Ilya R. Segal

Department of Economics
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
Tel. (650) 724-4905
Ilya.Segal@stanford.edu
http://www.stanford.edu/~isegal/

Academic Positions

· 2002 – present: Roy and Betty Anderson Professor in the Humanities and Sciences, Department of Economics, Stanford University (Courtesy appointment, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2004-present)

· 1999 – 2002: Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford University

· 1995 – 1998: Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California at Berkeley

Visiting Positions

· Visiting Researcher, Microsoft Research Silicon Valley, Summer 2008

· Member, The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, 2002-2003

· John Stauffer National Fellow in Public Policy, Hoover Institution, 1998 – 1999

· Visiting Assistant Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Fall 1995

· Pew Foundation Visiting Scholar, Harvard University, 1991-92

Education

· Harvard University, Ph.D., Economics, 1995. Advisors: Eric Maskin, Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer

· Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, M.S., Applied Mathematics, 1991

Honors, Awards, Grants

· 2018 INFORMS Edelman Award for Achievement in Advanced Analytics, Operations Research, and Management Science, as part of an interdisciplinary team designing the F.C.C.’s Incentive Auction

· American Academy of Arts and Sciences Member, elected in 2017

· Emerald Publishing Citation of Excellence for “the most highly cited and influential papers” (joint with Alessandro Pavan and Juuso Toikka), 2017

· Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory Fellow, elected in 2013

· Compass Lexecon Prize for “the most significant contribution to the understanding and implementation of competition policy” (joint with Michael Whinston), 2008

· Toulouse Network on Information Technology, Member, 2005-2017

· Econometric Society Fellow, elected in 2003

· John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 2002-2003

· Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Research Fellowship, 1999-2001

· National Science Foundation Research Grants 1998-2000, 2000-2002, 2002-2004, 2004-2005, 2004-2006, 2010-2012

· Review of Economic Studies European Tour, 1995

· Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Dissertation Fellowship, 1994-95

Publications

Refereed Journal Articles

• “Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation,” with Paul Milgrom, Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming
• “Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities,” with Gabriel Carroll, Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming
• “Economics and Computer Science of a Radio Spectrum Reallocation,” with Kevin Leyton-Brown and Paul Milgrom, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114 (28), 2017, pp. 7202–7209
• “Property Rights and the Efficiency of Bargaining,” with Michael Whinston, Journal of European Economic Association, 14(6), 2016, pp. 1287–1328
• “What Makes them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Internet Search Advertising,” with Przemyslaw Jeziorski, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3), 2015, pp. 24-53.
• “Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach,” with Alessandro Pavan and Juuso Toikka, Econometrica 82(2), 2014, pp. 601–653.
• “An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism,” with Susan Athey, Econometrica, 81(6), 2013, pp.2463–2485
• “A Simple Status Quo that Ensures Participation (with Application to Efficient Bargaining),” with Michael Whinston, Theoretical Economics 6(1), 2011, pp. 109-125
• “Optimal Information Disclosure,” with Luis Rayo, Journal of Political Economy 118(5), 2010, pp. 949-987
• “Nash Implementation with Little Communication,” Theoretical Economics 5(1), 2010, pp.51-71
• “The Communication Cost of Selfishness,” with Ronald Fadel, Journal of Economic Theory 144, 2009, pp. 1895-920
• “Antitrust in Innovative Industries,” with Michael Whinston, American Economic Review 97(5), 2007, pp. 1703-1730
• “The Communication Requirements of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets,” Journal of Economic Theory 136, September 2007, pp. 341-378
• “Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication,” with Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 28, March 2007, pp. 233-266
• “The Communication Requirements of Efficient Allocations and Supporting Prices,” with Noam Nisan, Journal of Economic Theory 129(1), July 2006, pp. 192-224

· “Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities,” with Michael Whinston, Econometrica, 71(3) 2003, pp. 757-791

· “Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand,” American Economic Review 93(3), 2003, pp. 509-529

· “Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining,” Review of Economic Studies 70(2), 2003, pp. 439-460

· “Coordination and Discrimination in Contracting with Externalities: Divide and Conquer?” Journal of Economic Theory 113(2), 2003, pp. 147-181

