Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada

FormedMay 2013
DisbandedGroup is active.
First AttackAugust 21, 2013: KSS is speculated to have been involved in the Assad Regime’s chemical weapons attack on the Damascus suburb of East Ghouta. Some sources have alleged that the regime used KSS soldiers to surround the area under attack to prevent opposition fighters from escaping. KSS has not commented on these allegations. (350-1,429 killed, unknown wounded) [1] [2] [3]
Last AttackJanuary 2016: January 2016: KSS fighters clashed with an Iraqi Army unit at a checkpoint in al-Tanoumah near Basra. The circumstances precipitating the firefight remain unclear. (0 killed, 2 wounded) [4]
UpdatedDecember 28, 2016

Narrative Summary

Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS), or “The Masters of the Martyrs Brigade,” is a Shiite militant organization operating in Syria and Iraq. [5] The group was founded in May 2013, although the exact circumstances of its formation remain somewhat unclear. While some sources allege that KSS was created by two other Iraqi Shiite paramilitary organizations, Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and the Badr Organization, in order to recruit more Iraqi Shiites to fight in Syria, others claim that it was formed by Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani and Falih Khazali after they broke away from KH. [6] [7] [8] Regardless, KSS remains a close ally to KH and the Badr Organization, as well as the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), from which it receives a large portion of its funding. [9] [10]

KSS first drew international attention in 2013 for fighting alongside the Assad Regime and its allies in the Syrian Civil War. When KSS first appeared in Syria in May 2013, its forces were primarily concentrated in the southern suburbs of Damascus. The group claims that the purpose of its participation in the Syrian Civil War is to protect the Zaynab Shrine, a major Shiite religious site located in the southern suburbs of Damascus. [11] However, the group has increasingly expanded its operations in support of the Assad Regime to other areas of Damascus as well as into southern Syria. [12] [13]

KSS has also been active in Iraq since 2013. The group is a member of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is an umbrella organization comprised of Iraqi Shiite militias that fight alongside the Iraqi Army against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq. KSS has been particularly active fighting IS in in several of the central and northern provinces of Iraq, most notably in the Salahadin Province. [14] [15]

In August 2013, KSS came under international scrutiny for its possible involvement in the Assad Regime’s chemical weapons attack on the Damascus suburb of East Ghouta on August 21, 2013. KSS social media confirms that the group was operating in East Ghouta as late as August 20th, leading many observers to speculate that the Assad Regime used KSS to surround the area targeted in the attack to ensure that no Sunni opposition fighters escaped. Others claim that the group’s presence in the area was unrelated to the attack and that KSS was simply stationed near East Ghouta in order to protect a strategically important, government-controlled rail station located in East Ghouta. The group itself has not commented on the allegations, although it did announce on August 24 that eight KSS fighters had been killed in Syria in the days following the chemical attack. [16]

In mid-October 2014, KSS again made headlines as one of the most outspoken critics of Saudi Arabia’s decision to execute Saudi Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr on sedition charges. KSS called on the Iraqi Government to sever diplomatic ties to Saudi Arabia and named “anything of Saudi origin,” whether human or material, as a legitimate future target for the group. [17]

In February 2015, KSS participated in the Syrian Government’s southern offensive alongside the forces of the Assad Regime, Hezbollah, and the IRGC. The offensive aimed to retake the southern governorates of Daraa and Quneitra. KSS’s participation in the offensive was chronicled in a documentary titled “The Men of God in Syria,” or Rijal al-allah fi Soorya in Arabic, that aired on Al-Anwar 2, an Iraqi news channel, in spring 2015. [18]

KSS again became the focus of regional attention in January 2016 after KSS fighters clashed with an Iraqi Army unit at a checkpoint in al-Tanoumah near Basra. At least two people were wounded in the firefight. The incident was widely cited as proof of rising criminality and tribal violence in Iraq’s southern provinces. The event was particularly notable as KSS is allied with the Iraqi Government and has fought alongside the Iraqi Army against the Islamic State (IS) in central and northern Iraq since 2013. As a result of the clash, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi deployed an armored brigade of the Iraqi Army to Basra on January 17th. A number of Iranian backed, Shiite militias in the region, including the KSS, the Badr Organization, Kata’ib al-Imam Ali and the Nujaba Movement, formed the Council of the Islamic Resistance Factions in Basra on January 17th to protest the presence of the armored brigade. The brigade withdrew on January 19th. [19]

Leadership

There is some uncertainty about the leadership of KSS. Most sources name Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani as the group’s leader; however, many others point to Falah al-Khazali as the true head of the KSS. KSS itself has not commented on or clarified the confusion surrounding its leadership. [20]

  1. Falih Khazali (May 2013 to Present): Falih Khazali, also known as Mustafa Khazali, is believed to be the secretary general of KSS, although some sources claim that he is actually the true founder and leader of the group. Khazali is thought to have been a member of Kata'ib Hezbollah before splitting away to form or join KSS. [21]
  2. Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani (May 2013 to Present): Sheibani is believed to be the commander of KSS. He is an Iraqi Shiite who has reportedly been affiliated with the Iranian Quds Force and the Badr Organization since the late 1980s. [22]

Ideology & Goals

KSS is a Shiite militant group that openly recognizes Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei as God’s representative on earth. [23] The stated aim of the group is to protect Shiite shrines and Mosques “around the globe.” In particular, the group has dedicated itself to the protection of the Zaynab Shrine in southern Damascus. KSS has also publically announced that it seeks the liberation of Jerusalem, the preservation of Iraqi unity, and an end to sectarian strife. [24] [25]

Name Changes

KSS has not changed its name.

