A Behavioral Foundation for Audience Costs∗

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Abstract

We provide a behavioral foundation for audience costs by augmenting the canonical crisis bargaining model with voters who evaluate material outcomes relative to an endogenous reference point. Voters are more likely to re-elect their leader when their payoff is higher than this reference point, and they are more likely to replace him when it is lower. Backing down after a challenge may be politically costly to the leader because initiating the challenge has the potential to raise voters’ expectations about their final payoff, creating the possibility that they suffer a payoff loss from disappointment when the leader backs down. Whether it is costly or beneficial to back down after a challenge (and just how costly or beneficial it is) depends on the reference point, which is determined in equilibrium.

Key words: crisis bargaining, audience costs, reference-dependent utility

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Consider the canonical “crisis bargaining” situation in which the leader of a country can challenge a foreign adversary. In this situation, “audience costs” refer to the costs that the leader incurs as a result of his citizens punishing him for backing down from the challenge relative to not making the challenge to begin with. The seminal work on this topic by Fearon (1994) and Schultz (1999) examines the implications of these costs for crisis bargaining, but does not provide an explanation for how the costs arise. Subsequent work on the foundations of audience costs has had difficulties in building a compelling case for these costs under the assumption that citizens are standard expected utility maximizers (see the discussion section below for more details).

Our objective in this paper is to take a new approach to micro-found audience costs in which we assume that citizens are “behavioral.” We augment the standard crisis bargaining model by adding a stage in which voters who care about the outcome of the crisis bargaining game vote to re-elect or replace the incumbent politician. Voters are behavioral in the sense that they have endogenous reference-dependent preferences modeled in the spirit of K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). Voters decide whether or not to reward the incumbent politician by re-electing him based both on the realized outcome of crisis bargaining and on their expected equilibrium payoff.

The crisis bargaining model that we extend is depicted in Figure 1. In this model, the leaders of two countries, a potential Challenger, $C$, and a Defender, $D$, make decisions sequentially. $C$’s leader is one of two types— weak, $W$, or strong, $S$— and type is private information, with the prior probability of the strong type denoted with $q \in (0,1)$. $C$ leader first chooses whether or not to challenge $D$ for a piece of territory that both value at $v > 0$. If $C$ challenges, then the leader of $D$ decides whether to resist or concede the territory. If $D$ resists then $C$’s leader can either escalate to war or back down. If there is no challenge, then the territory remains with country $D$, and both types of $C$’s leader get a payoff of 0 while $D$ gets a payoff of $v$. If the game ends with $D$ conceding, then the territory goes to country $C$, which results in both types of $C$’s leaders getting a payoff of $v$ and $D$ getting a payoff of 0. If the game ends with war, then the weak leader of $C$ obtains a payoff $z_W$ while the strong type gets $z_S$ and $D$ gets $-z_D$. If the game ends with $C$’s leader backing down, then the payoffs are $-a$ for both types of $C$’s leaders and $v$ for $D$. The interpretation of this is that the territory remains with country $D$, and if $a > 0$ then $C$’s leader incurs a cost from backing down in comparison to the payoff from not challenging to begin with. This corresponds to what Fearon (1994) call the “audience cost” (see also Schultz, 1999). Although it is exogenous, Fearon (1994)
postulates a foundation in which it results from the possibility that the citizens of $C$ punish their leader for backing down from the initial challenge.

To provide a behavioral foundation for this cost, we set the exogenous audience cost to $a = 0$ and augment the model above with voters who have reference-dependent payoffs in which the reference point is determined endogenously as in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006; 2007). The voters are citizens of $C$, and are of two types: hawks, whose material payoffs equal the crisis bargaining payoffs of the strong type of leader, and doves, whose material payoffs equal the crisis bargaining payoffs of the weak type of leader. If voters vote to re-elect their politician when their payoff is high, and vote to replace him when their payoff is low, then backing down after a challenge may be costly to the politician, who also values re-election. In particular, if voters are predominantly hawks, then entering a crisis by challenging the territory has the potential to raise the voters’ reference points. Backing down could then generate a payoff loss due to “disappointment.” On the other hand, citizens cannot be disappointed if the politician does not challenge the territory since this would not raise their expectations in the first place.

Our equilibrium analysis uniquely pins down the magnitude of the audience cost or benefit, and produces several new comparative statics results. In particular, our model predicts that the magnitude of the audience cost increases in the responsiveness of the electorate to the outcome of the crisis, the salience of the psychological component of payoffs, and the importance of the issue being disputed—for example, the value of the
territory that is being disputed. These comparative statics results are intuitive, and hence plausible, but have not been tested or even stated by prior work.

One noteworthy comparative static result is that the size of the audience cost is decreasing in the dovishness of the electorate, and if the electorate becomes sufficiently dovish, then the audience cost turns into an audience benefit. If sufficiently many voters are sufficiently hawkish about war, then backing down after a challenge generates both a “signaling audience cost” (i.e., a lower payoff after backing down than after not challenging to begin with) as well as a “commitment audience cost” (i.e., a higher expected payoff difference between backing down and escalating to war in the model with voters than in the model without). Instead, if sufficiently many voters are sufficiently dovish about war, then backing down generates the corresponding “audience benefits.” The reason is as follows. After a challenge, the doves form the pessimistic expectation that they are likely to go to war, which they would like to avoid. If the politician backs down from the challenge, these voters get a payoff gain from the sense of relief that war did not ensue. In the model, therefore, disappointment and relief are two psychological states that occur on the two opposite sides of an endogenous reference point.

Finally, because the reference point is determined in equilibrium, leaders can generate disappointment or relief only when outcomes depart from equilibrium expectations. This fact constrains the set of equilibrium predictions and yields some subtle comparative statics. For instance, if the doves are predominant, then an increase in the responsiveness of the electorate to the outcome of the crisis may decrease the audience benefit. This happens because, if the audience benefit stayed the same, weak types would want to deviate by challenging and then backing down.

After the pioneering work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), numerous studies uncovered evidence that individual behavior is consistent with the maximization of reference-dependent payoffs. Recent work in economics by Farber (2008), Fehr et al. (2011) and Pope and Schweitzer (2011) finds evidence for reference-dependent payoffs in labor markets, contractual relationships, and non-market settings. In political science, Kimball and Patterson (1997) and Waterman et al. (1999) highlight the importance of expectations in shaping political preferences and behavior—in particular, how expectations act as reference points. Kimball and Patterson (1997) show that voters’ attitudes towards members of Congress is affected by the discrepancy between the expectations of how their representatives should behave and perceptions of how they actually do behave. Waterman et al. (1999) show that the discrepancy between expectations and perceptions influences the approval rates of US presidents and voting preferences. These
papers are particularly relevant in that they show that disappointment (i.e., the shortfall in outcomes from expectations) affects voters’ self-reported preferences.

The mounting evidence for reference-dependent preferences has also motivated several theoretical models of politics prior to ours. Levy (1997) reviews early applications of prospect theory in international relations. More recently, Alesina and Passarelli (2015) and Lockwood and Rockey (2016) show that reference-dependent preferences can explain departures from the predictions of standard voting models. Passarelli and Tabellini (2017) use these preferences to explain political unrest. Grillo (2016) shows that reference-dependent voters might punish politicians who make campaign promises they cannot keep. And Martin (2016) shows that, due to reference-dependence, citizens may be more willing to punish corruption when their taxes are higher.

Model

The Canonical Model as a Benchmark

We start by introducing a set of standard assumptions on the canonical crisis bargaining model described above (and depicted in Figure 1) and reporting its equilibria.

First, we assume that $v > z_S > 0 > z_W$ so that absent any audience cost or benefit, the strong type would choose war at his final decision node, while the weak type would back down; and, the value of the territory for both types of C’s leaders is greater than the payoff from war. Second, we assume that $-z_D < 0$ so that $D$ would prefer to concede the territory than to go to war. These reduced form war payoffs can be interpreted as expected payoffs when war is costly and the outcome of war is uncertain.\footnote{For example, suppose that the probability that country C wins the war is $p$. Then, if the cost of war incurred by the leader of country $D$ is $c_D$, the expected payoff for that leader is $-z_D := (1-p)v - c_D$. Similarly, if the cost of war incurred by the weak (strong) leader of country $C$ is $c_W$ ($c_S$), then the expected payoff under war for the weak (strong) leader of country $C$ is $z_W := pv - c_W$ ($z_S := pv - c_S$). Our assumptions on $z_W$, $z_S$ and $z_D$ can then be translated to assumptions on $p$, $c_W$, $c_S$ and $c_D$.} Finally, to avoid having to deal with trivial sources of multiplicity arising from knife-edge cases of indifference, we maintain the assumption throughout the paper that payoffs $v$, $z_W$, $z_S$ and $-z_D$ are all generic.

The assumption of generic payoffs implies that the following three cases are exhaustive: (i) $-a > z_S > z_W$, (ii) $z_S > z_W > -a$ and (iii) $z_S > -a > z_W$. 

