intensity of the Event (EVENTINT)

$$EVENTINT = DTHS / (.01 \times MEN)$$

CASUALTY RATIOS

V86 - V91

For construction of these variables see the Identity of Casualties description preceeding vars. 51 - 56.

- V86 Regime Death Ratio (RDTH)**
 The regime death ratio equals the numbers of coercive forces killed in the event (Variable 51) divided by the sum of Variable 51, the number of initiators killed in the event (Variable 53), and the number of victims killed in the event (Variable 55).

$$RDTH = RFDTH/RFDTH + INITDTH + VICDTH$$
- V87 Initiators Death Ratio (IDTH)**
 The initiators death ratio is equal to the number of initiators killed in the event (Variable 53), divided by the sum of the number of coercive forces killed in the event (Variable 51), and the total of the initiators killed in the event (Variable 53) and the number of victims killed in the event (Variable 55).

$$IDTH = INITDTH/RFDTH + INITDTH + VICDTH$$
- V88 Victims Death Ratio (VDTH)**
 The victims death ratio is equal to the number of victims killed in the event (Variable 55) divided by the sum of the number of coercive forces killed in the event (Variable 51), the number of initiators killed in the event (Variable 53), and the number of victims killed in the event (Variable 55).

$$VDTH = VICDTH/RFDTH + INITDTH + VICDTH$$
- V89 Regime Injury Ratio (RFINJ)**
 The regime injury ratio is equal to the number of coercive forces injured in the event (Variable 52) divided by the sum of the number of coercive forces injured in the event, the number of initiators injured in the event (Variable 54), and the number of victims injured in the event (Variable 56).

$$RFINJ = RPHURT/RPHURT + INITHURT + VICHURT$$
- V90 Initiators Injury Ratio (IINJ)**
 The initiators injury ratio is equal to the number of initiators hurt in the event divided by the sum of the number of initiators injured in the event (Variable 54), the number of coercive forces hurt (Variable 52), and the number of victims injured in the event (Variable 56).

$$IINJ = INITHURT/RPHURT + INITHURT + VICHURT$$
- V91 Victims Injury Ratio (VINJ)**
 The victims injury ratio is equal to the number of victims hurt in the event (Variable 56) divided by the sum of the number of victims hurt, the number of initiators hurt (Variable 54), and the number of coercive forces hurt in the event (Variable 52).

$$VINJ = VICHURT/VICHURT + INITHURT + RPHURT$$
- V92 Event Sequence Number**
 A unique numeric code assigned each civil strife event appears as the first variable on the card image version of the data.

VARIABLE FORMAT FOR CIVIL STRIFE EVENTS DATA

```

****DECK=      1
  COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  MDCODE1
  1 - 1         IS THE CONSTANT: '1'
  2 - 5         EVENT SEQ. NO.      92    4     224   0
  6 - 8         COUNTRY             1     3     1     0
  9 - 11        @ C*CODE             2     3     4     0   0000999
 12 - 15        POF                 3     4     7     0   0009999
 16 - 16        REPORT              4     1    11    J   0000009
 17 - 18        BEGAN               5     2    12    0   0000099
 19 - 20        YEAREND             6     2    14    J   0000099
 21 - 22        MTEEND              7     2    16    J   0000099
 23 - 24        DAYEND              8     2    18    J   0000099
 25 - 26        LCCLASS             9     2    20    0   -000009
 27 - 28        HICLASS            10    2    22    J   -000009
 29 - 30        ELITES              11    2    24    0   -000009
 31 - 32        CLASSUM            12    2    26    J   -000009
 33 - 34        ALIENS              13    2    28    0   -000009
 35 - 39        NUMEST              14    5    30    J   0099999
 40 - 43        NUMGUESS            15    4    35    0   0009999
 44 - 45        GROUP               16    2    39    J   0000099
 46 - 48        SOCAREA             17    3    41    0   0000999
 49 - 49        TURMOIL             18    1    44    0   0000009
 50 - 50        CCNSPIRE            19    1    45    J   -000009
 51 - 51        IWAR                20    1    46    0   0000009
 52 - 52        TYPESUM             21    1    47    0   0000009
 53 - 54        ACINUM              22    2    48    J   -000009
 55 - 55        ACTINCID            23    1    50    0   0000009
 56 - 59        DAYS                24    4    51    J   0009999
 60 - 60        PCIPERTY            25    1    55    0   0000009
 61 - 62        PCIACTOR            26    2    56    0   -000009
 63 - 64        PRIVACTR            27    2    58    0   -000009
 65 - 66        PCLMOTIVE           28    2    60    0   -000009
 67 - 67        ECCMOTIVE           29    1    62    0   0000009
 68 - 68        SOCMOTIVE           30    1    63    0   0000009
 69 - 69        RPROLE              31    1    64    0   0000009
 70 - 70        RPTYPE              32    1    65    J   0000009
 71 - 71        RPBUM               33    1    66    0   0000009
 72 - 72        ARRESTS             34    1    67    0   0000009
 73 - 73        EXECUTE             35    1    68    0   0000009
 74 - 75        DAMAGE              36    2    69    0   0000099
 76 - 76        VICTIMS             37    1    71    0   0000009
 77 - 80        ARE BLANK

```

@ indicates alphabetic variable

```

****DECK=      2
  COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  MDCODE1
  1 - 1         IS THE CONSTANT: '2'
  2 - 5         EVENT SEQ. NO.      92     4     224    0
  6 - 10        DTHEST                38     5     72     0    -000009
 11 - 14        DTGUESS                39     4     77     0    -000009
 15 - 18        HURT                  40     4     81     0    0009999
 19 - 19        REEHHELP               41     1     85     0    0000009
 20 - 20        REGHELP               42     1     86     0    0000009
 21 - 22        NREBHELP              43     2     87     0    -000009
 23 - 24        NREGHELP              44     2     89     0    -000009
 25 - 25        RELIAB                 45     1     91     0    0000009
 26 - 26        RPSTATUS               46     1     92     0    0000009
 27 - 27        RFEEGIN                47     1     93     0    0000009
 28 - 28        RFCOMMIT              48     1     94     0    0000009
 29 - 29        RFRESPON              49     1     95     0    0000009
 30 - 30        RPLETRAL              50     1     96     0    0000009
 31 - 35        RFDEATH                51     5     97     0    0099999
 36 - 40        RFHURT                 52     5    102     0    0099999
 41 - 46        INITDTH                53     6    107     0    0999999
 47 - 51        INITHURT              54     5    113     0    0099999
 52 - 57        VICDTH                 55     6    118     0    0999999
 58 - 63        VICHURT                56     6    124     0    0999999
 64 - 64        POL1                   57     1    130     0    0000000
 65 - 65        PCI2                   58     1    131     0    0000000
 66 - 66        PCI3                   59     1    132     0    0000000
 67 - 67        PCI4                   60     1    133     0    0000000
 68 - 68        PCL5                   61     1    134     0    0000000
 69 - 69        PCI6                   62     1    135     0    0000000
 70 - 70        POL7                   63     1    136     0    0000000
 71 - 71        EC2                    64     1    137     0    0000000
 72 - 72        EC3                    65     1    138     0    0000000
 73 - 73        EC4                    66     1    139     0    0000000
 74 - 74        SOC1                   67     1    140     0    0000000
 75 - 75        SOC2                   68     1    141     0    0000000
 76 - 76        SOC3                   69     1    142     0    0000000
 77 - 77        SCC4                   70     1    143     0    0000000
 78 - 78        ECOCLU                 71     1    144     0    0000009
 79 - 79        GEOCLU                 72     1    145     0    0000009
 80 - 80        PCLCLU                 73     1    146     0    0000009

```

```

****DECK=      3
  COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  MDCODE1
  1 - 1         IS THE CONSTANT: '3'
  2 - 5         EVENT SEQ. NO.      92     4     224    J
  6 - 6         EVENTFOR           74     1     147    J    0000009
  7 - 7         VICNOVIO           75     1     148    0    0000009
  8 - 8         ANTIFORN           76     1     149    0    0000009
  9 - 9         PCLIEVEN           77     1     150    0    0000009
 10 - 11        EKINS              78     2     151    0    -J00009
 12 - 13        EXREG              79     2     153    0    -000009
 14 - 21        MEN                80     8     155    J    -J00009
 22 - 26        NDAYS              81     5     163    4    -J00009
 27 - 33        NDTHS              82     7     168    1    -000009
 34 - 41        NDAYPOP            83     8     175    2    -000009
 42 - 50        DTBPOP            84     9     183    3    -000009
 51 - 58        EVENTINT           85     8     192    3    -000009
 59 - 62        RDTH              86     4     200    3    -000009
 63 - 66        IDTH              87     4     204    3    -000009
 67 - 70        VDTH              88     4     208    3    -000009
 71 - 74        RFINJ             89     4     212    3    -000009
 75 - 78        IINJ              90     4     216    3    -000009
 79 - 80        ARE BLANK

```

```

****DECK=      4
  COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  MDCODE1
  1 - 1         IS THE CONSTANT: '4'
  2 - 5         EVENT SEQ. NO.      92     4     224    0
  6 - 9         VINJ              91     4     220    3    -000009
 10 - 80        ARE BLANK

```


CONFLICT MAGNITUDES

(ICPSR 7485)

Principal Investigators

**Ted Robert Gurr
Vaughn Bishop**

ICPSR 7485

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ICPSR ASSISTANCE

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STUDY DESCRIPTION FOR CONFLICT MAGNITUDES DATASET

This section provides summary information on measures of the magnitude and intensity of civil conflict during 1955-1970 in 115 countries. All these measures are derived by aggregating and weighting coded information on conflict events, for which see documentation on the "Civil Strife Events" dataset.

There are five conflict magnitude datasets: three based on five-year aggregations for 1955-1960, 1961-1965, and 1966-1970 (with 10, 115, and 87 countries respectively), and two based on annual aggregations, one containing all 115 countries, 1961-1970, and one containing only the 10 countries, 1955-1970, for which the data were collected for all years. See column C of Appendix A for a listing of the countries and the years for which data are available.

The first group of 66 variables below corresponds to the five year aggregations datasets. The second group of 11 variables pertains to the annual aggregations datasets. Operational distinctions among different aspects and kinds of conflict are described here.

(1) Political Conflict: All conflict magnitude measures are constructed using data on "political" events only, defined by reference to event Variable 77, "political" event=2. These are events coded as having apparent political motives.

(2) Man-Days and Deaths: For every set of events, we construct measures of two different aspects of "magnitude": SCOPE of conflict is indexed by the number of man-days of participation per 100,000 population, the INTENSITY of conflict is indexed by the number of deaths per 10 million population. These two measures are separately calculated and combined for each of the sets of "magnitude" measures listed below. An alternative measure of intensity is calculated by weighting total deaths by number of participants, across all events, but is not combined into any "magnitude" scores.

(3) Domestic Vs. Anti-Foreign Political Conflict: Separate and mutually exclusive sets of "magnitude" measures are constructed for domestic and anti-foreign conflict, defined by reference to event Variable 76. "Exclusively anti-foreign" events are those coded as being motivated primarily or exclusively by opposition to a foreign nation's policies or actors; all others are categorized as domestic events, though they too may have some anti-foreign aspects as well. There are relatively few "anti-foreign" events relative to "domestic" events.

(4) Violent Vs. Non-Violent Political Conflict: Separate and mutually exclusive sets of "magnitude" measures are constructed for violent and non-violent political conflict, defined by reference to event Variable 75. Non-violent events -- mainly political demonstrations and strikes, and plots -- are those for which neither casualties nor property damage are reported. Note that the "magnitude" measures for non-violent conflict must, by definition, be based on the "man-days" measure alone. Note also that this distinction cuts across the domestic vs. anti-foreign distinction, but that no separate measures are constructed for violent vs. non-violent DOMESTIC conflict or violent vs. non-violent ANTI-FOREIGN conflict.

(5) Turmoil Vs. Rebellion: Separate and mutually-exclusive sets of "magnitude" measures are constructed for conflict events categorized as turmoil and rebellion respectively, operationally defined by reference to event variable 74. "Turmoil" comprises events such as riots, demonstrations, clashes, and local rebellion. "Rebellion" comprises events categorized as "conspiracy" and "internal war," ranging from plots and coups to terrorism and civil and guerrilla wars. Two different sets of turmoil and rebellion measures are constructed, one for all political conflict, the second set for domestic political conflict only.

Users should note that the first "five-year" aggregation time period, (1955-1960), is really six years.

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION FOR CONFLICT MAGNITUDES

MEASURES OF MAGNITUDE OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFLICT: FIVE
YEAR AGGREGATIONS

- V1 Three Letter Country Identifier
- V2 Numeric Country Identifier
- V3 Total Number of Participants in all Domestic Political Conflict Events
Sum [20 (Civil Strife Events Var. 14)] + [1] (Civil Strife Events
Var. 15)]
- V4 Total Number of Deaths in all Domestic Political Conflict Events
Sum [1.5 (Civil Strife Events Var. 38)] + [Civil Strife Events
Var. 39]
- V5 Man-Days of Participation per 100,000 Population in Domestic Political
Conflict Events
This and subsequent Man-Days variables were constructed by aggregating
for each country the values of Civil Strife Events dataset Var. 83,
NDAYPOP, for the appropriate subset of events.
- V6 Deaths per 10 Million Population in Domestic Political Conflict
This and Subsequent Deaths variables were constructed by aggregating
for each country the values of Civil Strife Events dataset Var. 84,
DTRPOP, for the appropriate subset of events.
- V7 Man-Days per 100,000 Population in Domestic Turmoil Events
- V8 Deaths per 10 Million Population in Domestic Political Turmoil Events
- V9 Man-Days per 100,000 Population in Domestic Political Rebellion Events
- V10 Deaths per 10 Million Population in Domestic Political Rebellion Events

MEASURES OF MAGNITUDE OF ANTI-FOREIGN POLITICAL CONFLICT:
FIVE YEAR AGGREGATIONS

- V11 Man-Days of Participation per 100,000 Population in Anti-foreign
Political Conflict Events
- V12 Deaths per 10 Million Population in Anti-foreign Political Conflict
Events

MEASURES OF MAGNITUDE OF ALL POLITICAL CONFLICT, DOMESTIC
AND ANTI-FOREIGN: FIVE YEAR AGGREGATIONS

- V13 Total Number of Participants in all Political Conflict Events
Aggregation by country of Civil Strife Events dataset Var. 80, MEN,
for all political events (Var. 77 PCIEVEN = 2, "political event")
- V14 Total Number of Deaths in all Political Conflict Events
Aggregation by country of Civil Strife Events dataset Var. 82, NDTES,
for all political events

MEASURES OF MAGNITUDE OF VIOLENT POLITICAL CONFLICT EVENTS,
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN: FIVE YEAR AGGREGATIONS

- V15 Man-Days of Participation per 100,000 Population in all Violent
Political Conflict Events
- V16 Deaths per 10 Million Population in all Violent Political Conflict Events
- V17 Man-Days of Participation per 100,000 Population in all Violent Turmoil
Events
- V18 Deaths per 10 Million Population in all Violent Turmoil Events
- V19 Number of Deaths in Political Conflict Events for Which the Identify
of Casualties is Known (not coded for 1961-1965) (Sum of Var. 51, 53
and 55, Civil Strife Events Dataset)
- V20 Number of Regime Forces Reported Killed in Political Conflict Events
(not coded for 1961-1965) (Sum of Var. 51, Civil Strife Events Dataset)
- V21 Number of Initiators Reported Killed in Political Conflict Events (not
coded for 1961-1965) (Sum of Var. 53, Civil Strife Events Dataset)
- V22 Number of Injuries in Political Conflict Events for Which the Identity
of Casualties is Known (not coded for 1961-1965) (Sum of Var. 52, 54
and 56, Civil Strife Events Dataset)
- V23 Number of Regime Forces Reported Injured in Political Conflict Events
for Which the Identity of Casualties is Known (not coded for 1961
1965) (Sum of Var. 52, Civil Strife Events Dataset)
- V24 Number of Initiators Reported Injured in Political Conflict Events for
Which the Identity of Casualties is Known (not coded for 1961-1965)
(Sum of Var. 54, Civil Strife Events Dataset)

MEASURES OF MAGNITUDE OF NON-VIOLENT POLITICAL CONFLICT EVENTS:
FIVE YEAR AGGREGATIONS

V25 Man-Days of Participation per 100,000 Population in all Non-violent Political Conflict Events

V26 Man-Days of Participation per 100,000 Population in all Non-violent Political Turmoil Events

SUMMARY MEASURES OF FIVE YEAR MAGNITUDES AND INTENSITY OF CONFLICT

V27 Magnitude of all Domestic Political Conflict, Using Var. 5 and Var. 6

The general procedure for constructing these magnitude scores was as follows:

- (1) The constant 0.3 was added to Man-Days of participation per 100,000 population and to Deaths per 10 million for each country-case. (Each of the five-year aggregations constitutes a country case.)
- (2) These measures were logged to the base 1).
- (3) Each of the two logged measures was Z-scored across all country-cases; i. e., for purposes of Z-scoring the 10 1956-60 cases, the 115 1961-1965 cases, and the 87 1966 1970 cases were pooled.
- (4) The two Z-scores for each country-case were added to obtain a summary measure of magnitude. The 1961-65 magnitude scores for Malaysia are underestimated. The "events" datasets for Malaya include corrected data and so do Vars. 3 to 26 above. But the Z-scoring procedure for Vars. 27-29, 31-33, and 35-37 was not repeated.

V28 Magnitude of all Domestic Political Turmoil, Using Var. 7 and Var. 8 (See Var. 27 for magnitude score construction procedure)

V29 Magnitude of all Domestic Political Rebellion, Using Var. 9 and Var. 10 (See Var. 27 for magnitude score construction procedure)

V30 Intensity of Domestic Political Conflict, Var. 4/.0001 (Var. 3)

V31 Magnitude of all Anti-foreign Political Conflict, Using Var. 11 and Var. 12 (See Var. 27 for magnitude score construction procedure)

- V32 Magnitude of all Political Conflict, Domestic and Anti-foreign (See Var. 27 for magnitude score construction procedure)
- V33 Magnitude of all Political Turmoil, Domestic and Anti-foreign (See Var. 27 for magnitude score construction procedure)
- V34 Intensity of all Political Conflict Var. 14/.0001 (Var. 13)
- V35 Magnitude of all Violent Political Conflict, Using Var. 15 and Var. 16 (See Var. 27 for magnitude score construction procedure)
- V36 Magnitude of all Violent Political Turmoil, Using Var. 17 and Var. 18 (See Var. 27 for magnitude score construction procedure)
- V37 Magnitude of all Non-violent Political Turmoil: Man-Days of Participation in Non-Violent Events (Var. 26) + 0.3 logged and Z-scored.
- V38 Proportional Deaths of Regime Forces in Events Where Identity of Casualties is Known, Var. 20/Var. 19 (Not coded for 1961-1965)
- V39 Proportional Deaths of Initiators in Events Where Identity of Casualties is Known, Var. 21/Var. 19 (Not coded for 1961-1965)
- V40 Proportional Injuries of Regime Forces in Events Where Identity of Casualties is Known, Var. 23/Var. 22 (Not coded for 1961-1965)
- V41 Proportional Injuries of Initiators in Events Where Identity of Casualties is Known, Var. 24/Var.22 (Not coded for 1961-1965)

SOCIAL CLASS OF INITIATORS: FIVE YEAR AGGREGATIONS

All of the following measures are constructed using data on man-days of participation per 100,000 population in all political conflict events. Each represents the proportion of a case's man-days of conflict attributable to particular class and group participation and motives. The categories of classes, groups, and motives are coded for each event, where known; each category below was defined operationally in terms of coded variables in the Civil Strife Events dataset, and references in the descriptions below are to those variables. The denominator used in the calculation of all proportions is total political man-days per 100,000 population (the sum of Variable 5, man-days of participation per 100,000 population in domestic political conflict events, and Variable 11, man-days of participation per 100,000 population in anti-foreign political conflict events) FOR EXAMPLE: Variable 42 is the proportion of all man-days in a case which occurred in events coded as having substantial lower-class participation on Civil Strife Events Var. 9. Variable 43 is the proportion of all man-days in events with coded middle- and upper-class participation on Civil Strife Events Var. 10. Variable 44 signifies regime-class participation on Civil Strife Events Var. 11; and Variable 45 signifies man-days in events in which class participation could not be coded. The sum of Var. 42, 43, 44, and 45 ordinarily will equal more than 1.00 for any given country-case because most events have multiple-class participation.

- V42 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict With Lower-Class Participation
- V43 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict With Middle- and/or Upper-Class Participation
- V44 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict with Regime-Class Participation
- V45 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict in Events Where Class Participation is Unknown

GROUP CONTEXT OF ACTION: FIVE YEAR AGGREGATIONS

These variables refer to underdog groups involved in conflict, not to regime actors such as the military and police when acting in their conventional regime-supporting roles. Only one group is coded for each conflict event, except in the case of political clashes, when two contending private groups may be coded.

- V46 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict Involving Unstructured or Territorial Groups
Conflicts involved unstructured or territorial groups if Civil Strife Events, Var. 16, "Initiators Acting as Members of..." was coded 0, unstructured group, or 1, territorial group.

- V47 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict Involving Religious, Ethnic, Linguistic or Communal Groups
Conflicts involved religious, ethnic, linguistic, or communal groups if Civil Strife Events, Var. 16, was coded 2, Ethnic, Linguistic; 3, Religious; or 4, Communal.
- V48 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict Involving Apolitical, Student Groups
Conflicts involved apolitical student groups if Civil Strife Events, Var. 16, was coded 5, Apolitical student group.
- V49 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict Involving Conventional Political Groups
Conflicts involved conventional political groups if Civil Strife Events, Var. 16, was coded 6, Political Group.
- V50 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict Involving Economic (Labor, Business, etc.) Groups
Conflicts involved economic groups if Civil Strife Events, Var. 16, was coded 7, Economic Group.
- V51 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict Involving Government Factions (coup groups, etc.)
Conflicts involved governmental factions if Civil Strife Events, Var. 16, was coded 8, Governing Hierarchy.
- V52 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict Involving Clandestine Groups Outside of Government
Conflicts involved clandestine groups outside of government if Civil Strife Events, Var. 16, was coded 9, Clandestine group.
- V53 Proportion of May Days of Conflict in Events Where Group Context of Action is Unknown
Conflicts were coded as group action unknown if Civil Strife Events, Var. 16, was coded 99, No basis for judging.

POLITICAL MOTIVES FOR ACTION: 1955-1960 AND 1966-1970 ONLY

V54 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict Aimed Wholly or in Substantial Part at Seizing Political Power

Conflicts were cited as having aimed wholly or in substantial part at seizing political power if Civil Strife Events, Var. 28, "Political Motives of Initiators," was coded 2, Seize political power; or if Civil Strife Events, Var. 58, "Seize power," had any value other than missing data.

V55 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict Aimed Wholly or in Substantial Part at Changing Governmental Policies or Personnel

Conflicts were determined to be directed at changing government policies or personnel if Civil Strife Events, Var. 28, "Political Motives of Initiators," was coded 3, Increase political participation; 5, Promote/oppose specific domestic policies; or 6, Promote/oppose specific domestic political actor.

V56 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict Aimed Wholly or in Substantial Part at Competing Private Political Group

Conflicts were included in this category if Civil Strife Events, Var. 28, was coded 4, Injure/suppress competing political group.

V57 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict Aimed Wholly or in Substantial Part at Other or Diffuse Political Objectives

Conflicts were included in this category if Civil Strife Events, Var. 28, was coded 1, Retaliation; 7, Oppose foreign nation's policy or actors; or 9, Diffuse political motives.

V58 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict in Events Where Motives for Action Are Not Codable

Conflicts were included in this category if Civil Strife Events, Var. 28, was coded -9, No basis for judging.
NOTE: Because participants in political clashes are double-counted, once for each kind of group involved, the values for this variable are negative in a few cases. Negative values should be treated as 0.

POLITICAL MOTIVES FOR ACTION: ALL THREE PERIODS

These proportions are conceptually defined as those in Var. 54 to 58, above, but with more restricted operational definitions. The essential difference is that events with multiple-coded political motives are all aggregated in Var. 63, below, whereas in Var. 54-58 they are added separately to each appropriate precise category.

- V59 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict Aimed Wholly at Seizing Political Power
- Conflicts were determined to have aimed wholly at seizing political power if Civil Strife Events, Var. 28, was coded 2, Seize political power.
- V60 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict Aimed Wholly at Changing Governmental Policies or Personnel
- Conflicts were said to have been aimed wholly at changing governmental policies or personnel if Civil Strife Events, Var. 28, was coded 3, Increase political power; 5, Promote/oppose specific domestic policy; or 6, Promote/oppose specific political actor.
- V61 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict Aimed Wholly at a Competing Private Group
- Conflicts were determined to have been aimed wholly at a competing private group if Civil Strife Events, Var. 28, was coded 4, Injure/suppress competing political group.
- V62 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict with Other or Diffuse Political Objectives
- Conflicts were said to have had other or diffuse political objectives if Civil Strife Events, Var. 28, was coded 1, Retaliation; 7, Oppose foreign nation's policy; or 9, diffuse political motives.
- V63 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict in Events Where Motives Are Mixed but Specific Political Objectives of the Same Types
- Conflicts were said to have contained mixed but specific political objectives if Civil Strife Events, Var. 28, was coded 8, Several of the above.
- V64 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict in Events Where Motives for Action Are Not Codable.

NON-POLITICAL MOTIVES FOR ACTION: ALL THREE PERIODS

Since the dataset includes only events with some political motives or targets, the following proportions cannot be taken as indicators of the relative importance of overt economic and social motives for all manifest conflict in a country, but only as indicators of the extent to which they occur in combination with political motives.

V65 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict with Substantial Economic Motives

Conflicts were determined as having substantial economic motives if Civil Strife Events, Var. 29, "Economic Motives of Initiators," was coded any value except 0, None or minor.

