

Integrated pragmatic values (somewhere in Western Russia)

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1 The probability of formalizing the maxims

The formally-minded pragmatician could be forgiven for feeling discouraged by some of the literature, which offers more than a few grand pronouncements that the second of the juicy questions in (1) is outside the bounds of formalization.

- (1) a. What range of meanings is accessible to linguistic pragmatics?
- b. How do the pragmatic maxims work?

To be sure, we can be cheered by recent advances regarding (1a). There is now a wealth of evidence that only a proper subset of meanings can be generated by linguistic and contextual interactions (Fauconnier 1975; Horn 1989; Chierchia 2004; Sauerland 2004). That is, the range of meanings relevant to linguistic pragmatics is partly conventionalized, suggesting that the tools of linguistic semantics are useful here.

But on the topic of (1b), one often encounters pessimism. In answer to the related question, “Will we ever have a formal theory of the maxims?”, some reply with skepticism, others with a firm negative, and still others assert that the question itself is misguided. For instance, Beaver (2001:29) calls formalization in this area “notoriously problematic”. Bach (1999) is more decisive, offering various reasons why “it seems futile for linguists to seek a formal pragmatics”. Devitt and Sterelny (1987:§7.4) strike a similar chord.

It’s a harsh verdict. Pragmatic maxims are the heart of pragmatic theory. It doesn’t matter if there are five or more (Grice 1989) or just one (Sperber and Wilson 1995). It doesn’t matter if they operate externally to the semantics (Gazdar 1979b,a), as part of the recursive semantics (Geurts and Maier 2003; Chierchia 2004), or somewhere in between.

(Levinson 2000 offers extensive discussion.) Invariably, if one wants to provide a complete description of a context-dependent meaning, one needs to lean on the rationality of discourse participants (a cooperative principle) and some additional contractual obligations of the members of the speech community (maxims).

It is true, though, that the maxims — and in turn, pragmatic meanings — do not yield easily to a treatment in the usual terms of semantic theory. One can usually be precise up to a point, and then one must tell a story that depends more on one's knowledge of pragmatics than it does on the principles of one's theory. One thinks of the famous *Far Side* cartoon in which a scientist's mad chalkboard scribbles close with the phrase "And then a miracle happens".

Things are looking up, though. Recent work by Reinhard Blutner, Gerhard Jäger, Arthur Merin, Robert van Rooij, and others has shed new light on the situation. The chief innovation: a shift in emphasis from truth-conditions to probabilities. The aim of this paper is to synthesize some of these developments, to provide a clear picture of what theories in this vein look like and what they are capable of. Grice's maxims are my touchstone; as an organizing principle, I attempt to formalize Grice's maxims of quality, quantity, and relevance. But the formal tools employed seem general enough to work, with modifications, under various formulations of the maxims. For now, I set aside the maxim of manner, which is though discussed in roughly the present terms by Blutner (1998) and van Rooy (2003c).

The literature on probabilistic and game-theoretic approaches to pragmatics is new but growing fast. Many of the papers cover a lot of ground, technically and empirically. Here is a brief summary of the insightful works I mined for the present paper:

- The informativity measures relevant for quantity (section 6) are explicated and explored by Blutner (1998, 2000) and van Rooy (2003c) (and, indirectly, by van Rooy (2003a) and Krifka (2003)).
- Merin (1997, 2005) explains how to use probability distributions in linguistic semantics and pragmatics.
- van Rooy (2004a) explores relevance in general, and van Rooy (2003b) applies some of those notions and more to interrogative contexts.
- Benz et al.'s (2005) overview article on probabilistic and game-theoretic methods is essential. The present paper does not make an explicit connection with game theory, but Benz et al. provide the requisite details. The related conceptual link with Bidirectional OT is explored by Jäger (2002) and van Rooy (2004b).

2 A context and two scenarios

Our two discourse participants, call them player *I* and player *A*, want to visit Barbara. Player *I* has no knowledge of where Barbara lives, so he asks player *A*,

(2) “Where does Barbara live?”