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In the first case, both the strong and weak leaders of country $C$ back down at their final decision nodes, so $D$ resists. Furthermore, since $z_S > 0$, this case can arise if and only if $a < 0$. As a result, there is a unique equilibrium in which both types challenge.

In the second case, the audience cost $a$ is so high that both the weak and strong types of $C$ choose war over backing down. Since $-z_D < 0$, there is a unique equilibrium in which $D$ concedes and, consequently, both types of $C$ challenge.

In the third case, the strong type of $C$ chooses war at its final decision node, while the weak type backs down. If $q > v/(v + z_D)$, then there is a unique equilibrium in which $D$ concedes, and both the strong and weak types of $C$ challenge. On the other hand, suppose that $q < v/(v + z_D)$. Then, in equilibrium, $D$ resists with probability $\min\{1, v/(a+v)\}$ and the strong type of $C$ challenges. The weak type, instead, challenges with probability $qz_D/(1-q)v$ if $a > 0$, with probability 1 if $a < 0$, and with any probability $\sigma_W \geq qz_D/(1-q)v$ if $a = 0$. In the latter case, there is a continuum of equilibria, including one in which the weak type of $C$ challenges with certainty.\footnote{In the cases where a type is indifferent between challenging and not challenging because $a = 0$, challenging with certainty is weakly dominant. So weak dominance as a criterion for equilibrium selection would select the equilibrium in which that type challenges.}

Augmenting the Canonical Model with Behavioral Voters

We now augment the canonical model so that any cost that the leader of $C$ suffers from backing down arises endogenously.\footnote{There are a continuum of them so any voting rule could have been selected in a model in which the voters are considered to be players. Further, we assume below that voting is probabilistic so the assumption that voters are mechanical is standard.}

To this end, suppose that there are no exogenous audience costs, $a = 0$, and that after the leaders of $C$ and $D$ make their decisions, a continuum of citizens of $C$ cast votes to re-elect or replace their leader. The politician is re-elected if and only if a majority of voters vote to re-elect him. If the politician is not re-elected, he obtains only a payoff equal to the payoff that he gets from the crisis bargaining game. If he is re-elected, then he gets an additional payoff that we normalize to 1.

We consider the voters to be mechanical actors (whose behavior we specify below) so they are not players in the game.\footnote{There are a continuum of them so any voting rule could have been selected in a model in which the voters are considered to be players. Further, we assume below that voting is probabilistic so the assumption that voters are mechanical is standard.} Thus, an equilibrium of the game specifies only the behavior and beliefs of the leaders of the two countries. Let $\sigma_\theta$ denote the equilibrium probability with which the type $\theta \in \{W, S\}$ leader of country $C$ challenges, $\sigma_\theta^w$ the equilibrium probability with which this type chooses war, and $\sigma_D$ the equilibrium probability with which $D$ resists. The equilibrium strategy profile is therefore
\( \sigma = \langle (\sigma_\theta, \sigma_\theta^w)_{\theta = W, S}, \sigma_D \rangle \). Let \( \tilde{q} \) denote the equilibrium posterior probability with which the leader of \( C \) is considered to be the strong type after choosing to challenge the territory. \( D \)'s belief about \( C \)'s type matters only at the information set at which \( D \)'s chooses to resist or concede, so we may write an equilibrium to be simply the pair \( \rho = (\sigma, \tilde{q}) \).

There are two types of voters: those whose material payoffs are given by the payoffs of the strong type of leader of country \( C \) in the crisis bargaining game, and those whose material payoffs are given by the payoffs of the weak type in the same game. Fraction \( \lambda \) of voters are of the former type, while \( 1 - \lambda \) are of the latter type. We refer to these two types of voters as hawks and doves respectively, and use the labels \( S \) and \( W \) for voters as well. Voters also have a psychological component of payoffs, which is reference-dependent. The material and psychological components of voter payoffs are additively separable for each type \( \theta \). We write the sum of these two components as

\[
\begin{align*}
    u_\theta &= \pi_\theta + \eta(\pi_\theta - \mathbb{E}_\rho[\pi_\theta|\mathcal{I}]), & \theta \in \{W, S\} \\
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \pi_\theta \) is the material payoff of the type \( \theta \) leader in the crisis bargaining game, \( \mathbb{E}_\rho[\cdot|\mathcal{I}] \) denotes the expectation operator evaluated at an information set \( \mathcal{I} \), and given an equilibrium of the game \( \rho \); and \( \eta \geq 0 \) is the weight on the psychological component of payoffs. We assume that the voters’ reference points are determined at the information sets that arise immediately after the initial choice of \( C \)'s leader to challenge or not challenge, which we label \( \mathcal{I}_{ch} \) and \( \mathcal{I}_d \) respectively. This assumption reflects the salience of the initial decision of \( C \)'s leader in forming voters’ expectations. At the information set \( \mathcal{I}_d \) each voter knows that her payoff will be 0, so \( \mathbb{E}_\rho[\pi_\theta|\mathcal{I}_d] = 0 \) for both \( \theta \in \{W, S\} \) and all equilibria \( \rho \). Finally, we assume that voters share \( D \)'s belief about \( C \)'s type at \( \mathcal{I}_{ch} \): the posterior probability with which they think that \( C \) is strong is also \( \tilde{q} \).

Voting is probabilistic. Each voter receives a stochastic preference shock \( \varepsilon \) that is drawn uniformly from the interval \( \left[ -\frac{1}{2\alpha}, \frac{1}{2\alpha} \right] \) and independently across voters; then, each voter votes to reelect the incumbent politician if and only if his payoff (the deterministic part plus the shock) exceeds a stochastic threshold \( u \) that is drawn uniformly from the interval \( \left[ -\frac{1}{2\beta}, \frac{1}{2\beta} \right] \). Here, \( \beta \) measures the overall responsiveness of the electorate to the outcome of the crisis. We make the standard assumption that \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are sufficiently small so that the probability that the politician is re-elected is

\[
\frac{1}{2} + \beta[\lambda u_S + (1 - \lambda)u_W] 
\]
This quantity is also the additional expected payoff that the leader gets due to the fact that he may be re-elected. Since the term in squared brackets of this expression is simply the population-weighted (utilitarian) average of voters’ payoffs, the leader of country $C$ maximizes a payoff equal to the payoff that he receives in the crisis bargaining game, which depends on his type, plus $\beta$ times the utilitarian average of voters’ payoffs, which includes both the material and psychological parts.

**Remark 1.** Other assumptions could give rise to the result that $C$’s leader maximizes the payoff from the crisis plus (2). One is that the leader of $C$ has weighted utilitarian preferences and places weight $\beta$ on the average voter payoff. Another is that $C$’s citizens have non-electoral means of rewarding and punishing their leader such that the leader internalizes the average citizen payoff. However, under these alternative assumptions, note that $\beta$ would no longer be a measure of the responsiveness of the electorate to the outcome of the crisis. Instead, it would measure the extent to which the politician’s payoffs were other-regarding, or the extent to which the political process generates incentives for politicians to internalize the average voter’s interests.

**Remark 2.** The assumption that voters update their reference point at the two information sets that arise after $C$’s initial choice is natural in our application. It captures the idea that citizens form their expectations based on what they learn after observing their own leader’s initial policy choice, but not on the details of inter-state crisis bargaining, which, in practice, are typically opaque. That said, there does not yet exist a theory about how to select the information sets at which the endogenous reference points are updated in sequential move games. Given this, in Appendix B we discuss the equilibrium consequences of choosing other sets of information sets in which the reference point is updated. There, we show that audience costs arise even under alternative assumptions about the updating of the reference point.

**Remark 3.** Voting in our model is retrospective. However, our results extend to the case where voting is prospective and, following the game depicted in Figure 1, the incumbent leader of country $C$ runs for reelection against a challenger with a randomly drawn type. We examine this version in Appendix C, and show that endogenous audience costs arise

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4 Under this assumption, our results are also applicable to cases such as dictatorships where leaders are not directly chosen by voters (see, e.g., Weeks, 2008).

5 These games belong to the class of psychological games introduced by Geanakoplos et al. (1989), and developed further by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009), and others. This literature does not provide a general rule for when equilibrium conjectures should be update as the game is played. Therefore, we take our selection of information sets at which the reference point is updated to be part of the description of the game rather than part of the definition of equilibrium.
if voters, besides exhibiting reference dependence, are also “loss averse;” that is, they suffer from negative deviations from their reference point more than they benefit from equal-size positive deviations.\footnote{Loss aversion has been found to be a relevant behavioral phenomenon whenever individuals exhibit reference dependence. See, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1991), Kahneman et al. (1991), Camerer (2004) and the references therein.} The intuition for why loss aversion is necessary in this setting is as follows. If voters are retrospective, the payoff threshold $u$ is random and does not depend on the reference point; if they are prospective, a change in the reference point impacts the evaluation of the incumbent and the challenger symmetrically. Therefore, for audience costs to emerge, the challenger has to be more appealing to voters when their reference point has shifted up. This is exactly what happens under loss aversion.