V66 Proportion of Man-Days of Conflict with Substantial Social Motives

Conflicts were determined as having substantial social motives if Civil Strife Events, Var. 30, "Social Motives of Initiators," was coded as any other value except 0, None or minor.

VARIABLE FORMAT FOR FIVE YEAR MAGNITUDES

***DECK 1

COLUMNS	VARIABLE NAME	VAR #	WIDTH	TLOC	NODEC	MDCODE1
1 - 2	IS THE CONSTANT: '01'					
3 - 5	NUMERIC COUNTRY ID	2	3	4	0	-000009
6 - 8	@ 3-LETTER COUNTRY CODE	1	3	1	0	-9
9 - 16	PARTICIPANTS DOM POL	3	8	7	0	-000009
17 - 24	DEATHS DOM POL	4	8	15	1	-000009
25 - 33	MAN-DAYS DOM POL	5	9	23	2	-000009
34 - 42	DEATHS/10MILL DOM POL	6	9	32	3	-000009
43 - 51	MAN-DAYS/POP DOM TUR	7	9	41	3	-000009
52 - 59	DEATHS/10MILL DOM POLTUR	8	8	50	3	-000009
60 - 68	MAN-DAYS/POP DOM POLREB	9	9	58	2	-000009
69 - 77	DEATHS/10MILL DOM POLREB	10	9	67	3	-000009
78 - 80	ARE BLANK					

****DECK= 2

COLUMNS	VARIABLE NAME	VAR #	WIDTH	TLOC	NODEC	MDCODE1
1 - 2	IS THE CONSTANT: '02'					
3 - 5	NUMERIC COUNTRY ID	2	3	4	0	-000009
6 - 14	MAN-DAYS/POP ANTIFOREIGN	11	9	76	3	-000009
15 - 23	DEATHS/10MILL ANTIFORGN	12	9	85	3	-000009
24 - 32	PARTICIPANTS POL CONFLT	13	9	94	0	-000009
33 - 41	TOT DEATHS POL CONFLT	14	9	103	1	-000009
42 - 50	MAN-DAYS/POP VPOLCONFLT	15	9	112	2	-000009
51 - 59	DEATHS/10MILL VPOLCONFLT	16	9	121	2	-000009
60 - 68	MAN-DAYS/POP VPOLCONFLT	17	9	130	3	-000009
69 - 77	DEATHS/10MILL VTURMOIL	18	9	139	3	-000009
78 - 80	ARE BLANK					

****DECK= 3

COLUMNS	VARIABLE NAME	VAR #	WIDTH	TLOC	NODEC	MDCODE1
1 - 2	IS THE CONSTANT: '03'					
3 - 5	NUMERIC COUNTRY ID	2	3	4	0	-000009
6 - 12	DEATHS W/ID POL CONFLT	19	7	148	0	-000009
13 - 19	REGIME FOR KILLED POLCON	20	7	155	0	-000009
20 - 26	INITIATORS KILLED POLCON	21	7	162	0	-000009
27 - 33	INJURIES W/ID POL CONFLT	22	7	169	0	-000009
34 - 40	REGIME INJURED W/ID PCON	23	7	176	0	-000009
41 - 47	INITIATORS INJ W/ID PCON	24	7	183	0	-000009
48 - 56	MAN-DAYS NONVIOLENT PCON	25	9	190	3	-000009
57 - 65	MAN-DAYS NONVIOLENT PTUR	26	9	199	3	-000009
66 - 70	MAGNITUDE DOM POL CONFLT	27	5	208	3	-000009
71 - 75	MAGNITUDE DOM POL TURML	28	5	213	3	-000009
76 - 80	MAGNITUDE DOM POL REBELN	29	5	218	3	-000009

@ indicates alphabetic variable

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****DECK=
4
COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  MDCODE1
1 - 2         IS THE CONSTANT: '04'
3 - 5         NUMERIC COUNTRY ID      2      3      4      0      -000009
6 - 14        INTENSITY DOM POL CONFLT 30     9     223    4      -000009
15 - 19       MAGNITUDE ANTIFOR POLCON 31     5     232    3      -000009
20 - 24       MAG DOM + ANTIFOR POLCON 32     5     237    3      -000009
25 - 29       MAG DOM + ANTIFOR POLTUR 33     5     242    3      -000009
30 - 38       INTENSITY ALL POL CONFLT 34     9     247    4      -000009
39 - 43       MAG VIOLENT POL CONPLCT 35     5     256    3      -000009
44 - 48       MAG VIOLENT POL TURMOIL 36     5     261    3      -000009
49 - 53       MAG NONVIOLENT POL TUR  37     5     266    3      -000009
54 - 57       PEOPORTNL DEATHS REGIME  38     4     271    3      -000009
58 - 61       PEOPORTNL DEATHS INITRS  39     4     275    3      -000009
62 - 65       PEOPORTNL INJURY REGIME  40     4     279    3      -000009
66 - 69       PEOPORTNL INJURY INITRS  41     4     283    3      -000009
70 - 73       LOWER CLASS PARTICIPATN  42     4     287    3      -000009
74 - 77       MID-UPPERCLASS PARTIC    43     4     291    3      -000009
78 - 80       ARE BLANK

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****DECK=
5
COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  MDCODE1
1 - 2         IS THE CONSTANT: '05'
3 - 5         NUMERIC COUNTRY ID      2      3      4      0      -000009
6 - 9         REGIME CLASS PARTIC     44     4     295    3      -000009
10 - 13       CLASS PARTIC UNKNOWN    45     4     299    3      -000009
14 - 17       UNSTRC/TERRITORIAL GRPS 46     4     303    3      -000009
18 - 21       REL,ETH,LING,COMM GRPS  47     4     307    3      -000009
22 - 25       APOLITICAL STUDENT GRPS 48     4     311    3      -000009
26 - 29       CCONVENTIONAL POL GRPS  49     4     315    3      -000009
30 - 33       ECONOMIC GRPS           50     4     319    3      -000009
34 - 37       GOVERNMENT FACTIONS     51     4     323    3      -000009
38 - 41       GRPS OUTSIDE GOV'T      52     4     327    3      -000009
42 - 45       GRP CONTEXT UNKNOWN     53     4     331    3      -000009
46 - 49       POLITICAL POWER         54     4     335    3      -000009
50 - 53       CHANGING GOV'T POLICIES 55     4     339    3      -000009
54 - 57       PRIVATE POLIT GRP       56     4     343    3      -000009
58 - 61       DIFFUSE POL OBJECTIVES  57     4     347    3      -000009
62 - 67       MOTIVES UNCODABLE       58     6     351    3      -000009
68 - 71       ALL POLITICAL POWER      59     4     357    3      -000009
72 - 75       ALL CHANGE GOV'T POLICY 60     4     361    3      -000009
76 - 79       ALL PRIV POLITICAL GRP  61     4     365    3      -000009
80 - 80       ARE BLANK

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****DECK=
6
COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  MDCODE1
1 - 2         IS THE CONSTANT: '06'
3 - 5         NUMERIC COUNTRY ID      2      3      4      0      -000009
6 - 9         ALL DIFFUSE POL OBJES   62     4     369    3      -000009
10 - 13       MIXED MOTIVES           63     4     373    3      -000009
14 - 17       MOTIVES NOT CODABLE     64     4     377    3      -000009
18 - 21       ECONOMIC MOTIVES        65     4     381    3      -000009
22 - 25       SOCIAL MOTIVES          66     4     385    3      -000009
26 - 80       ARE BLANK

```

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION FOR CONFLICT MAGNITUDES
 MEASURES OF MAGNITUDE OF CONFLICT: ANNUAL AGGREGATIONS

These annual aggregations refer to domestic political conflict only. Ten countries have annual aggregations for 1955-1970; 77 additional countries for 1961 through 1970; and 28 countries for 1961-1965 only. The data are ordered by country and by year within country.

- V1 Three Letter Country Identifier
- V2 Numeric Country Identifier
- V3 Year of Aggregation (55, 56, 57,...70)
- V4 Annual Number of Participants in all Domestic Political Conflict Events
- V5 Annual Number of Deaths in all Domestic Political Conflict Events
- V6 Annual Man-Days of Participation per 100,000 Population in Domestic Political Conflict
- V7 Annual Deaths per 10 Million Population in Domestic Political Conflict

SUMMARY ANNUAL MEASURES OF MAGNITUDE AND INTENSITY
 OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFLICT

These annual measures are constructed as follows:

1. The constant 0.3 is added to Man-days of participation per 100,000 population and to Deaths per 10 million for each annual country case.
2. These measures are logged to the base 10.
3. Each of the two logged measures is Z-scored across all annual country cases: $(10 \times 6) + (115 \times 5) + (87 \times 5) = 1070$
4. The two Z-scores for each annual country case are added to obtain a summary measure of magnitude.

NOTE: The 1961 through 1965 magnitude scores for Malaya are underestimated. Variables 4 through 7 and 11 are correct.

- V8 Annual Magnitude of all Domestic Political Conflict
- V9 Annual Magnitude of all Domestic Political Turmoil
- V10 Annual Magnitude of all Domestic Political Rebellion
- V11 Annual Intensity of all Domestic Political Conflict

VARIABLE FORMAT FOR MAGNITUDES: ANNUAL AGGREGATIONS

```

****DECK=      1
  COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  MDCODE1
  1 - 3    @ 3-LETTER COUNTRY CODE      1     3     1     0     -9
  4 - 6      NUMERIC COUNTRY ID          2     3     4     0     000009
  7 - 8      YEAR OF AGGREGATION          3     2     7     0     000009
  9 - 16     NO. PARTICIPANTS ALL DPC         4     8     9     0     000009
 17 - 24     NO. DEATHS ALL DPC                   5     8    17     1     000009
 25 - 33     HANDBAYS/100,000 DPC                 6     9    25     2     000009
 34 - 42     DEATHS/10MILLION DPC            7     9    34     3     000009
 43 - 47     MAGNITUDE DMPOL CONFLICT        8     5    43     3     000009
 48 - 52     MAGNITUDE DMPOL TURMOIL        9     5    48     3     000009
 53 - 57     MAGNITUDE DPOL REBELLION       10    5    53     3     000009
 58 - 66     INTENSITY ALL DPC              11    9    58     4     000009

 67 - 80     ARE BLANK

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@ indicates alphabetic variable

CONFLICT AND SOCIETY

(ICPSR 7452)

Principal Investigators

**Ted Robert Gurr
Robin Gillies**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ICPSR ASSISTANCE

All manuscripts utilizing data made available through the Consortium should acknowledge that fact as well as identify the original collector or the data source. The ICPSR Council urges all users of ICPSR data facilities to follow some adaptation of this statement with the brackets indicating items to be filled in appropriately or deleted by the individual user.

The data [and tabulations] utilized in this [publication] were made available [in part] by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for Conflict and Society Dataset were originally collected by Ted Robert Gurr and associates. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations represented here.

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STUDY DESCRIPTION FOR CONFLICT AND SOCIETY DATASET

The variable description which follows lists the principal indicators of independent variables developed by Ted Robert Gurr between 1965 and 1975 for use in testing models of the causes of civil conflict. Its purpose is to bring together in useable form, with adequate documentation, a number of indices which may prove useful to others in correlational and causal analyses. Some of the indices are duplicates or slight modifications of measures generally available, e.g., Gross National Product per capita. Most, however, were constructed to meet the theoretical requirements of the research in question. Some of the indices were devised using data in readily-accessible statistical sources, others consist of data coded from narrative information in a variety of historical and journalistic accounts. In all instances the investigators have attempted to include here sufficient information on definitions, coding categories, scaling procedures, and sources so that the user can assess the validity of each measure for his or her purpose, and if necessary, check its accuracy and modify or correct it.

Some of the indicators documented here were originally collected for as many as 119 countries and colonies. This dataset includes data only for the 86 countries included in Gurr's latest studies (see below). Data for the others are neither complete nor particularly reliable. Most of the indicators documented here have complete data. The 86 countries are listed in Appendices A and B.

Most but not all the indicators listed here have been used in published or forthcoming studies. Those studies are listed below in chronological order. The number of each citation is used in the body of the variable description to designate the study in which the indicator was first used either separately or in combination with other variables. Most of the components of composite indicators used in published studies are included separately in this index. The identifying numbers appear at the beginning of each variable description. If no identifying number is given to a particular indicator, this indicates that it was either a test or control variable that was not used to index a theoretical concept in any study to date.

For complete citations see the bibliography that follows the introduction to this volume.

- (1) Gurr with Ruttenberg (1967)
- (2) Gurr (1968c)
- (3) Gurr (1970b)
- (4) Gurr and Duvall (1973)
- (5) Gurr and Weil (1973)
- (6) Gurr with Dose (1979)

This variable description and the dataset to which it refers are intended to supersede all datasets and documentation previously circulated, including the 1968 dataset deposited with the Inter-University Consortium for Social and Political Research in Ann Arbor. This dataset is complete, corrected to the best of the investigators' ability, and documented in a way that previous datasets were not.

NOTE: Missing data codes may not always be given in the variable description section. Consult the variable format section for a complete MD code list.

CONFLICT AND SOCIETY DESCRIPTION REFERENCES

This is a key to data sources cited summarily in the variable description and its appendices.

- Adelesan and Morris Irma Adelesan and Cynthia Taft Morris, SOCIETY, POLITICS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967.
- Banks and Textor Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A CROSS POLITY SURVEY. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1963.
- Gurr, "Causal Model" T. R. Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices." AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 62 (December 1968), 1104-1124.
- Gurr, "Persistence" T. R. Gurr "Persistence and Change in Political Systems 1800-1971." AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 68 (December 1974), 1482-1504.
- Gurr, NEW MEASURES T. R. Gurr, NEW ERROR-COMPENSATED MEASURES FOR COMPARING NATIONS: SOME CORRELATES OF CIVIL VIOLENCE. Princeton, N.J. Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 25, May 1966.
- EYB THE EUROPA YEAR BOOK, various editions, Vols. I and II. London: Europa Publications.
- FAOPYB Food and Agricultural Organization, PRODUCTION YEARBOOK, various editions, Rome: author.
- SYB THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK, various editions. London and New York: St. Martin's Press.
- UNDY United Nations, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK, various editions. New York: author.
- UNESCOYB Unesco, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, various editions. Paris: author.
- UNSYB United Nations, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, various editions. New York: author.
- UNYBITS United Nations, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS, various editions. New York: author.
- UNYNAS United Nations, YEARBOOK OF NATIONAL ACCOUNT STATISTICS, various editions. New York: author.
- WHI Bruce M. Russett, et al., WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.
- WHII Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS, 2nd ed., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972.
- YBILS International Labor Organization, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STATISTICS, various editions. Geneva.

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION FOR CONFLICT AND SOCIETY DATASET

V1 Alphabetic Country Code

See Appendix A for complete list.

V2 Standard Country Code

Numeric codes developed by Bruce M. Russett, J. David Singer and Melvin Small, and presented in "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 62, 3 (September 1963) 935-950. See Appendix A for list.

V3 Numeric Country Code Used by Principal Investigator

See Appendix A for list

I. BASIC SOCIAL PROPERTIES

The bases of the clusters in vars. 4 through 6 are explained in Gurr with Dose, (1979)^a.

V4 Economic Cluster of Country

- 28 1. High (developed)
- 29 2. Medium (transitional)
- 29 3. Low (low)

V5 Geocultural Cluster of Country

- 11 1. Africa south of the Sahara
- 25 2. Asia and North Africa
- 20 3. Latin (including Spain, Portugal, and Puerto Rico)
- 30 4. Europe (including Israel and European-settled countries of North America, the Pacific, and Southern Africa)

V6 Political Cluster of Country

- 15 1. Personalist
- 16 2. Elitist
- 19 3. Centrist
- 17 4. New democracy
- 19 5. Old democracy

V7 Country Population, Mid-1963, in 100,000's

Source: UNDP, various editions

^a NOTE: The number in parentheses refers to the study in which the investigator first used this indicator either separately or in combination with other variables. See page 90 for citations.

V8 GNP Per Capita, 1965, (1)

Source: WHII

V9 Per Capita GDP Relative to That of Most Prosperous Countries In Region, 1958

Calculated using data on GDP per capita in U.S. dollars for 1958, from ONYNAS 65, table 9b. An initial set of 114 countries was divided into six regional clusters: Asian, non-Islamic African, Islamic, Western European (including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S.), Eastern Europe, and Latin. The six highest per capita GDP estimates in each region were averaged (the three highest in Eastern Europe) and the average used as a "regional standard" against which to assess relative wealth. Each country's "deficit" relative to this standard was calculated using this formula:

$$\text{Relative poverty} = \left[\frac{\text{Regional Mean} - X}{\text{Regional Mean}} \right] \times 10$$

where X is a country's per capita GDP.

No scores were calculated for South Africa and Rhodesia because of ambiguity about whether to use a European or an African standard of reference.

16	0.	Most prosperous
7	1.	
7	2.	
8	3.	
12	4.	
11	5.	
9	6.	
8	7.	
6	8.	Least prosperous

V10 Extent of Transportation Networks Related to Area and Population Density, Scaled, ca. 1960, (1)

Computed as follows:

$$\text{Accessibility} = \frac{(\text{Km. roads} + 5 [\text{Km. railroads}] / 1000 \text{ sq. km.})}{(\text{Population per sq. km})^{1/2}}$$

The distribution of country scores obtained with the formula is strongly skewed, and were rescaled using the geometric progression of 1.5. The scale is reversed, so that high scores signify limited transportation networks, hence the greatest inaccessibility.

Sources: Roads and railroad trackage SYM 65-66; EYB 64. Land area and population density UNSYB 62.

2	0.	226+	Low Accessibility
4	1.	150 to 225	

7	2.	99 to 149	
12	3.	65 to 98	
12	4.	43 to 64	
15	5.	28 to 42	
7	6.	18 to 27	
13	7.	11 to 17	
13	8.	6 to 10	
1	9.	Less than 6	High Accessibility

V11 Percentage of Population in Cities of 20,000+, Various Years 1955-1963, (3)

Sources: WHI; UNDI 64; EYB 64; SYB 65-66

V12 Primary and Secondary School Enrollments as a Percentage of Population Aged 5-19, ca. 1960, (2)

Source: WHI

V13 Enrollment in Technical and Higher Education as Percentage of Monagricultural Employment, Various Years 1955-1963

Sources: Education UNESCO SYB 1963, tables 13-15; employment, see Var. 15.

V14 Proportion of Population Estimated to be Politically Mobilized, Rounded to the Nearest Tenth, ca. 1960

For countries with competitive elections, the proportion of voting-age population that voted in any contested national election or referendum during 1955-1964.

Sources: WHI, 84-86; SYB 1965-66; various country sources.

For other countries, the average of (proportion of population 15+ literate) plus (proportion of children 5-19 actually in school 1960). Sources: WHI 222-24; UNESCO SYB 1963.

V15 Proportion of Population Estimated to be in Money Economy, Rounded to Nearest Tenth, ca. 1960

Based on proportion of males in wage-and-salary employment, adjusted upwards to take account of cash cropping.

Sources: FAOPYB 65; IBILS 64, 65.

II. SOCIAL PROCESSES

- V16 Decennial Percentage Population Growth, 1940-1950
See Var. 18
- V17 Decennial Percentage Population Growth, 1950-1960, (5)
See Var. 18
- V18 Decennial Percentage Population Growth, 1960-1970
Sources: Population growth measures were computed from data provided by the Demographic Analysis Branch, International Statistical Programs Center, U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1940 data are from diverse sources. 1950 and 1960 estimates are from International Labour Office, LABOUR FORCE PROJECTIONS (Geneva, 1971). Various other sources were used to ensure comparability over time of data for countries with territorial gains and losses between 1940 and 1960.
- V19 Percentage Annual Population Growth, 1950-65
- V20 Age Bulge Ratio, 1950
The ratio of youth population, 15-24, to adult population, 25-60.
Sources: See Var. 18.
- V21 Age Bulge Ratio, 1960 (5)
The ratio of youth population, 15-24, to adult population, 25-60.
Sources: See Var. 18.
- V22 Age Bulge Ratio, 1970
The ratio of youth population, 15-24, to adult population, 25-60.
Sources: See Var. 18.
- V23 Growth or Decline of Proportional Size of Youth Population, 1950-60 (5)
Var. 21 minus Var. 20 divided by Var. 21.

- V24 Growth or Decline of Proportional Size of Youth Population, 1960-70
 Var. 22 minus Var. 21 divided by Var. 22
- V25 Rate of Urban Population Growth, 1950-1960 (5)
 Computed as follows:

$$\frac{\text{urban pop. 60} - \text{urban pop. 50}}{\text{Total urban pop. 60}}$$
- V26 Rate of Urban Population Growth 1960-1970
 Computational procedure as for Var. 25.
- V27 New City Dwellers, 1950-1960, As a Proportion of Total Population, (1)
 Computed as follows:

$$\frac{\text{urban pop. 60} - \text{urban pop. 50}}{\text{total pop. 60}}$$
- V28 New City Dwellers, 1960-1970, as a Proportion of Total Population
 Computational procedure as for Var. 27. Note that the "new city dwellers" measures represent urban growth in proportion to total population, while the "rate of urban population growth" measures represent the proportional growth of cities only. The measures are only weakly correlated. Sources: Urban population growth measures were computed from data provided by the Demographic Analysis Branch, International Statistical Programs Center, U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1950 and 1960 data are from Kingsley Davis, WORLD URBANIZATION 1950-1970, Vol. 1: BASIC DATA FOR CITIES, COUNTRIES, AND REGIONS, Population Monograph No. 4 (Berkeley, 1966). 1970 estimates are from various sources.
- V29 Average Decennial Percentage Increase in Primary School Enrollment Ratios, 1930's to 1960
 Primary school enrollment ratios are the total reported enrollment in public (and, usually, private) primary schools, divided by estimates of the population aged 5 to 14, and multiplied by 100. Such ratios are more-or-less systematically understated estimates of the proportion of school-age children in school; increases signify the expansion of modern educational systems. The data are rounded to the nearest whole number and negative changes are treated as zero.
 Sources: Early period -- usually the average of years 1930-34 - Unesco, WORLD SURVEY OF EDUCATION, Vol. II: PRIMARY EDUCATION (Paris 1958), country tables, supplemented by SYB, various years; 1960 is UNESCOSYB 63, table 9.

V30 Decennial Percentage Increment in School-Age Males in School, 1950-1960, (1)

Basic data are percentages of school-age children in school, first plus secondary levels, adjusted for discrepancies between school attendance age-spans and the proportion of children in the 5-19 age bracket. On the basis of estimates of proportions of primary pupils who are female, the proportions are adjusted to obtain estimates of the proportions of school age males in school. This increases the cross-national comparability of the data, by comparison with Var. 29, because in much of the Third World fewer girls attend school than boys. The decennial increases are rounded to the nearest whole number, negative changes are treated as zero.

Source: UNESCO SYB 63, 96-111.

V31 Decennial Increase in Radio Audience, ca. 1953-1963

Estimated using data on radio receivers per 1,000, either sets in use or licenses issued. It was assumed that 200 receivers per 1,000 population constituted saturation; of the world's 25 most-developed countries about two-thirds exceed this ratio, the remainder are slightly below it. Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 55 (September 1961), 511, uses 250 as a saturation factor. The decennial increase, for the purposes of this variable, is divided by the 200 saturation estimate to obtain an estimate of the increase in total radio audience, and expressed as a percentage. In those instances in which the ratio changed from less than 200 in the initial year to more than 200 in the last, only changes to 200 were counted in determining the score. Changes above 200, and negative changes, are coded as zero.

Sources: UNSYB 53 (545-46) and UNSYB 64 (714-15).

V32 Decennial Change in Daily Newspaper Circulation, ca. 1953-1963

Estimation method similar to that used in Var. 31 above. Basic data for initial and terminal years are estimates of newspaper circulation per 1,000 population. It was assumed that 200 copies per 1,000 population constituted saturation, assuming 50-65% of the population is adult and two to three readers per copy. Deutsch, OP. CIT., 511, assumes that 333 copies per 1,000 constitutes saturation. The decennial increase, for the purposes of this variable, is divided by the 200 saturation estimate to obtain an estimate of the increase relative to the total potential newspaper audience, and expressed as a percentage. If the ratio changed from less than 200 in the initial year to more than 200 in the last, only the increase up to 200 was counted in determining the score. Changes above 200, and negative changes, are coded as zero.

Source: UNSYB 53 (541-42) and 63 (706-07).

III. ECONOMIC PROCESSES

V33 Adverse Economic Conditions, 1960-1963, (2)

Summary news sources were searched for evaluative statements about adverse internal economic conditions such as crop failures, unemployment, export market slumps, drought, etc. Each such description was coded on the following intensity and extent scales:

"Severity" (Intensity) Scores		"Proportion Affected" (Extent) Scores	
Moderate	1	One region or city or a small economic sector	0.2
Substantial, or moderate and persisting for more than one year	2	Several regions or cities, or several economic sectors	0.5
Severe, or substantial and persisting for more than one year	3	Much of country, or several major or one dominant economic sector	0.7
Severe and persisting for more than one year	4	Whole country, or all economic sectors	1.0

The score for each such condition is the product of the extent and intensity scores; the score for each country and for each year is the sum of the "condition" scores; and the score used for Var. 33 is the sum of annual scores for 1960-1963.

Sources: HISPANIC-AMERICAN REPORT for Latin America, ANNUAL REGISTER for other polities.

V34 Long-Range Decline in Cereals Production Relative to Population, ca. 1950-1962

Negative values (signifying growth in cereals production greater than population growth) were set at zero.

Source for tonnage of cereal production and change in population: FAOPYB 65, table 2 and 22B.

54	0.	Growth in cereal production greater than population growth
3	1.	
2	2.	
4	3.	
4	4.	
4	5.	
4	6.	
4	7.	Population growth greater than cereal production
7	9.	Missing data

- V35 Average Annual Proportional Change in Total Value to Trade, 1950-1960, (2)

Total trade value (exports + imports) was determined for 1950 and 1960 and converted to U.S. dollars (to control for differential inflation rates). Total proportional change was calculated and divided by 10.