The players’ interpretation of this question — in particular, the level of detail requested by *where* — will be heavily conditioned by a range of contextual factors, as will player *A*’s reply. Let’s assume that the players’ shared goal is to buy plane tickets, and thus that (2) is interpreted by them as equivalent to the question of which *city* Barbara lives in. This is the question-under-discussion. We’ll focus on two different utterances with this backdrop.

(3) **Scenario 1: Underinformative relative to the question**

i. **Player *A*’s knowledge**

Player *A* knows which country Barbara lives in: Russia. But he is not sure which city in Russia she lives in.

ii. **Player *A*’s reply**

“Well, she lives in Russia”.

iii. **Player *I*’s calculation**

I will conclude that *A* has limited knowledge, that *A* was not positioned to name a city.

Player *A* does not have sufficient evidence to name a city. So he offers an underinformative answer. Our pragmatic theory should identify Player *A*’s response as the preferred one in this situation, despite possible semantic deviance in the eyes of many theories of questions (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1982, 1988; Groenendijk 1999; cf. Beck and Rullmann 1999; van Rooy 2003b).

Scenario 2 involves a different kind of underinformativity, and, in turn, a different sort of pragmatic meaning.

(4) **Scenario 2: Underinformative relative to A's knowledge**i. **Player A's knowledge**

Player A knows Barbara's exact street address: Tallinskaja 2, Moscow.

ii. **Player A's reply**

"She lives in Moscow."

iii. **Player I's calculation**

I will not conclude that player A lacks more specific knowledge than this, because Player A offered the right amount of information given the shared goal of the discourse.

Here, Player A is positioned to say something more informative, but doing so would be, we sense, infelicitous in light of the question-under-discussion.

3 The model

Like many semantic theories, this one is grounded in a set W of possible worlds. The power-set of W , $\wp(W)$, is the set of all propositions. Here are the facts:

$$(5) \quad W = \{w_1 \dots w_8\}$$

$$\llbracket \textit{Barbara lives in Moscow} \rrbracket = \{w_1, w_2\}$$

$$\llbracket \textit{Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street} \rrbracket = \{w_1\}$$

$$\llbracket \textit{Barbara lives on Pushkinskaja Street} \rrbracket = \{w_2\}$$

$$\llbracket \textit{Barbara lives in Petersburg} \rrbracket = \{w_3, w_4\}$$

$$\llbracket \textit{Barbara lives on Kolomenskaja Street} \rrbracket = \{w_3\}$$

$$\llbracket \textit{Barbara lives on Nevsky Prospekt} \rrbracket = \{w_4\}$$

$$\llbracket \textit{Barbara lives in New York} \rrbracket = \{w_5, w_6\}$$

$$\llbracket \textit{Barbara lives on 2nd Avenue} \rrbracket = \{w_5\}$$

$$\llbracket \textit{Barbara lives on Union Square} \rrbracket = \{w_6\}$$

$$\llbracket \textit{Barbara lives in Northampton} \rrbracket = \{w_7, w_8\}$$

$$\llbracket \textit{Barbara lives on Main St} \rrbracket = \{w_7\}$$

$$\llbracket \textit{Barbara lives on Pleasant St} \rrbracket = \{w_8\}$$

We can use this model to articulate certain background assumptions of scenarios 1 and 2 above:

- i. In both scenario 1 and scenario 2, Player *I* is in the state of complete ignorance: he regards any of the members of w as live possibilities for the actual world; his belief state is representable with W .
- ii. In scenario 1, player *A* knows that Barbara lives in Russia, though she is unsure which city (Moscow or Petersburg). We can model player *A*'s belief worlds with $\{w_1 \dots w_4\}$.
- iii. In scenario 2, player *A* knows that Barbara lives in Moscow, and, moreover, that she lives on Tallinskaja Street. So, in this scenario, player *A*'s belief state corresponds to $\{w_1\}$.

In the next section, I employ probability distributions to model these facts about the players' beliefs.

