Narrative
Narrative of the Organization's History
Narrative of the Organization's History
Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations
Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics
First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks
Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences
Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time in regional maps
The MILF is an Islamist organization with the goal of creating an independent, Islamic state for Muslims in the country’s southern regions. As suggested by its name, the MILF had a clear Islamic orientation from the beginning, in contrast to the MNLF’s more secular orientation. Many of the MILF’s early leaders had studied at conservative universities in Muslim countries, and Salamat himself studied at Egypt’s Al-Azhar University. Later, MILF members trained at military camps in the Middle East. In the 1980s, the MILF formulated a policy of gradually creating an Islamic society in the Moro regions. To accomplish this, the MILF applied Islamic law in the areas under its control and believed that the creation of an independent Moro state would eventually follow. Some Filipino Muslims resisted the MILF’s interpretation of Islam, which was more fundamentalist than the version practiced by most Moros.[60]
Generally, the MILF seeks meaningful self-determination for Filipino Muslims. The MILF sometimes expressed willingness to accept autonomy for the Moro regions rather than full independence, especially in its earlier stages and again in recent years. In 2010, the group officially dropped its demand for full independence in favor of regional autonomy.[61] Currently, the MILF seeks the ratification of the BLBAR, which is under consideration in the Philippine Congress. This law would establish the new autonomous region of the Bangsamoro and effectively complete the peace negotiations between the MILF and the Philippine government.[62] President Rodrigo Duterte has insisted that the law must be passed and put into effect before the end of 2018.[63] On January 21, 2019, there will be a plebiscite for citizens to vote for ratification of the BLBAR.[64]
Historically, the MILF’s most prominent political activity has been its participation in negotiations with the Philippine government. These talks have continued on and off in different forms since the 1980s, almost from the MILF’s beginnings. The MILF seems to have privileged a strategy of negotiations, supported by armed strength, for achieving Moro self-determination.[65] In seeking legitimacy, the MILF has incorporated foreign actors, and it has appealed to other states to participate in MILF-Philippine government negotiations. As a condition for restarting peace talks after the war in 2000, for example, the MILF required that negotiations occur outside the Philippines and under the purview of OIC members like Malaysia or Libya.[66]
Upon Benigno Aquino III’s assumption of the presidency in 2010, the Philippine government and the MILF began peace negotiations to replace the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with a new political entity called the Bangsamoro. In the same year, the MILF officially dropped its demand for full independence, instead seeking regional autonomy.[67] The Philippine government and the MILF signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in 2012 and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014. Among other stipulations, these agreements will create new power and wealth-sharing arrangements between the Philippine and Bangsamoro governments, allow for multiple judicial systems within the new region—such as Shariah-based courts for Muslims and separate courts for non-Muslims—and facilitate the transition of MILF members back to civilian life.[68]
Increasingly, the MILF is becoming integrated into the Philippine political system. On March 7, 2015, in accordance with the CAB, the Philippine Commission on Elections conducted the first of several voter registration events for MILF members—including fighters—and their relatives.[69] In May 2015, the MILF officially registered its own political party, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP). All MILF members are listed as UBJP members, but anyone outside the MILF can also register with the party. The UBJP fielded candidates in the 2016 Bangsamoro elections for a new regional government.[70]
On June 16, 2015, the MILF surrendered 75 weapons in its first round of arms deactivation in accordance with recent negotiations, and 145 BIAF members were decommissioned. These former members received small payments from the government, to be used for education, job seeking, or other expenses in order to ease their integration into society.[71]
Currently, the MILF is urging ratification of the BLBAR, which is under consideration in the Philippine Congress. This law would effectively complete the peace negotiations between the MILF and the Philippine government.[72] In 2018, Philippine President called for the law to be passed and enacted before the end of 2018, thus vowing to fulfill the long-standing agreement.[73] As stated previously, on January 21, 2019, there will be a plebiscite for citizens to vote for ratification of the BLBAR.[74]