### Endogenous Payoffs and the Equilibrium Concept

Substituting (1) into (2) and simplifying, the politician’s probability of re-election is

$$\frac{1}{2} + \beta \left[ \pi^\lambda + \eta \left( \pi^\lambda - \mathcal{R}^\rho[\mathcal{I}] \right) \right]$$

where

$$\pi^\lambda := \lambda \pi_S + (1 - \lambda) \pi_W$$

is the population-weighted average of material payoffs given any outcome of the crisis bargaining game, and

$$\mathcal{R}^\rho[\mathcal{I}] := \lambda \mathbb{E}^\rho[\pi_S|\mathcal{I}] + (1 - \lambda) \mathbb{E}^\rho[\pi_W|\mathcal{I}]$$

is the the population weighted average value of the endogenous reference point evaluated at an equilibrium $\rho$ and information set $\mathcal{I}$.

As mentioned above, for both types of voters, $\theta \in \{W, S\}$, the endogenous reference point in the case where the $C$’s leader chooses not to challenge the territory is $\mathbb{E}^\rho[\pi_\theta|\mathcal{I}_d] = 0$. This implies that $\mathcal{R}^\rho[\mathcal{I}_d] = 0$ independently of the equilibrium $\rho$. Therefore, if either type of leader chooses not to challenge the territory, he is re-elected with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ and obtains a payoff of $\frac{1}{2}$ from not challenging.

At the information set $\mathcal{I}_{ch}$, voters observe that $C$’s leader decided to challenge. Thus, the endogenous reference point of a type $\theta$ voter after a challenge is a weighted average of the payoffs that arise at the terminal nodes following the initial challenge, with weights given by the probabilities with which these nodes are reached according to voters’ equi-
librium beliefs. Formally:

$$E^\rho[\pi_\theta|I_{ch}] = (1 - \sigma_D) v + \sigma_D \left[ \tilde{q}(\sigma^w_{S\theta} z + (1 - \sigma^w_{S\theta})0) + (1 - \tilde{q})(\sigma^w_{W\theta} z + (1 - \sigma^w_{W\theta})0) \right]. \quad (6)$$

This implies that the population weighted average value of the endogenous reference point after country \( C \)'s leader challenges the territory is

$$R^\rho(I_{ch}) = (1 - \sigma_D) v + \sigma_D \left[ \tilde{q}\sigma^w_{S} + (1 - \tilde{q})\sigma^w_{W} \right] z^\lambda \quad (7)$$

where \( z^\lambda = \lambda z_S + (1 - \lambda) z_W \). Therefore, if the game ends with country \( D \) conceding, the expected payoff to both types of country \( C \)'s leaders is

$$v + \frac{1}{2} + \beta \left[ v + \eta(v - R^\rho(I_{ch})) \right] \quad (8)$$

If the game ends with \( C \)'s leader backing down, the expected payoff to both types of \( C \)'s leaders is

$$0 + \frac{1}{2} + \beta \left[ 0 + \eta(0 - R^\rho(I_{ch})) \right] \quad (9)$$

and if the game ends with war, the expected payoff to each type \( \theta \) of \( C \)'s leaders from choosing war is

$$z_\theta + \frac{1}{2} + \beta \left[ z^\lambda + \eta(z^\lambda - R^\rho(I_{ch})) \right] \quad (10)$$

The payoffs from the various outcomes of the game to the leader of \( D \) are simply \( D \)'s payoffs in the crisis bargaining game, depicted in Figure 1.

Since the payoffs to the two types of leaders of country \( C \) are endogenous to the equilibrium strategy and beliefs of \( D \), we say that \( \rho = (\sigma, \tilde{q}) \) is an equilibrium of the model if (i) \( \tilde{q} \) is consistent with Bayesian updating given \( \sigma \), and (ii) no type of either player has a profitable deviation from the strategy profile \( \sigma \) given beliefs \( \tilde{q} \) when the payoffs to all of the outcomes of the game are computed at the equilibrium \( \rho \). In this sense, an equilibrium of a model in which players have reference-dependent preferences with endogenous reference points has the fixed point characteristic that is typical of a rational expectations equilibrium: the reference points are derived from equilibrium behavior and equilibrium behavior is consistent with the endogenous reference points.
Endogenous Audience Costs

It is now already apparent that the politician may suffer an endogenous audience cost from backing down after making a threat. The cost for the leader of $C$ from backing down after a challenge is the payoff difference from backing down after a challenge and not challenging at the start of the game, which is

$$a_s^p = \beta \eta R^p(I_{ch})$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

If the weak type tries to signal that he is the strong type by challenging the territory at the start of the game but then has to back down later, then this type pays the cost $a_s^e$. If this quantity is positive, it represents the endogenous cost of signaling. For this reason, we refer to $a_s^e$ as the signaling audience cost if the cost is positive, or benefit if it is negative.

Similarly, the payoff difference between going to war and backing down for a leader of type $\theta$ is $z_\theta + \beta (1 + \eta) z^\lambda$. This exceeds the same payoff difference in the canonical model without voters by the quantity

$$a_t = \beta (1 + \eta) z^\lambda$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

Therefore, if there are sufficiently many hawks in the population so that $z^\lambda$ is positive then the leader of $C$ has an extra incentive to go to war over backing down. In particular, electoral incentives can commit even the weak type of politician to war.\footnote{Even though $z_W < 0$, it is possible that $z_W + \beta (1 + \eta) z^\lambda > 0$ so that the weak leader’s payoff in (10) is greater than his payoff in (9). This means that in the augmented model with electoral incentives, even a weak type may choose war over backing down. See the analysis of case (ii) in the next section.} On the other hand, if there are sufficiently many doves in the population then $z^\lambda$ is negative, so electoral incentives can commit even the strong type to back down rather than choose war. For this reason, we refer to $a_t$ as a commitment audience cost or benefit.\footnote{This distinction is analogous to, but not exactly the same as the distinction between the “sunk” and “tying hands” audience costs introduced by Fearon (1997).}

Both the signaling and commitment audience costs are endogenous quantities but the signaling cost is also an equilibrium quantity since it depends on $R^p(I_{ch})$, which is an equilibrium quantity. In fact, the sign of $a_s^p$ is determined by the sign of $R^p(I_{ch})$. So, whether there is an audience cost or benefit is also determined in equilibrium.

In what follows, we will interpret $z^\lambda$ as the overall hawkishness of the electorate. If the hawks are predominant, or have stronger preferences than the doves, then $z^\lambda$ is
high. If the doves are predominant, or have stronger preferences than the hawks, then \( z^\lambda \) is negative. And, \( z^\lambda \) is increasing both in the population share of hawks and in their relative intensity of preference for war against the doves’ preference for peace.

## Results

### Equilibrium Characterization

Our main result, Proposition 1 below, characterizes the equilibrium set in three cases that mirror the three cases analyzed in the canonical model: (i) \(-a_t > z_S > z_W\), (ii) \(z_S > z_W > -a_t\), and (iii) \(z_S > -a_t > z_W\). Since the signaling audience cost \( a_s^e \) is an equilibrium quantity, we also report its equilibrium value.

**Proposition 1.**

(i) If \(-a_t > z_S > z_W\) then there is a double continuum of equilibria in which both the strong and weak types of \( C \) back down, \( D \) resists, and both types of \( C \) are indifferent between not challenging and challenging, so each may challenge with any probability. In all of these equilibria, \( a_s^e = 0 \).

(ii) If \( z_S > z_W > -a_t \) then there is a unique equilibrium in which both types of \( C \) choose war, \( D \) concedes, and both types of \( C \) challenge, so \( a_s^e = \beta \eta v \).

(iii) If \( z_S > -a_t > z_W \) then in any equilibrium, the strong type of \( C \) chooses war and challenges, while the weak type backs down. In addition, if \( q > v/(v + z_D) \), then there is a unique equilibrium in which \( D \) concedes and the weak type of \( C \) also challenges, so again \( a_s^e = \beta \eta v \). If \( q < v/(v + z_D) \) then we have three subcases:

(a) If \( \eta = 0 \), then there is a continuum of equilibria in which \( D \) resists, and the weak type of \( C \) challenges with any probability \( \sigma_W \geq q z_D/(1 - q) v \). In all of these equilibria, \( a_s^e = 0 \), so there is no signaling audience cost or benefit.

(b) If \( \eta > 0 \) and \( z^\lambda < 0 \), there is a unique equilibrium in which \( D \) resists and the weak type of \( C \) challenges, so there is a signaling audience benefit, \( a_s^e = \beta \eta q z^\lambda < 0 \).

(c) If \( \eta > 0 \) and \( z^\lambda > 0 \) there is a unique equilibrium in which \( D \) resists with probability

\[
\sigma_D = \frac{(1 + \beta)(v + z_D)}{(1 + \beta)(v + z_D) + \beta \eta z^\lambda}
\]
and the weak type of $C$ challenges with probability $\sigma_W = qz_D/(1-q)v$. In this case, the signaling audience cost is

$$a_s^e = (1 - \sigma_D) [1 + \beta(1 + \eta)] v = \frac{\beta \eta z^\lambda}{(1 + \beta)(v + z_D) + \beta \eta z^\lambda} [1 + \beta(1 + \eta)] v$$

The results for the first two cases are straightforward. In case (i), both the strong and weak types back down, so $D$ resists. As a result, each type of $C$’s leader is indifferent between challenging and not challenging, giving rise to multiple equilibria. However, since all equilibria yield the same payoffs to voters, there is neither a signaling audience cost, nor benefit. Since $z_S > 0 > z_W$, this case arises only when there are sufficiently many doves in the population, so that $z^\lambda < 0$. In this case, a predominantly dovish electorate forces even a strong leader not to choose war.