Source: UNYBITS 64

- V36 Relative Change in Annual Value of Trade, (1957-60) - (1950-57), (2). Signs Reversed So That Positive Values = Economic Deprivation

Average annual proportional changes in total value of trade was computed (as in Var. 35) separately for 1957-60 and 1950-57 and the latter value subtracted from the former: high scores therefore signified short-term relative increases in trade value. Signs were then reversed so that the greater the relative decrease, the higher the score.

Source: UNYBITS 64

- V37 Relative Change in Annual Value of Trade (1960-63) - (1950-60), (2), Positive Values = Economic Deprivation

Computational procedure as for Var. 36.

Source: UNBITS 64

- V38 GDP Annual Percentage Growth, ca. 1950-60, (1)
Sources: Various sources, including UNYNAS 66, tables 4A and 4B; UNYNAS 63, 327-31; AID, Statistics and Reports Division, "Estimates of Gross National Product Calendar Year 1962 in Current Market Prices (Dollar Equivalents): Summary for Non-Communist Countries" (mimeo., 1963, 1964 eds.); and AID, Statistics and Reports Division, "Gross National Product: Growth Rates and Trend Data by Region and Country," June 15, 1966.

- V39 GDP Annual Percentage Growth, ca. 1960-1964, (2)
Source: See Var. 38

- V40 Measure of the Relative Short-Term Decline in Productivity, (2)
Var. 38 minus Var. 39

- V41 Points Change in Cost-of-Living Index, 1958-1961, (2)
Source: IBILS 66, table 25

- V42 Points Change in Cost-of-Living Index, 1960-1963, (2)
Source: IBILS 66, table 25

V43 Relative Change in Cost-of-Living Index, (2)

Var. 42 minus Var. 41

V44 Geometric Annual Percentage Growth Rates of Government Expenditure, 1951-1961, (1)

Source: Gurr, NEW MEASURES, 33-36

IV. SOCIAL RIGIDITIES

V45 Ethnic Linguistic Fractionalization Index x 100, ATLAS NARODOV MIRA data, (6)

Source: WHII, table 4.15

V46 Strain Resulting from Religious Cleavages, ca. 1960, (2)

Severity of religious cleavages is the sum of scores on the following two scales:

Sources: EYB 64; SYB 65-66; WHI, tables 73-75

Number of organized religious groups with 2%+ of population	Duration of coexistence of religious groups
-----	-----
0 One such organized group only in 1960	0 One group only in 1960
1 Two groups	1 All groups have coexisted in the territory now comprising the state for 200+ years before 1961
2 Three groups	2 One or more groups was established from 50 to 200 years before 1961
3 Four or more groups	3 One or more groups was established within 50 years of 1961
21 0. Minimum strain	
17 1.	
20 2.	
6 3.	
18 4.	
3 6. Maximum strain	
1 9. Missing data	

V47 Approximate Proportion of Primary-School Leavers with No Opportunity to Attend Secondary Schools

Primary-school enrollment ratio ca. 1960 minus the secondary school enrollment ratio ca. 1963, rounded to the nearest .1.
Source: UNESCO SYB 65

V48 Social Immobility, ca. 1960

Codes are adapted and expanded from Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, SOCIETY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967). Adelman and Morris coded most of the developing countries on a seven-category version of the scale. The principal investigator coded the remaining countries on an expanded scale.
Sources: educational data, WHI, 218-20; UNESCO SYB 63, 96-109. Middle-class occupation data, YBILS 661, tables 2A, B

- 3 00. School enrollment ratio (SER) 60%+ AND middle class (proportion of economically-active male population engaged in middle-class occupations) 30%+ AND no substantial discrimination or stratification. Note that the coding for "modern" countries follows the procedure used by Adelman and Morris: the presence of discrimination/stratification adds 1 to 3 points to the immobility score. (Adelman and Morris = none)
- 8 01. SER 60%+ OR middle class 30%+, no discrimination (Adelman and Morris = none)
- 8 02. SER 50-60% AND middle class 20-30%, no discrimination (Adelman and Morris = none)
- 10 03. SER 50%+ OR middle class 20-30%, no discrimination (Adelman and Morris = A+)
- 15 04. SER 40-50% AND middle class 10-20%, no discrimination (Adelman and Morris = A)
- 4 05. Countries with A+ or A SER and middle-class scores but with marked stratification (Adelman and Morris = A-)
- 2 06. Appears only for a few countries with high SER and middle-class ratios but with substantial discrimination (Adelman and Morris = none)
- 18 07. SER 25-40%, middle class 5-10%; OR countries meeting the first two criteria for A scores but having prohibitive discriminatory barriers to mobility (Adelman and Morris = B)
- 0 08. (No countries receive this score)
- 10 09. SER more than 25%, OR very small but rapidly growing middle class (Adelman and Morris = C+)
- 8 10. SER less than 25%, very small middle class (Adelman and Morris = C)
- 0 11. SER less than 25%, very small middle class, prohibitive discriminatory barriers to mobility affecting a portion of the population (Adelman and Morris = C-)
- 0 12. SER less than 25%, very small middle class, discriminatory barriers affect almost the entire population (Adelman and Morris = none)

V49 Intensity of Economic Discrimination ca. 1963, (4)

Variables 49 to 54 are based on identifications of social groups subject to systematic discrimination on various ascriptive grounds. A detailed description of procedures and a table listing groups so coded, and scores, is given in Appendix C.

- | | | |
|----|----|--|
| 44 | 0. | None |
| 12 | 1. | Most higher economic value positions, or some specific classes or economic activity, are closed to the group |
| 18 | 2. | Most higher and some medium economic value positions are closed, OR many specific classes of economic activity |
| 11 | 3. | Most higher and most medium economic value positions are closed |
| 1 | 4. | Almost all higher, medium, and some lower economic value positions are closed |

V50 Proportion of Total Population Affected by Economic Discrimination, ca. 1963, (1)

Rounded to nearest .05. See Var. 49.

V51 Economic Discrimination ca. 1963, (4)

Intensity x proportion affected. See Var. 49.

V52 Intensity of Political Discrimination ca. 1963, (4)

See Var. 49.

- | | | |
|----|----|---|
| 44 | 0. | None |
| 18 | 1. | Some significant political elite positions are closed to the group, OR some participatory activities (party membership, voting, etc.) |
| 26 | 2. | Most or all political elite positions are closed OR most participatory activities, OR some of both |
| 1 | 3. | Most or all political elite positions and some participatory activities are closed |
| 1 | 4. | Most or all political elite positions and most or all participatory activities are closed |

V53 Proportion of Total Population Affected by Political Discrimination, ca. 1963, (1)

Rounded to nearest .05. See Var. 52.

V54 Political Discrimination on Ascriptive Bases, ca. 1963, (4)

Intensity x proportion affected. See Var. 52.

V55 Negative Net Factor Payments Abroad as Percent of National Product, (2)

Calculated from data on net factor income from abroad as a percent of GDP at market prices, or similar national product aggregate. The percentages for three years were averaged when available: 1958, 1960, and 1963 or 1964. (Exceptions: Algeria 58, 59; Argentina 58, 60, 62; Cambodia 63 only; Cuba 62, 64; Indonesia 57, 59; U.A.R.-Egypt 58, 60; South Vietnam 60, 62.) Countries with positive net factor income were scored zero: on balance they profit from the international flow of capital and earnings whereas the countries with negative net factor income experience an outflow. The signs of countries with "net factor payments abroad" were reversed, so that the highest scores would signify the greatest outflow. Data were missing for a number of countries, and estimated on the following bases:

- 1) Seven Eastern European countries and the USSR = 0, on grounds that there is no counterpart to "capital flow" in their economic interrelationships.
- 2) Cameroun, Hong Kong, Kenya, Malagasy, Nigeria, Singapore, Uganda = 4. These colonial and neocolonial countries were judged to be substantially dependent on capital from the (former) metropolitan power and given the approximate mean score of similar countries.
- 3) Lebanon and Syria = 2, the approximate mean for all Third World countries.

Source: UNYNAS 65, tables 1 and 2

V56 Concentration of Export-Receiving Countries, (4)

The weighted proportion of a country's exports consigned to the largest receiving country x 100, ca. 1965.

Source: WHIL, table 6.6

V57 Proportion of a Country's Exports Received by the Largest Receiving Country x 100, ca. 1960, (6)

Source: Our calculation from data in UNYBITS

V. COERCIVE INTERVENTIONS

V58 Number of External Interventions 1951-55 by Another Nation or Rebel Group Operating From Outside the Country

Source: WHII, table 3.6

V59 Number of External Interventions 1956-60 by Another Nation or Rebel Group Operating From Outside the Country

Source: WHII, table 3.6

V60 External Support for Dissidents, 1961-65, (3)

Each conflict event coded between 1961 and 1965 (see Gurr, "Causal Model," 1108-09) was scored for maximum level of foreign support (if any) for dissidents and regimes engaged in open strife on the following two scales.

SUPPORT FOR DISSIDENTS

- 0 none apparent
- 1 arms and supplies
- 2 provision of refuge
- 3 provision of facilities,
training
- 4 military advisors,
mercenaries
- 5 military units

SUPPORT FOR REGIME

- 0 none apparent
- 1 non-military aid
- 2 military material
- 4 personnel, facilities
- 5 military units

For each event, the "support" score was multiplied by the NUMBER OF NATIONS providing any such support. The "dissident support" and "regime support" scores thus obtained were separately aggregated for all events in a country, 1961-65. The two distributions of scores were sharply skewed, so were rescaled using the following geometric progression:

60	00.	0	-- Low support
2	01.	1	
8	02.	2	
7	03.	3-4	
3	04.	5-6	
2	05.	7-9	
1	06.	10-15	
1	07.	16-22	
0	08.	23-33	
0	09.	34-50	
2	10.	51-75	
0	11.	76-112	-- High support

V61 External Support for Regime, 1961-1965, (3)

See Var. 60.

77	00.	0	--	Low support
0	01.	1		
0	02.	2		
2	03.	3-4		
3	04.	5-6		
0	05.	7-9		
1	06.	10-15		
0	07.	16-22		
0	08.	23-33		
1	09.	34-50		
1	10.	51-75		
1	11.	76-112	--	High support

VI. REGIME COERCION

- V62 Military Personnel per 10,000 Adults, Early 1960's, (1)
 Source: WHI, tables 22-23, supplemented by data from:
 Institute For Strategic Studies, THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE
 WESTERN ALLIANCES: THE MILITARY BALANCE 1965-1966 (London,
 1965) and (same title), 1966-67 (London, 1966); G. Weeks,
 "The Armies of Africa," AFRICA REPORT 9 (January 1964);
 D. Woods, "The Armed Forces of African States," ADELPHI
 PAPERS 27 (Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966); D. Woods,
 "Armed Forces in Central and South America," ADELPHI PAPERS
 34 (Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967); STATESMAN'S YEAR
 BOOK, various editions.
- V63 Military Personnel per 10,000 Adults in Countries without Major
 Foreign or Internal Threat, Early 1960's, (2)
 Ongoing foreign threat includes actively participating in a cold-
 war alliance or engaged in arms race with hostile countries.
- V64 Defense Expenditures as a Percent of GNP, Early 1960's, (4)
- V65 Defense Expenditures as Percent of GNP in Countries without Major
 Foreign or Internal Threat, Early 1960's
 See Var. 63
- V66 Internal Security Forces per 1,000 Adults, mid-1960's, (1)
 Source: WHII, table 2.5; Gurr, NEW MEASURES, 111-126
- V67 Internal Security Forces per 1,000 Square Kilometers, mid-1960's, (6)
 Source: See Var. 66

V68 Restrictions on Political Participation, 1960-1963, (2)
 Seventeen types of action were defined on A PRIORI grounds as value-depriving political restrictions, including harassment and banning of parties of various sizes, banning of political activity, and improper dismissal of elected assemblies and executives. These were ranked on a six-point intensity scale, as follows:

1. Amalgamation of splinter party with larger party
 Restriction or harassment of splinter party
2. Banning of splinter party
 Amalgamation of minority party with larger party
 Restriction or harassment of minority party
3. Banning of minority party
 Amalgamation of a major party with another major party
 Restriction or harassment of major party
4. Banning of major party
 Improper dismissal of regional representative body
 Improper dismissal of elected regional executive
5. Ban on party activities, parties allowed to continue their organizational existence
 Improper dismissal of national legislature, with provision for calling a new one within a year
 Improper dismissal of elected chief executive, with provision for replacement within a year
6. Dissolution of all parties, ban on all political activity
 Improper dismissal of national legislature, no short-term provision for re-establishment
 Improper dismissal of elected chief executive, no short-term provision for re-election

Then, each such action was weighted by the proportion of population politically mobilized (Var. 14). The score for each action identified is the product of the intensity and extent scores. The country score is the sum of such "action" scores for 1961 through 1963.

Source: See Var. 33

- V69 **Governmental Value-Depriving Policies, 1960-1963, (2)**
 New value-depriving policies of governments were defined as any new programs or actions that appeared to take away some significant proportion of attained values from a numerically or socially significant group: for example, land reform, tax increases, restrictions on trade, limitations of civil liberties, restrictive actions against ethnic, religious, or economic groups, and so forth. Two aspects of such policies were taken into account in scaling for intensity: the degree of deprivation imposed, and their equality of application. The "degree of deprivation" scale values are: small = 1, moderate = 2, substantial = 3, most or all = 4. The "equality of application" scale values are: uniform = 1, discriminatory = 2. The intensity score is the product of values on these two scales. The most intensely depriving policies are assumed to be those intentionally discriminatory and designed to deprive the affected group of most or all the relevant value, e.g., seizure of all property of absentee landlords without compensation (score = 8). Deprivation is inferred to be least intense if the policy is uniformly applicable to all the affected class of citizens and deprives them of only a small part of the value, e.g., a five percent increase in corporation tax rates (score = 1). The extent measure is a crude estimate of the proportion of the adult population likely to be directly affected, the permissible values being .01, .02, .05, .10, .20, .40, .60, .80, and 1.00. The score for each policy identified is the product of the intensity and extent scores; the country score is the sum of such "policy" scores for 1961 through 1963.
 Source: See Var. 33
- V70 **Number of Negative Sanctions by Authorities (Censorship, Restrictions on Political Participation, Espionage Arrests), 1948-1954**
 Source: WHII, table 3.5
- V71 **Number of Negative Sanctions, 1955-1960**
 Source: WHII, table 3.5
- V72 **Number of Negative Sanctions, 1956, (6)**
 Source: WHII, table 3.5

- V73 Number of Negative Sanctions, 1957, (6)
Source: WHII, table 3.5
- V74 Number of Negative Sanctions, 1958, (4)
Source: WHII, table 3.5
- V75 Number of Negative Sanctions, 1959, (4)
Source: WHII, table 3.5
- V76 Number of Negative Sanctions, 1960, (4)
Source: WHII, table 3.5
- V77 Number of Negative Sanctions, 1961, (6)
Source: WHII, table 3.5
- V78 Number of Negative Sanctions, 1962, (6)
Source: WHII, table 3.5
- V79 Number of Negative Sanctions, 1963, (6)
Source: WHII, table 3.5
- V80 Number of Negative Sanctions, 1964, (6)
Source: WHII, table 3.5
- V81 Number of Negative Sanctions, 1965, (6)
Source: WHII, table 3.5
- V82 Number of Negative Sanctions, 1966, (6)
Source: WHII, table 3.5

VII. CONFLICT TRADITIONS

- V83 Success of Dissidents in Internal Wars 1850-1960, (3)
 Included are civil and guerrilla wars, popular revolts, large-scale terrorism, and private wars which began before 1958. Internal wars which began before 1958 and continued in 1961 are coded on the basis of their status at the end of 1960. Those beginning in 1958 and later are not taken into account. Each country is coded on the basis of its most successful internal war. Older internal wars presumably have less influence on cultural traditions than recent ones. Scores were adjusted to take this into account: if the last internal war in a country ended before 1901, the score is divided by 2 and rounded up to the nearest whole number. See Appendix E for country scores.
- 16 0. No internal wars were fought between 1850 and 1960 by culture groups now comprising the country.
- 18 1. One or more unsuccessful internal wars. Internal wars are "unsuccessful" if the underdogs are quickly suppressed and no changes of consequence occur in governmental policy, personnel, or institutions that favor the underdogs' cause.
- 14 2. One or more small-scale, partly-successful internal wars. Internal wars are "small-scale" if confined to less than a third of the social area of a country and do not directly affect the capital city. Internal wars are "partly-successful" if the underdogs briefly or partially attain their goals. Continuation of an internal war for more than three years is PRIMA FACIE evidence of partial success, even if it is subsequently suppressed. In a private war, an unsanctioned standoff between contending groups is a "partial success," i.e., neither group secures a clearcut increase in its position relative to the other, neither is heavily penalized for its actions.
- 14 3. One or more medium or large-scale, partly-successful internal war.
- 11 4. One or more successful internal wars. Internal wars are "successful" if:
 --in a civil war or rebellion, the underdogs secede or gain autonomy for a decade or more;
 --in a guerrilla war, revolt, and terrorism, the underdogs gain power for a year or more;
 --in a private war, one of the contending groups eliminates, expels, or subjugates its opponents.
- 13 5. One or more successful internal wars PLUS one large-scale internal war, directly affecting almost all regions and groups, whether or not successful.

V84 Success of Conspiracies 1900-1960, (3)

Included are coups d'etat, attempted coups which reach the stage of overt action, military rebellions, and assassinations of heads of state, chief executives, and other national leaders (but not always attempted assassinations). See Appendix E for tables.

35 0. No conspiracies.

8 1. A few (no more than a total of two) unsuccessful coups, military rebellions or assassinations. Such events are "unsuccessful" if:
 --in an attempted coup, the dissidents fail to attain power;
 --in a military rebellion, the dissidents fail to attain power or to gain substantial concessions for the military;
 --in an assassination, the successor(s) to the assassinated individual(s) do not substantially alter policies.

12 2. A number (more than two) of unsuccessful coups, rebellions, and/or assassinations; OR one successful one and one or more unsuccessful ones.

11 3. Two successful coups, rebellions, and/or assassinations between 1900 and 1960.

20 4. Three or more successful coups, rebellions, and/or assassinations between 1900 and 1960.

V85 Success of Group Protest 1940-1960, (3)

Included are anti-government riots and demonstrations, political clashes, and political strikes. THESE CODINGS ARE OF QUESTIONABLE RELIABILITY, BECAUSE BASED ON LIMITED INFORMATION.

13 0. Little or no reported turmoil, 1940-1960.

30 1. Substantial turmoil, met by rather consistently coercive government response without substantial, direct concessions.

16 2. Substantial turmoil, with governmental response varying between coercive and favorable but without major, directly-responsive changes in personnel, policies, or institutions.

14 3. Turmoil associated with a successful coup d'etat or one or more instances of partly/wholly successful internal war; or one or more instances of turmoil leading to major change in policies favoring the underdogs on at least one occasion.

13 4. One or more instances of turmoil, not in the context of conspiracy or internal war, leading to major and enduring changes in governmental personnel and/or institutions favoring the underdogs.

V86 Success of Elite Strife
 Sum of Var. 83 and 84

- V87 Recency of Military Intervention in Politics as of December, 1960, (2)
 Military intervention, 1910 through 1960, was coded from various historical and journalistic sources. Three kinds of events were treated as evidence of disloyalty: (a) any large-scale attempt to overthrow the existing regime in which military or police units were major participants, whether or not successful; (b) any successful attempt, however short-lived, by active members of the military or police to seize power; and (c) any large-scale regional rebellion in which military units were the primary participants. Small-scale plots said to involve military or police personnel were not taken into account; nor were assassination attempts, or mutinies concerned only with pay or promotion policies. See Appendix E for years of last intervention and country scores.
- 10 1. The polity last experienced military intervention between 1958 and 1960, inclusive
 - 11 2. The polity last experienced military intervention between 1951 and 1957, inclusive
 - 23 3. The polity last experienced military intervention between 1935 and 1950, inclusive
 - 24 4. As of 1960, the polity or its metropolitan power had been autonomous for 5 to 24 years and had experienced no military intervention during that period; or had been autonomous for a longer period but experienced military intervention between 1910 and 1934.
 - 18 5. As of 1960, the polity or its metropolitan power had been autonomous for 25 years or more and had experienced no military intervention since 1910.
- V88 Number of Riots, 1948-1954
 Source: WHII, tables 3.1-3.4, 3.10
- V89 Number of Riots, 1955-1960
 Source: WHII, tables 3.1-3.4, 3.10
- V90 Number of Strife Deaths, 1948-1954
 Source: WHII, tables 3.1-3.4, 3.10
- V91 Number of Strife Deaths, 1955-1960
 Source: WHII, tables 3.1-3.4, 3.10
- V92 Number of Armed Attacks, 1948-1954
 Source: WHII, tables 3.1-3.4, 3.10
- V93 Number of Armed Attacks, 1955-1960
 Source: WHII, tables 3.1-3.4, 3.10
- V94 Number of Demonstrations, 1948-1954
 Source: WHII, tables 3.1-3.4, 3.10

- V95 Number of Demonstrations, 1955-1960
Source: WHII, tables 3.1-3.4, 3.10
- V96 Number of Irregular Power Transfers (Mostly Coups), 1948-1960
Source: WHII, tables 3.1-3.4, 3.10
- V97 Estimated Man-Days of Participation in Civil Conflict per 100,000 Population, 1948-1954, (6)
Variables 97-106 are magnitude of conflict scores for 1948-54 and 1955-60, estimated from the nine conflict event counts listed immediately above in such a way as to maximize their comparability with the data on magnitudes of conflict for 1961-65. The first step was to aggregate annual counts of demonstrations, riots, armed attacks, and deaths from domestic violence (from WHII, tables 3.1-3.4) for 1961-65 for 86 countries. Then, these event counts were subject to three different transformations: $\log(10)$, square root, and weighted by population (X per million). Third, a step-wise regression was done of each of the five 1961-65 magnitude-of-conflict measures (Man-days of participation per 100,000*; Deaths per 10 million*; Magnitude of turmoil; Magnitude of internal war; Total magnitude of conflict) on the full set of 16 raw and transformed "event" measures for 1961-65. The most efficient linear combinations of event measures accounted for 63 to 83 percent of the variance in the "magnitude" measures. The final step in estimating "magnitudes of past conflict" was to apply the regression equations for 1961-65 to the same transformed "event" measures for 1948-54 and 1955-60, and thereby generate estimated (Y) "magnitude" scores for each of the five dimensions.
*using a log to the base 10 transformation
- V98 Estimated Deaths From Civil Conflict per 10 Million Population, 1948-1954, (6)
See Var. 97
- V99 Estimated Total Magnitude of Civil Conflict, 1948-1954, (6)
See Var. 97
- V100 Estimated Magnitude of Turmoil (Group Protest), 1948-1954, (6)
See Var. 97
- V101 Estimated Magnitude of Internal War (Rebellion), 1948-1954, (6)
See Var. 97
- V102 Estimated Man-Days of Participation in Civil Conflict per 100,000 Population, $\log(10)$, 1955-1960, (4)
See Var. 97
- V103 Estimated Deaths From Civil Conflict per 10 Million Population, $\log(10)$, 1955-1960, (4)
See Var. 97

- V104 Estimated Total Magnitude of Civil Conflict, 1955-1960
See Var. 97
- V105 Estimated Magnitude of Turmoil (Group Protest), 1955-1960, (4)
See Var. 97
- V106 Estimated Magnitude of Internal War (Rebellion), 1955-1960, (4)
See Var. 97

VIII. REGIME CHARACTERISTICS

- V107 Character of National Political Institutions, 1960, (2)
- 7 1. Institutions are wholly or primarily accretive and autochthonous; reformations, if any, had indigenous roots (although limited foreign elements may have been assimilated into indigenous institutions).
 - 20 2. Institutions are a mixture of substantial autochthonous and foreign elements, e.g., polities with externally derived parliamentary and/or bureaucratic systems grafted to a traditional monarchy.
 - 18 3. Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were deliberately chosen by indigenous leaders, and have been adapted over time to indigenous political conditions. (By adaptation is meant either the modification of regime institutions themselves or development of intermediate institutions to incorporate politically the bulk of the population.)
 - 16 4. Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, have been adapted over time to indigenous political conditions, but were inculcated under the tutelage of a foreign power rather than chosen by indigenous leaders of their own volition.
 - 14 5. Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were deliberately chosen by indigenous leaders, but have not been adapted over time to indigenous political conditions.
 - 9 6. Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were inculcated under the tutelage of a foreign power, and have not been adapted to indigenous political conditions.
 - 2 7. Institutions are imposed, and maintained under threat of sanctions, by foreign powers (including polities under colonial rule as of 1965).
- V108 The Lifespan in Years of National Political Institutions as of 1960, (6)
Source: the Polity Persistence and Change dataset.
- V109 The Lifespan in Years of National Political Institutions as of 1970
Source: See Var. 108

V110 The Extent of Conflict Attending the Establishment of the National Political Institutions Operating in 1960, (6)

If several of the specified conditions apply, the 1960 polity is given the highest applicable score. New nations whose first polities were established between 1961 and 1965 were coded according to those circumstances.

Source: See Var. 108

- 27 0. No overt internal or external conflict.
- 17 1. Region secedes from a larger nation without war; or
Successor state resulting from breakup or partition of a nation without war; or
Previous polity ended when nation was forcibly assimilated into or conquered by another nation; or
Polity change in the context of non-violent internal political crisis.
- 22 2. Successor state resulting from breakup or partition of a nation with warfare; or
Coalition or union of separate states, with warfare; or
Previous polity ended when nation joined another under violent internal pressure; or
Polity change following coup or assassination.
- 20 3. Nation gains independence through international or internal war; or
Region secedes during international or internal war; or
Polity change following internal war or massive turmoil.