In its earliest years, the MILF largely avoided significant confrontations with the government. Instead, it concentrated on the quiet development of its own organization and armed division, the latter known as the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF).[75] The MILF sought to establish Shariah-based societies in the areas under its control, claiming to liberate the Moro regions from the Philippine government. In recent years the MILF has seemed to focus more on politics and negotiations than carrying out violent attacks.[76]
When the MILF has targeted the Philippine military in the past, it primarily did so utilizing guerrilla tactics.[77] Over time, the MILF’s BIAF developed from a decentralized band of unconventional fighters into a semi-conventional force, complete with a regular infantry, and the MILF engaged in extended gunfights with Philippine authorities.[78] During times of peace talks, the MILF’s sincerity has been questioned when members killed Philippine troops, but the MILF has generally blamed “rogue” units or accused the government of encroaching on its territory. Clashes often occurred when government forces entered MILF-controlled zones for other operations without notifying the MILF.[79] Unlike in organizations such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), from which the MILF has tried to distinguish itself, indiscriminate targeting of civilians has not been a consistent part of the MILF’s strategy.[80] However, at least in the early 2000s, the MILF blocked major highways and reportedly bombed power lines to undermine the Philippine government and increase its own influence.[81]
In addition, the MILF has employed terror tactics against local officials, Christian communities, and businesses to elicit payments to the MILF. The organization has used bombs and other weapons to attack cities in Mindanao and has also conducted kidnappings. The Special Operations Group (SOG), the alleged terrorist division of the MILF founded in 1999, is the division responsible for conducting these attacks.[82]
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization’s history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.
February 25, 2000: Bombs exploded on one or more buses aboard the M/V Our Lady of Mediatrix ferry that was traveling to Ozamiz City. MILF commanders were among those blamed for the attack (39-44 killed, 41-50 injured).[83]
February 27, 2000: A bomb exploded outside dxMS, a Catholic radio station in Cotabato City. The attack was blamed on the MILF, especially because one dxMS host had received MILF death threats. The organization denied involvement (unknown killed, 7 wounded).[84]
March 17, 2000: A MILF commander named Abdullah Macapaar, also known as Commander Bravo and generally considered rogue, led an assault on Kauswagan Municipal Hall, reportedly taking 294 hostages and leaving several dead (unknown killed, unknown wounded, 294 hostages).[85]
March 3, 2003: A bomb exploded at Davao City International Airport. The MILF was allegedly responsible for the attack. The Philippine government subsequently ordered the arrest of various MILF leaders, although the organization denied involvement (22 killed, 148 wounded).[86]
July 10, 2007: Philippine Marines were attacked in a MILF-controlled zone while trying to rescue an Italian hostage from the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Several Marines were decapitated. The MILF admitted to the attack, and the attacking group also reportedly included ASG members (18-43 killed, 9+ wounded).[87]
January 25, 2015: Philippine Special Action Force (SAF) troops targeted two key bomb-makers in an operation in Maguindanao. During the pursuit, the troopers were attacked by rebel forces that included MILF members. The MILF acknowledged the involvement of its members, although it also stated that the SAF operation was not coordinated with them as required by a ceasefire agreement with the government. Consideration of the BLBAR was temporarily suspended after this attack (approximately 55 killed, 12+ wounded).[88]
April 17, 2017: The MILF claimed responsibility for two attacks coordinated in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, Philippines. One explosive device detonated near a gas station and a second device targeted police personnel responding to an earlier blast. There were no casualties, but 5 civilians and 9 police officers were wounded (0 killed, 14 injured).[89]
The MILF is not designated as a terrorist organization by the United States or the European Union.[90]
The MILF seems to enjoy substantial support in the southern Philippines. From its beginnings, it has permeated society by setting up a parallel government in the areas under its control, offering marriage and birth certificates as well as other services that the Philippine government often did not provide.[91] MILF communities and camps encompass mosques, schools, factories, and more. Within its controlled areas, the MILF has implemented Shariah-based societies, but tension has arisen because some Moros have opposed the MILF’s rigid imposition of Islamic law and social structure.[92]