4 Knowledge of the model

4.1 Probability distributions

I adopt an additional perspective on the set of all propositions, by employing *probability distributions* over W . A function $P : \wp(W) \mapsto [0, 1]$ is a probability distribution iff the following conditions are met:

- (6)
- i. $P(W) = 1$
 - ii. $P(\{w\}) \geq 0$, for all $w \in W$
 - iii. Probabilities are additive: if p and q are disjoint propositions, then $P(p \cup q) = P(p) + P(q)$

In virtue of clause (iii), we can derive the probabilities of nonsingleton propositions from the probabilities of singleton propositions. If $p = \{w_1 \dots w_n\}$, then we calculate $P(\{w_1\} \cup \dots \cup \{w_n\})$ to find $P(p)$. A bit more formally:

$$P(p) = \sum_{w \in p} P(\{w\})$$

Probability distributions can mimic the usual view of propositions (Merin 1997, 2005). The definition in (7) connects them.

(7) The probability distribution P mimics the proposition q (a subset of W) iff the following conditions are met:

- i. $P(\{w\}) = 0$ iff $w \notin q$
- ii. $P(\{w\}) = P(\{w'\})$ for all $w, w' \in q$

Clause (7i) associates 0 probabilities with non-membership in the propositional counterpart. Clause (7ii) ensures that all the worlds in the proposition q have identical probabilities according to P . Together with the axioms for probability distributions, these clauses ensure that if we add up all the probabilities for the worlds in q , we get a value of 1.

4.2 Probability distributions for our players

Probability distributions provide a means for representing our players' beliefs, or, alternatively, their degrees of commitment to certain pieces of information.

As noted above, player I is in the state of ignorance in both our scenarios. That is, $P_I(\{w\}) = \frac{1}{8}$, for all $w \in W$. Player A has sharper beliefs. In scenario 1, she believes that Barbara lives in Russia, but nothing more specific than that. That is, in scenario 1, $P_A(\{w_i\}) = .25$ for all $1 \leq i \leq 4$, and $P_A(\{w_j\}) = 0$ for all $5 \leq j \leq 8$. Here are graphic depictions of these probability distributions:

(8) **Scenario 1**

$$P_I = \begin{bmatrix} P(\{w_1\}) \mapsto .125 \\ P(\{w_2\}) \mapsto .125 \\ P(\{w_3\}) \mapsto .125 \\ P(\{w_4\}) \mapsto .125 \\ P(\{w_5\}) \mapsto .125 \\ P(\{w_6\}) \mapsto .125 \\ P(\{w_7\}) \mapsto .125 \\ P(\{w_8\}) \mapsto .125 \end{bmatrix} \quad P_A = \begin{bmatrix} P(\{w_1\}) \mapsto .25 \\ P(\{w_2\}) \mapsto .25 \\ P(\{w_3\}) \mapsto .25 \\ P(\{w_4\}) \mapsto .25 \\ P(\{w_5\}) \mapsto 0 \\ P(\{w_6\}) \mapsto 0 \\ P(\{w_7\}) \mapsto 0 \\ P(\{w_8\}) \mapsto 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

(9) **Scenario 2**

$$P_I = \begin{bmatrix} P(\{w_1\}) \mapsto .125 \\ P(\{w_2\}) \mapsto .125 \\ P(\{w_3\}) \mapsto .125 \\ P(\{w_4\}) \mapsto .125 \\ P(\{w_5\}) \mapsto .125 \\ P(\{w_6\}) \mapsto .125 \\ P(\{w_7\}) \mapsto .125 \\ P(\{w_8\}) \mapsto .125 \end{bmatrix} \quad P_A = \begin{bmatrix} P(\{w_1\}) \mapsto 1 \\ P(\{w_2\}) \mapsto 0 \\ P(\{w_3\}) \mapsto 0 \\ P(\{w_4\}) \mapsto 0 \\ P(\{w_5\}) \mapsto 0 \\ P(\{w_6\}) \mapsto 0 \\ P(\{w_7\}) \mapsto 0 \\ P(\{w_8\}) \mapsto 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

4.3 Utterance contexts

Our pragmatic values will of course be set relative to specific utterance contexts. In practical terms, this means that our definitions are encumbered by parameters for the speaker, the addressee, belief states for each, etc. To keep things relatively straightforward, I define here a notion of context that is just rich enough to make the distinctions we need to make:

- (10) An *utterance context* is a tuple $C = \langle A, P, Q, U^{a_i \mapsto a_j} \rangle$, where
- i. $A = \{a_1, a_2, \dots\}$ is the set of players.
 - ii. $P = \{P_1, P_2, \dots\}$ is the set of probability distributions, where P_i represents the beliefs of player a_i .
 - iii. $Q \subseteq \wp(W)$ is the question-under-discussion.
 - iv. $U^{a_i \mapsto a_j}$ is an utterance by player $a_i \in A$ to addressee $a_j \in A$.