V111 Degrees of Autocracy in National Political Institutions, 1960, (6)

Variables 111-113 denote properties of political systems (polities) as of 1960, using the 7-point scales of Autocracy, Democracy, and Anocracy described in Gurr, "Persistence," (p. 1487.), and the data base reported there. The following exceptions apply to the year of reference. Eight countries were undergoing political transitions in 1960, so were coded on the basis of the authority characteristics of their first post-1960 polity: Algeria (1963), Cameroun (1961), Kenya (1965), Malagasy (1961), Syria (1961), Tanganyika (1963), Uganda (1962), and Zambia (1964). The Congo had no effective central government for most of the period so was coded 0 for autocracy and democracy, 6 for anocracy. The colonies of Puerto Rico and Hong Kong were coded on the basis of less detailed information on their internal authority structures ca. 1960, which were predominately democratic and autocratic, respectively. See Polity codebook, Var. 40-47 for full definitions.

- 28 0. None
- 21 1. Minimum, score one
- 7 2. Score two
- 3 3. Score three
- 8 4. Score four
- 18 5. Score five
- 1 6. Score six
- 0 7. Maximum, score seven

V112 Degree of Democracy in National Political Institutions, 1960, (6)
See Var. 111

34	0.	None
6	1.	Minimum, score one
4	2.	Score two
3	3.	Score three
12	4.	Score four
3	5.	Score five
17	6.	Score six
7	7.	Maximum, score seven

V113 Degree of Anocracy (Lack of Institutionalization) in National Political Institutions, 1960, (6)
See Var. 111

51	0.	None
13	1.	Minimum, score one
14	2.	Score two
4	3.	Score three
1	4.	Score four
1	5.	Score five
2	6.	Score six
0	7.	Maximum, score seven

V114 Stability of Political Party System ca. 1962, (6)
Source: Arthur Banks and Robert Textor, A CROSS POLITY SURVEY,
raw characteristic 43

3	0.	No parties, or party membership restricted on ascriptive bases to less than 20% of the population
25	1.	Unstable (all parties unstable, situational, personalistic, or AD HOC)
9	2.	All parties relatively new (founded after 1945), long-range stability not yet ascertainable*
12	3.	Moderately stable (relatively infrequent or non-abrupt system changes, or mixed situational-permanent party complex) *
37	4.	Stable (all significant parties stable and organizationally non-situational)

*In countries with new party systems, 3 was coded for those in which the same party dominated all elections between 1956 and 1963, and others coded 2.

V115 Stability of Party Systems Weighted for Number of Major Parties, ca. 1960, (2)

The number of political parties was determined from Arthur Banks and Robert Textor, A CROSS-POLITY SURVEY, raw characteristic 41 and recoded as follows:

- 0 = no parties, or all parties illegal or ineffective.
- 1 = one or several parties, membership restricted on ascriptive bases (typically along ethnic lines) to less than 20% of the population.
- 2 = one party with no formal or substantial informal restrictions on membership (all other parties non-existent, banned, non-participant, or adjuncts of dominant party in electoral activity; includes "national fronts" and one-party fusion systems).
- 3 = one party dominant (organized, operative opposition but unable to win majority; includes minority participation in government while maintaining party identity for electoral purposes).
- 4 = two-party or effectively two-party (reasonable expectation of party rotation).
- 5 = multi-party (coalition or minority party government normally mandatory if parliamentary system).

The number of parties and system stability scores (Var. 114, above) were combined into the following 8-point scale, which gives primary weight to party system stability but qualifies that according to number of parties.

	summary score	score from Var. 114	number of parties score from above
3	0.	0	0, 1
9	1.	1	0, 1, 2, 3
16	2.	1	4, 5
9	3.	2	0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
12	4.	3	0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
14	5.	4	0, 1, 2
14	6.	4	3, 4
9	7.	4	5

V116 Nominal Electoral Support for Government, Early 1960's, (3)
 Scores for "electoral support for regime" were assigned using the following matrix; high scores are a joint function of high voter turnout and low opposition strength.

NOTES:

If there is an appointive legislature, but no national elections to it, the country is scored as having "0-30%" of adults voting.

If elections are held but voting turnout is not known, the midpoint score, for 50% turnout is assigned.

If elections are held, but opposition strength is not known and cannot be estimated, a midpoint opposition score is assigned, 6 if voting turnout is 90-100%, 5 if 70-89%, etc.

If elections are held, but neither datum is available, score = 5.

If no elections of any kind are held between 1957 and 1965 and no assembly or other representative body exists, score = 1.

Sources: Voters, WHI, table 24; Opposition strength, SYB 65-66; Council on Foreign Relations, POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD 1964.

Regime Electoral Support Scores, Early 1960's

% of Adults Voting	Opposition Strength in Assembly or Election			
	Negligible (<5%)	6-25%	26-49%	50%+
90 - 100%	8	7	5	4*
70 - 89%	7	6	4*	3
50 - 69%	6	5	3	2
31 - 49%	5	4*	2	1
0 - 30%	4*	3	1	0

13 1. See matrix above for meaning of codes
 7 2.
 19 3.
 18 4.
 14 5.
 5 6.
 0 7.
 10 8.
 0 9.

*For example, a score of 4 would mean 0-30% of adults voting and negligible opposition; OR 31-49% voting and 6-25% opposition; OR 70-89% voting and 26-49% opposition; OR 90-100% voting and 50%+ opposition.

V117 Political Cohesiveness, Taking into Account National Integration And Unity and Degree of Political Centralization, late 1950's/early 1960's, (3)

This index is constructed from scales of "national integration and unity" and "political centralization" devised by Adelman and Morris. The scales are summarily listed below; for full definitions, see the source.

NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND UNITY

- 4 Marked degree of national integration, indicated by common language and culture, integration of central and local political systems, sense of national unity
- 3 Moderate degree of national integration
- 2 Small degree of national integration
- 1 Marked absence of national integration

POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION

- 3 Highly centralized, effective government control through most of country
- 2 Administrative decentralization of political power
- 1 Central governments did not maintain effective administrative control in important parts of country

Third-world countries are coded on these scales in Iraa Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, SOCIETY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH; all others were coded using various country and comparative studies. The index is constructed by adding "national integration" and "political centralization" scores for each country resulting in a 1-7 scale.

- 2 1. Low cohesiveness
- 9 2.
- 6 3.
- 14 4.
- 26 5.
- 21 6.
- 8 7. High cohesiveness

V118 Central Government Budget as a Percentage of GDP, ca. 1962, (1)
Source: Gurr, NEW MEASURES, 51-66

IX. DISSIDENT GROUP CHARACTERISTICS

- V119 Ratio of Union Membership to Non-agricultural Labor Force X 100, Various Years 1950-1963, (1)
Source: Gurr, NEW MEASURES, 101-110
- V120 Orientations of Labor Unions, Pro/Anti- Regime (+3 to -3), 1955-1966, (3)
Sources: Orientations were coded using data on the frequency of reported political strikes 1955-66, and on the independence of the labor movement. Political strike data for 1955-58 and 1962-66 are from J. M. Firestone, AN EXPLORATION IN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC CONFLICT (Buffalo: Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory Technical Report, 1969), Appendix A. Political strike data for 1961-65 were taken from the coded data on conflict events 1961-65. The independence of labor movements was evaluated using categories proposed by Adelman and Taft, 69-71. Their coding of Third-World countries was used and the labor movements of other countries coded by the investigator.
- | | | |
|----|-----|---|
| 11 | +3. | Government-controlled unions only, with no reported political strikes 1955-65 |
| 30 | +2. | Independent unions with no reported strikes, OR government-controlled unions with one reported strike |
| 18 | +1. | Independent unions with one strike, OR government-controlled unions with two strikes |
| 6 | 0. | Negligible union movement, no strikes |
| 10 | -1. | Independent unions with two strikes, OR government-controlled unions with three or four strikes |
| 5 | -2. | Independent unions with three strikes, OR government-controlled with five or more |
| 6 | -3. | Independent unions with four or more strikes |
- V121 Labor Union Dissidence, (3)
The product of Var. 119 and Var. 120 with all positive values set equal to 0, signs reversed on negative values; the higher the values, the greater the scope and intensity of union dissidence.
- V122 Labor Union Support for Regime, (3)
The Product of Var. 119 and Var. 120, with all negative values set to 0.
- V123 Communist Party Membership per 10,000 Population, ca. 1963, (2)
Coded 0 if party was in power.
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, WORLD STRENGTH OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS (1964)

V124 Communist Party Status, ca. 1963 (2), Scaled
Source: See Var. 123

- 18 0. In power or non-existent
22 1. Out of power; no serious factionalization or multiple organization; party permitted to participate in electoral activities
9 2. Out of power; multiple factions or organizations; party permitted to participate in electoral activities
7 3. Out of power; party excluded from electoral activities but other party activities tolerated
20 4. Out of power; no serious factionalization or multiple organization; party illegal and/or activity suppressed
9 5. Out of power; multiple factions or organizations; party illegal and/or actively suppressed
1 -9. Missing data

V125 Summary Index of Communist Party Dissidence in the Early 1960's, (2)
Party membership per 10,000 (Var. 123) was rescored on the following scale and the membership score multiplied by the Party status score (Var. 124). For a rationale for this procedure, see Gurr, "Causal Model," 1114.

Membership score -----	Party Members per 10,000 -----
1	less than 2
2	3 to 5
3	6 to 10
4	11 to 20
5	21 to 40
6	41 to 80
7	81 to 160
8	161 to 320
9	321 to 640
10	641 to 1280
11	1281 and up

V126 Military Participation in Civil Strife 1961-1965, (2)
Constructed from coded data on strife events. Each protest event (demonstration, riot, mutiny, etc.) in which the military were reported to have participated was scored 1. Each conspiracy and internal war in which the military reportedly played a part was scored 2. The country scores are the sum of event scores.

- V127 Intensity of Inferred Separatism, 1960, (4)
 Variables 127-129 specify properties of ethnic or regional groups which were known or inferred to have had significant separatist sentiments as of 1960. Operational definitions of potential separatism are given in Appendix D, along with a table listing the groups so coded and their proportional sizes.
- 48 0. No separatist region or group
 4 1. The separatist region or group was incorporated in the state of which it was a part in 1960 by its own request or by mutual agreement (least intense separatism)
 15 2. The separatist region or group was designated part of the state by international agreement or by fiat of a former colonial or governing power, except when 3 or 4 below holds
 9 3. The separatist region or group was forcibly assimilated into the state prior to the twentieth century, or was forcibly conquered by a former colonial power prior to the twentieth century
 10 4. The separatist region or group was forcibly assimilated into the state during the twentieth century, or was forcibly reassimilated in the twentieth century after a period of autonomy due to rebellion or other circumstance (most intense separatism).
- V128 Proportion of Country Population in Group or Region With Separatist Sentiment, (1)
 Rounded to the nearest .05, x 100. See Var. 127.
- V129 Potential Political Separatism, 1960, (4)
 Var. 127 (Intensity) times Var. 128 (Proportion of Population)
- V130 Proportional Size of Dissident Groups in a Country's Population, 1960, (3)
 Rounded to the nearest .05, x 100. Variables 130-135 specify properties of communal groups, including separatist groups, which had a pre-1961 history of active (not necessarily violent) dissidence and lived in identifiable locales rather than being dispersed throughout the population. The groups are identified in Appendix D, along with their scores for proportional size (Var. 130), isolation (Var. 134), and organization (Var. 135).
- V131 Density of Dissident Population, (3)
 See Var. 130
- 47 00. Sparse (less than 10/square kilometer)
 1 05.
 29 10. Moderate
 3 15.
 6 20. Dense (more than 100/square kilometer)

V132 Character of Terrain Held by Dissidents, (3)
See Var. 130

- 51 00. Highly accessible; e.g., flat, settled land or urban areas
1 01.
21 10. Somewhat accessible
3 15.
10 20. Great difficulty of access; e.g., jungle, mountains, desert

V133 Transportation Facilities in Dissident Areas, (3)
See Var. 130. Var. 133 was coded by reference to the "inaccessibility" scores in Var. 10 compressed to a three-category scale:

Approximate inaccessibility scores -----	(Lack of) transportation facilities in dissident areas -----
1, 2, 3, 4	0
5, 6, 7	10
8, 9	20

V134 Summary Index of Dissidents' Isolation, (3)
Sum of Var. 131, 132 and 133. See Var. 130.

V135 Index of the Extent of Over-arching Organization among Geographically-Concentrated Dissidents, (3)
The following five-category scale is used, with scores of 2 and 4 assigned to conditions between the three defined categories:

- 40 0. No dissidents
5 1. Dissidents are divided into a large number of small segments with little or no organizational source of cohesiveness.
2 2.
28 3. Dissidents are divided among several comprehensive, multi-functional groups (e.g., several tribes or regional communities); CR are united by one or more functional organizations, e.g., an ethnic or linguistic interest group, political party, etc.; CR are members of a formerly-comprehensive organization that has been substantially weakened, losing some of its primary functions.
7 4.
4 5. One comprehensive, multi-functional organization encompasses most dissidents. Such organizations include traditional groups, such as intact tribal groups, and a few modern groups, such as semi-autonomous regional governments in highly organized states and cohesive communal associations.

VARIABLE FORMAT FOR CONFLICT & SOCIETY

****DECK 1

COLUMNS	VARIABLE NAME	VAR #	WIDTH	TLOC	NODEC	MDCODE2
1 - 2	IS THE CONSTANT: 'J1'					
3 - 5	STANDARD COUNTRY CODE	2	3	4	0	
6 - 8	@ CCOUNTRY CODE	1	3	1	0	
9 - 11	GURR NUMERIC CODE	3	3	7	0	
12 - 12	ECON.CLUSTER	4	1	10	0	000009
13 - 13	GEOCULTURAL CLUSTER	5	1	11	0	000009
14 - 14	POLITICAL CLUSTER	6	1	12	0	000009
15 - 19	CCOUNTRY POP 63	7	5	13	0	-000009
20 - 24	GNP PER CAPITA 65	8	5	18	0	-000009
25 - 26	PEB CAP GDP RELATIVE TO	9	2	23	0	-000009
27 - 28	TEAMS NETWK RELATED TO	10	2	25	0	000009
29 - 30	% POP CITIES	11	2	27	0	-000009
31 - 32	PRIM/SEC SCHOOL ENROLL	12	2	29	0	-000009
33 - 35	ENROLL TECH/HIGHER ED	13	3	31	1	-000009
36 - 37	PROPOR POP POLIT	14	2	34	1	-000009
38 - 39	PFCPOP POP MONEY ECON	15	2	36	1	-000009
40 - 43	% POP GRO 40 50	16	4	38	1	0009999
44 - 47	% POP GRO 50 60	17	4	42	1	0009999
48 - 51	% POP GRO 60 70	18	4	46	1	-000009
52 - 54	% ANN POP GRO 50-65	19	3	50	1	-000009
55 - 58	AGE BULGE RATIO 50	20	4	53	3	-000009
59 - 62	AGE BULGE RATIO 60	21	4	57	3	-000009
63 - 66	AGE BULGE RATIO 70	22	4	61	3	-000009
67 - 70	GFC DECLINE YOUTH POP	23	4	65	3	0009999
71 - 74	GRO DECLINE YOUTH POP	24	4	69	3	0009999
75 - 78	URBAN POP GROWTH 50 60	25	4	73	3	-000009
79 - 80	ARE BLANK					

****DECK=

2

COLUMNS	VARIABLE NAME	VAR #	WIDTH	TLOC	NODEC	MDCODE2
1 - 2	IS THE CONSTANT: '02'					
3 - 5	STANDARD COUNTRY CODE	2	3	4	0	
6 - 9	URBAN POP GROWTH 60 70	26	4	77	3	-000009
10 - 14	NEW CITY DWELL 50 60	27	5	81	3	-000009
15 - 19	NEW CITY DWELL 60 70	28	5	86	3	-000009
20 - 21	% INC PRIM SCHOOL ENROL	29	2	91	0	-000009
22 - 23	% INC MALES SCHOOL	30	2	93	0	-000009
24 - 25	INC IN RADIO AUD	31	2	95	0	-000009
26 - 27	CHANGE IN NEWSP CIRC	32	2	97	0	-000009
28 - 30	ADVERSE ECON COND	33	3	99	1	-000009
31 - 31	DECLINE CEREALS PROD	34	1	102	0	0000009
32 - 38	ANN CHANGE OF TRADE-AVG	35	7	103	5	-9999999
39 - 45	CGE TRADE 50-60	36	7	110	5	-9999999
46 - 52	CGE TRADE 50-63	37	7	117	5	-9999999
53 - 56	GDF GRO 50-60	38	4	124	1	-0009999
57 - 61	GDP GRO 60-64	39	5	128	1	-0099999
62 - 66	SHORT TERM PRODUCTIVITY	40	5	133	1	-0099999
67 - 71	CGE CST LIV 58-61	41	5	138	0	-000009
72 - 77	CGE CST LIV 60-63	42	6	143	0	-000009
78 - 80	ARE BLANK					

@ indicates alphabetic variable

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****DECK=      3
COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  MDCODE2
 1 -   2      IS THE CONSTANT: '03'
 3 -   5      STANDARD COUNTRY CODE      2     3     4     0
 6 -  11      REL CGE CST LIV      43    6    149    0    -099999
12 -  14      GHO GOVT EXPEND      44    3    155    1    -000009
15 -  17      LING FRACT INDEX      45    3    158    0    -000009
18 -  19      STRAIN - RELIGIOUS      46    2    161    0    000009
20 -  21      PRIM SCHOOL/NO SECOND      47    2    163    1    -000009
22 -  24      SOCIAL IMMOBILITY      48    3    165    0    0000099
25 -  26      ECCN DISC INTENSITY      49    2    168    0    000009
27 -  29      POP APP ECOM DISC      50    3    170    2    -000009
30 -  32      ECCN DISC INTENS X POP      51    3    173    2    -000009
33 -  34      PCL DISC INTENSITY      52    2    176    0    000009
35 -  37      POP APP POL DISC      53    3    178    2    -000009
38 -  40      POL DISC INTENS X POP      54    3    181    2    -000009
41 -  42      NEG NET FACTOR PAY      55    2    184    0    0000099
43 -  45      EXPORT RECEIV COUNTRY      56    3    186    0    -000009
46 -  48      EXP RECEIV COUNT/PROPOR      57    3    189    0    -000009
49 -  51      EXT INTERVEN 51-55      58    3    192    0    -000009
52 -  53      EXT INTERVEN 56-60      59    2    195    0    -000009
54 -  55      EXTER SUPPORT-DISSIDENT      60    2    197    0    0000099
56 -  57      EXTER SUPPORT-REGIME      61    2    199    0    0000099
58 -  61      MIL PER 10,000 ADULTS      62    4    201    0    -000009
62 -  64      MIL W/ NO THREAT      63    3    205    0    -000009
65 -  67      % DEF EXPEND OF GNP      64    3    208    1    -000009
68 -  69      % DEF EXPEND NO THREAT      65    2    211    1    -000009
70 -  72      INT SEC FRC/1000 POP      66    3    213    1    -000009
73 -  77      INT SEC FRC/SQKM      67    5    216    0    -000009
78 -  80      RESTRICT POL PART      68    3    221    1    -000009

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****DECK= 4
  COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  MDCODE2
  1 - 2         IS THE CONSTANT: '04'
  3 - 5         STANDARD COUNTRY CODE      2      3      4      J
  6 - 9         DEPRIVING POLICIES          69     4     224    1     -000009
 10 - 12        NEG SANCS 48-54              70     3     228    0     -000009
 13 - 16        NEG SANCS 55-60             71     4     231    0     -000009
 17 - 18        NEG SANCS 56                 72     2     235    0     -000009
 19 - 22        NEG SANCS 57                 73     4     237    0     -000009
 23 - 25        NEG SANCS 58                 74     3     241    0     -000009
 26 - 28        NEG SANCS 59                 75     3     244    0     -000009
 29 - 31        NEG SANCS 60                 76     3     247    0     -000009
 32 - 34        NEG SANCS 61                 77     3     250    0     -000009
 35 - 36        NEG SANCS 62                 78     2     253    0     -000009
 37 - 39        NEG SANCS 63                 79     3     255    0     -000009
 40 - 41        NEG SANCS 64                 80     2     258    0     -000009
 42 - 44        NEG SANCS 65                 81     3     260    0     -000009
 45 - 47        NEG SANCS 66                 82     3     263    0     -000009
 48 - 48        SUCCESS-DISSIDENTS          83     1     266    0     000009
 49 - 49        SUCCESS-CONSPIRACIES        84     1     267    0     000009
 50 - 50        SUCCESS-GROUP PROTEST        85     1     268    0     000009
 51 - 52        SUCCESS-ELITE STRIFE        86     2     269    0     -000009
 53 - 53        MILINTER IN POL            87     1     271    0     000009
 54 - 56        # RIOTS 48-54              88     3     272    0     -000009
 57 - 59        # RIOTS 55-60             89     3     275    0     -000009
 60 - 64        # STRIPE DTHS 48-54        90     5     278    0     -000009
 65 - 69        # STRIPE DTHS 55-60        91     5     283    0     -000009
 70 - 73        # ARMED ATKS 48-54        92     4     288    0     -000009
 74 - 77        # ARMED ATKS 55-60        93     4     292    0     -000009
 78 - 80        # DEMONS 48-54           94     3     296    0     -000009

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****DECK= 5
  COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  MDCODE2
  1 - 2         IS THE CONSTANT: '05'
  3 - 5         STANDARD COUNTRY CODE      2      3      4      0
  6 - 8         # DEMONS 55-60            95     3     299    0     -000009
  9 - 10        # IRREG POWER TRANS        96     2     302    0     -000009
 11 - 18        # DAYS CVL CONF 48-54     97     8     304    3     -000009
 19 - 26        # DTHS CVL CONF 48-54    98     8     312    3     -999999
 27 - 34        MAG OF CVL CONF 48-54    99     8     320    3     -999999
 35 - 42        MAG TURMOIL 48-54       100    8     328    3     -999999
 43 - 50        MAG REBEL 48-54         101    8     336    3     -999999
 51 - 58        # DAYS CVL CONF 55-60   102    8     344    3     -000009
 59 - 66        # DTHS CVL CONF 55-60   103    8     352    3     -999999
 67 - 74        MAG OF CVL CONF 55-60   104    8     360    3     -999999
 75 - 80        ARE BLANK

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****DECK=      6
  COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  MDCODE2
  1 - 2         IS THE CONSTANT: 'J6'
  3 - 5         STANDARD COUNTRY CODE      2      3      4      0
  6 - 13        MAG TURNOIL 55-60          105     8     368     3     -999999
 14 - 21        MAG REBEL 55-60            106     8     376     3     -999999
 22 - 23        CHAR NAT POL INST 60       107     2     384     0     000009
 24 - 26        SPAN NAT POL INST 60       108     3     386     0     -000009
 27 - 30        SPAN NAT POL INST 70       109     4     389     0     -000009
 31 - 32        CCNP IN ESTAB POLITY 60    110     2     393     0     000009
 33 - 34        AUTOCRACY 60              111     2     395     0     000009
 35 - 36        DEMOCRACY 60              112     2     397     0     000009
 37 - 38        ANCCRACY 60              113     2     399     0     000009
 39 - 40        STAB POL PARTS 62          114     2     401     0     000009
 41 - 42        WTD STAB POL PARTS 60      115     2     403     0     000009
 43 - 44        ELEC SUPP FOR GOVT 60     116     2     405     0     000009
 45 - 46        PCI COHESE 50-60          117     2     407     0     000009
 47 - 48        GOVT BUD % GDP 62          118     2     409     0     -000009
 49 - 51        RATIO UNION/NONAGRIC        119     3     411     0     -000009
 52 - 53        UNION PRO/ANTI REGIME        120     2     414     0     000009
 54 - 57        UNION DISSIDENCE            121     4     416     0     -000009
 58 - 61        UNION SUPP REGIME          122     4     420     0     -000009
 62 - 66        CCEM MEN / 10000 POP 63      123     5     424     1     -000009
 67 - 68        COMM STATUS 63              124     2     429     0     000009
 69 - 70        COMM DISS 60               125     2     431     0     000009
 71 - 72        MIL IN CVL STRIFE 61-65     126     2     433     0     -000009
 73 - 74        INTENS SEPARATISM 60         127     2     435     0     000009
 75 - 76        POP W/ SEP LEAN             128     2     437     0     -000009
 77 - 79        PCTENT POL SEP                   129     3     439     0     -000009
 80 - 80        ARE BLANK

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****DECK=      7
  COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  MDCODE2
  1 - 2         IS THE CONSTANT: 'J7'
  3 - 5         STANDARD COUNTRY CODE      2      3      4      0
  6 - 8         DISS SIZE / POP 60          130     3     442     0     -000009
  9 - 10        DENS OF DISS POP                       131     2     445     0     -000009
 11 - 12        TERRAIN OF DISS                    132     2     447     0     -000009
 13 - 14        TRANS IN DISS AREAS                   133     2     449     0     -000009
 15 - 16        INDEX - DISS ISULATION                134     2     451     0     -000009
 17 - 17        CHAR OF DISS                          135     1     453     0     000009
 18 - 80        ARE BLANK

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**POLITY
PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE**

(ICPSR 5010)

Principal Investigators

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Erika Gurr**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ICPSR ASSISTANCE

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The data [and tabulations] utilized in this [publication] were made available [in part] by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for Polity were originally collected by Ted Robert Gurr and Erika Gurr. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations represented here.

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STUDY DESCRIPTION

The unit of analysis in this study is not the nation-state or national political community as such but rather the POLITY or political system: that is, the basic political arrangements by which national political communities govern their affairs. These systems are described in terms of their authority pattern. They change through time, and when they do so in an abrupt and substantial way, the change is treated as signifying the end of one polity and the beginning of another. A very few nations, including Britain and Costa Rica, had the "same" gradually-changing polity throughout the era studied. In contrast, some nations experimented with more than 10 successive political systems; Greece and Guatemala are examples. Altogether this dataset contains information on 428 polities which functioned in 144 nominally different states at some time during the 19th and/or 20th centuries.