In order to govern its claimed territories, the MILF established an extensive committee structure, which it called Political Committee Set-Ups. Besides its own central leadership and committee structure, the MILF has created Provincial Committees, such as the Basilan Provincial Committee or the Sulu Provincial Committee, to enact MILF policies across the southern Philippines. Upon consulting with the local communities, the MILF Central Committee appoints provincial chairmen. The MILF’s committee structure also extends to the municipal and Barangay—or village—levels, where it is largely modeled on the Philippine government’s structures. By engaging the local Moros in their own governance, the MILF has been able to win popular support. Consequently, the AFP) has reported difficulties in gaining cooperation from the public in MILF-controlled zones.[93]
Besides citing its engagement of communities through committees, the MILF supports its claim to being the legitimate representative of Moro interests through its General Consultations, also called Consultative Assemblies or the Bangsamoro General Assembly. These consultations gather thousands of MILF supporters and commanders to encourage unified political positions, and the events also serve to demonstrate the level of local backing enjoyed by the MILF. The most prominent MILF General Consultation occurred between May 29 and May 31, 2005, attracting approximately 900,000 supporters and reportedly even foreign dignitaries. Another Consultative Assembly occurred between July 7 and July 9, 2012, during MILF peace negotiations with the Philippine government.[94]
Since splitting from the MNLF in 1977 and officially becoming the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 1984, the MILF has been in competition with its parent organization for resources, support, and political legitimacy. From its beginnings as an anti-Misuari splinter group, the MILF attempted to differentiate itself from the MNLF in various ways, portraying itself as more religious as well as more or less radical, depending on circumstance.[95] The MILF has rejected the Philippine government’s peace agreements with the MNLF, most notably a 1996 agreement in in which the MILF believes that the MNLF sacrificed Moro welfare for political gain. Similarly, the MNLF has opposed the MILF’s ongoing negotiations with the government on the grounds that its own 1996 agreement had already settled the question of Moro Muslim status in the Philippines.[96]
Although the MILF has formally condemned the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), another MNLF offshoot, there is evidence of at least low-level relationships between the MILF and the ASG. Individual units or members from both organizations have participated together in attacks.[97]
Beyond Philippine organizations, AQ influenced the MILF in its early years, as demonstrated by the cooperation between the MILF and individuals linked to Osama bin Laden in the mid-1990s. The MILF also received AQ money funneled through various charities.[98] Some MILF fighters had fought earlier against the Soviets in Afghanistan, making contacts with future AQ members, and by the end of the 1990s, AQ operatives were training MILF operatives.[99]
Beginning in the late 1990s, the MILF harbored AQ and JI operatives in its bases, where they sought refuge and trained. Around 2003 or 2004, the MILF officially cut ties with AQ, JI, the ASG, and other terrorist organizations in order to strengthen its standing with the Philippine government, the United States, and other states.[100] As with the ASG, the relationship between the MILF and JI seems to have continued on an informal level.[101] Local MILF units and JI members may have continued joint training, support, or attacks even after 2004, although the extent to which the MILF’s central leadership knew about or could control this collaboration is unclear. Alleged ties with AQ, JI, and the ASG jeopardized the MILF’s negotiations with the government several times throughout the peace process.[102]
Before the 1990s, the MILF may have received weapons and support from Libya and Malaysia, among other Muslim countries.[103] Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi supported Moro separatists in general throughout his rule, and beneficiaries included the MILF as well as the MNLF and the ASG. Libya supplied weapons, funds, and training to the MILF, and it also played a role in mediating MILF-Philippine government peace negotiations and ceasefire agreements.[104]
In the early 2000s, Malaysia began to play a similar role as mediator between the MILF and the Philippine government. Malaysia has often expressed security concerns about conflict in the southern Philippines as well as wariness regarding separatist threats to sovereign states. Besides acting in their own interests, both Libya and Malaysia also acted in their capacity as members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)—now known as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation— to monitor some of the peace agreements between the Philippine government and the MILF.[105]
The MILF also reportedly receives money from various Islamic states, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, and individuals in those states. Other funding sources include money diverted from foreign Islamic nongovernmental organizations and remittances from Moro members of the United Overseas Bangsamoro.[106]
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