I often use s to pick out the speaker and a to pick out the addressee. In such cases, I am assuming that $A = \{s, a\}$.

Each of the scenarios in section 2 defines an utterance context in the above sense. Player A is the speaker, player I the addressee. The elements P_A and P_I represent their beliefs, and $U^{A \mapsto I}$ is always an utterance by A to I (in response to the immediately preceding utterance situation in which I was the speaker, A the addressee, and $U^{I \mapsto A}$ was “Where does Barbara live”). For both these scenarios, the backdrop is (5).

5 Quality

The above view of probability distributions is all we need for a fresh statement of Grice’s quality maxim, which is given in its original form in (11).

(11) **Quality (Grice 1975)**

Say only what you know to be true. Do not say that which is false. Do not say that which you lack evidence for.

We don’t do too much damage to this maxim if we reduce it to the injunction that speakers should assert only those propositions that are entailments of their beliefs. We could formalize this in nonprobabilistic terms: an utterance U by speaker s (in w) respects quality iff the semantic value of U is a superset of the set of belief worlds for s (in w).


But, in the spirit of the semantics described above, I follow a different route, relying instead on a gradient view of quality. The general strategy is to assign *quality-ratings*

to utterances in context. There are numerous ways that one can do this. To start, we can imagine that we simply identify quality-ratings with the values for our probability distribution. For instance, in scenario 1, player *A* assigns the proposition that Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street the probability .25. This would seem to represent only a modicum of confidence in this proposition. Player *I* assigns this same proposition the probability .125, an even lower value, representing even less confidence and, one might imagine, even less felicity if asserted.

However, these values do not drop off rapidly enough. If a speaker assigns p a probability of .5, then we want that speaker to be extremely reluctant to assert p . The quality-rating for p should be much lower than .5, a number that seems to suggest a fair degree of assertability.

To achieve a steeper drop-off in values, I employ exponents of the values we obtain from our players' probability distributions. The value of the exponent can be any n . The higher n is, the greater a speaker's confidence in a proposition will have to be before he can felicitously assert it. In (12), I provide a graph depicting five values of n , with probabilities along the y-axis and the number of worlds in the proposition (out of 8 total) along the x-axis). The leftmost line is with n set to 1 and thus duplicates the values for the probability distribution. The next three values are for exponents 2, 3, and 4. The rightmost curve has the exponent at 50, and thus mimics a very rigid 1-or-nothing view of quality.

(12) P



number of worlds in the proposition

Emphasizing that 4 is somewhat arbitrarily chosen, I offer (13), which assigns *quality-ratings* to speakers' utterances.

(13) **Quality-rating**

The *quality-rating* of an utterance $U^{s \rightarrow a}$ with content p in context C is

$$\text{Quality}_C(p) = (P_s(p))^4$$

We can reproduce the traditional, binary formulation of quality by saying that $U^{s \rightarrow a}$ respects quality iff its semantic content of has a probability of 1 according to P_s . Or, almost equivalently, we could make the exponent very high, as in the rightmost curve in (12). But the truly gradient view defined in (13) is useful in studying interactions among the maxims and understanding which interpretations count as preferred.

It is often helpful to imagine what would happen if a given maxim constituted the only pressure speakers felt when choosing their utterances. If quality were the only pressure, then speakers would maximize the quality-ratings of their utterances by saying only those things that have probability of 1 for them. In reality, though, speakers are rarely this confident about the things they say. The things about which they have the highest degree of confidence are generally dull (tautological) things. Speakers take risks with contingent truths, things that they might have some doubts about. Why? Because they want their utterances to be relevant and contentful. The primary function of quality-ratings is to keep the forces of relevance and informativity from growing so powerful that they overwhelm belief.