In case (ii), both types of $C$’s leaders choose war at their final decision nodes. Therefore, in the unique equilibrium, $D$ concedes and both types challenge. This case arises only if there are sufficiently many hawks in the population, so that $z^\lambda$ is sufficiently high. Unlike the first case, in this case the electorate works as a commitment device that enables $C$ to credibly threaten to escalate the crisis to war, forcing $D$ to concede. Moreover, since the electorate is predominantly hawkish, the leader faces a signaling audience cost by backing down.

The proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A, therefore focuses on case (iii) in which the hawkishness of the electorate, $z^\lambda$, is neither high nor low. In this case, the strong type of $C$ challenges with certainty, while the weak type does so with a weakly lower probability. This means that the weak leader bluffs with positive probability by pretending to be strong with the hope of getting a concession from $D$. This case is compatible with a signaling audience cost, a signaling audience benefit, or neither.

Remark 4. It is worth noting that type-uncertainty plays an important role in generating audience costs. If the type of the leader is degenerate (i.e., $q = 0$ or $q = 1$) but the rest of the model is the same, then in equilibrium the leaders of the two country plays pure strategies except in knife-edge cases. Because the reference point is determined by equilibrium behavior, voters’ expectations about what the politicians do is exactly equal to what they do in equilibrium. So, there would be no discrepancy between expectations and outcomes, and therefore no audience cost or benefit.

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9If we refine equilibrium predictions by assuming that players play weakly undominated strategies, then there is a unique equilibrium in which both types of $C$ challenge with certainty.
Canonical Model

- $a > z_S > z_W$
  - $S$ and $W$ back down
  - $D$ resists
  - $S$ and $W$ challenge

$z_S > -a > z_W$
- $S$ chooses war and challenges; $W$ backs down
- If $q > \frac{v}{t + z_D}$ then $D$ concedes and $W$ challenges
- If $q < \frac{v}{t + z_D}$ then $D$ resists w.p. $\min\{1, \frac{v}{t + z_D}\}$ and $W$ challenges w.p. $\frac{qz_D}{(1 - q)v}$ if $a > 0$, any prob. $\geq \frac{qz_D}{(1 - q)v}$ if $a = 0$, and probability 1 if $a < 0$.

$z_S > z_W > -a$
- $S$ and $W$ choose war
- $D$ concedes
- $S$ and $W$ challenge

Augmented Model

- $a_t > z_S > z_W$
  - $S$ and $W$ back down
  - $D$ resists
  - $S$ and $W$ challenge with any probability

$z_S > -a_t > z_W$
- $S$ chooses war and challenges; $W$ backs down
- If $q > \frac{v}{t + z_D}$ then $D$ concedes, $W$ challenges
- If $q < \frac{v}{t + z_D}$ then there are three cases:
  (a) $\eta = 0 \Rightarrow D$ resists; $W$ challenges w.p. $\geq \frac{qz_D}{(1 - q)v}$
  (b) $\eta > 0$, $z^h < 0 \Rightarrow D$ resists; $W$ challenges w.p. $\frac{(1 + \beta)(v + z_D)}{(1 + \beta)(v + z_D) + \beta z^h}$
  (c) $\eta > 0$, $z^h > 0 \Rightarrow D$ resists w.p. $\frac{(1 + \beta)(v + z_D)}{(1 + \beta)(v + z_D) + \beta z^h}$ and $W$ challenges w.p. $\frac{qz_D}{(1 - q)v}$

$z_S > z_W > -a_t$
- $S$ and $W$ choose war
- $D$ concedes
- $S$ and $W$ challenge

Table 1. Comparison of equilibrium behavior in the augmented model to equilibrium behavior in the canonical model.

Remark 5. A key prediction of our model is that there may be an audience benefit if the doves are predominant. While the literature has not investigated the relationship between how dovish the electorate is and the magnitude and sign of the audience cost, most of the empirical literature has found evidence for an audience cost but not a benefit (see our discussion of this literature below). We note that in our model the level of dovishness required to generate an audience benefit would rise if voters were also loss averse. In this case, the psychological gains that doves feel from their leader backing down would be weighted lower than the disappointment that hawks feel. This would not eliminate the possibility of audience benefits altogether (for example, if everyone in the population is a dove, then there would still be an audience benefit) but it would raise the threshold of aggregate dovishness needed to generate an overall audience benefit.

Comparison with the Canonical Model

Equilibrium payoffs in the augmented model are unique and the equilibria closely resemble the equilibria of the canonical model. Table 1 informally summarizes the behavioral similarities and differences in the equilibria of the two models.

As the table shows, in the augmented model, the commitment audience cost, $a_t$, defines the threshold that separates the three cases where the weak and strong types
both back down, both choose war, or make different choices at their final decision nodes, exactly as the exogenous audience cost \( a \) does in the canonical model.

When the commitment audience cost is low and possibly a benefit (left column), the equilibrium set of the augmented model is larger than the equilibrium set of the canonical model with a high exogenous audience cost since \( C \)'s leader can now challenge with any probability lower than 1. Nevertheless, both models predict that the territory remains with country \( D \). In the opposite case of a high commitment audience cost in the augmented model and a correspondingly high exogenous audience cost in the canonical model (right column), the equilibrium sets coincide.

The center column is the case where the commitment audience cost is intermediate in the augmented model and the exogenous audience cost is intermediate in the canonical model. Here, according to Proposition 1, there is no signaling audience cost or benefit in the augmented model when \( \eta = 0 \). This establishes the necessity of reference-dependent payoffs to produce a signaling audience cost in the augmented model. For each equilibrium of the augmented model, there is a behaviorally identical equilibrium of the \( a = 0 \) case of the canonical model; and vice versa. When \( \eta > 0 \), the sign of \( z^\lambda \) determines whether there is a signaling audience cost or benefit. When there is a signaling audience benefit, equilibrium behavior in the augmented model is identical to equilibrium behavior in the canonical model for the case of \( a < 0 \). When there is a signaling audience cost, equilibrium choices in the augmented model are also similar to equilibrium choices in the canonical model for the case where \( a > 0 \). The weak type of \( C \) mixes with the same probability in both models, but, accounting for the equilibrium value of the signaling audience cost, the probability that \( D \) resists is lower.\(^{10}\) This is because the indifference condition that pins down \( D \)'s mixing probability in the augmented model (equation (18) in the Appendix) is qualitatively different from the analogous indifference condition in the canonical model. One key difference is that the augmented model includes re-election payoffs that differ across terminal nodes. Another is that, since the reference point is based on endogenous expectations, the psychological part of voters’ payoffs that enters in leader \( C \)'s payoff includes the signaling audience cost also when \( D \) concedes, whereas in the canonical model \( a \) does not enter this payoff. In particular, the payoff gain that

\[^{10}\text{To see this, substitute } a \text{ with the expression for } a^\rho \text{ we derived in part (iii)(c) of Proposition 1, into the probability with which } D \text{ resists in the corresponding case of the canonical model, which is } v/(a + v). \text{ The resulting quantity is greater than the probability with which } D \text{ resists reported in part (iii)(c) of Proposition 1, which is the quantity } \sigma_D = (1 + \beta)(v + z_D)/[(1 + \beta)(v + z_D + \beta \eta z^\lambda)].\]
C’s leader gets if $D$ concedes is lower in the augmented model and this enables $D$ to concede less frequently without raising the probability of being challenged.

**Comparative Statics**

The key advantage of endogenizing the signaling and commitment audience costs is that we can study their comparative statics.

We start by reporting the comparative static of the commitment audience cost, $a_t$. The sign of $a_t$ is determined by the sign of $z^\lambda$: there is an audience cost when citizens are predominantly hawks, and an audience benefit when they are predominantly doves. In addition, $a_t$ is increasing in $z^\lambda$, a measure of how hawkish the electorate is. The magnitude of $a_t$ is also increasing in $\beta$, which means that when voting behavior is more responsive to the outcome of the crisis, or when the politician weights the average voter payoff more, there is a larger audience cost or benefit. Lastly, the magnitude of $a_t$ is increasing in $\eta$, which means that when the psychological part of voters’ payoffs becomes more important, there is a greater audience cost or benefit.

The signaling audience cost $a^s_\rho$ is an equilibrium quantity that can vary with the equilibrium updated belief $\tilde{q}$ that C’s leader is strong, the equilibrium probability $\sigma_D$ with which $D$ resists, and the equilibrium choices of C’s types at their final decision nodes. So we must take this into account when studying the comparative statics of $a^s_\rho$.

These comparative statics are by and large similar to those of the commitment audience cost, with only a few notable differences.