Universe of Analysis: The initial universe of analysis comprised the 82 nations which Singer and Small identified as being members of the international system at any time between 1817 and 1940 (This was discussed in their article, "Composition and Status Ordering of the International System, 1814-1940." *WORLD POLITICS*, 18 (January, 1966) 236-282). This list was used partly as a way of ensuring that the sample included the more important historical states as well as contemporary ones. However, coding was not limited to the periods during which these nations were members of the international system; also coded were their political characteristics for all periods between 1800 and 1970 during which they had internal autonomy. Korea, for example, was a member of the international system by Singer and Small's criteria only from ca. 1889 to 1904; this study coded Korea's political system characteristics from 1800 through 1904 (when it came under Japanese control), and North and South Korea separately from 1948 through 1970. This study also included predecessor states to those on Singer and Small's list, when they fell within the study's timeframe: an example is Gran Colombia, the predecessor state from 1821 to 1830, of Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. A second reason for relying on Singer and Small's list was that it gave at least preliminary assurance that a moderate amount of historical information would be available on these states. Only four proved uncodeable for the purposes of this study: Mongolia, Mecklenburg, and the two Hessens. In cases where a political system was in existence in 1800, its approximate date of origin was identified, and it was coded according to its "initial" authority characteristics as of 1800. At a later point the analysis was extended to 51 new nations which became independent between 1941 and 1965.

Two groups of political entities are excluded from the universe of analysis. Among them are countries like Liechtenstein and Bhutan, which are too small or peripheral to be "in" the international system. Periods of colonial rule similarly are excluded except for colonies which gained internal autonomy and then independence prior to 1965. New Zealand, for example, was coded from the beginning of effective internal rule in 1857, though it did not obtain Dominion status until 1907.

Determining Polity Changes: A polity comprises the basic political arrangements by which autonomous, national political communities ("countries") govern their affairs. Its basic elements are its structures of rule-making and rule-application and their relations with citizens or subjects. The life span or DURABILITY of a polity is the length of time it endures without MAJOR, ABRUPT changes in the pattern of authority relations among these basic elements.

A. Abrupt Changes defined:

Any one major change (defined below) that is accomplished in ten years or less is an abrupt change.

B. Major Changes defined:

These are operationally defined in terms of the variables listed below. The following changes in authority pattern are MAJOR:

- Var. 15, Selection of Executive: Change from any of the categories to another, except from 3 or 4 to 5 and reverse.
- Var. 16, Characteristics of Executive: Change to or from the collective executive category.
- Var. 17, Independence of Executive Authority: Any change among the categories is a polity change EXCEPT changes from 2 to 3 or 3 to 2.
- Var. 18, Extent of Political Competition and Opposition: Any change of two categories or more (1 to 3, 2 to 4, etc.) or any change between 3, Institutionalized Competition, and 4, Restricted Competition.
- Var. 23, Distribution of Authority: Change from either of the categories to the other.

New laws or constitutions are not necessarily "major changes." Formal changes of the kinds listed above are regarded as "major changes" only if accompanied by substantial changes in practice. However, formal changes are usually a clue that changes in practice are to be attempted. If more detailed information is lacking, a formal constitutional change of any of the specified types can be regarded as "major" provided the country has a history of attempting to govern by constitutional prescription.

Note that major changes in practice are "major" whether or not they are accompanied by formal, constitutional change.

"Revolutionary" seizures of power are not necessarily indicators of "major changes." Seizures of power often change only the office-holders, not the basic authority patterns of government. Similarly, the new "revolutionary" leaders may temporarily change the independence of executive authority or the extent of political competition--say for a few months or a year and a half--but then allow a return to "government as usual." Such temporary deviations from a basic authority pattern are not "polity changes." "Revolutionary" changes are like major constitutional changes: we need evidence that real changes are seriously attempted before we can decide that a new polity has been established.

Temporary "major changes" in authority are sometimes made by governments during crises. Political competition may be restricted during wartime. The executive may assume emergency powers during an economic crisis or natural disaster. These are not polity changes unless they are kept in force after the crisis has passed.

Several real, major changes often occur together. In Russia, for example, the period from 1917 to the mid-1920s saw a shift from ascriptive selection of the executive to designation, from a pure individual to a qualified individual executive, and from restricted to nonexistent political competition. These changes together constitute a polity change, not separate changes. Any series of linked changes, even if separated by several years, constitutes one not several polity changes.

In summary, any one of the major changes listed above that takes place in ten years or less signifies a polity termination and the beginning of a new polity, provided the change reflects an attempt at real, enduring change in authority patterns.

Some countries undergo periods of interregnum, during which there is a complete collapse of central political authority. This is most likely to occur during periods of internal war, for example the Congo (now Zaire) when it was rent by secessionist movements and civil wars in 1960-62. We characterize such periods as "interregna" in which NO polity exists. For interregnal periods of less than a year, the period is usually incorporated without separate mention in the "transition period" of the next polity. Longer interregna are separately represented as cases which are coded only for vars. 1,2,3,4,30,31,32,37,and 38.

Data Collection: Data were collected by a single coder working with increasingly refined versions of category definitions and coding guidelines. On three occasions all information gathered to date was reviewed and recoded to ensure its consistency with more detailed guidelines: multiple historical sources as the STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK, the ANNUAL REGISTER, the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD HISTORY, and Banks' CROSS POLITY TIME SERIES DATA. The procedure involved, first identifying a number of historical and social science texts and monographs for each state, then compiling from them a basic political chronology. Periods of substantial political change were identified while compiling each chronology and then carefully scrutinized, on the basis of diverse sources, to determine whether events met the criteria of this study for changes of and in polities. Changes of system were thereby identified and separate coding sheets were prepared for each polity, incorporating the relevant portions of the chronologies. The same sources were searched for information on authority characteristics.

Authority changes short of polity termination were also described and a separate polity authority profile was coded for each altered polity at its termination (or as of 1971 for continuing polities). Altogether, about four of 10 polities underwent minor or gradual changes in authority characteristics between their origin and termination.

The reliability of the coding procedure was partly assessed when, early in the coding process, a second coder was employed to duplicate the coding for several countries. The results were compared for the purpose of reducing ambiguity in the guidelines and interpretation of source material, but no formal reliability test was conducted. The coder's and the author's judgment is that the data have a high degree of internal consistency.

For further information about the project and a report of initial findings see: Ted Robert Gurr, "Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971." AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, (December, 1974).

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION FOR POLITY DATASET

- V 1 **Alphabetic Country Code (ALPHA CCODE)**
See Appendix A for list of codes
- V2 **Numeric Country Code (NUMERIC C-CODE)**
See Appendix A for complete list of codes
- V3 **Year Polity Established (DATE)**
Last three digits of year in which polity established.
- V4 **Regions of Polities (REGN)**
- 88 1. Western Europe: Sweden, Norway, Finland, Germany and the other German States, Austria (but not Hungary except as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire), Italy and its predecessors, and all countries to the west of them including Iceland.
 - 62 2. Eastern Europe: All continental European countries to the east of the above, including Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia, but excluding Turkey.
 - 12 3. European Settled Countries: U.S., Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Cyprus, Jamaica and Trinidad.
 - 63 11. Continental Latin America: South American countries Venezuela and south.
 - 58 12. Other Latin American countries: Mexico, Central American countries, Latin Caribbean countries, Haiti.
 - 47 21. Afro-Asian, South and East Asia: Pakistan and all continental Asian and Island states to the east of Pakistan to Japan, Philippines, and Indonesia inclusively.
 - 48 22. Afro-Asian, Near and Middle East, North America: All Islamic countries from Afghanistan to Morocco, including Turkey and Lebanon, but excluding Israel and such sub-Saharan states as Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania, etc.
 - 50 23. Afro-Asian, Black Africa: Saharan and sub-Saharan African countries, including Malagasy, but excluding white-ruled colonized countries.

V5 Month Polity Established (ES)

For each polity, the month and last three digits of the year (Variables 5 and 6) of a symbolic act formally establishing the polity (i.e., declaration of independence, adoption of a new constitution, or proclamation of a new dictatorship or military government) is coded. If there are several symbolic acts, the date of the first is normally coded and if there are none, an approximate date is assigned. For example, in Mexico, an unstable autocracy with individual leadership was transformed into an institutionalized one-party state between the mid-1920's and 1938. The party itself was established in 1929, which is one possible date for the new polity. But it was not until the election of 1934 that the effectiveness of the new party in controlling factional strife and military intervention was demonstrated, and not until 1938 that the new party was restructured to give formal representation to the major population sectors. The whole period is one of transition. In this case, the new polity is dated 1930, an arbitrary date in the transition period.

As a general rule, the shorter the polity's life, the more precise a beginning date is needed. The month of establishment is only important if the polity's lifespan is less than five years. If no exact year for the polity's origin was determined, an approximate year is recorded in the data and the month is coded as 99.

V6 Year of Polity Establishment (TAB)

Last three digits of year

V7 Month and last two digits of year in which "transition period", if any, began prior to formal establishment of the polity (TRAN 1)

Some new polities are preceded by a "transition period" (Variables 7 & 8) during which new institutions are planned, legally constituted, and put into effect. Democratic and quasi-democratic polities are particularly likely to be so established, in a procedure involving constitutional conventions and referenda.

Such polities are dated from the effective date of implementation of the new institutions, e.g., the date on which a new constitution is put into effect. The transition period, thus is not counted in the polity's lifespan. Two examples:

- a. In Colombia, a coup ended a dictatorship in May, 1957.

An interim junta formulated a basic constitutional revision, which was approved by plebiscite in December, 1957. Although the first elections under the new political system were not held until March, 1958, the new polity is dated from the December, 1957 approval of the new constitution. The transitional period is the period from May through December, 1957.

- b. In France, the Fourth Republic ended when General de Gaulle assumed power in June, 1958. The Fifth Republic's constitution was formulated and approved by referendum in September, to take effect in October. (It effected a transition from an assembly-dominant to a president-dominant polity, hence was an "abrupt polity change.") The transition period includes the four months from June to October; the new polity dates from October, 1958.

V8 Month and last two digits of year in which "transition period", if any, ended prior to formal establishment of polity (TRAN2)

V9 Origin of New Nation's Polity (ORIG1)

The circumstances of a new polity's "birth" with special attention to the presence of violent conflict, if any, are coded in variables 9-13. For established nations, the circumstances of "polity termination" are usually the same as those of origin for the next polity. The exceptions are most likely for polities which originate with a "transitional period." For a hypothetical example, the old polity may terminate with a coup d'etat, followed by a several-year transitional period which is concluded by non-violent institutional changes. The institutional changes that characterize the transitional period are coded.

- 284 0. Not relevant
 18 1. Polity imposed under the tutelage of the former occupying power while still in authority
 23 2. Polity dictated by the former occupying power, or another country, after, or as part of, the attainment of formal independence
 102 3. Polity developed by citizens or the head of state of the new country, whether or not borrowed from some other source.

1 -9. Missing data

V10 Circumstances of New Nation's Birth (ORIG2)

- 284 0. Not relevant
 32 1. Colony becomes independent during violent conflict (including territories captured and returned to autonomy after a war)
 18 2. Region secedes from a larger nation during violent conflict
 22 3. Successor state or states to the breakup or partition of a nation, conquest state, empire or federation during a violent conflict
 13 4. Coalition or union of formerly separate states or territories during violent conflict
 42 5. Colony becomes independent with no violent conflict
 7 6. Region secedes from a larger nation with no violent conflict
 1 7. Successor state or states to the breakup or partition of a nation, conquest state, empire or federation without violent conflict
 4 8. Coalition or union of formerly separate states or territories with no violent conflict
 4 9. Other new nation: for example, establishment of new states in previously uncolonized areas such as the Transvaal Bepublic

1 -9. Missing data

V11 **Origins of Established Nation's Polity; External Conflict (JRIG3)**
 Pertains to polities established in existing nations, and after an interregnum, in circumstances of external war, foreign threat, or direct intervention. Note that conditions in codes 2 and 3 can occur in an existing nation without necessarily destroying its autonomy.

- 398 0. Not relevant
- 2 1. Polity change to deal with foreign war or threat
- 13 2. Polity change imposed or directed by foreign power(s) (including international agencies and agencies like the CIA) without direct military intervention
- 10 3. Polity change imposed by occupying foreign power(s) (e.g., West Germany in 1949)
- 4 4. Other polity changes in the context of war
- 1 -9. Missing data

V12 **Origins of Established Nation's Polity; Violent Internal Conflict (ORIG4)**

Pertains to polities established in existing nations during or as a direct result of coups, internal wars, or MASSIVE turmoil (riots, demonstrations). Note that coups are seizures of power involving relatively few individuals and brief, relatively nonviolent conflict. Internal wars are longer lived, large-scale events such as rebellions, civil and guerrilla wars, and popular revolutions.

- 318 0. Not relevant
- 67 1. Polity change is the direct result of a successful coup or assassination or small military uprising (barracks uprising).
- 1 2. Polity change is the direct result of an unsuccessful coup or assassination (for example, when an unsuccessful coup inspires the executive to eliminate political opposition permanently).
- 23 3. Polity change is made by victorious rebels directly following an internal war.
- 10 4. Polity change is made by incumbent rulers during or after an internal war or massive turmoil.
- 8 5. Other: Polity change is made because of violent internal conflict under circumstances not classifiable under 1, 2 or 3 (for example, interregnum, government disintegration, or lack of precise information).
- 1 -9. Missing data

V13 Origins of Established Nation's Polity; Non-violent
Internal Political Transition (ORIG5)

Pertains to polities established in existing nations under circumstances other than those listed in Variables 11 and 12 above. Note that the minor turmoil may occur during a "non-violent" transition. Internal crisis is defined as internal conditions or conflicts which (explicitly or implicitly) place stress on governmental operations (e.g., natural disasters, economic depressions, intense class or ethnic or religious conflicts, demands for massive socio-economic change, factional conflict within the elite, and demands for representation).

- 272 0. Not relevant
- 16 1. Personalistic changes, without apparent internal crisis. Polity changes which mainly enhance the position of the executive and/or his immediate supporters. Establishment of dictatorial rule and suppression of peaceful opposition are usually "personalistic" changes, unless accompanied by substantial change in such variables as scope of government activity, or the degree of centralism/federalism.
- 24 2. Personalistic changes, in the context of internal political crisis.
- 44 3. Institutional changes, without apparent internal crisis. Changes in the basic structure, scope, and/or operations of government (e.g., the creation of a one-party state, a shift from dictatorship to constitutional government or change in the selection of the executive)
- 48 4. Institutional changes, in the context of internal political crisis
- 7 5. Other non-violent polity transitions, not classifiable above (e.g., not clear whether personalistic or institutional)
- 8 6. Major change in political participation in the context of internal political crisis
- 9 9. Country and polity were in existence in 1800, but circumstances of polity origin are not specifiable

V14 Source of Model for New Polity's Authority Pattern (MODEL)
 Authority pattern is defined as the set of structures and processes whereby directives applicable to members of the state are made, issued and enforced.

- 2 0. No basis for judging
- 29 1. New, imposed: The polity model is one that is new to the country and is imposed or prescribed by external agents. Examples are the imposition of a new form of autonomous government by an invading foreign power, such as the Vichy Regime created in France after the German invasion in 1940-41; institutions established by a de-colonizing power, such as the polities of almost all independent African countries; and institutions created under the tutelage of foreign commissions, e.g., in Albania in 1913 and in West Germany, 1949.
- 42 2. New, borrowed: Modeled after some foreign system but is chosen and implemented without external coercion or persuasion. For example, most Latin American states chose new polities at the time of their independence that were modeled after the United States.
- 226 3. New, indigenous: Not visibly the result of imitation. The Nazi polity established in 1933 is an example. The French Fifth Republic is another; it is a "presidential" system, but not one designed in imitation of some other model. (It is also not a "reversion," described below, because previous "strong executive" polities in French history were headed by non-elected monarchs.)
- 107 4. Reversion: A return to a pattern of political arrangements in effect in the country within the past generation. The Colombian polity established in 1958 following a five-year dictatorship was clearly a reversion, with temporary modifications, to the president-dominant polity of the pre-1953 era.
- 22 5. Continuation: A residual category. Coded for polities established before 1800 and for polities originating in "personalistic" changes which have no visible indigenous roots OR foreign models.

V15 Method of Selection of Executive (EXSEL1)

Any change in the prevailing pattern of executive selection is coded as a polity change. Some polities oscillate regularly between two of the following patterns, without any other pattern changes; these oscillations are not "polity changes," and such polities are coded according to the MOST COMMON method of executive selection.

- 4 0. No basis for judging
- 61 1. Caesaristic: Chief executives typically attain office by forceful seizure of power. Such seizures are sometimes legitimized after the fact in noncompetitive elections or by legislative enactment. This does not include the occasional ouster of a president if elections are called within a reasonable time and the previous pattern continues.
- 111 2. Competitive elections: Chief executives are typically chosen in or through elections matching two or more major parties or candidates. (Elections may be popular or by an elected assembly.)
- 141 3. Designation: Chief executives are typically chosen within the political elite, without formal competition. Examples are rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidents before their terms end; recurrent military selection of civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selection of successors; or repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties.
- 63 4. Ascription: Kings, emperors, beys, emirs and queens who assume executive powers by right of descent. An executive selected by other means may proclaim himself "king," but the polity he governs is not coded "ascription" unless a relative actually succeeds him as ruler.
- 48 5. Dual executive: Ascription and designation or ascription and competitive elections coexist; for example, in the selection of king and premier, respectively.

V16 Characteristics of Executive (MONOC1)

If in variable 15, dual executive (code 5) is used to describe the selection of the executive, then that same country is coded as 2 or 3 below, depending on whether one member of the executive team exercised predominant authority. If authority fluctuated between them over time, it was coded as 2, qualified individual. Furthermore, for communist polities, if one person regularly held both the Party chairmanship and chairmanship of the supreme executive organ--Council of State or Presidium--they were coded as 1, pure individual executive. If the two posts were regularly held by two persons, they were coded as 2, qualified individual.

Note: A change to or from 3 in less than a ten-year period was considered an abrupt polity change. Changes between 1 and 2 were not.

- 2 0. No basis for judging
- 245 1. Pure individual executive--a single individual, not dependent either formally or informally for his position or authority on a cabinet, council or junta. An executive who is a "front man" for a "strong man" behind the scenes is also coded here. Monarchs are almost always "pure individual executives" and presidents and dictators usually are. Premiers and generals-as-executives are usually dependent, at least formally, on cabinets, councils or juntas, and are coded 2 below.
- 178 2. Qualified individual executive--one member of a cabinet, supreme council or junta, but "first among equals" and holds substantially more effective authority than other members. Most parliamentary junta, and Communist regimes are of this sort.
- 3 3. Collective executive--power is formally and effectively in a committee, supreme council or junta. It may have a chair, but no one individual or position clearly dominates it. "Permanent" collective executives must be distinguished from "temporary" ones (coded 1 or 2 above). Generally, the collective executives whose members proclaim themselves as temporary, and who rule collectively only until the election, or emergence, of an individual executive, are "temporary." The following rules operate in the selection of the codes:
- i. If a new constitution or similar document is issued which institutionalizes the collective executive, it is "permanent", however long it lasts.
 - ii. If a collective body rules during an emergency such as war or civil war, but afterwards gives way to an individual executive, it is "temporary."
 - iii. If a collective body changes its chair without a dominant individual executive emerging, it is "permanent."

- iv. If a collective body rules for more than two years, but without any of the above kinds of evidence about whether it is "transitional" to an individual-executive pattern, it is "permanent."

V17 Independence of Executive Authority (EXIND1)

Records the extent of effective institutionalized limitations on executive authority. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups." In Western democracies, these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; and in many nations a strong, independent judiciary.

NOTE: Any change from 2 to 3 or from 3 to 2 has been considered a polity change.

- 12 0. No basis for judging
- 17J 1. Unlimited authority: There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassination). Examples of evidence:
 - i. Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored.
 - ii. Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive's initiative.
 - iii. There is no legislative assembly, OR there is one but it is called and dismissed at the executive's pleasure.
 - iv. The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and can remove them at will.
 - v. The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive.
 - vi. Rule by decree is repeatedly used.

If the executive is given limited or unlimited power by a representative body to cope with an emergency and relents this power after the emergency has passed, this is NOT a change to unlimited authority.

- 132 2. Slight to moderate limitations on executive authority: There are some real but limited restraints on the executive. Examples:
- i. The legislature initiates some categories of legislation.
 - ii. The legislature delays implementation of executive acts and decrees.
 - iii. The executive fails to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term.
 - iv. The ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action independently of the executive.
 - v. The legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by the executive.
 - vi. There is an independent judiciary.
- 38 3. Substantial limitations on executive authority: The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group, but is subject to substantial constraints by them. Examples:
- i. A legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action.
 - ii. A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive.
 - iii. The accountability groups makes important appointments to administrative posts.
 - iv. The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.
- 76 4. Executive parity or subordination: Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. Examples of evidence:
- i. A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation.
 - ii. The executive (president, premier, king, queen, cabinet, council) is chosen by the accountability group AND is dependent on its continued support to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems).
 - iii. In multi-party democracies, there is chronic "cabinet instability."

V18 Extent of Political Competition and Opposition (COMP1)

A newly enacted right to engage in political activities is most likely a change from category 5 to 4 and is so coded. In addition, as an operational rule, the banning of a political party which received more than 10% of the vote in a recent national election is considered sufficient evidence that competition is "restricted". Additional information was used to determine whether the appropriate coding was 2, Factional/Restricted; or 4, Restricted.

- 5 0. No basis for judging
- 28 1. Uninstitutionalized competition: Political competition is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time. "Uninstitutionalized competition" may or may not be characterized by violent conflict among partisan groups.
- 169 2. Factional/restricted competition: Relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level -- but the competition among them is intense, hostile, and frequently violent. Extreme factional competition may be manifest in the establishment of rival governments and in civil war. When one such political group emerges on top, it typically restricts its opponents' political activities, hence the polity is "Factional/restricted" by turns. Also coded here are polities in which political groups are factional but a part or most of the population is excluded from political competition (e.g., Indians in some South American countries until recently). See also code 4, "Restricted competition."
- 41 3. Institutionalized competition: Relatively stable and enduring political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level and competition seldom causes widespread violence or disruption. The regime usually regulates their activity, but no significant political groups are suppressed or systematically excluded from competition. Very small parties or political groups may be restricted in the "institutionalized competition" pattern.

- 71 4. Restricted competition: Some organized, competitive political activity occurs outside government, without serious factionalism; but the regime in power systematically and sharply limits competitive political activity in form and/or extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the male adult population) from participation. "Restricted competition" is distinguished from "Factional/restricted competition" (2 above) by the systematic, persisting nature of the restrictions: large classes of people, groups, or types of peaceful political participation are continuously excluded from the political process. Examples:
- i. Prohibiting some kinds of political organizations, either by type or group of people involved (e.g., no national political parties, or no political organizations among blacks or Peronistas).
 - ii. Prohibiting some kinds of political action (e.g., Communist parties may organize but are prohibited from competing in elections).
 - iii. Systematic harassment of political opposition (leaders killed, jailed, or sent into exile; candidates regularly ruled off ballots; opposition media -- press, radio stations -- banned, etc.). This is evidence for EITHER "Factional/restricted" or "Restricted," depending on its persistence.
- 114 5. Suppressed or nonexistent competition: No significant political oppositional activity of any kind is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and the governing party -- if there is one.

V19 Method of Executive Selection at Polity Termination, if Different than at Onset (EXSEL2)

(see Variable 15 for full definition of codes.)

- | | | |
|---|----|-----------------------|
| 1 | 1. | Caesaristic |
| 8 | 2. | Competitive elections |
| 2 | 3. | Designation |
| 0 | 4. | Ascription |
| 7 | 5. | Dual executive |

410 -9. Missing data

V20 Characteristics of Executive at Polity Termination, if Different than at Onset (MONOC2)

(See Variable 16 for full definition of codes.)

- | | | |
|----|----|--------------------------------|
| 10 | 1. | Pure individual executive |
| 12 | 2. | Qualified individual executive |
| 0 | 3. | Collective executive |

406 -9. Missing data

- V21 Independence of Executive Authority at Polity Termination, if Different from Those at Onset (EXIND2)
(See Variable 17 for full definition of codes.)
- 4 1. Unlimited authority
 - 12 2. Slight or moderate limitations on executive authority
 - 17 3. Substantial limitations on executive authority
 - 3 4. Executive parity or subordination
- 392 -9. Missing data
- V22 Political Competition at Polity Termination, if Different from Pattern at Onset (COMP2)
(See Variable 18 for full definition of codes.)
- 2 1. Uninstitutionalized competition
 - 13 2. Factional/restricted competition
 - 13 3. Institutionalized competition
 - 9 4. Restricted competition
 - 14 5. Suppressed or non-existent competition
- 377 -9. Missing data
- V23 Distribution of Authority (DIST1)
- 1) 0. No basis for judging
 - 371 1. Centralized--no more than moderate decision-making authority is vested in local or regional governments. Many nominally "federal" systems, like the Soviet Union, are in fact centralized in this sense.
 - 47 2. Decentralized-- local and regional governments have substantial decision-making authority. Switzerland, Canada, and the United States are contemporary examples of effectively decentralized governments.
- V24 Distribution of Governmental Authority at Polity Termination, if Different from That at Onset (DIST2)
(See Variable 23 for full definition of codes.)
- 4 1. Centralized
 - 0 2. Decentralized
- 424 -9. Missing data

V25 Scope of Government Functions (SCOPE1)

This is a continuum which refers to the extent to which all levels of government combined attempt to regulate and organize the economic and social life of the national population. The codes defined below refer to positions along the continuum from minimum to totalitarian control, and so distinctions among them often are somewhat arbitrary. One of a number of indicators used to determine coding categories was data on per capita expenditure of central governments in U.S. dollars, as reported in Arthur S. Banks, CROSS-POLITY TIME SERIES DATA, Segment 3, col. b, which are reported annually for most countries from 1860 to 1960. The dollar "thresholds" of each category were judged mainly by reference to per capita expenditures in countries whose "scope of government functions" had been evaluated on the basis of other information.

