Philosophy of Mind - Phil 186

Philosophy 186 Stanford University Philosophy Department Professor: Paul Skokowski Winter Quarter, 2003 Mondays and Wednesdays, 10am-11:30am Texts:

Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings Kim, Philosophy of Mind

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Chapter references below are to Chalmers unless otherwise noted.

Introduction Week 1, Jan. 8th:

Overview of Course Content, Schedule, Assignments and Grading

Dualism and Epiphenomenalism

Week 2, Jan 13th:

Descartes, Meditations, Ch. 1 Descartes, Passions of the Soul, Ch. 2

Week 2, Jan 15th:

Huxley, On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, Ch. 3 Smullyan, The Unfortunate Dualist, Ch. 4 Kim, Introduction, pp. 1-9.

Behaviorism

Week 3, Jan 20th:

Holiday, No Class

Week 3, Jan 22nd:

Ryle, Descartes' Myth, Ch. 5 Carnap, Psychology in Physical Language, Ch. 6 Kim, Ch. 2, pp. 25-31.

Mind-Brain Identity Theories

Week 4, Jan 27th:

Putnam, Brains and Behavior, Ch. 7 Kim, Ch. 2, pp. 31-45. Further recommended readings: Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, sec. 293

Week 4, Jan 29th:

Place, Is Consciousness a Brain Process?, Ch. 8 Kim, Ch. 3, pp. 47-54

Week 5, Feb 3:

Smart, Sensations and Brain Processes, Ch. 9 Feigl, The Mental and the Physical, Ch. 10 Kim, Ch. 3, pp. 54-71

Functionalism

Week 5, Feb 5th:

Putnam, The Nature of Mental States, Ch. 11 Kim, Ch. 3, pp. 73-85

Week 6, Feb 10th:

Armstrong, The Causal Theory of the Mind, Ch. 11 Kim, Ch. 3, pp. 85-101 * * Mid-Term Paper topics handed out in class * *

Week 6, Feb 12th:

Lewis, Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, Ch. 11 Kim, Ch. 4, pp. 104-111

Week 7, Feb 17th:

Holiday, No Class

Week 7, Feb 19th:

Block, Troubles with Functionalism, Ch. 11 Kim, Ch. 4, pp. 111-122

Intentionality

Week 8, Feb 24th:

Brentano, The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena, Ch. 44 Dretske, A Recipe for Thought, Ch. 46 Kim, Ch. 1, pp. 20-23 * * MID-TERM PAPERS DUE * *

Week 8, Feb 26th:

Putnam, The Meaning of "Meaning", Ch. 54

Propositional Attitudes

Week 9, March 3rd:

Putnam, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Ch. 44 Fodor, Propositional Attitudes, Ch. 46 Dennett, True Believers, Ch. 52 Churchland, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes, Ch. 53

Consciousness

Week 9, March 5th:

Block, Concepts of Consciousness, Ch. 24 Nagel, What is it Like to be a Bat?, Ch. 25

Week 10, March 10th:

Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qualia, Ch. 28 Stoltjar, Two Conceptions of the Physical, Ch. 31

Week 10, March 12th:

Shoemaker, Introspection and Phenomenal Character, Ch. 43 Dretske, Conscious Experience, Ch. 40

Week 10, Friday, March 14th:

* * FINAL EXAM QUESTIONS POSTED HERE * *

Week 11, Monday, March 17th:

* * FINAL EXAM DUE AT NOON * *

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