6 Quantity

The quantity maxim calls on speakers to tailor the information content of their utterances to the present discourse situation:

(14) **Quantity (Grice 1975)**

Make your contribution as informative as is required. Do not say more than is required.

The “required” portions of this maxim are, I believe, fully duplicated by the relevance maxim, discussed in detail below. So I regard quantity as a call for speakers to maximize information content, expecting this injunction to be mitigated by quality as well as relevance.

So we need a measure of information content. There are many such measures on the market (van Rooy 2004a; Benz et al. 2005). To keep things simple, I adopt a version of


Blutner's (1998) proposal to derive information content from probabilities using a logarithmic function, in the mode of Carnap (1950). Here is the basic measure:

(15) **Information value of p for player a**

$$\text{inf}_a(p) = -\log_2 P_a(p)$$

By this measure, informativity values rise as probabilities fall (with the probability of 0 assigned the pathological value ∞):

(16) $-\log_2$



As with quality, we want to assign utterances *quantity-ratings*. However, it won't do to identify these with the inf values for propositions relative to the speaker's probability distribution. On that approach, the more strongly a speaker believed a proposition p , the lower p 's information content would be. This indicates that the speaker's belief state is not the one we want to use to model quantity.

I argue instead that we should use the *addressee's* probability function in calculating the inf values relevant for pragmatics, as in (17).

(17) **Quantity-rating**

The *quantity-rating* of the proposition p in context C with addressee a is

$$\text{Quantity}_C(p) = \text{inf}_a(p)$$

It might seem strange at first that the quantity-rating of the speaker’s utterances are determined by the probability distribution of her addressee. But this seems to match well our intuitions about pragmatic values. I might accidentally tell you something you already know, on the mistaken assumption that it is new to you. In such cases, the information value of what I said is indeed very low. More generally, as a speaker, I must guess about what your probability distribution is like. If I guess wrong, my utterance is infelicitous. (You might also be insulted by my supposition about your belief state.)

7 Quality–quantity interactions

Imagine what would happen if the quantity maxim were left unchecked. Let the background be some set p . Speakers in a quantity-only community would always choose utterances that expressed some singleton subset of p . These propositions have the lowest non-0 probabilities and hence the highest inf values. Speakers would offer this content regardless of whether or not they believed these propositions were true.

The quality maxim provides an important check on the content that speakers can felicitously offer. Why don’t speakers actually restrict themselves to maximally specific content? Part of the answer is that they rarely if ever have the capacity (or poor judgment) to believe such things. As a result, such things receive poor quality-ratings.

So quality is a check on quantity. I propose to formalize this with the product of the relevant quality and quantity (inf) ratings:

(18) Quality–quantity (QQ-) ratings

Let $U^{s \rightarrow a}$ in context C have propositional content p . The quality–quantity (QQ) rating of p , written $QQ_C(p)$, is the product of its quality and quantity ratings. That is:

$$QQ_C(p) = \text{Quality}_C(p) \times \text{Quantity}_C(p)$$

Scenario 1, described in (3), is excellent for observing how QQ-ratings work. At the heart of that scenario is the observation that speaker A does not provide a semantically complete answer to the question “Where does Barbara live?” when she replies “In Russia”. The stated goal of the discourse participants is to determine which city Barbara lives in (so that they can purchase plane tickets). The utterance “In Russia” does not narrow down the options to a single city even in our impoverished universe (5).

However, we intuit also that player A ’s response is the most felicitous available to her, given the goals and limitations of the context. In the technical terms laid out above, this is because all utterances of the form “Barbara lives in city C ” have poor quality-ratings for

A. In (19), I provide a more detailed look at the state of things. (These values are the same for “Barbara lives in Petersburg”.)