- 6 0. No basis for judging
- 260 1. Minimal--governments whose operations are largely or wholly limited to such core functions as maintenance of internal security and administration of justice. "Extractive" or "predatory" governments which exploit a population primarily for the benefit of the elite are also coded here; Haiti under the elder Duvalier is an example.
- 105 2. Segmental- governments whose activities are intermediate between minimal and segmental. Governments which provide limited basic services, like postal service, internal communications, and education for a substantial part of their population have been coded here. Most 19th century democracies are examples.
- 34 3. Segmental governmental authority includes a wide range of basic services to the country's population, plus close regulation of major sections of social and economic activity. The contemporary U.S. and Canada are examples.
- 11 4. Segmental+ governments whose activities are intermediate between segmental and totalitarian. Governments which provide almost all basic social services for their populations, and/or directly control large economic sectors have been coded here. Contemporary Britain, and Sweden are examples, as are Mexico and Yugoslavia.
- 12 5. Totalitarian--governments which directly organize and control almost all aspects of social and economic life. The contemporary Russian and Cuban states are examples.

V26 'Scope of Governmental Functions at Polity's Termination, if Different than at Onset (SCOPE2)

Directiveness. (See Variable 25 for full definition of codes.)

- 0 1. Minimal
- 48 2. Segmental-
- 36 3. Segmental
- 22 4. Segmental+
- 2 5. Totalitarian
- 320 -9. Missing data

V27 Number of Major Gradual Changes (MAJCH)

Major changes in the basic power relationships in the political system.

See study description, Determining Polity Changes, pages 130-131 for discussion. They are GRADUAL if the shift is one of one kind only and requires more than 10 years (or more than 20 years if two related changes occur). For example, the change in Britain from ascriptive to elected executive (coinciding with the shift in executive authority from the king to the cabinet) required more than a century.

387	0.	None
33	1.	One
5	2.	Two
1	3.	Three
2	4.	Four

V28 Number of Minor Polity Changes (MINCH)

Minor changes are changes recorded in Variables 15-26 which do not meet the criteria for "major changes" as described in the study description, page 130.

282	0.	None
88	1.	One minor change
38	2.	Two minor changes
7	3.	Three minor changes
11	4.	Four minor changes
1	5.	Five minor changes
1	6.	Six minor changes

V29 Number of Polity Interruptions (INTER)

Polity changes that are imposed by external authority, for example, by an invading or colonial country, are "polity interruptions" if the country later regains independence and reestablishes the polity that existed before the invasion. Denmark and the Netherlands (among other European countries) had "polity interruptions" during World War II, for example, and so did the Philippines: each subsequently returned to pre-war forms of government. Italy and Yugoslavia did not return to pre-war forms, and their pre-war polities are coded as "terminated", with their post-invasion collapse. Polity interruptions will very seldom exceed 1. If the existing government cooperated with the invading forces and continued to function, this was not considered an interruption.

389	0.	None
31	1.	One interruption
6	2.	Two interruptions
2	3.	Three interruptions

- V30 Date of Polity Termination (TERM)**
 Month and last three digits of year of polity termination. Date is based on a symbolic act or event which formally terminated a polity. The act or event may be a revolution, a seizure of power or the date on which a new constitutional arrangement is proclaimed. If no such symbolic acts were identified, an approximate date has been assigned. DATES OF POLITY TERMINATION USUALLY WILL BE THE SAME AS THE DATE OF ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEXT POLITY, but with some exceptions. There may be an intervening period of civil war, or a period of foreign occupation, or a transitional government which works out the ground rules for the new polity. The month of polity termination is specified when possible if the polity life is less than five years.
- V31 Polity Persistence in Years for Those Polities Terminated before 1971 (PERSI)**
 By definition, polity persistence for 117 continuing polities (as of 1971) was unknown and is coded as "missing data" on Variable 31.
- V32 Persistence Score (SCORE)**
 A scaled measure of persistence, using the data in Variable 31. Note that for coding purposes, if by 1971 a continuing polity's persistence is more than 76 years, it is coded 7 on Variable 32. If the continuing polity is less than 76 years old in 1971, it is coded as "missing data".
- | | | |
|----|----|-------------|
| 94 | 0. | 0-5 years |
| 61 | 1. | 6-10 years |
| 39 | 2. | 11-15 years |
| 39 | 3. | 16-25 years |
| 25 | 4. | 26-40 years |
| 15 | 5. | 41-55 years |
| 18 | 6. | 56-75 years |
| 31 | 7. | 76+ years |
- 106 -9. Missing data (continuing polity in 1971, less than 76 yrs. old)

- V33 Polity Terminated by Loss of National Autonomy (TERM1)
 Indication of the general circumstances of a polity's "death" or transformation is coded in Variables 33-36, with special attention to the presence of crisis and violent conflict, if any. The four variables parallel quite closely those for coding "Polity Origins". Each variable is mutually exclusive except that rarely, a polity is terminated under circumstances of both external conflict (Variable 34) and violent internal conflict (Variable 35). Categories WITHIN each of the variables are mutually exclusive and only one has been coded for each polity. Variable 33 pertains to nations whose polities end when the nation itself gives up autonomous existence.
- 276 0. Not relevant
 14 1. Nation voluntarily joins another new or established state, or a confederation is dissolved voluntarily, resulting in several new nations.
 16 2. Nation is forcibly assimilated into or conquered by another nation.
 5 3. Nation joins another new or established state under violent pressure from internal groups, e.g., Austria, 1938.
- 117 -9. Missing data (continuing polity in 1971)
- V34 Polity terminated because of external conflict (TERM2)
 Pertains to polities terminated in circumstances of international war threat or intervention, but only if the nation or its component parts maintain their autonomy. Note that conditions in codes 2 and 3 can occur in an existing nation without necessarily destroying its autonomy.
- 279 0. Not relevant
 3 1. Polity change to deal with foreign war or threat
 10 2. Polity changes imposed or directed by foreign power(s) (including international agencies and agencies like the CIA), without direct military intervention.
 13 3. Polity change imposed by occupying foreign power(s) (e.g., West Germany in 1949).
 6 4. Other polity changes in the context of war.
- 117 -9. Missing data (continuing polity in 1971)
- V35 Polity Terminated because of Violent Internal Conflict (TERM3)
 Pertains to polities terminated during or as a direct result of coups and internal wars.
- 174 0. Not relevant
 79 1. Polity change is the direct result of a successful coup or assassination or a small military uprising (barracks uprising).

- 3 2. Polity change is a direct result of an unsuccessful coup or assassination (e.g., when an unsuccessful coup inspires the executive to eliminate political opposition permanently).
- 31 3. Polity change is made by victorious rebels directly following an internal war.
- 13 4. Polity change is made by incumbent rulers during or after an internal war or massive turmoil.
- 11 5. Other: Polity change is made because of violent internal conflict under circumstances not classifiable under 1, 2, or 3 (e.g., interregnum, government disintegration, or lack of precise information).

117 -9. Missing data (continuing polity in 1971)

V36 Polity Terminated through Non-violent Internal Polity Transformation (TERM4)

Pertains to polities terminated under circumstances other than those in Variables 33-35. Note that explanation of the terms "internal crisis" "personalistic change" and "institutional change" are in Variable 13.

- 194). Not relevant
- 12 1. Personalistic changes, without apparent internal crisis
- 24 2. Personalistic changes, in the context of internal political crisis
- 30 3. Institutional changes, without apparent internal crisis
- 38 4. Institutional changes, in the context of internal political crisis
- 6 5. Other non-violent polity transitions, not classifiable above (e.g., because not clear whether personalistic or institutional).
- 7 6. Major change in political participation in the context of internal political crisis.
- 117 9. Country and polity were in existence at the beginning of 1971.

V37 Population of Country at Time of Polity Establishment in Billions (POP1)

(When less than 1 million, the figure is rounded up to 1 million). For polities in existence in 1800, the population figure is for that year.

V38 Population of Country at Time of Polity Termination in Billions (POP2)

(When less than 1 million, the figure is rounded up to 1 million). For polities in existence at the beginning of 1971, the population figure is for that year.

V39 Date of Country's Establishment (SET)

Prior to 1941 or after 1940.

- 1. Country established before 1941
- 2. Country established after 1940

V40 Autocracy Score at Polity Onset (AUTOC1)

The essential quality of the "autocratic polity" is the institutionalized monopolization of power and political activity by the state. The following calculation is used for each polity to compute an autocracy score from 0-7.

COMPONENT PARTS	CHARACTERISTICS	WEIGHT
Executive Selection (Var. 15)	Ascription	1
	Designation	1
Political Competition (Var. 18)	Suppressed	2
	Restricted	1
Executive Independence (Var. 17)	Unlimited Authority	2
	Slightly Limited	1
Centralization	None*	
Scope of Government (Var. 25)	Totalitarian	2
	Segmental +	1

MAXIMUM SCORE = 7

*Centralization is not a distinctive feature of autocracies in view of the large portion of competitive democracies that share that characteristic.

70	0.	None
78	1.	Minimum, score one
79	2.	Score two
73	3.	Score three
51	4.	Score four
64	5.	Score five
12	6.	Score six
1	7.	Maximum, score seven

V41 Autocracy Score at Polity Termination (AUTOC2)

See Var. 40 for definitions and method for calculating score.

67	0.	None
90	1.	Minimum, score one
72	2.	Score two
61	3.	Score three
60	4.	Score four
60	5.	Score five
14	6.	Score six
4	7.	Maximum, score seven

V42 Mean of Autocracy Scores in Variables 40 and 41 (MAUTOC)

V43 Democracy Score at Polity Onset (DEMOC1)

The essential quality of the "democratic polity" is the presence of multiple institutionalized centers of power, at least some of which are open to widespread citizen participation. The following calculation is used for each polity to compute a democracy score from 0-7.

COMPONENT PARTS	CHARACTERISTICS	WEIGHT
Executive Selection (Var.15)	Competitive Elections	2
Political Competition (Var.18)	Institutionalized	2
Executive Independence (Var.17)	Legislative Parity	2
	Substantial Limits	1
Centralization (Var.24)	Decentralized	1
Scope of Government (Var.25)	None*	

MAXIMUM SCORE = 7

*No particular scope of government is distinctively characteristic of democracies; empirically the range is from "minimal" to "segmental +." (See Var. 25 for definitions.)

252	0.	None
41	1.	Minimum, score one
43	2.	Score two
15	3.	Score three
41	4.	Score four
15	5.	Score five
17	6.	Score six
4	7.	Maximum, score seven

V44 Democracy Score at Polity Termination (DEMOC2)

See Var. 43 for definitions and method for calculating score.

248	0.	None
37	1.	Minimum, score one
47	2.	Score two
17	3.	Score three
34	4.	Score four
13	5.	Score five
25	6.	Score six
7	7.	Maximum, score seven

V45 Mean of Democracy Scores in Variables 43 and 44 (NDEMOC)

V46 Anarchy Score at Polity Onset (ANARCH1)

The essential quality of the "anocratic polity" is its relative lack of political power and institutionalization. The following calculation is used for each polity to compute an anarchy score from 0-7.

COMPONENT PARTS	CHARACTERISTICS	WEIGHT
Executive Selection (Var.15)	Caesaristic	1
Political Competition (Var.18)	Uninstitutionalized Factional/Restricted	2 1
Executive Independence (Var.17)	None*	
Centralization (Var.24)	Decentralized	2
Scope of Government (Var.25)	Minimal	2

MAXIMUM SCORE = 7

*None of the categories of "executive independence" seen uniquely or predominantly associated with the anocratic polity. Whatever the relative independence of their executives, the more salient characteristic of such polities is the minimal scope of governmental action.

92	0.	None
48	1.	Minimum, score one
114	2.	Score two
101	3.	Score three
50	4.	Score four
17	5.	Score five
6	6.	Score six
0	7.	Maximum, score seven

V47 Anarchy Score at Polity Termination (ANARCH2)

See Var. 46 for definitions and method of calculating score.

124	0.	None
72	1.	Minimum, score one
95	2.	Score two
88	3.	Score three
31	4.	Score four
14	5.	Score five
4	6.	Score six
0	7.	Maximum, score seven

- V48 Mean of Anarchy Scores in Variables 46 and 47 (MANARC)
- V49 Openness of Executive Selection Process at Polity Onset (OPEN1)
The categories of Var. 15 are reordered on the "openness" continuum.
- 63 1. Ascription
 - 141 2. Designation
 - 48 3. Dual executive
 - 61 4. Caesaristic
 - 111 5. Competitive
 - 4 -9. Missing data
- V50 Openness of Executive Selection Process at Polity Termination (OPEN2)
- 57 1. Ascription
 - 136 2. Designation
 - 52 3. Dual executive
 - 60 4. Caesaristic
 - 119 5. Competitive
 - 4 -9. Missing data
- V51 Mean of Openness Scores in Variables 49 and 50 (MOPEN)
- V52 Executive Decision-Making Latitude at Polity Onset (SLAT1)
The categories of Var. 17 are defined here as the "latitude" continuum.
- 170 1. Unlimited
 - 132 2. Slight to moderate limits
 - 38 3. Substantial limits
 - 76 4. Co-equal with or subordinate to legislature
 - 12 -9. Missing data
- V53 Executive Decision-Making Latitude at Polity Termination (SLAT2)
- 171 1. Unlimited
 - 123 2. Slight to moderate limits
 - 43 3. Substantial limits
 - 79 4. Co-equal with or subordinate to legislature
 - 12 -9. Missing data

V54 Mean of Latitude Scores in Variables 52 and 53 (MSLAT)

V55 Participation at Polity Onset (PART1)

The categories of Var. 18 are reordered here on the participation continuum. The amount of participation is high to the extent that there is a large volume of influence attempts by subordinates via open channels. The operational assumption here is that volume is high to the extent that there is open, institutionalized political competition and opposition.

114 1. Suppressed or non-existent
 71 2. Restricted
 28 3. Uninstitutionalized
 169 4. Factional/restricted
 41 5. Institutionalized
 5 -9. Missing data

V56 Participation at Polity Termination (PART2)

119 1. Suppressed or non-existent
 62 2. Restricted
 18 3. Uninstitutionalized
 174 4. Factional/restricted
 50 5. Institutionalized
 5 -9. Missing data

V57 Mean of Participation Scores in Variables 55 and 56 (MPART)

V58 Directiveness of Government at Polity Onset (DIRC1)

The categories of Var. 25 are reordered here on the directiveness continuum.

The directiveness of a social unit is high to the extent that a wide scope of members' activities are closely regulated and sanctions frequently imposed for violations. The directiveness of polities is evaluated by reference to the scope of governmental regulation of societal functions.

12 1. Totalitarian
 11 2. Segmental +
 34 3. Segmental
 105 4. Segmental -
 260 5. Minimal
 6 -9. Missing data

V59 Directiveness of Government at Polity Termination (DIREC2)

14 1. Totalitarian
 31 2. Segmental +
 59 3. Segmental
 124 4. Segmental -
 194 5. Minimal

6 -9. Missing data

V60 Mean of Directiveness Scores in Variables 58 and 59 (MDIREC)

V61 Complexity Score of Polity Conformation at Polity Onset (CONF1)

The complexity score is calculated using the following chart:

a.	EXECUTIVE CHARACTERISTICS (Var.16)	WEIGHT
	Collective	4
	Qualified Individual	3
	Pure Individual	1
b.	EXECUTIVE INDEPENDENCE (Var.17)	WEIGHT
	Co-equal	4
	Substantial Limits	3
	Some Limits	2
	Unlimited	1
c.	POWER DISTRIBUTION (Var.23)	WEIGHT
	Decentralized	4
	Centralized	1

COMPLEXITY SCORE = a + b + c

NOTE: Cases scored 2 have missing data on one of the three component variables.

0 1. Least complex
 7 2.
 125 3.
 129 4.
 63 5.
 26 6.
 66 7.
 10 8.
 1 9. Most complex
 1 0. Missing data

V62 Complexity of Polity Conformation at Polity Termination (CONF2)

0	1.	Least complex
7	2.	
126	3.	
124	4.	
65	5.	
25	6.	
69	7.	
10	8.	
1	9.	Most complex
1	0.	Missing data

V63 Mean of Conformation Scores in Variables 61 and 62 (MCONF)

V64 Weighted Measure of Polity Adaptability (ADAPT)

Adaptability refers to the extent of a political system's demonstrated capacity for undergoing incremental change in its authority pattern, not only its ability to cope. Adaptability = $2(\text{Var. 27, "Number of Major Gradual Polity Changes"} + \text{Var. 29, "Number of Polity Interruptions"}) + \text{Var. 28, "Number of Minor Polity Changes."}$

V65-V7)

Variables 65 through 7) permit the analyst to distinguish among subsets of polities according to the circumstances in which they were established and terminated. Continuing polities in 1971 are coded missing data (-9).

V65 Externally-Imposed Polity Origin (IMORIG)

Polity origin is "imposed" if Var. 9=1 or 2, or if Var. 11=2 or 3.

355	0.	No
64	1.	Yes

V66 Polity Origin During Intense Internal Conflict (VCORIG)

Polity origin during intense internal conflict (VCORIG) if Var. 12 equals 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.

310	0.	No
109	1.	Yes

V67 Polity Origin Through Adaptive Change (ADORIG)

Polity origin is "adaptive" if Var. 9=3, or Var. 11= 1 or 4, or Var. 13= 1 through 6.

165	0.	No
254	1.	Yes

- V68 Externally-Imposed Polity Termination (INTERM)
 Polity termination is externally imposed if Var. 33=2 or if Var.34= 2 or 3.
- | | | |
|-----|----|-----|
| 272 | 0. | No |
| 39 | 1. | Yes |
- V69 Polity Termination During Intense Internal Conflict (VCTERM)
 Polity termination during intense conflict if Var. 34= 3, or if Var.35=1 through 5.
- | | | |
|-----|----|-----|
| 169 | 0. | No |
| 142 | 1. | Yes |
- V70 Polity Terminated Through Adaptive Change (ADTERM)
 Polity termination is "adaptive" if Var.33=1, or Var.34=1 or 4, or Var. 36= 1 through 6.
- | | | |
|-----|----|-----|
| 174 | 0. | No |
| 137 | 1. | Yes |
- V71 Average Years Persistence of All Preceding Post-1800 Polities in a Country (ALLPER)
 Average of Variable 31 values for all preceding polities in a country's history, if any.
- V72 Years Persistence of Immediately-Preceding Polity (LSTPER)
 Variable 31 for preceding polity in a country's history, if any.
- V73 Persistence in Years Through 1971 for "Continuing" Polities (PERSI2)
 Data are shown here only for polities with missing data in Var. 31.
- V74 Estimated Persistence in Years for Continuing Polities, Among Pre-1940 Nations (EPERSI)
 Persistence in years estimated from life expectancy table (in Gurr 1974, "Political Persistence and Change," p.1495) with arbitrary estimates very long-lived polities.
- V75 Merged Variables 73 and 74 (PERSI3)
 Polities in existence at the end of 1970 among the post-1940 "new nations" have missing data in this variable.

- V76 Square-Root Transformation of Variable 75 (PERSIQ)
- V77 Polities Grouped According to Durability (Persistence + Adaptability) (DURSET)
- See Var. 75 note, above, regarding missing data cases.
- 146 0. Low durability: historical polities which persisted
5 years or less
- 238 1. Middling durability: polities not coded 0 or 2 on this
variable
- 44 2. High durability: historical polities which persisted
55 years or more AND had adaptability
scores (Var. 64) of 2 or more; plus
continuing polities (as of 1971) with life
expectancies of 85 years or more AND
adaptability scores of 1 or more.
- 48 -9. Missing data
- V78 Democratic Polities (DEM)
- 349 0. Mean democracy score (Var. 45) less than 3.5
- 79 1. Mean democracy score (Var. 45) more than 3.5
- V79 Highly Democratic Polities (HIDEM)
- 382 0. Mean democracy score (Var. 45) less than 4.5
- 46 1. Mean democracy score (Var. 45) more than 4.5
- V80 Autocratic Polities (AUT)
- 288 0. Mean autocracy score (Var. 42) less than 3.5
- 140 1. Mean autocracy score (Var. 42) more than 3.5
- V81 Highly Autocratic Polities (HIAUT)
- 357 0. Mean autocracy score (Var. 42) less than 5.0
- 71 1. Mean autocracy score (Var. 42) more than 5.0
- V82 Anocratic Polities (ANO)
- 370 0. Mean anocracy score (Var. 48) less than 3.5
- 58 1. Mean anocracy score (Var. 48) more than 3.5
- V83 Highly Anocratic Polities (HIANO)
- 378 0. Mean anocracy score (Var. 48) less than 4.0
- 50 1. Mean anocracy score (Var. 48) more than 4.0
- V84 Polities With Coherent and Incoherent Authority Patterns (COHER)
- 269 0. Incoherent (polities not coded 1 or 2 on this variable)
- 50 1. Anocratic (Var. 83 = 1)
- 109 2. (Var. 83 = 0 and Var. 79 = 1 OR Var. 81 = 1)

VARIABLE FORMAT FOR POLITY DATA

***DECK 1	VARIABLE NAME	VAR #	WIDTH	TLOC	NODEC	MDCODE1
1 - 2	IS THE CONSTANT: '01'					
3 - 5	NUMERIC C-CODE	2	3	4	0	
6 - 8	DATE	3	3	7	0	
9 - 10	ES	5	2	12	0	-000009
11 - 13	a ALPHA CCODE	1	3	1	0	
14 - 15	REGN	4	2	10	0	
16 - 18	TAB	6	3	14	0	
19 - 22	TBAN1	7	4	17	0	-000009
23 - 26	TBAN2	8	4	21	0	-000009
27 - 28	ORIG1	9	2	25	0	-000009
29 - 30	ORIG2	10	2	27	0	-000009
31 - 32	ORIG3	11	2	29	0	-000009
33 - 34	ORIG4	12	2	31	0	-000009
35 - 36	ORIG5	13	2	33	0	-000009
37 - 38	MODEL	14	2	35	0	-000009
39 - 40	EXSEL1	15	2	37	0	-000009
41 - 42	MCNOC1	16	2	39	0	-000009
43 - 44	EXIND1	17	2	41	0	-000009
45 - 46	CCMP1	18	2	43	0	-000009
47 - 48	EXSEL2	19	2	45	0	-000009
49 - 50	MONOC2	20	2	47	0	-000009
51 - 52	EXIND2	21	2	49	0	-000009
53 - 54	CCMP2	22	2	51	0	-000009
55 - 56	DIST1	23	2	53	0	-000009
57 - 58	DIST2	24	2	55	0	-000009
59 - 60	SCOPE1	25	2	57	0	-000009
61 - 62	SCOPE2	26	2	59	0	-000009
63 - 64	MAJCH	27	2	61	0	-000009
65 - 66	HINCH	28	2	63	0	-000009
67 - 68	INTER	29	2	65	0	-000009
69 - 73	TERM	30	5	67	0	-000009
74 - 76	PEBSI	31	3	72	0	-000009
77 - 78	SCORE	32	2	75	0	-000009
79 - 80	TERM1	33	2	77	0	-000009

****DECK=	2	VARIABLE NAME	VAR #	WIDTH	TLOC	NODEC	MDCODE1
COLUMNS							
1 - 2		IS THE CONSTANT: '02'					
3 - 5		NUMERIC C-CODE	2	3	4	0	
6 - 8		DATE	3	3	7	0	
9 - 10		ES	5	2	12	0	-000009
11 - 12		TERM2	34	2	79	0	-000009
13 - 14		TERM3	35	2	81	0	-000009
15 - 16		TERM4	36	2	83	0	-000009
17 - 19		POP1	37	3	85	0	-000009
20 - 22		POP2	38	3	88	0	-000009
23 - 23		SET	39	1	91	0	
24 - 25		AUTOC1	40	2	92	0	-000009
26 - 27		AUTOC2	41	2	94	0	-000009
28 - 30		MAUTOC	42	3	96	1	-000009

a indicates alphabetic variable

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****DECK=      2
  COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  HDCODE1
 31 - 32      DEMOC1                43     2     99     0     -000009
 33 - 34      DEMOC2                44     2    101     0     -000009
 35 - 37      MDEMOC                 45     3    103     1     -000009
 38 - 39      ANARC1                 46     2    106     0     -000009
 40 - 41      ANARC2                 47     2    108     0     -000009
 42 - 44      MANARC                 48     3    110     1     -000009
 45 - 46      OPEN1                  49     2    113     0     -000009
 47 - 48      OPEN2                  50     2    115     0     -000009
 49 - 51      MOPEN                  51     3    117     1     0000000
 52 - 53      SLAT1                  52     2    120     0     -000009
 54 - 55      SLAT2                  53     2    122     0     -000009
 56 - 58      MSLAT                   54     3    124     1     0000000
 59 - 60      PART1                   55     2    127     0     -000009
 61 - 62      PART2                   56     2    129     0     -000009
 63 - 65      MPART                    57     3    131     1     0000000
 66 - 67      DIREC1                    58     2    134     0     -000009
 68 - 69      DIREC2                    59     2    136     0     -000009
 70 - 72      MDIREC                   60     3    138     1     0000000
 73 - 74      CCNP1                    61     2    141     0     0000000
 75 - 76      CCNP2                    62     2    143     0     0000000
 77 - 79      MCCNP                    63     3    145     1     0000000
 80 - 80      ARE BLANK