Like the commitment audience cost $a_t$, the sign of the signaling audience cost $a^s_\rho$ is determined by the sign of $z^\lambda$. As well, the magnitude of $a^s_\rho$ is again increasing with the magnitude of $z^\lambda$. So, exactly as in the case of the commitment audience cost, the more dovish is the electorate the lower is the signaling audience cost. When $z^\lambda > 0$, the signaling audience cost is increasing in both $\beta$ and $\eta$. However, when $z^\lambda < 0$, it is piecewise constant in these parameters, with a jump to 0 when $-a_t$ crosses $z_S$. This jump is negative if $q > v/(v + z_D)$ and positive if $q < v/(v + z_D)$. Thus, if voters are predominantly doves and the prior probability of C’s leader being the strong type is high, the signaling audience cost is weakly decreasing in $\beta$ and $\eta$. On the other hand, if the electorate is largely dovish, but C’s leader is ex ante likely to be weak, then there is an audience benefit that decreases discontinuously with $\beta$ and $\eta$. The intuition behind this last result is as follows. As these parameters increase, the weak type of C is tempted to reap the audience benefit by challenging and then backing down.
Because the reference point is endogenous, voters anticipate this opportunistic behavior and assign high probability to their leader backing down. As a result, the audience benefit decreases.

Finally, if there is a signaling audience cost, then it is increasing in $v$. The reason is simple. If voters are predominantly hawks, then as the value of the disputed territory goes up, a voter’s expected payoff after a concession by $D$ goes up as well. This increases the reference points and therefore increases the signaling audience cost.$^{11}$

**Discussion**

**Empirical Evidence**

Although the predictions of our model are mostly novel, some of our assumptions and predictions find support in experimental investigations of the audience cost.

The first experimental study of the audience cost was done by Tomz (2007), who estimates the signaling audience cost from survey data.$^{12}$ Tomz (2007) estimates a positive audience cost, and finds that the audience cost is higher among more politically active respondents. Though political engagement may not be the obvious way to measure voter responsiveness, this finding provides some evidence that is consistent with our prediction that the audience cost is increasing in the responsiveness of the electorate, $\beta$, to the outcome of the crisis. This result was replicated in the UK by Davies and Johns (2013), who found that the audience cost was highest among the most politically engaged British respondents.$^{13}$ These authors also found that the disapproval for bluffing by the British prime minister was lower in a nuclear crisis scenario than in an ally defense crisis scenario, which was in turn lower than in a hostage crisis scenario. This provides some evidence that audience cost may potentially vary with the importance or scale of the issue, measured in our model by $v$. However, whether their findings show that it increases or decreases with scale remains unclear.

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$^{11}$This comparative static result with respect to $v$ would continue to hold even if we substituted the payoffs following a war with the lottery payoffs described in footnote 1.

$^{12}$Tomz (2007) argues that concerns about external validity notwithstanding, the experimental approach sidesteps several of the challenges in estimating the audience cost in observational studies, such as partial observability and strategic selection (see, e.g., Schultz, 2001).

$^{13}$However, one result of theirs that goes against the grain of our predictions concerning the relationship between responsiveness and the audience cost is that political knowledge, which may also be correlated with responsiveness, did not substantially moderate the audience cost.
Building on Tomz’s (2007) approach, Trager and Vavreck (2011) estimate a leader’s public approval at every outcome of the crisis bargaining game and this enables them to estimate both the signaling audience cost and the commitment audience cost as defined in this paper. They find positive values for both of these costs. They also find that presidential approval is highest when the adversary concedes, and can be lowest when the leader backs down—even lower than after the war outcome.

In an historical study of audience costs, Trachtenberg (2012) argues that in several episodes (e.g., the Rhineland crisis of 1936) the leader’s decision to back down did not generate an audience cost but instead was actually greeted with relief by a predominantly dovish electorate.\(^{14}\) This suggests that the magnitude of the audience costs and whether there is an audience cost or an audience benefit may depend on the underlying preferences of the electorate, which is in line with our comparative statics on \(z^A\).

Finally, Tomz (2007) reports some results on the mechanism behind audience costs based on open-ended survey questions that asked respondents why they disapproved of their leader’s behavior. He finds that a majority of respondents gave answers that reflected a concern for the country’s reputation and credibility. Nevertheless, there was considerable heterogeneity in the way these concerns were expressed and many of the responses could be interpreted as a “normative preference for honesty rather than—or in addition to—an instrumental concern for reputation” (p. 835). While these interpretations differ from our disappointment-based mechanism, we note that the mechanisms may be hard to disentangle in open-ended survey responses. For example, when prompted to explain why a respondent disapproved of backing down, the respondent may be inclined to come up with ex post rationalizations for his disapproval rather than to reveal that he acted on an emotion. Moreover, external validity may be a particular concern in testing mechanisms. The disappointment mechanism may be at play in real life but not in the lab, where stakes are much lower. In particular, lab respondents are unlikely to react emotionally and to exhibit relief or disappointment to hypothetical situations presented to them through vignettes.

In short, while previous studies provide some suggestive evidence for our theory, more work needs to be done to disentangle the mechanisms behind audience costs.

\(^{14}\)Similarly, Chaudoin (2014) provides some evidence that voters’ reaction to the outcome of the crisis is affected more by their preferences over the issue at stake than by the desire to have the leader behave consistently with resolve.
Other Approaches

One influential theory of the audience cost is that leaders suffer a cost from the damage to their reputation that bluffing causes.\textsuperscript{15} A simple and natural extension to the canonical model that captures this story says that voters prefer to re-elect the strong type and replace the weak type. Suppose that the strong type challenges, and chooses war over backing down. If the weak type separates from the strong type at his final decision node, then he is not re-elected. However, he would not be re-elected even if he separated at the initial decision node, as this would also reveal his type to the voters. Therefore, this simple reputation-based extension does not produce an endogenous audience cost.

Smith (1998) circumvents this problem by assuming that there are a continuum of types in an ally defense scenario. When the politician is inferred to be stronger, he is re-elected with higher probability. The set of types is partitioned into those that announce that they will support the ally against the adversary, and those that announce that they will not. In equilibrium, those that announce that they will support the ally follow through. If a deviation takes place, however, then Smith (1998) has the voters think that the type is the weakest possible type and re-elect him with the lowest probability. Thus, he generates audience costs with the help of off-path beliefs. However, for every profile of parameters (i.e., payoffs and initial beliefs) his game also has equilibria in which audience costs do not arise. Moreover, these equilibria cannot be ruled out using standard refinements.\textsuperscript{16} In contrast, our model yields generically unique equilibrium predictions without relying on any refinements.

Guisinger and Smith (2002) also develop a theory of audience costs based on reputation but depart further from the standard crisis bargaining scenario. In their model, two countries play a repeated demand bargaining game with adverse selection. In the one shot game, communicating a credible threat is not possible; but since the game is repeated, credible communication can be supported by an equilibrium strategy profile that reverts to babbling if the lying side is caught. Since payoffs are lower in the babbling equilibrium, voters would like to replace the lying politician after he is caught and start

\textsuperscript{15}As mentioned above, this is the theory that Tomz (2007) claims to find the strongest empirical support for based on open-ended survey responses.

\textsuperscript{16}Smith’s (1998) game is neither a standard signaling game, nor a standard cheap talk game, though it has some features of both. This means that standard equilibrium refinements for signaling games must be adapted to his specific game. Furthermore, in his model, if the weakest possible type is better off by threatening the intervention and then not following through despite the bluff being called, types above it may also want to do the same. As a result, refinements like the ones proposed by Banks and Sobel (1987) do not uniquely select equilibria that support audience costs.
afresh with a new leader. Again, audience costs are supported by the selection of one of many possible equilibria of the game; and, in fact, equilibria that are renegotiation-proof in the sense of Farrell and Maskin (1989) would not support audience costs.

Other papers that provide foundations for audience costs include Ashworth and Ramsay (2017) and Slantchev (2006). Slantchev (2006) studies a game between a voter, a politician, an opposition party, and media, abstracting away from the foreign adversary. He shows that an audience cost for implementing bad policies arises when voters are not perfectly informed about the quality of the policy implemented by the politician and a non-strategic media source can convey information about the policy. His justification for audience costs relies on assumptions about what kind of evidence can and cannot be provided to citizens, as well as the existence of exogenous and unbiased news providers. Ashworth and Ramsay (2017) take a mechanism design approach and show that an optimizing voter would design incentives to punish a politician for bluffing. However, they do not investigate the classical case in which there is adverse selection and the voter does not possess commitment power; e.g., the situation (corresponding to our extension in Appendix C) in which voting is prospective and the incumbent politician possesses private information about his type.

Our paper differs from the prior literature in at least three ways. First, we directly extend the canonical crisis bargaining model, endogenizing the audience costs in such a way as that equilibrium behavior in the extended model is directly analogous to equilibrium behavior in the canonical model with exogenous audience costs. Second, we do this with behavioral voters and without relying on any equilibrium refinement. Third, we provide a psychological theory for audience costs based on disappointment and relief, and can then justify audience benefits as well.