- (19) a. **The scenario 1 quality-rating for “Barbara lives in Moscow”**

$$(P_A(\llbracket \text{Barbara lives in Moscow} \rrbracket))^4 = .0625$$

- b. **The scenario 1 quantity-rating for “Barbara lives in Moscow”**

$$\text{inf}_I(\llbracket \text{Barbara lives in Moscow} \rrbracket) = -\log_2 .25 = 2$$

- c. **The scenario 1 QQ-rating for “Barbara lives in Moscow”**

$$\text{QQ}_{\text{scenario 1}}(\llbracket \text{Barbara lives in Moscow} \rrbracket) = .0625 \times 2 = .125$$

Let’s compare this to the rating of A’s actual utterance in scenario 1, which is “In Russia”:

- (20) a. **The scenario 1 quality-rating for “Barbara lives in Russia”**

$$(P_A(\llbracket \text{Barbara lives in Russia} \rrbracket))^4 = 1$$

- b. **The scenario 1 quantity-rating for “Barbara lives in Russia”**

$$\text{inf}_I(\llbracket \text{Barbara lives in Russia} \rrbracket) = -\log_2 .5 = 1$$

- c. **The scenario 1 QQ-rating for “Barbara lives in Russia”**

$$\text{QQ}_{\text{scenario 1}}(\llbracket \text{Barbara lives in Russia} \rrbracket) = 1 \times 1 = 1$$

As desired, A’s answer “In Russia” receives a higher QQ-rating than “In Moscow” (1 vs. .125), and we are thus on our way to an account of why it is pragmatically preferred. Still missing, though, is some notion of relevance. To see that this is a pressing problem, observe that the function QQ currently delivers incorrect results for scenario 2, in which player A knows that Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street but still says merely that she lives in Moscow. In that scenario, $\text{Quality}_C(\llbracket \text{Barbara lives in Russia} \rrbracket) = 1$. Since the values for P_I are unchanged in this scenario (I remains in the state of ignorance), the QQ value here is the same as in (20), namely, 1. Here is the value for $\llbracket \text{Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street} \rrbracket$ in this revised state of affairs:

- (21) a. **The scenario 2 quality-rating for “Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street”**
 $(P_A(\llbracket \text{Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street} \rrbracket))^4 = 1$
- b. **The scenario 2 quantity-rating for “Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street”**
 $\text{inf}_I(\llbracket \text{Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street} \rrbracket) = -\log_2 .125 = 3$
- c. **The scenario 2 QQ-rating for “Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street”**
 $\text{QQ}_{\text{scenario 2}}(\llbracket \text{Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street} \rrbracket) = 1 \times 3 = 3$

Thus, “Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street” has a higher pragmatic value than “Barbara lives in Russia”, the reverse of our intuitions. The missing ingredient is clearly that, given the shared goal of *I* and *A*, Barbara’s street address is *too much* information in scenario 2 (and scenario 1). It isn’t in accord with the players’ choice for how to interpret question (2).

8 Relevance

Grice’s relevance (relation) maxim depends entirely on our intuitive understanding of what relevance involves:

- (22) **Relevance (Grice 1975)**

Be relevant.

The concept is left unanalyzed. What we would really like is to better understand the notion of *relevance to a question*, so we need to do a bit of question semantics. But not much. All we need to see in this regard is that the question “Where does Barbara live?” can, in our model (5), be viewed as semantically ambiguous between three salient partitions of *W*:

- (23) a. **Street-level semantics**
 $\llbracket \text{Where does Barbara live?} \rrbracket = \left\{ \begin{array}{cccc} \{w_1\} & \{w_2\} & \{w_3\} & \{w_4\} \\ \{w_5\} & \{w_6\} & \{w_7\} & \{w_8\} \end{array} \right\}$
- b. **City-level semantics**
 $\llbracket \text{Where does Barbara live?} \rrbracket = \left\{ \begin{array}{cc} \{w_1, w_2\} & \{w_3, w_4\} \\ \{w_5, w_6\} & \{w_7, w_8\} \end{array} \right\}$
- c. **Country-level semantics**
 $\llbracket \text{Where does Barbara live?} \rrbracket = \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \{w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4\} \\ \{w_5, w_6, w_7, w_8\} \end{array} \right\}$

Answering a question means selecting part or whole of one or more of the partitions in the question. The more complete an answer is, the closer it comes to be identical to one of the questions cell's. The following definitions, due to van Rooy (2003b), get at this notion:

- (24) a. $p_Q = \{q \in Q \mid q \cap p \neq \emptyset\}$ (for p an answer to question Q)
 b. $\text{Ans}(p, Q) = |p_Q|$

The set p_Q is the set of propositions in the question Q that are consistent with the proposition p (our answer). $\text{Ans}(p, Q)$ is simply the cardinality of the set p_Q . A complete answer to Q has cardinality 1 by this measure. Partial answers have cardinalities greater than 1. (Only the empty-set answer has a cardinality of 0, so we ignore that case.) Here is an illustration using the city-level semantics in (23):

- (25) $\llbracket \text{Where does Barbara live?} \rrbracket = \left\{ \begin{array}{cc} \{w_1, w_2\} & \{w_3, w_4\} \\ \{w_5, w_6\} & \{w_7, w_8\} \end{array} \right\}$
- a. $\llbracket \text{Barbara lives on earth} \rrbracket = \{w_1 \dots w_8\}$
 $\text{Ans}(\llbracket \text{Barbara lives on earth} \rrbracket, \llbracket \text{Where does Barbara live?} \rrbracket) = 4$
- b. $\llbracket \text{Barbara lives in Russia} \rrbracket = \{w_1 \dots w_4\}$
 $\text{Ans}(\llbracket \text{Barbara lives in Russia} \rrbracket, \llbracket \text{Where does Barbara live?} \rrbracket) = 2$
- c. $\llbracket \text{Barbara lives in Moscow} \rrbracket = \{w_1, w_2\}$
 $\text{Ans}(\llbracket \text{Barbara lives in Moscow} \rrbracket, \llbracket \text{Where does Barbara live?} \rrbracket) = 1$
- d. $\llbracket \text{Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street} \rrbracket = \{w_1\}$
 $\text{Ans}(\llbracket \text{Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street} \rrbracket, \llbracket \text{Where does Barbara live?} \rrbracket) = 1$

The set of sample calculations (25) has one particularly important property: relative to the city-level question semantics, the proposition $\llbracket \text{Barbara lives in Moscow} \rrbracket$ and the proposition $\llbracket \text{Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street} \rrbracket$ have identical Ans values. If we move to the country-level semantics (23)Q-sem-country, then the propositions

- $\llbracket \text{Barbara lives in Russia} \rrbracket$,
 $\llbracket \text{Barbara lives in Moscow} \rrbracket$, and
 $\llbracket \text{Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street} \rrbracket$

all have Ans values of 1.

These observations are important for two central reasons. First, they show that Ans values are highly dependent upon the question under discussion. Second, they provide an important clue as to how we should explicate the relevance maxim. Ans ranks propositions according to how well they answer a given question, but it cannot be the only factor in calculating relevance, since scenario 2 distinguishes, e.g., “Barbara lives in Moscow” and “Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street”.

At the heart of the problem lies the observation that *too much* information can lead to a decrease in relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995; van Rooy 2003c). If two propositions have identical Ans values, then we want to get rid of one of them. Following van Rooy (2003c:14), I resolve these ties by eliminating all but the *least* informative member of the set. This moves us to a total ordering on the set of propositions. The definition is (26).

(26) **Relevance-ranking**

Let Q be the question-under-discussion in context C .

The set of propositions R is the subset of $\wp(W)$ restricted so that

for all $p, q \subseteq W$,
 $q \notin R$ iff $\text{Ans}(p, Q) = \text{Ans}(q, Q)$ and $\text{Quantity}_C(p) < \text{Quantity}_C(q)$

The relevance-ranking for C is the set R ordered by Ans.

In words: if two propositions answer the question-under-discussion equally well (have identical Ans values), then the more informative one is eliminated from the pragmatic competition entirely. With these overly-informative propositions removed, we obtain a total ordering: the relevance ranking for the context C containing question Q .

This definition permits us to come to grips with what happens in scenario 2, (4). There, player A is in a position to offer a more informative answer than she did. However, her actual answer does not lead to pragmatic infelicity. On the contrary, a more informative answer would have been less felicitous.