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****DECK=      3
  COLUMNS      VARIABLE NAME      VAR #  WIDTH  TLOC  NODEC  HDCODE1
  1 -  2      IS THE CONSTANT: '03'
  3 -  5      NUMERIC C-CODE                2     3     4     0
  6 -  8      DATE                          3     3     7     0
  9 - 10      ES                             5     2     12    0     -000009
 11 - 12      AEAPT                       64     2    148     0
 13 - 14      IHORIG                      65     2    150     0     -000009
 15 - 16      VCORIG                      66     2    152     0     -000009
 17 - 18      ADCRIG                      67     2    154     0     -000009
 19 - 20      IMTERM                      68     2    156     0     -000009
 21 - 22      VCTERM                      69     2    158     0     -000009
 23 - 24      ADTERM                      70     2    160     0     -000009
 25 - 27      ALLPER                      71     3    162     0     -000009
 28 - 30      LSTPER                      72     3    165     0     -000009
 31 - 33      PERSI2                      73     3    168     0     -000009
 34 - 36      EPERSI                      74     3    171     0     -000009
 37 - 39      PERSI3                      75     3    174     0     -000009
 40 - 44      PERSIQ                      76     5    177     2     -000009
 45 - 46      DUESSET                    77     2    182     0     -000009
 47 - 47      DEM                          78     1    184     0
 48 - 48      HIDEM                       79     1    185     0
 49 - 49      AUT                          80     1    186     0
 50 - 50      HIAUT                       81     1    187     0
 51 - 51      ANO                         82     1    188     0
 52 - 52      HIANO                      83     1    189     0
 53 - 53      COBER                       84     1    190     0
 54 - 80      ARE BLANK

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TABLE OF COUNTRY IDENTIFIERS AND DATA AVAILABILITY

COUNTRY	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)			(E)	(F)
	COUN CODE	ALPHA CODE	GURR CODE	55/ 60	61/ 65	66/ 70	NO. OF POLS	CONFLICT & SOCIETY
Afghanistan	700	APG			X		3	
Albania	339	ALB					3	
Algeria	615	ALG	002		X	X	1	XX
Angola	540	ANG			X		*	
Argentina	160	ARG	004	X	X	X	9	XX
Australia	900	AOA	005		X	X	1	XX
Austria	305	AUI	006		X	X	6	XX
Baden	267	PAD					3	
Bavaria	245	BAV					1	
Belgium	211	BEL	007		X	X	2	XX
Bolivia	145	BOL	008		X	X	8	XX
Brazil	140	BRA	009	X	X	X	8	XX
Bulgaria	355	BUL	010		X	X	8	XX
Burma	775	BUR	011		X	X	2	XX
Burundi	516	BUU			X		2	
Cambodia	811	CAM	013		X	X	3	XX
Cameroun	471	CAE	014		X	X	1	XX
Canada	020	CAN	015		X	X	1	XX
Central African Rep.	482	CAR			X		1	
Ceylon	780	CEY	017		X	X	1	XX
Chad	483	CHA			X		1	
Chile	155	CHI	019		X	X	3	
China	710	CCH			X		4	
China-Taiwan	713	NCH	021		X	X	1	XX
Colombia	100	COL	022		X	X	9	XX
Congo-Brazzaville	484	CON					2	
Congo-Zaire	484	ZAI	023		X	X	2	XX
Costa Rica	094	COS	024		X	X	1	XX
Cuba	040	CUB	025		X	X	5	XX
Cyprus	352	CYP					1	
Czechoslovakia	315	CZE	026		X	X	3	XX
Dahomey (Benin)	434	DAH			X		2	
Denmark	390	DEN	028		X	X	3	XX
Dominican Republic	042	DOM	029	X	X	X	4	XX
Ecuador	130	ECU	030		X	X	1	XX
Egypt (UAR)	651	EGY	106	X	X	X	5	XX
El Salvador	092	ELS	031		X	X	5	XX
Estonia	366	EST					2	
Ethiopia	530	ETH			X		1	
Finland	375	FIN	033		X	X	3	XX
France	220	FRN	034		X	X	9	XX

See page 168 for NOTES

COUNTRY	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)			(E)	(F)
	COUN CODE	ALPHA CODE	GURR CODE	55/ 60	61/ 65	66/ 70	NO. OF POLS	CONFLICT & SOCIETY
Gabon	481	GAB					1	
Germany (before 1945)	255	GER					3	
Germany, East	265	EGE	035		X	X	1	XX
Germany, West	260	WGE	036		X	X	1	XX
Ghana	452	GHA	037		X	X	3	XX
Gran Colombia	099	GCO					2	
Greece	350	GRE	038		X	X	12	XX
Guatemala	090	GUA	039		X	X	17	XX
Guinea	438	GNI			X		1	
Haiti	041	HAI			X		4	
Hanover	240	HAN					3	
Honduras	091	HON			X		5	
Hong Kong	720	HOK	043		X	X	*	XX
Hungary	310	HUN	044		X	X	4	XX
Iceland	395	ICE					1	
India	750	IND	045		X	X	1	XX
Indonesia	850	INO	046		X	X	3	XX
Iran	630	IRN	047		X	X	4	XX
Iraq	645	IRQ	048		X	X	4	XX
Ireland	205	IRE	049		X	X	1	XX
Israel	666	ISR	050		X	X	1	XX
Italy	325	ITA	051	X	X	X	3	XX
Ivory Coast	437	IVO			X		1	
Jamaica	051	JAM	053		X	X	1	XX
Japan	740	JAP	054		X	X	3	XX
Jordan	663	JOR	055		X	X	3	XX
Kenya	501	KEN	056	X	X	X	1	XX
Korea (before 1948)	732	KOR					1	
Korea, North		NKO					1	
Korea, South		SKO	057		X	X	5	XX
Kuwait	690	KUW					1	
Latvia	367	LAT					2	
Lebanon	660	LEB	058		X	X	1	XX
Liberia	450	LIB			X		2	
Libya	620	LIY			X		3	
Lithuania	368	LIT					2	
Luxembourg	212	LUX					1	
Malagasy	580	MAG	061		X	X	2	XX
Malawi-Nyasaland	553	HAL			X		1	
Malaysia	820	MAY	062	X	X	X	1	XX
Mali	432	MAL			X		2	
Mauritania	435	MAU					1	
Mexico	070	MEX	064		X	X	5	XX
Modena	332	MOD					1	
Morocco	630	MOR	065		X	X	3	XX
Mozambique	541	MOZ			X		*	

COUNTRY	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)			(E)	(F)
	COUN CODE	ALPHA CODE	GURR CODE	STRIPE 55/ 60	EVENTS 61/ 65	66/ 70	NO. OF POLS	CONFLICT & SOCIETY
Nepal	790	NEP			X		5	
Netherlands	210	NET	068		X	X	3	XX
New Zealand	920	NZE	069		X	X	2	XX
Nicaragua	093	NIC	070		X	X	3	XX
Niger	436	NIE			X		1	
Nigeria	475	NIG	072		X	X	2	XX
Northern Ireland	204	NIR			X	X	*	
Norway	385	NOR	074	X	X	X	3	XX
Orange Free State	564	OPS					1	
Ottoman Empire	639	OTT					4	
Pakistan	770	PAK	076	X	X	X	5	XX
Panama	095	PAN	077		X	X	2	XX
Papal States	327	PAP					2	
Papua-New Guinea	910	PAP			X		*	
Paraguay	150	PAR	079		X	X	7	XX
Parma	335	PAM					1	
Peru	135	PER	080		X	X	13	XX
Peruvian-Bolivian Con.	136	PBC					1	
Philippines	840	PHI	081		X	X	1	XX
Poland	290	POL	082		X	X	3	XX
Portugal	235	POR	083		X	X	9	XX
Puerto Rico	006	PUE	084		X	X	*	XX
Prussia	254	PUR					1	
Roman Republic	330	ROR					1	
Rumania	360	ROM	085		X	X	6	XX
Rwanda	517	RWA			X		1	
Sardinia-Piedmont	324	SAD					2	
Saudi Arabia	670	SAR			X		1	
Saxony	269	SAX					3	
Senegal	433	SEN			X		2	
Serbia	344	SER					6	
King/Sicilies, Naples	329	SIC					3	
Sierra Leone	451	SIE			X		1	
Singapore	830	SIN	090		X	X	2	XX
Scania	520	SOM			X		2	
Rep. of South Africa	560	SAP	092		X	X	2	XX
Southern Rhodesia	552	RHO	093		X	X	1	XX
Spain	230	SPA	094		X	X	10	XX
Sudan	625	SUD	095		X	X	4	XX
Sweden	380	SWE	096		X	X	3	XX
Switzerland	225	SWI	097		X	X	1	XX
Syria	652	SYR	098		X	X	7	XX

COUNTRY	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)			(E)	(F)
	COUN CODE	ALPHA CODE	GURR CODE	55/ 60	61/ 65	66/ 70	NO. OF POLs	CONFLICT & SOCIETY
Tanganyika-Tanzania	510	TAN	099		X	X	1	XX
Thailand	800	THA	100		X	X	4	XX
Togo	461	TOG			X		2	
Trinidad	052	TRI					1	
Tunisia	616	TUN	102		X	X	1	XX
Turkey	640	TUR	103		X	X	4	XX
Tuscany	337	TUS					3	
Uganda	500	UGA	104		X	X	3	XX
U.S. S. R.-Russia	365	USR	105		X	X	5	XX
United Kingdom	200	ENG	107		X	X	1	XX
United States	002	USA	108		X	X	1	
United Prov. Cen. Amer.	089	UCA					1	
Upper Volta	439	VOL			X		2	
Uruguay	165	URU	109		X	X	4	XX
Venezuela	101	VEN	110		X	X	3	XX
Vietnam (North)	816	NVI					1	
Vietnam (South)	817	SVI	111		X	X	3	XX
Wurttemberg	271	WOR					1	
Yemen	678	YEM			X		3	
Yugoslavia	345	YUG	114	X	X	X	5	XX
Zambia-N. Rhodesia	551	ZAM	073		X	X	2	XX

NOTES

- (A) Numeric Country Identifier
 (B) Alphabetic Country Code used by Gurr in Polity coding
 (C) Numeric Code used by Gurr in Conflict and Society dataset.
 (D) X indicates the years for which data are available in the Civil Strife and Conflict Magnitudes datasets.
 (E) Number of Polities coded for this nation in Polity Dataset.
 A * indicates that the nation was not included in the Polity Dataset.
 (F) An XX indicates that data are available for these countries in the Conflict and Society Dataset.

APPENDIX B

COUNTRIES AND DATES OF POLITY ESTABLISHMENT

Nation (a)	Coded Polity (b)	Date of Initial Date of Subse- quent New Polities (c)	Status of Last Polity (d)
EUROPE			
Albania	1914	(1914-1925), 1925, (1939-1946), 1946	C.
Australia	1901		C.
Austria	c. 1775	1848, 1861, 1920, 1934, (1938-1946), 1946	C.
Hungary	1867	1919, 1920, 1948	C.
Belgium	1831	1853	C.
Bulgaria	1879	1881, 1883, 1886, 1894, 1918, 1935, 1947	C.
Canada	1867		C.
Cyprus	1960		C.
Czechoslovakia	1918	(1939-1945), 1945, 1948	C.
Denmark	c. 1730	1849, 1915	C.
Estonia	1917	1936	to Russia 1940
Finland	1917	1931, 1944	C.
France	1799	1814, 1848, 1852, 1863, 1877, 1940, 1946, 1958	C.
Germany	1871	1919, 1933	partitioned after 1945
Baden	1818	1841, 1848	to Germany 1871
Bavaria	1799		to Germany 1871
Hanover	1837	1848, 1855	to Germany 1871
Prussia	c. 1701		to Germany 1871
Saxony	1806	1831, 1849	to Germany 1871

See page 176 for NOTES

Wation(a)	Date of Initial Coded Polity(b)	Date of Subsequent New Polities(c)	Status of Last Polity(d)
Wurttemberg	c. 1700		to Germany 1871
East Germany	1949		C.
West Germany	1949		C.
Greece	1827	1833, 1844, 1864, 1915, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1936, 1944, 1949, 1967	C.
Iceland	1918		C.
Ireland	1922		C.
Israel	1949		C.
Italy	1861	1928, 1948	C.
Modena	1815		to Italy 1860
Parma	1815		to Italy 1860
Papal States	1815	1850	to Italy 1870
Republic of Rome	1849		to Papal States 1849
Sardinia	1815	1848	to Italy 1860
Sicilies	1816	1820, 1821	to Italy 1860
Tuscany	1815	1848, 1849	to Italy 1860
Latvia	1920	1934	to Russia 1940
Lithuania	1918	1928	to Russia 1940
Luxembourg	1867		C.
Netherlands	1815	1840, 1917	C.
Norway	1814	1884, 1898	C.
New Zealand	1857	1876	C.
Poland	1918	1926, 1948	C.
Portugal	c. 1765	1823, 1834, 1836, 1842, 1907, 1908, 1911, 1930	C.
Rumania	1859	1864, 1866, 1938,	C.

Nation (a)	Date of Initial Coded Facility (b)	Date of Subsequent New Politics (c)	Status of Last Polity (d)
Rumania (cont.)		1941, 1948	C.
Russia	c. 1500	1906, 1917, 1922, 1953	C.
South Africa	1856	(1877-1880), (1902-1910), 1910	C.
Orange Free State	1854	(1902-1910)	to South Africa 1910
Southern Rhodesia	1923		C.
Spain	c. 1785	1820, 1823, 1837, 1871, 1873, 1876, 1923, 1931, 1939	C.
Sweden	1789	1812, 1917	C.
Switzerland	1848		C.
United Kingdom	1689		C.
U.S. A.	1789		C.
Yugoslavia	1921	1929, 1939, 1946, 1953	C.
Serbia	1830	1838, 1858, 1861, 1869, 1903	to Yugoslavia 1921
LATIN AMERICA			
Argentina	1825	1835, 1853, 1930, 1937, 1940, 1948, 1957, 1966	C.
Bolivia	1826	(1836-1839), 1839, 1864, 1873, 1876, 1880, 1936, 1956	C.
Brazil	1824	1889, 1894, 1934, 1946, 1948, 1958, 1965	C.
Chile	1818	1891, 1925	C.
Cuba	1902	1928, 1933, 1955, 1961	C.
Dominican Republic	1844	(1861-1865), 1865, 1932, 1962	

Nation(a)	Date of Initial Coded Polity(b)	Date of Subsequent New Polities(c)	Status of Last Polity(d)
Gran Colombia	1821	1828	in 1830 became:
Colombia	1832	1853, 1861, 1867, 1886, 1904, 1930, 1948, 1957	C.
Ecuador	1830		C.
Venezuela	1830	1936, 1958	C.
Haiti	1820	1918, 1935, 1950	C.
Jamaica	1959		C.
Mexico	1822	1835, 1880, 1917, 1930	C.
Panama	1903	1968	C.
Paraguay	1816	1870, 1936, 1937, 1940, 1947, 1954	C.
Peru	1821	1822, 1824, 1828, 1835, 1836, (1836-1839), 1839, 1879, 1886, 1896, 1920, 1933, 1968	C.
Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation	1836		in 1839 became Bolivia and Peru
Trinidad	1962		C.
United Provinces of Central America	1824		became:
Costa Rica	1838		C.
Guatemala	1839	1848, 1854, 1873, 1876, 1880, 1896, 1898, 1900, 1920, 1932, 1944, 1950, 1954, 1958, 1963, 1966	C.
Honduras	1839	1894, 1904, 1908, 1936	C.
Nicaragua	1838	1909, 1936	C.

Nation (a)	Date of Initial Coded Polity (b)	Date of Subsequent New Polities (c)	Status of Last Polity (d)
El Salvador	1841	1913, 1931, 1950, 1964	C.
Uruguay	1830	1904, 1952, 1967	C.
AFRICA, ASIA			
Afghanistan	c. 1747	1925, 1965	C.
Algeria	1963		C.
Burma	1948	1962	C.
Burundi	1961	1966	C.
Cambodia	1949	1955, 1972	C.
Cameroun	1961		C.
Central African Republic	1962		C.
Ceylon	1948		C.
Chad	1962		C.
China	c. 1644	1912, 1914, 1949	C.
Rep. of China	1949		C.
Congo	1961	1963	C.
Dahomey	1960	1965	C.
Egypt	1811	1923, 1930, 1936, 1953	C.
Ethiopia	1855		C.
Gabon	1961		C.
Ghana	1960	1970, 1972	C.
Guinea	1958		C.
India	1950		C.
Indonesia	1945	1945, 1950	C.
Iran	c. 1650	(1906-1925), 1925, 1941, 1955	C.

Nation (a)	Date of Initial Coded Polity (b)	Date of Subsequent New Polities (c)	Status of Last Polity (d)
Iraq	1924	1936, 1941, 1958	C.
Ivory Coast	1960		C.
Japan	c. 1250	1868, 1952	C.
Jordan	1946	1951, 1957	C.
Kenya	1965		C.
Korea	c. 1392	(1904-1948)	became:
South Korea	1948	1952, 1960, 1961, 1963	C.
North Korea	1948		C.
Kuwait	1963		C.
Lebanon	1944		C.
Liberia	1847	1884	C.
Libya	1951	1964, 1969	C.
Malagasy	1961	1972	C.
Malawi	1966		C.
Malaysia	1957		C.
Mali	1960	1968	C.
Mauritania	1961		C.
Morocco	c. 1660	1956, 1970	C.
Nepal	c. 1769	1846, 1951, 1959, 1960	C.
Niger	1959		C.
Nigeria	1960	1966	C.
Ottoman Empire	c. 1300	1876, 1877, 1908	broken up 1918
Saudi Arabia	1926		C.
Turkey	1923	1946, 1953, 1961	C.
Yemen	1918	1948, 1962	C.

Waticn(a)	Date of Initial Coded Polity(b)	Date of Subsequent New Polities(c)	Status of Last Polity(d)
Pakistan	1947	1948, 1956, 1958, 1962	C.
Philippines	1935		C.
Rwanda	1962		C.
Senegal	1960	1964	C.
Sierra Leone	1961		C.
Singapore	1959	1965	C.
Somalia	1960	1969	C.
Sudan	1954	1958, 1965, 1971	C.
Syria	1944	1949, 1949, 1952, 1954, 1961, 1963	C.
Tanganyika	1963		C.
Thailand	c. 1782	1935, 1958, 1969	C.
Togo	1961	1967	C.
Tunisia	1959		C.
Uganda	1962	1967, 1971	C.
Upper Volta	1960	1966	C.
Vietnam-N.	1954		C.
Vietnam-S.	1955	1963, 1967	C.
Zaire	1963	1967	C.
Zambia	1964	1972	C.

NOTES:

- a. Listed alphabetically by region with successor and predecessor states tabled beneath the larger entity of which they are/were a part.
- b. Dates of origin of pre-1800 polities are approximate; their authority characteristics coded as of 1800.
- c. Dates of polity inception, excluding transitional periods. Dates in parenthesis are periods of uncoded interregna, foreign occupation, or temporary absorption by a larger state.
- d. The fate of the nation, if no longer in existence; C. indicates a continuing polity as of 1971 in a contemporary nation.'

APPENDIX C

Group Discrimination ca. 1960*

The groups which we judged to be objects of systematic economic or political discrimination are listed below. Four measures are included: the proportional size of groups affected by economic and political discrimination respectively, and the intensity of those two kinds of discrimination as rated on four-point scales. The PROPORTION estimates are by reference to total population, and rounded to the nearest .05. The INTENSITY scales are judgmental scales, given in the text. Note that discrimination on the basis of sex, age, illiteracy, or caste is not treated as discrimination for the purposes of these indices.

A detailed description of the criteria used for assessing "group discrimination" and a list of references are given in Ted Robert Gurr, *NEW ERROR-COMPENSATED MEASURES FOR COMPARING NATIONS: SOME CORRELATES OF CIVIL VIOLENCE* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Center of International Studies Research Monograph 23, 1966), 67-9). The groups listed in that source and their proportional sizes have since been revised by reference to other sources.

There also are substantial discrepancies among sources about the sizes of Indian and Negroid (black, mulatto) populations in Latin America, and disagreements about whether the bases of discrimination are "ethnic" or "cultural." (The Latin contention that there is no discrimination is a reflection of formal prescription more than norms or practices.) All estimates for Latin America here and in the original source have been checked against and corrected by reference to, Donald D. Brand, "The Present Indian Population of Latin America," *SOME EDUCATIONAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF LATIN AMERICA* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1948), 51, reprinted in William S. Stokes, *LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS* (New York: Crowell, 1959), 17. Brand defines as Indians those who are more than 75% Amerindian by descent and "other persons recognized or accepted as Indians;" those classified Negroid are all those with perceptible Negro blood. These definitions seem to be a reasonably close approximation to the effective bases of discrimination in most of Latin America; i.e., that those who look either Indian or Negroid, or live like Indians, find it considerably more difficult than others to improve their socio-economic or political positions. Four exceptions to this generalization are taken into account in this coding: Indians in Mexico (20-30% of the population), blacks in Cuba and Haiti, and mulattoes in Brazil are regarded as relatively free of discrimination, although except for Haiti, arguments can be made to the contrary. It can also be argued that mestizos are subject to discrimination in much of Latin America, but it tends to affect their mobility only into the uppermost part of the class structure and ordinarily can be overcome by the appropriate evidences of cultural and economic attainment; these are essentially the same criteria for mobility by lower-middle-class whites, hence no discrimination against mestizos is coded.

*This appendix was written by the principal investigator.

Two other revised codings require separate justification: Africans are coded as subject to economic discrimination in independent Kenya and Uganda during the 1960's, mainly by Asians but also by Europeans. The coding decision is open to question, but it was evident that many Africans in those two nations regarded themselves as the objects of such discrimination, and both governments subsequently followed policies based on such perceptions.

One kind of technical adjustment also was applied to some of the data carried over from Gurr, *NEW ERRORS-COMPENSATED MEASURES*, op. cit. The groups affected by discrimination -- especially political discrimination -- changed abruptly as a function of independence or of internal autonomy in Algeria, April 1962; Kenya, June 1963; Uganda, July 1961; and Zambia, December 1962. The measures in the table reflect conditions after these transitions rather than a before-after average, and as a result, they understate the severity of strain in these countries during the first part of the 1961-65 period.

The group discrimination variables (and Potential Separatism Appendix D below) have been recoded for 1975 on the basis of a thorough search of relevant literature and will be included in the forthcoming third edition of the *WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS*.

TABLE OF GROUP DISCRIMINATION

Affected Groups		ECONOMIC		POLITICAL	
		Pro.Inten. Var.Var. 50 49	Pro. Inten. Var. Var. 53 52	Pro. Inten. Var. Var. 53 52	Pro. Inten. Var. Var. 53 52
Algeria (b)	Berbers, Europeans, Jews (after 4/62)	15	2	15	1
Argentina	Indians (a)	0	0	0	0
Australia	Aborigines, Asians (a)	0	0	0	0
Austria	None	0	0	0	0
Belgium	None	0	0	0	0
Bolivia	Indians	55	2	55	1
Brazil	Indians, Negroes, Japanese	15	2	15	2
Bulgaria	Non-Bulgars	0	0	10	1
Burma	Urban, ethnic, tribal minorities	0	0	45	2
Cambodia	Vietnamese	0	0	5	1
Cameroun	None	0	0	0	0
Canada	French-Canadians, Indians	30	1	0	0
Ceylon	Indian and Ceylonese Tamils	20	2	0	0
Chile	Indians	10	3	10	2
Colombia	Indians, Negroes	20	3	20	2
Costa Rica	Indians, Negroes	5	3	5	2
Cuba	None	0	0	0	0
Czechoslovakia	Magyars, Ukranians, Poles, Germans	5	1	5	1
Denmark	None	0	0	0	0
Dominican Rep.	Negroes	80	2	80	1
Ecuador	Indians, Negroes	60	3	60	2
El Salvador	Indians	40	2	40	2
Finland	None	0	0	0	0
France	None	0	0	0	0
Germany-E.	None	0	0	0	0
Germany-W.	None	0	0	0	0
Ghana	None	0	0	0	0
Greece	Muslims (a)	0	0	0	0
Guatemala	Indians	65	3	65	2
Hong Kong	Chinese	0	0	100	1
Hungary	Germans	0	0	5	1
India	Muslims, Sikhs	10	2	0	0
Indonesia	Chinese	5	1	5	2
Iran	Tribesmen, Non-Muslims	0	0	5	2
Ireland	None	0	0	0	0
Israel	Non-Jews, African, Asian Immigrants	45	2	45	1
Italy	None	0	0	0	0
Jamaica	None	0	0	0	0
Japan	None	0	0	0	0
Jordan	Non-Muslims	10	2	10	1
Kenya (b)	Africans (economic), Asians (political)	95	1	5	1
Korea-S.	None	0	0	0	0
Lebanon	Non-Christians	50	1	0	0
Malagasy	None	0	0	0	0
Malaysia	Indians (econ); Indians, Chinese (pol)	10	2	50	1
Mexico	None	0	0	0	0

TABLE OF GROUP DISCRIMINATION

Affected Groups		ECONOMIC Pro.Inten.		POLITICAL Pro. Inten.	
Morocco	Non-Muslims	5	2	5	2
Netherlands	Catholics	40	1	40	1
New Zealand	Maori	5	2	5	2
Nicaragua	Negroes, Indians	15	3	15	2
Nigeria	None	0	0	0	0
Norway	None	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	Hindus, Christians, Tribesmen	10	2	10	2
Panama	Indians, Negroes	40	2	40	2
Paraguay	Indians	65	2	65	2
Peru	Indians, Negroes	50	3	50	2
Philippines	Muslims, Chinese	5	2	5	1
Poland	National minorities (a)	0	0	0	0
Portugal	None	0	0	0	0
Puerto Rico	None	0	0	0	0
Rhodesia	Africans	95	3	95	3
Rumania	National minorities	0	0	15	1
Singapore	None	0	0	0	0
South Africa	Non-whites	80	4	80	4
Spain	Non-Catholics	0	0	0	0
Sudan	Non-Muslim	30	1	30	1
Sweden	None	0	0	0	0
Switzerland	None	0	0	0	0
Syria	Non-Muslims, Alawites, Druzes	15	2	15	2
Taiwan	Taiwanese	85	1	85	2
Tanganyika	None	0	0	0	0
Thailand	Non-Thai rural minorities, tribes, unassimilated urban Chinese	10	1	10	2
Tunisia	None	0	0	0	0
Turkey	Non-Muslims, non-Turkic speakers	0	0	10	1
Uganda (b)	Africans, Asians	100	1	0	0
U.S. S. R.	Non-Russian nationality groups	0	0	45	1
U. A. R.	Non-Muslims	10	1	10	2
U. K.	"Coloreds"	5	2	5	2
United States	Negroes, Indians, Puerto Ricans	15	3	15	2
Uruguay	None	0	0	0	0
Venezuela	Indians, Negroes	20	2	20	2
Vietnam-S. (c)	Tribesmen, ethnic minorities	10	3	5	2
Yugoslavia	Roman Catholics	0	0	30	1
Zaire	None	0	0	0	0
Zambia (b)	None	0	0	0	0

(a) Excluded groups constituting less than 2.4% of population.

