A New Focus on Efficiency
A
s 2001 wound to a close, Boeing brass acknowledged the existence of another new airplane, code-named Project Yellowstone.
It would be the same size as the Sonic Cruiser (about 225 seats) and, like the Cruiser, built of lightweight composites. But it would not have the same sexy delta-wing design, and would fly more slowly, thereby burning 20 percent less fuel. While the Sonic Cruiser was designed for speed, Yellowstone had economy as its priority.
But it would take almost a year and multiple rounds of customer meetings for Boeing to officially pivot away from the Sonic Cruiser.
In February and March 2002, Boeing held a second round of private meetings with about two dozen customers, showing them the “super-efficient” airplane. The Project Yellowstone plane was used primarily as a “reference configuration” against which the airlines could judge the Sonic Cruiser’s technology.N
At the same time, customers were raising questions about whether the Sonic Cruiser’s warp speeds could disrupt flight schedules, run up against airport curfews, and leave passengers flying overnight from New York to London too groggy, because the flights were so short. And there was another problem:
By April, Boeing was still having problems developing its business case for the Sonic Cruiser; strategist [Nicole] Piasecki said one might not be completed for another nine months. After more than a year of work the company still hadn't figured out how much value the airlines would place on extra speed.N
In July, after a third round of customer meetings, Boeing acknowledged that potential customers weren’t sure whether they wanted the Sonic Cruiser and said that Boeing wouldn't proceed unless the project “makes sense.”N Airlines were listening to the briefings about the Sonic Cruiser, but asking for more details on the reference model.N
By fall, CEO Phil Condit declared that the Sonic Cruiser and the super-efficient airplane were in a horse race. N In October, customers were again invited to Seattle to discuss the planes at a conference center at Seattle’s Pier 66.N Cash-strapped airlines’ message to Boeing was clear: Don’t worry about increasing speeds; increase our fuel efficiency to save money.
Details of the “reference aircraft,” renamed the Super Efficient, were first unveiled in November at an aerospace engineers conference in Phoenix.N
In December 2002, Boeing formally abandoned the Sonic Cruiser and pivoted to the new model, which it called the 7E7. The “E” stood for efficiency.
The 7E7 would use the Sonic Cruiser’s lighter materials to make the plane go not faster, but further. It would have the same range as a super jumbo jet, but with fewer passengers. This would be good for routes with less demand than those served by the A380.
The 7E7 could serve more than 90 percent of the routes that super jumbo jets could. It boasted 30 percent better fuel economy per seat than Airbus’ A330, and 10 percent better fuel economy per seat than Airbus’ A350 (both planes carried about 250-300 passengers). The 7E7 also had more cargo space and the cabin featured a higher degree of humidity, increasing passenger comfort.N
Boeing believed that the 7E7 would be particularly appealing to airlines in Asia, where rising prosperity was projected to fuel a boom in air travel. Both business and leisure customers were eager for more direct intercontinental flights between smaller cities, Boeing believed. The company estimated that there were more than 400 city pairs (such as Seattle to Shanghai, and Madrid to Manila) that could efficiently be served non-stop for the first time with the 7E7.
By early 2003, Boeing was briefing customers on the seating and range of the 7E7. In early 2004, it announced that pricing would be in the ballpark of the 767-300ER, which had a range of about 7,300 miles and a maximum capacity of 375 passengers.N
Within months, in April 2004, Japan’s
ANA placed a formal order for 50 planes at $6 billion, and the plane was
renamed the 787 Dreamliner. It was the largest launch order in Boeing's history.N