· “Communication Complexity and Coordination by Authority,” Advances in Theoretical Economics, forthcoming

· “Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets,” with Paul Milgrom, Econometrica 70(2), 2002, pp. 583-601

· “The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-Up and Risk Sharing),” with Michael Whinston, Econometrica 70(1), 2002, pp. 1-45

· “Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments,” with Michael Whinston, RAND Journal of Economics 31(4), 2000, pp. 603-633

· “Naked Exclusion: Comment,” with Michael Whinston, American Economic Review 90(1), 2000, pp. 296-309

· “Contracting with Externalities,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(2), 1999, pp. 337-388

· “Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies 66(1), 1999, pp. 57-82

· “Monopoly and Soft Budget Constraint,” RAND Journal of Economics 29(3), Autumn 1998, pp. 596-609

Refereed Conference Proceedings

· “Exponential Communication Inefficiency of Demand Queries," with Noam Nisan, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X, June 2005, pp. 158-164

· “The Communication Cost of Selfishness: Ex Post Implementation,” with Ronald Fadel, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X, June 2005, pp. 165-76

· “Multi-Player and Multi-Round Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication," with Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan, European Symposium on Algorithms, September 2003, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2832 Springer 2003, ISBN 3-540-20064-9

Invited Contributions

• “The Efficiency of Bargaining under Divided Entitlements,” with Michael Whinston, University of Chicago Law Review 81(1), 2014
• “Property Rights,” with Michael Whinston, Handbook of Organizational Economics, ed. by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, Princeton University Press, 2012

· Designing Efficient Dynamic Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games, with Susan Athey, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 97(2), May 2007, pp. 131-6

· Communication in Economic Mechanisms, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application, Ninth World Congress (Econometric Society Monographs), ed. by Richard Blundell, Whitney K. Newey, and Torsten Persson, Cambridge University Press, 2006

· Communication Requirements of Combinatorial Allocation Problems, in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006

Other Publications

· “Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey” (with Michael Whinston), European Competition Law Review, 2007, 323-32

· Solutions Manual for “Microeconomic Theory” by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green , 1996, with Chiaki Hara and Steve Tadelis, Oxford University Press

Selected Invited Lectures

· Alfred Marshall Lecture, European Economic Association Meetings, Mannheim, 2015

· Keynote Speaker, Econometric Society Australasian Meetings (Hobart), 2014, Southern California Symposium on Network and Game Theory, 2012

· Plenary Speaker, Midwest Economic Theory and International Trade Meetings, Ann Arbor, Fall 2013

· Semi-Plenary Speaker, 4^th World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Istanbul, 2012

· Lecturer, Summer Schools in Economic Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2007, 2012

· Invited Speaker, North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society (Evanston 2012), Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society (Rio de Janeiro 2008), 9^th World Congress of the Econometric Society (London 2005)

Professional Service

· Editor-in-Chief, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, April 2017-present

· Associate Editor, Econometrica, 2015-present

· Foreign Editor, Review of Economic Studies, 2010-2016

· Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory, 2013-2015

· Co-Organizer, Program on Economics and Computation, Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, Fall 2015

· National Science Foundation Economics Panel, 2008-2010

· Program Committee, Bay Algorithmic Game Theory Symposia, BAGT1-BAGT6, 2006-2009

· B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics, Founding Editor, 1999-2005

· American Economic Review, Editorial Board, 2002-2005

· RAND Journal of Economics, Associate Editor, 1998-2006

· Director, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2003-2005

· Program Committee, North American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Winter 2002, Winter 2004, Summer 2004; 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society (August 2000); ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (2003, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2017), Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge IX (2003)

· Workshop Organizer, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (2000, 2001, 2002, 2004); European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory, Gerzensee, July 2000

· Director of Graduate Studies, Economics Department, 2005-2011

· Stanford University Committee on Libraries, 2004-2007

· Chair of Graduate Admissions, Economics Department, Stanford University, 2004-2005

Languages: Bilingual Russian - English, fluent in Ukrainian, basic knowledge of French 

Last Modified: March 2, 2019