The crucial factor is that, in scenario 2, the players have asked the question “Where does Barbara live?” at the city level. We are thus in a situation like the one defined in (25), in which the the answer “Barbara lives in Moscow” and “Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street” share the relevance value of 1. But “Barbara lives in Moscow” is less informative than “Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street”. By (26), “Barbara lives on Tallinskaja” is eliminated from pragmatic consideration — it is not even in the relevance ranking.

If we change the goals of the players, then we change the status of A 's answer. For instance, suppose that the question “Where does Barbara live?” is interpreted instead at

the street-level. Then “Barbara lives in Moscow” and “Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street” have different relevance values. The first has a value of 2, the second of 1. So the two do not compete by the metric in (26). Since player A’s quality-rating for “Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street” is 1, and since it has high information content, it is favored over “Barbara lives in Moscow” in this revised scenario.

9 Overall pragmatic values

QQ-ratings and relevance-rankings provide two measurements of pragmatic felicity. I propose that we use these two measurements to arrive at a notion of *maximally-felicitous utterance*. To do this, let’s first have a broad look at the values we obtain for various utterances in versions of scenarios 1 and 2:

(27) Scenario 1 rankings

	Quality	Quantity	QQ	Ans	relevance-ranking
B. lives on Tallinskaja	.004	× 3	= .012	1	—
B. lives on Pushkinskaja	.004	× 3	= .012	1	—
B. lives in Moscow	.0625	× 2	= .125	1	1
B. lives in Petersburg	.0625	× 2	= .125	1	1
★ B. lives in Russia	1	× 1	= 1	2	2
B. lives in the U.S.	0	× 1	= 0	2	2

(28) Scenario 2 rankings

	Quality	Quantity	QQ	Ans	relevance-ranking
B. lives on Tallinskaja	1	× 3	= 3	1	—
B. lives on Pushkinskaja	0	× 3	= 0	1	—
★ B. lives in Moscow	1	× 2	= 2	1	1
B. lives in Petersburg	0	× 2	= 0	1	1
B. lives in Russia	1	× 1	= 1	2	2
B. lives in the U.S.	0	× 1	= 0	2	2

The stars are endorsements, but not yet the selections of the theory. But these tables provide a clear indication of how to proceed. The starred candidates represent the highest possible QQ values, on the crucial assumption that utterances without relevance-rankings do not enter into pragmatic competition. (If they did, then “Barbara lives on Tallinskaja Street” would win in scenario 2 — its QQ value of 3 is unbeaten.)

Thus, I propose the following definition of *maximally felicitous utterances*:

(29) **Maximally-felicitous utterances**

Let C be a context with question-under-discussion Q and players s and a . The set of maximally felicitous utterances in C is set of utterances $U^{s \rightarrow a}$ whose propositional content have the highest QQ-rating of all the relevance-ranked propositions in C .

According to this definition, speakers maximize QQ ratings, even if this entails a drop in relevance. The relevance-rankings are thus required only to settle competitions among equally-relevant propositions.

Speakers are expected to choose maximally-felicitous utterances. Hearers know this, and they can use this fixed assumption to arrive at the preferred interpretations for the utterances that they hear.

10 Summary and prospects

This paper was largely about taking measurements. I proposed integrated quality–quantity values as the primary measure of pragmatic worth. Relevance rankings further regulate the amount and kind of information that felicitous utterances can carry. In the interest of keeping this paper short, I did not do much beyond a basic analysis of two simple question–answer scenarios. But the overall framework suggest a number of more complex and challenging applications. For instance, probabilities seem to provide an excellent way of distinguishing regular updates from conversational-implicature updates in a dynamic setting. The measurements taken in this paper seem ideal for understanding why phrases with low information content like the *not exactly ADJ* (Horn 1989; Majewski 2005) tend to receive *litotic* readings on which they leap to the opposite end of the scale (so that, e.g., *She's not exactly dumb* means she's brilliant). Looking even further ahead, I conjecture that the new view of semantic and pragmatic content that probability distributions provide might be the key to unlocking the mysteries of *expressive content* (Kaplan 1999; Kratzer 1999; Potts 2005).

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