(b) Discrimination scores for these countries refer to post-independence conditions.

(c) The non-Catholic 80% of the population was subject to political discrimination at the higher levels of government before the overthrow of the Diem regime in November 1963. Tribesmen (5%) were the principal objects of political discrimination.

APPENDIX D

POTENTIAL SEPARATISM AND COMMUNAL DISSIDENTS

The following table lists separatist and communal dissident groups that were identified in the 86 countries tabled in Appendix C, above. Only 47 countries are listed below, the other 39 had no significant groups meeting the criteria specified. The proportional size of groups is rounded to the nearest .05, except for a few groups with 2% of their respective country's population which are also included. On the basis of more recent research a few additions and deletions to the listings are in order, as well as some adjustment of population proportions. The revised listings and data will be included in the forthcoming third edition of the WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS, now in preparation.

POTENTIAL SEPARATISM

The groups which we judged to be potentially separatist are listed in the following table. All are regional or ethnic groups, often but not necessarily, of different culture or religion from group(s) controlling the state. We infer that these groups are dissatisfied with the closeness of their political association with the polity of which they are formally members. These kinds of criteria were used to identify separatist regions. First, any region transferred from one country to another in the 20 years before 1961, or autonomous but during this period incorporated in another country, was judged to be potentially separatist as of 1961. Second, the presence of organized and extensive advocacy of greater regional autonomy or independence for a regional population at any time during the 20 years before 1961 was considered grounds for considering the region potentially separatist in 1960. Third, a prolonged or especially intense history of efforts to secure regional autonomy, even if given no recent expression, also constitutes potential separatism. Fourth, irredentism among any one segment of a cultural group distributed among several different countries is taken to imply latent separatism among the others. For example, Albanians living in Yugoslavia have vocally sought greater autonomy from the Yugoslav state during the last several decades; we therefore infer comparable irredentism among Albanians living in Greece. Note, though, that a sense of regional identity and pride does not alone constitute separatism, only if associated with widespread demands for greater autonomy.

These criteria are described in more detailed and qualified form in Gurr, NEW MEASURES, 75-78. Identifications were made using numerous historical sources, cited in NEW MEASURES, 87-90. The following table includes a few revisions of groups and data listed in NEW MEASURES.

COMMUNAL DISSIDENTS

The list of communal dissident groups comprises all groups subject to group discrimination (see Appendix C) plus all separatist groups (above) which met two criteria: (a) they had a pre-1961 history of active (not necessarily violent) dissidence, and (b) they lived in identifiable locales rather than being dispersed throughout the population. Their identities and proportion of the total population ca. 1960 were determined mainly from the lists and sources in Gurr, NEW MEASURES, 67-90.

The dissident groups are listed in the following table, along with data on their size, isolation, and organization.

TABLE OF POTENTIAL SEPARATISM AND COMMUNAL DISSIDENTS, CA.1960

COUNTRY	Potential Separatism		Characteristics of Communal Dissent Group (D)	Characteristics of Communal Dissent		
	Prop (B)	Int. (C)		Size (E)	Iso. (F)	Org. (G)
Groups (A)						
Algeria Kabyle, Shawia	15	3	Berbers, nomads Berbers; desert nomads	17	30	3
Belgium Wallons	40	1	Walloons	40	20	3
Bolivia None	0	0	Indians	50	30	1
Brazil None			Indians	5	40	1
Bulgaria Southern Dobrudja	5	2		0	0	0
Burma Karen; Kayah; Kachin; Shan; Mons; Arkanese	30	4	tribal minorities	30	50	3
Cambodia Vietnamese	5	4	Vietnamese	5	30	4
Cameroun Western Cameroun	20	1	W. Cameroun	20	30	3
Canada Quebec Province	30	2	Quebeois	30	10	4
Ceylon Ceylonese Tamil provinces	10	2	Tamil Provinces	10	30	3
Chile None	0	0	Indians	10	20	1
Czechoslovakia Slovakia; Magyars and Germans	35	1	Slovakia	35	10	5
France None	0	0	Brittany	5	10	3
Ghana Ashanti	20	3	Ashanti, Volta	30	20	4
Ghana Volta	10	2				
Greece None	0	0	Albanians, Muslims	2	30	3
Hong Kong None	0	0	Chinese	100	20	2

TABLE OF POTENTIAL SEPARATISM AND COMMUNAL DISSIDENTS, CA.1960

COUNTRY	Potential Separatism		Characteristics of Communal Dissent Group (D)	Communal Dissent		
	Prop (B)	Int. (C)		Size (E)	Iso. (F)	Org. (G)
Groups (A)						
India	40	2	Non-Hindu states, etc.	45	35	3
Non-Hindu speaking states						
India	5	4				
Nagaland; Assam; Kashmir						
Indonesia	35	4	Regions other than Java	35	40	3
All regions except Java						
Iran	25	4	Azerbaijan, Kurds, tribes	25	40	3
Azerbaijan provinces; Kurds, other tribes						
Iraq	20	4	Kurds	20	50	5
Kurds						
Italy	0	0	Germans	2	40	3
None						
Jordan	45	2	W. Jordan	45	30	2
West Jordan						
Kenya	45	2	Non-Kikuyu	45	30	3
Tribes not supporting KANU						
Lebanon	45	4	Muslims, Druzes	45	25	3
Muslims, Druzes						
Malaysia	0	0	Non-Malays	50	20	2
None						
Morocco	25	4	tribal Berbers	25	40	4
Tribal Berber areas						
New Zealand	0	0	Maori	5	20	3
None						
Nigeria	45	2	E., W. Regions	45	35	4
Eastern, Western regions						
Pakistan	55	2	E. Pakistan, tribal W. Pakistan	60	40	3
East Pakistan						

TABLE OF POTENTIAL SEPARATISM AND COMMUNAL DISSIDENTS, CA.1960

COUNTRY	Potential Separatism		Characteristics of Communal Dissent			
	Prop (B)	Int. (C)	Group (D)	Size (E)	Iso. (F)	Org. (G)
Groups (A)						
Pakistan	5	3				
Tribal areas						
Peru	0	0	Indians	45	40	1
None						
Philippines	0	0	Muslims	5	30	3
None						
Rhodesia	10	3	Africans	95	10	3
Matabeleland						
Rumania	10	3		0	0	0
Magyars						
South Africa	25	3	Blacks in urban townships and reserves	70	10	1
Bantu reserves						
Spain	15	4	Basque, Catalanian provinces	15	20	3
Basque, Catalanian provinces						
Switzerland	2	1	Jura	2	20	3
Jura						
Syria	10	2	Kurds, Alawites, Druzes	15	40	3
Non-Muslims, Alawites, Druzes						
Thailand	0	0	S.Malays ; N.E. tribes	10	45	3
None						
Turkey	10	2	Kurds	5	40	4
Hatay; Kurds						

TABLE OF POTENTIAL SEPARATISM AND COMMUNAL DISSIDENTS, CA. 1960

COUNTRY	Potential Separatism		Characteristics of Communal Dissident Group (D)	Characteristics of Communal Dissident		
	Groups (A)	Prop (B)		Int. (C)	Size (E)	Iso. (F)
Uganda	45	2	Kingdoms	45	20	3
	Kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole					
U.S.S.R.	50	2	Ukraine	20	10	5
	All autonomous and constituent reps. except RSPSR*					
U.K.	15	3	Wales, Scotland, N. Ireland	15	20	3
	N. Ireland, Wales, Scotland					
United States	10	3	segregated blacks	10	20	3
	"Hard core" southern states					
Vietnam-S.	5	4	Montagnards	5	50	5
	Mountain tribes, Khmers					
Yugoslavia	75	2	Non-Serbs	75	20	3
	All republics except Serbia proper					
Zaire	30	3	Katanga; Lulua; Baluba; Bakongo	30	30	4
	Katanga; Lulua; Baluba, and Bakongo tribes					
Zambia	10	2	Africans to 12/62	100	30	3
	Barotseland					
*Ukraine, Transcaucasia, Beyorussia						
		25	1			
Baltic Republics						
		5	4			
Islamic Republics,						
		15	3			
Others						

- (A) Potential Separatism: GROUP IDENTITY
 (B) Potential Separatism: PROPORTION (Var. 128)
 (C) Potential Separatism: INTENSITY (Var. 127)
 (D) Characteristics of Communal Dissidents: GROUP IDENTITY
 (E) Characteristics of Communal Dissidents: PROPORTIONAL SIZE (Var. 130)
 (F) Characteristics of Communal Dissidents: GROUP ISOLATION (Var. 134)
 (G) Characteristics of Communal Dissidents: GROUP ORGANIZATION (Var. 135)

TABLE OF CONFLICT SUCCESS AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

	Conflict Success		Military Intervention	
	Internal wars 1850-1960 (Var. 83)	Conspiracies 1900-1960 (Var. 84)	Date of last intervention (before 1961)	Intervention score (Var. 87)
New Zealand	2	0	--	1
Nicaragua	4	4	1936	3
Nigeria	1	0	C	4 (a)
Norway	0	0	--	1
Pakistan	4	1	1958	5
Panama	4	3	1949	3
Paraguay	1	4	1954	4
Peru	1	4	1948	3
Philippines	3	0	--	1
Poland	1	3	1926	2
Portugal	4	4	1926	2
Puerto Rico	0	0	--	1 (b)
Rhodesia	1	0	--	2
Rumania	1	2	1944	3
Singapore	0	0	C	5 (a)
South Africa	5	0	--	1
Spain	5	3	1937	3
Sudan	3	2	1958	5
Sweden	0	0	--	1
Switzerland	0	0	--	1
Syria	3	4	1955	4
Taiwan	0	0	--	2
Tanganyika	1	0	C	5 (a)
Thailand	0	4	1957	4
Tunisia	1	0	--	2
Turkey	2	4	1960	5
Uganda	2	0	C	5 (a)
U.S.S.R.	5	2	1917	2
U.A.R.	3	3	1952	4
U.K.	0	0	--	1
United States	3	1	--	1
Uruguay	2	3	--	1
Venezuela	2	4	1958	5
Vietnam-S.	5	1	1960	5
Yugoslavia	1	4	1941	3
Zaire	2	0	1960	5
Zambia	1	0	C	5 (a)

(a) refers to scores assigned to newly-independent (1957-65) nations on the basis of the longevity of their political institutions.

(b) refers to colonies, coded identically with their metropolitan power.

The dates of the last pre-1961 intervention, according to our coding, are given in the table. If none were identified between 1910 and 1960, the column is blank. "C" signifies that the country was a colony in 1957. Note that the dates given are of the inception of the last intervention, not their conclusion. Military participation in or support of a regime does not of itself constitute intervention; only its inception, if illicit, is so regarded.

APPENDIX F

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CIVIL STRIKE CODING SHEET (rev. 6/66)

Polity _____

Coder _____

Month and Year of Coding _____

Source(s) _____

Issue and pages _____

Summary _____

col. num.	contents of columns	col. num.	contents of columns
1-3	Polity I.D. Number	(18)	8 some, undifferentiable 9 other
4-7	Polity Population (100,000's)	19	Regime Classes 0 none or insignificant 1 military/police 2 public employees 3 political elite 4 military/police, employees 5 political elite, employees 6 military/police, elite 7 all three 8 some, undifferentiable 9 other
8	Character of Report 1 single report, current period, continuing event 2 single report, all of continuing event, to date 3 single report, concluded event 6 cumulative report, current period, continuing event 7 cumulative report, continuing event, to date 8 cumulative report, concluded event	20	Domestic Initiators, Summary 0 none or insignificant 1 lower classes only 2 middle classes only 3 regime classes only 4 lower and middle classes 5 lower and regime classes 6 middle and regime classes 7 all domestic classes
9-10	Year Event Began		
11-16	Period Covered by Report From () to Year / Month / Day	21	Resident Alien Initiators 0 none or insignificant 1 pastoral migrants 2 foreign workers 3 foreign students 4 refugees 5 political exiles 6 foreign clandestine group 7 several of the above (ck.) 8 other
17-21	I. IDENTITY OF INITIATORS bbbb no basis for judging		
17	Lower Classes 0 none or insignificant 1 farmers/peasants 2 rural wage laborers 3 urban wage laborers 4 unemployed 5 farmers, wage laborers 6 wage laborers, unemployed 7 farmers, laborers, unemployed 8 some, undifferentiable 9 other	22-26	Number of Initiators, Proximate 00000 (go to next heading) bbbb1 1 to 40 bbbb3 41 to 80 bbbb8 81 to 240 bbb16 241 to 400 bbb32 401 to 900 bbb64 901 to 1,700 bb128 1,701 to 3,500 bb250 3,501 to 6,500 bb500 6,501 to 14,000 b1000 14,001 to 27,000 b2000 27,001 to 55,000 b4000 55,001 to 110,000 bbbb no basis for judging
18	Higher Classes 0 none or insignificant 1 students 2 petite bourgeoisie 3 professionals 4 students, bourgeoisie 5 students, professionals 6 bourgeoisie, professionals 7 all three		

col. num.	contents of columns	col. num.	contents of columns
27-30	<p><u>Number of Initiators, Estimate</u> 0000 (previous heading coded) bbb4 less than 100 bb40 101-1,000, "hundreds," "many" b400 1,001-10,000, "thousands" 4000 10,001-100,000 bbbb no basis for judging other</p>	37	<p><u>Conspiracy Events</u> 0 none 1 plot 2 purge 3 assassination 4 bombing 5 small-scale terrorism 6 small-scale guerrilla war 7 coup/putsch 8 mutiny</p>
31-32	<p>II. GROUP AND SOCIAL CONTEXT <u>Initiators Acting as Members of</u> b0 unstructured crowd b1 territorial group b2 ethnic/linguistic group b3 religious group b4 communal group b5 apolitical student group b6 political group b7 economic group b8 governing hierarchy b9 clandestine group _____ clash between two of above; <u>specify categories</u> other _____ bb no basis for judging</p>	38	<p><u>Internal War Events</u> 0 none 1 large-scale terrorism 2 large-scale guerrilla war 3 civil war (secessionist) 4 private war 5 large-scale revolt 6 turmoil/conspiracy event is part of internal war</p>
33-35	<p><u>Social Area</u> bb1 rural village or county bb3 several villages, counties or a small town bb5 a large town bl0 several town, or a city, or a small state b20 large state, or part of the capital city b40 several large states or several cities, or entire capital city b60 several states or cities and the capital city b80 almost the entire polity 100 the entire polity other _____ bbb no basis for judging</p>	39	<p><u>Summary of Form of Event</u> 1 turmoil 2 conspiracy 3 internal war 4 turmoil and internal war 5 conspiracy and internal war 6 other _____</p>
		40	<p><u>Number of Actions</u> 1 single occurrence 2 two, "several" 3 three, "some" 4 4-6 5 7-11 <u>No. Reported</u> 6 12-20 7 21-35 8 36-60 9 61 +</p>
		41	<p><u>Incidence of Action</u> 1 single occurrence 2 multiple sporadic 3 multiple simultaneous</p>
		42-45	<p><u>Duration of Action</u> bbbb no basis for judging bbb1 1/2 day or less bbb3 1/2 to 1 day bbb5 1 to 2 days bb10 2 to 4 days bb20 4 days to 1 week bb40 1 to 2 weeks bb80 2 weeks to 1 month bl60 1 to two months b320 2 to 4 months b640 4 to 9 months l217 9 to 15 months 2000 15 months to 2 years 4000 2 to 4 1/2 years other _____</p>
36	<p>III. TYPOLOGY OF ACTION <u>Turmoil Events</u> 0 none 1 demonstration 2 political strike 3 riot 4 localized rebellion 5 banditry/raiding 6 political clash 7 nonpolitical clash</p>		

col. num.	contents of columns	col. num.	contents of columns
	IV. ACTION DIRECTED AT		Economic Motives
46-48	bbb no basis for judging	50	0 none or minor 1 retaliation 2 seize economic goods 3 change distribution patterns 4 oppose economic actor 5 several of the above (ck.) 6 diffuse economic motives 7 other
46	<u>Property Targets</u> 0 none or negligible 1 foreign public 2 foreign private 3 all foreign 4 domestic public 5 domestic private 6 all domestic 7 foreign and domestic	51	<u>Social Motives</u> 0 none or minor 1 retaliation 2 promote/oppose belief system 3 promote/oppose community 4 increase social goods (status, education, etc.) 5 several of the above (ck.) 6 diffuse social motives 7 other
47	<u>Political Actor(s)</u> 0 none or negligible 1 major domestic 2 minor domestic 3 military/police, domestic 4 private political group 5 several of the above (ck.) 6 undifferentiable domestic 7 foreign public 8 foreign military 9 domestic, foreign actors (ck.)		VI. PUNITIVE ACTION
48	<u>Nonpolitical Actor(s)</u> 0 none or negligible 1 random actors 2 ethnic actors 3 religious actors 4 communal actors 5 economic actors 6 several of the above (ck.) 7 undifferentiable 8 foreign nonpolitical actors 9 other	52	<u>Role of Punitive Forces</u> 0 not committed or committed after end of action 1 victims 2 present but passive 3 defensive action 4 moderate suppressive action 5 extreme suppressive action 6 provoke action b no basis for judging
	V. STATED OR APPARENT MOTIVES	53	<u>Type of Punitive Forces</u> 0 none 1 police 2 domestic military units 3 police and domestic military 4 foreign military units 5 domestic and foreign b no basis for judging
49-51	bbb no basis for judging	54	<u>Number of Punitive Forces</u> 0 none 1 1 to 10 2 11 to 100 3 101 to 1,000 4 1,001-10,000 5 10,001-100,000 6 100,001-1,000,000 b no basis for judging
49	<u>Political Motives</u> 0 none or minor 1 retaliation 2 seize political power 3 increase pol. participation 4 injure/suppress competing political group 5 promote/oppose specific domestic policy 6 promote/oppose specific domestic political actor 7 oppose foreign nation's policy or actors 8 several of the above (ck.) 9 diffuse political motives other	55	<u>Arrests and Detentions</u> 0 none 1 1 to 10 2 11 to 100 3 101 to 1,000 4 1,001 to 10,000 5 no basis for judging
			<u>No. Reported</u>

col. num.	contents of columns	col. num.	contents of columns
56	<u>Executions</u> 0 none 1 1 to 10 <u>No. Reported</u> 2 11 to 100 3 101 to 1,000 4 1,001 to 10,000 b no basis for judging	69-72	<u>Number of Injuries</u> bbb0 none, none likely bbb4 10 or less, "few" bb40 11 to 100, "scores," "many" b400 101 to 1,000, "hundreds" 4000 1,001 to 10,000 bbbb no basis for judging <u>No. Reported</u> <u>Other</u>
57-58	VII. EXTENT OF VIOLENCE <u>Damage in Affected Area</u> 00 none or presumed negligible 01 slight 03 moderate 07 extensive 10 massive bb no basis for judging	73-76	VIII. EXTERNAL SUPPORT bbbb no basis for judging 0000 none apparent
59	<u>Who are Casualties?</u> 0 none, none likely 1 initiators 2 victims 3 punitive forces 4 initiators, victims 5 initiators, punitive forces 6 victims, punitive forces 7 all three 8 some, unspecified b no basis for judging	73	<u>Degree of Support for Initiators</u> 0 none apparent 1 arms and supplies 2 provision of refuge 3 provision of facilities, training 4 military advisors, mercenaries 5 military units
60-64	<u>Number of Deaths, Proximate</u> 00000 (go to next heading) bbbb0 zero, none likely bbbb1 1 to 2 bbbb3 3 to 6 bbbb8 7 to 16 bbb16 17 to 32 bbb32 33 to 64 bbb64 65 to 130 bb128 131 to 250 bb256 251 to 500 bb500 501 to 1,000 b1000 1,001 to 2,000 b2000 2,001 to 4,000 b4000 4,001 to 8,000 b8000 8,001 to 16,000 other bbbbb no basis for judging <u>No. Reported</u>	74	<u>Degree of Support for Regime</u> 0 none apparent 1 nonmilitary aid 2 military materiel 4 personnel, facilities 5 military units
65-68	<u>Number of Deaths, Estimate</u> 0000 (previous heading coded) bbb4 10 or less, "few" bb40 11 to 100, "scores, many" b400 101 to 1,000, "hundreds" 4000 1,001 to 10,000 bbbb no basis for judging <u>No. Reported</u>	75	<u>Number of Nations Supporting Initiators (identify)</u> (USA; China; USSR; UK; No. _____; _____; _____; _____
		76	<u>Number of Nations Supporting Regime (identify)</u> (Metro. power; France; No. USA; UK; _____; _____; _____
		77	<u>Reliability of Report</u> 0 unclassified 1 unknown 2 questionable
		78-80	<u>Event Identification</u> _____
COMMENTS, OTHER INFORMATION			

Supplementary Civil Strife Coding Sheet
p. 5

Col. 1-3 _____ Same as col. 1-3, p. 1 (Polity I.D. Number)

Col. No.	Contents of Columns	Description
	II. Initial Role of Coercive Forces	
	<u>Status of Loyal Coercive Forces at Onset</u>	
5	0 absent 1 routine activity, routine numbers 2 routine activity, increased numbers 3 routine numbers, deterrent activity 4 increased numbers, deterrent activity 5 retaliatory or suppressive activity b no basis for judging	
5	<u>Loyal Coercive Forces as Precipitators</u> 0 no precipitating role 1 initial objects of attack 2 Initiate first act of violence b no basis for judgment	
	III. Responses of Loyal Coercive Forces to Event	IV. Casualties
	<u>Rapidity of Commitment of Forces</u>	<u>Coercive Forces</u>
9	0 absent or minimal contact throughout 1 first major contact after peak (midpoint) of event 2 first major contact before peak (midpoint) of event 3 major contact from onset b no basis for judgment	Dead ----- 12-16 Injured ----- 17-21
10	<u>Fluctuations in Commitment of Forces</u> 0 absent or minimal contact throughout 1 withdrawal/defeat/defection 2 fluctuating or inconsistent responses 3 gradual buildup to high levels relative to scale 4 rapid buildup to high levels relative to scale b no basis for judgment	<u>Initiators</u> Dead ----- 22-27 Injured ----- 28-32
11	<u>Quality of Response of Forces</u> 0 corrective 1 absent throughout 2 present but passive 3 defensive 4 dispersive 5 nonviolently-punitive 6 violently but nonlethally punitive 7 lethally punitive, restrained 8 lethally punitive, unrestrained b no basis for judgment	<u>Victims: Dead</u> ----- 33-38 <u>Victims: Injured</u> ----- 39-44 <u>Event Identification</u> 78-80 (First two letters should be same as cols. 78-79 on p. 4)

Supplementary Civil Strife Coding Sheet

p. 6

Locale of Event (city or cities, region or regions):

Reported Number of Initiators (specify fluctuations, if any):

Identity of Initiators (specify specific socioeconomic groups and mobilizing organizations, if any):

Specific Motives (distinguish articulated from implied motives):

Supplementary Civil Strife Coding Sheet
p. 5

Col. 1-3 _____ Same as col. 1-3, p. 1 (Polity I.D. Number)

Col. No.	Contents of Columns	Description
	<p>II. Initial Role of Coercive Forces</p> <p><u>Status of Loyal Coercive Forces at Onset</u></p> <p>5 0 absent 1 routine activity, routine numbers 2 routine activity, increased numbers 3 routine numbers, deterrent activity 4 increased numbers, deterrent activity 5 retaliatory or suppressive activity b no basis for judging</p> <p>5 <u>Loyal Coercive Forces as Precipitators</u> 0 no precipitating role 1 initial objects of attack 2 initiate first act of violence b no basis for judgment</p>	
	<p>III. Responses of Loyal Coercive Forces to Event</p> <p><u>Rapidity of Commitment of Forces</u></p> <p>9 0 absent or minimal contact throughout 1 first major contact after peak (midpoint) of event 2 first major contact before peak (midpoint) of event 3 major contact from onset b no basis for judgment</p> <p>10 <u>Fluctuations in Commitment of Forces</u> 0 absent or minimal contact throughout 1 withdrawal/defeat/defection 2 fluctuating or inconsistent responses 3 gradual buildup to high levels relative to scale 4 rapid buildup to high levels relative to scale b no basis for judgment</p> <p>11 <u>Quality of Response of Forces</u> 0 corrective 1 absent throughout 2 present but passive 3 defensive 4 dispersive 5 nonviolently-punitive 6 violently but nonlethally punitive 7 lethally punitive, restrained 8 lethally punitive, unrestrained b no basis for judgment</p>	<p>IV. Casualties</p> <p><u>Coercive Forces</u></p> <p>Dead _____ 12-16</p> <p>Injured _____ 17-21</p> <p><u>Initiators</u></p> <p>Dead _____ 22-27</p> <p>Injured _____ 28-32</p> <p><u>Victims: Dead</u> _____ 33-38</p> <p><u>Victims: Injured</u> _____ 39-44</p> <p><u>Event Identification</u> 78-80</p> <p>_____ (First two letters should be same as cols. 78-79 on p. 4)</p>

Supplementary Civil Strife Coding Sheet

p. 6

Locale of Event (city or cities, region or regions):

Reported Number of Initiators (specify fluctuations, if any):

Identity of Initiators (specify specific socioeconomic groups and mobilizing organizations, if any):

Specific Motives (distinguish articulated from implied motives):