**Conclusion**

When rational politicians make threats, voters with reference-dependent preferences may raise their expectations about how successful the politician will be in extracting concessions from the adversary. If the politician eventually backs down from the threat, voters who formed high expectations are “disappointed.” If voting behavior is based on this disappointment such that the politician’s re-election probability is decreasing in it, then the politician suffers an audience cost from making the challenge and subsequently backing down.
This is the logic upon which we have developed our model of audience costs. We developed the theory by adding to the standard crisis bargaining model a voting stage in which voters have reference-dependent payoffs. The model endogenizes both a signaling audience cost and a commitment audience cost, and it produces new comparative statics predictions about the sign and magnitude of these costs. If voters are predominantly hawkish about war, then both audience costs are positive, and are a consequence of voters being “disappointed” that their expectations were not met. But if they are predominantly dovish about war, then both audience costs are negative, turning them into audience benefits. In this case, dovish voters who were worried about the possibility that the crisis would end in war get a payoff benefit from the “relief” that they experience from seeing their leader back down. Leaders can then face audience costs or benefits depending on how hawkish or dovish their voters are.

The magnitudes of these audience costs or benefits depend on the model’s parameters. The audience cost or benefit is increasing in the value of the territory, or in the importance of the issue to voters. The magnitude of the signaling audience cost is also increasing in the responsiveness of the electorate to the outcome of the crisis, as well as in the salience of the psychological component of payoffs. These comparative statics predictions of the model can be tested empirically.
References


Appendix

A Proof of Proposition 1

The results for cases (i) and (ii) follow from the discussion in the main text following the statement of Proposition 1. Here we examine case (iii).

In case (iii), the weak and strong types make separating choices at their final decision nodes: the weak type chooses to back down while the strong type chooses war. As a result, we have

\[ \mathcal{R}^p(I_{ch}) = (1 - \sigma_D)v + \sigma_D\tilde{q}z^\lambda. \] (13)

From here, the proof proceeds in two more steps. In the first step, we prove that in any equilibrium the strong type of \( C \) challenges with probability 1. In the second step, we provide a characterization of the full equilibrium set by searching for equilibria in three exhaustive cases: the case where \( D \) concedes, the case where \( D \) resists, and the case where \( D \) mixes between conceding and resisting.

Lemma A.1. In case (iii), the strong type challenges in equilibrium.

Proof: Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is an equilibrium in which the strong type of \( C \) challenges with probability less than 1. If there were such an equilibrium, then the strong type’s expected payoff from challenging could not exceed his expected payoff from not challenging, i.e.

\[
0 \geq \sigma_D[z_S + \beta(z^\lambda + \eta(z^\lambda - \mathcal{R}^p(I_{ch}))) + (1 - \sigma_D)[v + \beta(v + \eta(v - \mathcal{R}^p(I_{ch})))]] \\
= \sigma_D[z_S + \beta(1 + \eta(1 - \tilde{q}))z^\lambda] + (1 - \sigma_D)(1 + \beta)v
\] (14)

where the second line follows from substituting \( \mathcal{R}^p(I_{ch}) \) from (13). If \( z^\lambda \geq 0 \), the right side of (14) is strictly positive, establishing the contradiction. If \( z^\lambda < 0 \), we have \( z_S + \beta(1 + \eta(1 - \tilde{q}))z^\lambda > z_S + \beta(1 + \eta)z^\lambda > 0 \), where the last inequality follows from the fact that we are analyzing a case where \( z_S > -a_t \), and by the definition of \( a_t \). Thus, (14) is again positive, establishing the contradiction. \( \Box \)

Since the strong type always challenges in equilibrium, \( \tilde{q} \) is pinned down by Bayes rule. In particular,

\[ \tilde{q} = \frac{q}{q + \sigma_W(1 - q)}. \] (15)
Then, given that the two types of $C$ separate at their final decision nodes, $D$ chooses to concede only if
\[ \tilde{q}(-z_D) + (1 - \tilde{q})v \]
is weakly less than 0, in which case $D$’s expected payoff from resisting is weakly lower than her expected payoff from backing down. $D$ chooses to resist only if (16) is weakly greater than 0, and $D$ chooses to mix between conceding and resisting only if it is exactly equal to 0. We now complete the characterization of the equilibrium set, organizing the analysis according to $D$’s equilibrium choices.

**Equilibria where $D$ concedes** Suppose that $D$ concedes, so $\sigma_D = 0$. Then $R^\rho(I_{ch}) = v$ and the payoff to both types of $C$ from challenging is $v + \frac{1}{2} + \beta v$, which is greater than $\frac{1}{2}$, the payoff from not challenging. So both types challenge, and $\tilde{q} = q$. Then, for it to be optimal for $D$ to concede we need (16) to be at least as large as 0 when $\tilde{q} = q$; that is, we need $q \geq v / (v + z_D)$. Thus, if the prior $q$ is above $v / (v + z_D)$ there is an equilibrium in which $D$ concedes, and both types of $C$ challenge. If $q < v / (v + z_D)$, then $D$ has a profitable deviation and there is no equilibrium in which $D$ concedes for sure.

**Equilibria where $D$ resists** Next, consider the case where $D$ resists, so $\sigma_D = 1$. For $D$ to want to resist we would need (16) to be weakly greater than 0 evaluated when $\tilde{q}$ is given by (15). Thus, we need $\sigma_W \geq qz_D / (1 - q)v$. This latter inequality defines a feasible value of $\sigma_W$ if and only if $q \leq v / (v + z_D)$.

Now suppose that $\eta = 0$. The weak type of $C$ is always indifferent between challenging and not challenging since his expected payoff from challenging is $\frac{1}{2} - \beta \eta R^\rho(I_{ch}) = \frac{1}{2}$ and his expected payoff from not challenging is also $\frac{1}{2}$. Therefore, when $q \leq v / (v + z_D)$ and $\eta = 0$, there is a continuum of equilibria in which $D$ resists and the weak type of $C$ challenges with any probability $\sigma_W \geq qz_D / (1 - q)v$.

Lastly, consider the case where $\eta > 0$. If $z^\lambda > 0$, then there is no equilibrium where $D$ resists, because if this were the case, the weak type’s payoff from not challenging, $\frac{1}{2}$, would exceed his equilibrium payoff from challenging, $\frac{1}{2} - \beta \eta R^\rho(I_{ch})$, giving this type a profitable deviation. On the other hand, if $z^\lambda < 0$ then the weak type would want to challenge. Therefore, when $\eta > 0$ there is an equilibrium in which $D$ resists if and only if $z^\lambda < 0$. In this equilibrium, both the weak and strong types challenge.
Equilibria where $D$ mixes Suppose that $D$ mixes between conceding and resisting. To mix, $D$ must be indifferent, so (16) must equal 0. Substituting (15) into this indifference condition gives us

$$0 = \frac{q}{q + \sigma_w(1-q)}(1-z) + \frac{\sigma_w(1-q)}{q + \sigma_w(1-q)}v$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)$$

This pins down the equilibrium value of $\sigma_w$, which is $\sigma_w = qz/(1-q)v$. As in the previous case, this condition defines a feasible value for $\sigma_w$ if and only if $q \leq v/(v+z)$. If this condition is satisfied, then $\tilde{q} = v/(v+z)$. Otherwise, there is no equilibrium in which $D$ mixes. Thus, suppose $q < v/(v+z)$. Since $\sigma_w \in (0,1)$, the weak type of $C$ must also be indifferent between challenging and not challenging, we need

$$0 = (1 - \sigma_D) (v + \beta [v + \eta (v - R^p(\mathcal{I}_{ch}))]) + \sigma_D (-\beta \eta R^p(\mathcal{I}_{ch}))$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)$$

Now we substitute the equilibrium belief $\tilde{q} = v/(v+z)$ into $R^p(\mathcal{I}_{ch})$ in (13), and then $R^p(\mathcal{I}_{ch})$ from (13) into (18), and solve for $\sigma_D$ to get

$$\sigma_D = \frac{(1+\beta)v}{(1+\beta)v + \beta \eta \tilde{q} z^\lambda} = \frac{(1+\beta)(v + z)}{(1+\beta)(v + z) + \beta \eta z^\lambda}$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)$$

This implies that there is no equilibrium in which $D$ mixes if $z^\lambda < 0$ or $\eta = 0$, but there is such an equilibrium when $z^\lambda$ and $\eta$ are both positive.

B Alternative Updating Rules

In the main text, we assumed that the endogenous reference point for voters is updated at two information sets: the one following $C$’s decision not to challenge, and the one following $C$’s decision to challenge. Here, we discuss the equilibrium consequences of alternative modeling choices. We maintain the assumption that in the canonical model there is no exogenous audience cost, $a = 0$.

