The 747X was Boeing's first direct response to the Airbus A380.
The 747X was not an all-new aircraft like the A380 (see video below). Instead, Boeing’s idea was to modify the 30-year-old 747 and offer two or three versions: One would carry more fuel than the 420-seat 747-400 but only a few more passengers, giving it greater range. Another would carry up to 550 passengers, but have only the same range as the 747-400. A 600-seat 747X “Stretch” was conceived for the Japanese market.N
Boeing targeted the same customers Airbus was going after for the A380. Aimed at airlines operating a hub-and-spoke network with high-volume intercontinental routes between the hubs, the 747X promised leisure and business travelers affordable flights. Because the 747x would be a “derivative” of the 747, it would cost far less to build than an all-new model and therefore require fewer orders to justify development, Boeing said.
The company figured if it could get 10 to 30 orders for the aircraft, it would build it.N It would need those commitments by mid-2001 to hit a planned service entry target of 2005.
In June 2000, the company brought 30 of its key 747 customers in for a detailed presentation at Seattle’s Museum of Flight, discussing the three variants.N
“I would love to have three [launch customers], but we typically end up launching with one.”
Boeing said it was getting positive feedback on the idea, but criticism was bubbling up publicly. FedEx Chief Executive Fred Smith, for example, told one reporter that the A380 was a “quantum leap” over the 747X. Added the CEO of Singapore Airlines, Cheong Choong Kong, who in September opted to buy the A380 over the 747X: “A larger aircraft also means lower operating costs per seat, especially with the higher efficiency that comes with newer technology.”N
John Roundhill, then a senior engineer with Boeing, recalled: “We started getting some extremely explicit input from the customers for Boeing to start looking at something in the middle of the market — and something with more range.”N
By early 2001, the results were becoming clear: Boeing didn’t have any firm orders; Airbus had 60 for the A380.N
Walt Orlowski, then the general manager for all Boeing 747 programs, insisted that the 747X “is going to happen,” whether those orders came sooner or not until the end of 2001.
But Boeing had already started working on plans for other planes. At the end of 2000, it had launched a 90-day, top-secret engineering sprint aimed at creating a “next generation airliner.”N
Sure enough, in March 2001, Boeing dropped the 747x idea like a hot potato for something radically different: the Sonic Cruiser.