Publications

Cournot Competition in Networked Markets
(with S Ehsani and R Ilkilic)
Management Science, forthcoming

Extended abstract at the ACM Conf of Economics and Computation (EC)

[abstract] [paper]

Designing Dynamic Contests
(with S Ehsani and M Mostagir)
Operations Research, forthcoming

Extended abstract at the ACM Conf of Economics and Computation (EC)

[abstract] [paper]

Multi-sourcing and Miscoordination in Supply Chain Networks
(with D Fearing and A Tahbaz-Salehi)
Operations Research, forthcoming
[abstract] [paper]

Information Sale and Competition
(with D Crapis and A Tahbaz Salehi)
Management Science, forthcoming
[abstract] [paper]

Crowdsourcing Exploration
(with Y Papanastasiou and N Savva)
Management Science, forthcoming
[abstract] [paper]

Learning and Hierarchies in Service Systems
(with M G Markakis)
Management Science, forthcoming

[abstract] [paper]

Dynamic Learning of Patient Response Types: An Application to Treating Chronic Diseases
(with D Negoescu, M Brandeau, and D Iancu)

Management Science, forthcoming
The paper was selected as a finalist for the 2014 Pierskalla award

[abstract] [paper]

Randomized Markdowns and Online Monitoring
(with K Moon and H Mendelson)
Management Science, forhcoming
[abstract] [paper]

Competitive Targeted Advertising over Networks
(with A Ozdaglar and E Yildiz
Operations Research
, 64(3): 705-720, May-June 2016
Formerly circulated as "Competing over Networks"
[abstract] [paper]

Inventory Pooling under Heavy-Tailed Demand
(with M G Markakis)
Management Science, 62(6): 1800-1813, June 2016
[abstract] [paper]

Dynamics of Information Exchange in Endogenous Social Networks
(with D Acemoglu and A Ozdaglar)
Theoretical Economics, 9(1): 41-97, January 2014

[abstract] [paper]

Optimal Pricing in Networks with Externalities
(with O Candogan and A Ozdaglar)
Operations Research, 60(4): 883-905, July-August 2012
The paper appeared as an Extended Abstract at WINE 2010
[abstract] [paper]

Abstract:

We study the optimal pricing strategies of a monopolist selling a divisible good (service) to consumers who are embedded in a social network. A key feature of our model is that consumers experience a (positive) local network effect. In particular, each consumer's usage level depends directly on the usage of her neighbors in the social network structure. Thus, the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy may involve offering discounts to certain agents, who have a central position in the underlying network. Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we consider a setting where the monopolist can offer individualized prices and derive a characterization of the optimal price for each consumer as a function of her network position. In particular, we show that it is optimal for the monopolist to charge each agent a price that consists of three components: (i) a nominal term which is independent of the network structure, (ii) a discount term proportional to the influence that this agent exerts over the rest of the social network (quantified by the agent's Bonacich centrality), (iii) and a markup term proportional to the influence that the network exerts on the agent.} In the second part of the paper, we discuss the optimal strategy of a monopolist who can only choose a single uniform price for the good and derive an algorithm polynomial in the number of agents to compute such a price. Thirdly, we assume that the monopolist can offer the good in two prices, full and discounted, and study the problem of determining which set of consumers should be given the discount. We show that the problem is NP-hard, however we provide an explicit characterization of the set of agents who should be offered the discounted price. Next, we describe an approximation algorithm for finding the optimal set of agents. We show that if the profit is nonnegative under any feasible price allocation, the algorithm guarantees at least 88% of the optimal profit. Finally, we highlight the value of network information by comparing the profits of a monopolist who does not take into account the network effects when choosing her pricing policy to those of a monopolist who uses this information optimally.

Experimentation, Patents, and Innovation
(with D Acemoglu and A Ozdaglar)
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3(1): 37-77, Feb 2011
[abstract] [paper]

Price and Capacity Competition
(with D Acemoglu and A Ozdaglar)
Games and Economic Behavior, 66(1): 1-26, May 2009
[abstract] [paper]

Working Papers

Spatial Pricing in Ride-Sharing Networks
(with O Candogan and D Saban)
Major Revision, Operations Research
Extended abstract at the NetEcon Conference
[abstract] [SSRN]

Managing Market Thickness in Online B2B Markets
(with W Elmaghraby, K Moon, and W Zhang)
Major Revision, Management Science
[abstract] [Paper]

Supply Disruptions and Optimal Network Structures
(with O Candogan and S Ehsani)
Minor Revision, Management Science
[abstract] [paper]

Conference Papers

Spatial Pricing in Ride-Sharing Networks, with O Candogan and D Saban
NetEcon Conference

Designing Dynamic Contests, with S Ehsani and M Mostagir
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)

Cournot Competition in Networked Markets, with S Ehsani and R Ilkilic ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)

Optimal Pricing in the Presence of Local Network Effects, with O Candogan and A Ozdaglar, WINE

Forming Information Networks, with D Acemoglu and A Ozdaglar, Allerton

Communication and Learning in Social Networks: Partial Results, with D Acemoglu and A Ozdaglar, Allerton

Competition with Atomic Users, with A Ozdaglar, Asilomar

Partial Results on Capacity Competition, with D Acemoglu and A Ozdaglar, Allerton