The model has three decision points: $C$’s initial decision of whether or not to challenge the territory, $D$’s decision of whether or not to concede, and $C$’s decision of whether to escalate or back down. This means that there are a total of four natural possibilities: the reference point is updated after only the first decision (the case analyzed in the

\[^{17}\text{The case where } q = v/(v+z) \text{ would yield a continuum of equilibria. Since our assumption that } z \text{ is generic rules out this case, we do not characterize the set of equilibria for this case.}\]
main body of the paper), the reference point is never updated (section B.1 below), the reference point is updated after all three decisions (section B.2 below), and the reference point is update after the first and second decisions (section B.3 below).\textsuperscript{18}

B.1. The reference point is updated nowhere

If the endogenous reference point is determined (based on rational expectations about equilibrium behavior) at the initial information set and it is never updated, then there is no signaling audience cost, $a^s_t = 0$. Instead, the commitment audience cost would be the same as the one we characterized in the main text, $a_t = \beta(1 + \eta)z^\lambda$. Then, we can have one of three possible cases:

(i) If $-a_t > z_S > z_W$, then both types of $C$ backs down, $D$ resists and both types of $C$ are indifferent between not challenging and challenging, so each may challenge with any probability.

(ii) If $z_S > z_W > -a_t$, then both types of $C$ choose war, $D$ concedes and both types of $C$ choose to challenge.

(iii) If $z_S > -a_t > z_W$, the strong type of $C$ chooses war, while the weak type chooses to back down. If $q > v/(v + z_D)$ then there is a unique equilibrium in which $D$ concedes and both the strong and weak types of $C$ challenge. If $q < v/(v + z_D)$, then $D$ resists, the strong type of $C$ challenges, and the weak type challenges with any probability weakly larger than $qz_D/(1 - q)v$.

B.2. The reference point is updated everywhere

As mentioned in the main text, if the voters’ endogenous reference points are updated at every information set of the game, including all terminal information sets, then the equilibrium set of the game is the same as in the augmented model with $\eta = 0$.

Since voters update their reference point at every terminal information set, they cannot be pleasantly surprised or disappointed. As a result, in every equilibrium $\rho$, $a^s_t = 0$ and $a_t = \beta z^\lambda$. Equilibrium behavior is then identical to the one we provided in the main text for the specific case in which $\eta = 0$.

\textsuperscript{18}Note that for the assumption of endogenous reference-dependent payoffs to play a role in affecting equilibrium behavior, it must be that the endogenous reference point is not updated at every information set. In this case, the equilibrium of the model would be behaviorally identical to the equilibrium of the canonical model without reference-dependent payoffs.
B.3. The reference point is updated after C’s initial choice, and D’s choice

Finally, suppose that the endogenous reference point of voters is updated after C’s decision of whether or not to challenge, and also after D’s decision of whether or not to resist. Then \( R^\rho(I_d) = 0 \), and \( R^\rho(I_{co}) = v \), where \( I_{co} \) is the information set following D’s decision to concede. Also, \( R^\rho(I_r) = [\tilde{q}\sigma_S^w + (1 - \tilde{q})\sigma_W^w]z^\lambda \), where \( I_r \) is the information set following D’s decision to resist. The signaling audience cost in any given equilibrium \( \rho \) is \( a_s^\rho = \beta\eta R^\rho(I_r) \), and the commitment audience cost is again \( a_t = \beta(1 + \eta)z^\lambda \).

In this case, the equilibria of the game can be pinned down following the same steps we used in the main text. We summarize behavior in the equilibrium set as follows:

(i) If \(-a_t > z_S > z_W\), then there is a double continuum of equilibria in which both the strong and weak types of C back down, D resists and each type of C challenges with any probability. Thus, \( a_s^\rho = 0 \).

(ii) If \( z_S > z_W > -a_t \), then there is a unique equilibrium in which both types of C choose war at their final decision nodes, D concedes, and both types of C challenge. In this case, the signaling audience cost is \( a_s^\rho = \beta\eta z^\lambda \).

(iii) If \( z_S > -a_t > z_W \), then in any equilibrium, the strong type of C chooses war at its final decision node while the weak type backs down. Thus, \( a_s^\rho = \beta\eta \tilde{q} z^\lambda \). If \( q > v/(v + z_D) \), then both types challenge at the initial decision nodes, D concedes, and \( a_s^\rho = \beta\eta q z^\lambda \). Instead, if \( q < v/(v + z_D) \), then the strong type challenges at its initial decision node, and we have three subcases:

(a) If \( \eta = 0 \), then there is a continuum of equilibria in which D resists, and the weak type of C challenges with any probability \( \sigma_W \geq qz_D/(1 - q)v \). In all of these equilibria, \( a_s^\rho = 0 \), so there is no signaling audience cost or benefit.

(b) If \( \eta > 0 \) and \( z^\lambda < 0 \), there is a unique equilibrium in which D resists and the weak type of C challenges. Thus, there is a signaling audience benefit equal to \( a_s^\rho = \beta\eta qz^\lambda < 0 \).

(c) If \( \eta > 0 \) and \( z^\lambda > 0 \) there is a unique equilibrium in which D resists with probability

\[
\sigma_D = \frac{v + z_D}{v + z_D + \beta\eta z^\lambda}
\]
and the weak type of $C$ challenges with probability $\sigma_W = qz_D/(1-q)v$. In this case, the signaling audience cost is given by

$$a_s^w = \left(\frac{v}{v + z_D}\right) \beta \eta z^A > 0.$$ 

Thus, behavior in the equilibrium set of the augmented model continues to be analogous to behavior in the equilibrium set of the canonical model even under the alternative assumption that the endogenous reference points are updated after $D$’s decision as well. It is also straightforward to verify that the comparative statics of the audience costs under this assumption are similar to the comparative statics under the updating assumption made in the main text.

## C    Prospective Voting

In the main text we assumed that voters vote retrospectively. Here we show how our main result generalizes to a setting in which voters vote prospectively: they care about the type of their leader and use the outcome of the crisis bargaining game to make inferences about the incumbent’s type. After making these inferences, voters decide whether to re-elect the incumbent or replace him with a challenger.

Suppose that country $C$ is led by an incumbent, who plays the game depicted in Figure 1 of the main text and can be one of two possible types: weak, $W$, and strong, $S$. Again, there is no exogenous audience cost, so $a = 0$. At the end of the crisis bargaining part of the game, the incumbent runs for reelection against a challenger, whose type is drawn from the same distribution as that of the incumbent. Thus, the challenger is strong with probability $q \in (0,1)$. The types of the incumbent and the challenger are their own private information.

As in the main text, assume that the outcome of the election is determined by the vote of a unit mass of voters belonging to one of two types: hawks and doves. Voters vote sincerely. The proportion of hawks in the population is equal to $\lambda$, so the doves are fraction $1 - \lambda$. The two types of voters differ in their preferences over the leader in office: a hawk prefers the strong type, while a dove prefers the weak type. Hawks get a payoff equal to 1 if they support a strong leader and a payoff of 0 if they support a weak leader. Doves are the reverse: they get 1 from supporting a weak leader and 0
from supporting a strong leader. Voters choose who to vote for based on the politicians’
expected types and the realization of the preference shocks described below.

Voting is again probabilistic. Let $\tilde{q}_\omega$ be the probability that voters assign to the
incumbent leader being strong when terminal node $\omega$ is reached. (Since all actions are
uniquely labeled, we abuse notation by identifying terminal nodes with the action that
leads to them.) Absent reference dependence, hawkish voter $i$ votes for the incumbent
against the challenger at terminal node $\omega$ if and only if $\tilde{q}_\omega + \epsilon_i + \delta \geq q$, where $\epsilon_i$ is
a stochastic preference shock to voter $i$’s payoff in favor of the incumbent, and $\delta$ is
a stochastic aggregate popularity shock in favor of the incumbent that hits all voters
(hawks and doves) in the same way.\footnote{We break ties assuming that, whenever indifferent, the voter votes for the incumbent. We make
the same assumption throughout this section, but our analysis does not hinge on it.} As in the main text, for each voter $i$, $\epsilon_i$ is drawn
uniformly from the interval $[-\frac{1}{2\alpha}, \frac{1}{2\alpha}]$. The popularity shock $\delta$ is drawn uniformly from
the interval $[-\frac{1}{2\beta}, \frac{1}{2\beta}]$. Analogously, in the absence of reference dependence, a dove
supports the incumbent against the challenger if and only if

$$(1 - \tilde{q}_\omega) + \epsilon_i + \delta \geq (1 - q).$$

Now, suppose that voters have reference-dependent payoffs. As in the main text, the
reference point is determined after the initial choice by the leader of whether or not to
challenge. Therefore, the reference utility of a hawk (resp., dove) is equal to the expected
probability with which the leader is strong (resp., weak). Formally, let $\mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I]$ be the
expected probability with which the incumbent is believed to be strong at information
set $I$, where the expectation is taken over the distribution of final outcomes $\omega$ that are
possible after information set $I$. Given voters’ payoff, this is precisely a hawkish voter’s
reference point at information set $I$. A dove’s reference point at the same information
set is the complement, $1 - \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I]$.