Size Estimates

Designated/Listed

Resources

KSS allegedly receives substantial aid from the Iranian government. [28] As part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), KSS also receives funding and material aid from the Iraqi government. It is believed that at least some of the funding and equipment the KSS receives from the Iraqi government is provided by the United States. [29] For instance, reports surfaced in February 2016 that KSS was using a U.S.-made M1 Abrams tank in the fight against the Islamic State in central Iraq. [30] Regardless, the group remains adamantly opposed to the United States and its intervention in Iraq. [31] In addition to U.S.-made tanks, KSS has an arsenal of machine guns and sniper rifles as well as Kalashnikov-type assault rifles. [32] 

External Influences

KSS is closely aligned with the Islamic Republic of Iran and is widely considered an Iranian proxy organization. The Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-QF) of Iran is believed to provide funding, material assistance and possibly training to KSS. [33] [34] [35] The group openly recognizes Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei as God’s representative on earth. [36] 

KSS is also a member of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of roughly 40 Shiite Iraqi militias formed and ostensibly controlled by the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior to help the Iraqi Army fight the Islamic State (IS). [37] As a member of the PMF, KSS receives funding from the Iraqi government and has cooperated with the Iraqi Security Forces against IS in Iraq. [38] [39] [40]    

Geographical Locations

KSS operates exclusively in Iraq and Syria. When KSS first appeared in Syria in May 2013, its forces were primarily concentrated in the southern suburbs of Damascus around the Zaynab Shrine. [41] However, the group has increasingly expanded its operations in support of the Assad Regime to other areas of Damascus as well as into the southern Syrian provinces of Daraa and Quneitra. [42] [43] As of January 2015, the group claimed to have 500 members operating in Syria. [44]

In Iraq, the group is believed to draw the majority of its support from the Dhi Qar Province in Southern Iraq. [45] However, the group has also fought in several of the central and northern provinces of Iraq against the IS, most notably in the Salahadin Province. [46]

Targets & Tactics

Very little is known about the weapon systems KSS has at its disposal. There is speculation that KSS was involved in the Assad Regime's chemical weapon’s attack in East Ghouta in August 2013. Some sources have alleged that Assad forces used KSS soldiers to surround the targeted area to prevent the escape of any Sunni opposition Fighters. This has not been confirmed by either Syrian Government forces or by KSS itself. [47] The group’s units in Iraq are also known to possess at least one M1-Abrams tank, a U.S.-made tank most likely given to the group by the Iraqi government. [48] 

Despite using American made equipment, KSS is vehemently anti-U.S. in its rhetoric. It has openly accused the United States of funding and backing the Islamic State and engineering the current crisis in the region. [49] Although the United States is aligned with the Iraqi government, with whom KSS is also allied, the group has refused to cooperate with U.S. forces in Iraq and has threatened to abandon the front lines if more U.S. group forces are deployed to the country. [50]

In Iraq, KSS primarily targets the Islamic State (IS). Reports indicate that the group has been involved in a number of operations against IS in the Salahadin Province in particular. [51] Additionally, the group has released statements claiming that it had “fought the U.S. occupation in Iraq.” [52] This, however, is unconfirmed, as the group was not founded until May 2013—almost two years after the United States pulled its last troops out of Iraq.

In Syria, KSS’s primary targets are Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra), elements of the Free Syrian Army and other militant organizations operating in opposition to the Assad Government. [53] [54]

Political Activities

Although KSS is a member of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a group of Shiite militias sponsored and ostensibly controlled by the Iraqi government, the group itself is not politically active. [55] However, one of the group’s leaders, Falih Khazali, is a member of the Iraqi parliament. [56]

Major Attacks

  1. August 21, 2013: KSS is speculated to have been involved in the Assad Regime’s chemical weapons attack on the Damascus suburb of East Ghouta. Some sources have alleged that the regime used KSS soldiers to surround the area under attack to prevent opposition fighters from escaping. KSS has not commented on these allegations (350-1,429 killed, unknown wounded).[57]
  2. February 2015: KSS participated in the Assad Regime's offensive in southern Syrian provinces, namely in Daraa and Quneitra. KSS fought alongside Assad Regime troops, Hezbollah, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and other Shiite militias against elements of the Free Syrian Army and Jabhat al-Nusra (63-400 killed, unknown wounded).[58]
  3. January 2016: KSS fighters clashed with an Iraqi Army unit at a checkpoint in al-Tanoumah near Basra. The circumstances precipitating the firefight remain unclear (0 killed, 2 wounded).[59]

Relationships with Other Groups

KSS is closely aligned with the other Iranian-backed Iraqi Shiite paramilitaries, including Katai’b Hezbollah (KH), Asai’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and the Badr Organization, which are all members of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) along with KSS. [60] [61] [62] The PMF is an umbrella organization of roughly 40 Shiite Iraqi militias formed by the Iraqi Government to fight the Islamic State. The PMF is ostensibly controlled by the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. [63]

KSS also cooperates with KH and AAH in Syria, where the groups are fighting alongside the forces of the Assad Regime, Hezbollah and the Iranian IRGC against the IS, Jabhat al-Nusra, the Free Syrian Army and other militant opposition groups to the Assad Regime. KSS also cooperates with Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA) in Syria. LAFA is another Shiite militant group fighting alongside the Assad government. Some sources indicate that KSS actually sends fighters from Iraq to fight as an intrinsic part of LAFA, which also is based around the Zaynab Shrine in southern Damascus, whereas other sources describe the groups as two separate entities that merely coordinate with one another. [64] [65]

Community Relationships

Little is known about KSS’s relations with the communities in which it operates.

References

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  2. ^ “SYRIA: REPORTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE" (PDF). U.K. Joint Intelligence Organisation. 29 August 2013. Web. 7 May 2016.
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