In addition, we also assume that voters are loss averse, namely they are harmed by
negative deviations from their reference utility more than they are benefited by equal-
size positive deviations, but that their payoffs are piece-wise linear around the reference
point. Then, a hawk votes for the incumbent at terminal node $\omega$ if and only if

$$q_\omega + \eta q_\omega (1 - \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I]) + \eta \ell (1 - q_\omega)(0 - \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I]) + \epsilon_i + \delta \geq$$

$$q + \eta q (1 - \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I]) + \eta \ell (1 - q)(0 - \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I]),$$

$$19$$
where \( \eta > 0 \) captures the importance of psychological payoffs as opposed to consumption ones and \( \ell > 1 \) captures the degree of loss aversion, i.e. the extent to which losses loom larger than gains in the mind of the voters. Notice that at terminal node \( \omega \), the voter is uncertain about the types of the incumbent and of the challenger. As a result, they account for the fact that they may experience a gain if the politician they support turns out to be strong (which happens with probability \( q_\omega \) for the incumbent and \( q \) for the challenger) or they may experience a loss if the politician they support turns out to be weak (which happens with complementary probabilities). Similarly, a dove votes for the incumbent at terminal node \( \omega \) if and only if

\[
(1 - q_\omega) + \eta \ell q_\omega (0 - (1 - \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I])) + \eta (1 - q_\omega) (1 - (1 - \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I])) + \epsilon_i + \delta \geq \\
(1 - q) + \eta \ell q (0 - (1 - \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I])) + \eta (1 - q) (1 - (1 - \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I])),
\]

Thus, the vote shares the incumbent gets among hawkish and dovish voters are respectively given by

\[
\frac{1}{2} + \alpha (q_\omega - q) [1 + \eta + \eta (\ell - 1) \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I]] + \alpha \delta \\
\frac{1}{2} - \alpha (q_\omega - q) [1 + \eta \ell - \eta (\ell - 1) \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I]] + \alpha \delta
\]

Combining these two vote shares and exploiting the distributional assumption on \( \delta \), we find that the probability with which the incumbent is reelected at terminal node \( \omega \) is

\[
V(\omega | \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I]) = \frac{1}{2} + \psi (q_\omega - q) [\lambda (1 + \eta) - (1 - \lambda)(1 + \eta \ell) + \eta (\ell - 1) \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I]].
\]

(20)

Thus, the winning probability of the incumbent is endogenous insofar as \( \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I] \) is determined by equilibrium behavior, \( \rho \). Furthermore, whenever \( \sigma_W \) and \( \sigma_S \) are neither both equal to 1 nor both equal to 0, we can apply Bayes rule to conclude that

\[
\mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I_d] = \frac{q(1 - \sigma_S)}{q(1 - \sigma_S) + (1 - q)(1 - \sigma_W)}; \\
\mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I_{ch}] = \frac{q \sigma_S}{q \sigma_S + (1 - q) \sigma_W}.
\]

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In the remaining cases, one of the two reference points is determined by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. To pin down reference points in these cases, we invoke the D1 criterion adapted in the natural way to our setting (see e.g. Banks and Sobel, 1987).

As in the main text, for any \( \rho \), the continuation value to \( C \)'s leader from choosing to challenge is (weakly) higher for the strong type than for the weak type. Thus,

\[
\sigma_S \geq \sigma_W \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{E}^\rho[\tilde{q}_\omega \mid I_{ch}] \geq \mathbb{E}^\rho[\tilde{q}_\omega \mid I_d].
\]

Moreover, by looking at the decision on whether to back down or go to war, we have one of three possible cases: (i) both types choose war with probability 1 (in which case \( \tilde{q}_{\text{war}} = q \) and the D1 criterion would yield \( \tilde{q}_{\text{back down}} = 0 \)), (ii) both types choose to back down with probability 1 (in which case \( \tilde{q}_{\text{back down}} = q \) and the D1 criterion would yield \( \tilde{q}_{\text{war}} = 1 \)), and (iii) the two types separate with the strong type choosing war and the weak type choosing to back down (in which case \( \tilde{q}_{\text{war}} = 1 \) and \( \tilde{q}_{\text{back down}} = 0 \)).

In particular, the first case arises if the fraction of hawks in the population is sufficiently high, the second if it is sufficiently low and the third one arises if the fraction of hawks in the population is neither too high nor too low. In this last case, strong types challenge for sure at the initial node, while weak leaders randomize between challenging and not challenging. As a result,

\[
\mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega \mid I_d] = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega \mid I_{ch}] = q/(q + (1 - q)\sigma_W)
\]

Reasoning as in the main text, we can further conclude that \( \sigma_W \) must leave the leader of country \( D \) indifferent between conceding and resisting; thus,

\[
\sigma_W = qz_D/(1 - q)v \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega \mid I_{ch}] = v/(v + z_D).^{20}
\]

Thus, if the fraction of hawkish voters is neither too high, nor too low,

\[
0 = \mathbb{E}^\rho(q_\omega \mid I_d) < \mathbb{E}^\rho(q_\omega \mid I_{ch}) = v/(v + z_D)
\]

---

\[^{20}\text{Instead, if both types of } C \text{ go to war, } D \text{ concedes with probability 1 and the D1 criterion would select the equilibrium in which both types of } C \text{ choose to challenge. And, if a leader does not challenge, then she is believed to be weak. In this case } \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega \mid I_d] = 0, \text{ and } \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega \mid I_{ch}] = q. \text{ Finally, if both types of } C \text{ choose to back down, then } D \text{ would resist and there would be a continuum of equilibria in which both types choose to challenge with the same probability. In this case, } \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega \mid I_d] = \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega \mid I_{ch}] = q.\]
and (20) is lower if the leader backs down after a challenge than if she does not challenge at all provided that $\ell > 1$. In other words, the model with prospective voters still generates an audience cost due to the joint effect of reference dependence and loss aversion. In the presence of these two behavioral biases, we can define the signaling and commitment audience costs as:

$$a_s^\rho = \beta \eta (\ell - 1) q \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I_{ch}]$$
$$a_t^\rho = \beta [\lambda (1 + \eta) - (1 - \lambda) (1 + \eta \ell) + \eta (\ell - 1) \mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I_{ch}]]$$

(Recall that the signaling audience cost is the payoff difference $C$’s leader would get on top of what she would get in the canonical model between backing down after a challenge and not challenging at the beginning of the game, while the commitment audience cost is the payoff difference between war and backing down.)

So even with prospective voters the signaling audience cost can be positive. Moreover, the cost is still increasing in the reference point, as measured by the probability of the leader being strong. Also notice that $a_s^\rho$ is increasing in the weight put on the psychological component of the voters’ utility function, $\eta$, in the degree of loss aversion, $\ell$, and in the ex-ante probability with which politician are strong, $q$. Intuitively, if any of these parameters increases, then when hawks see their leader challenging the opponent, they put high probability on her being strong and are disappointed if she then backs down.

Furthermore, unlike the case of retrospective voting, the commitment audience cost (or benefit) is now an equilibrium quantity as well, since it depends on $\mathbb{E}^\rho[q_\omega | I_{ch}]$. This happens because voters evaluate the election of the challenger also with respect to the reference point. Furthermore, the commitment audience cost is increasing in $\lambda$ and can turn into a commitment audience benefit if $\lambda$ is low enough.

Finally, if the fraction of hawks is either very high or very low, we can define the two types of audience costs (or audience benefits) in a similar way by using the reference points given in footnote 20.

**Remark A.1.** We have assumed in this prospective voting extension that hawks prefer strong leaders and doves prefer weak leaders. One reason why voters may prefer a leader with aligned preferences is because this mitigates agency problems. However, strategic doves may also prefer strong leaders because these leaders are able to do better in crisis bargaining than the weaker types.
Consider a two-period extension of the prospective voting model in which the leader of country \( C \) runs for re-election against a random challenger at the end of period 1 and the winner of this election plays the game depicted in Figure 1 against a different country \( D \). The payoffs to all actors are additive and there is no discounting. In this setting, the utility that voters get from re-electing or replacing the incumbent at the end of period 1 is determined by the behavior of these players in period 2.

The question is: Are voters always better off re-electing a leader whose preferences in the crisis bargaining game are identical to their own?

While the answer to this question is obviously “yes” for the hawks, doves may prefer to appoint a strong leader because that leader’s resolve could get country \( D \) to concede the territory with higher probability. In other words, doves could be willing to trade off a higher probability of ending up in a war against a higher probability of getting a concession by country \( D \). This is an incentive for “strategic delegation.”

However, the logic of strategic delegation may run into problems in the equilibrium setting. Note that strategic delegation can work only if the leader is able to (at least partially) signal his type in period 1. Yet if strategic delegation works, then the weak leaders of country \( C \), who have the same crisis bargaining preferences as the doves, may also have a greater incentive to mimic the strong type in period 1. This additional incentive to pool could undermine the possibility of strategic delegation, which requires sufficient separation.

Furthermore, because the incentives for strategic delegation depend on the equilibrium behavior of leaders in the continuation game, their modeling would require us to take a stance on the dynamic updating (or lack thereof) of the reference point. It is not clear how robust our results would be to different specifications of the updating rule, and we do not pursue this question here. However, we do think that this is an interesting question for future work.