The word Sauti - Swahili for voice - captures the spirit of the Stanford Journal of African Studies. Sauti is committed to ensuring that student voices are heard both within and without the Stanford community. Through the reproduction of research compilations and personal narratives of field experiences, we seek to highlight critical African issues, to ignite meaningful discussions and to invoke calls to action. Although Africa gains most of its global attention by virtue of its ‘problems’ and ‘needs’, the continent possesses troves of opportunity. It is our aim to present a balanced view of the continent, juxtaposing the ills that bedevil Africa with the awe-inspiring events and developments that are primed to propel the continent into an era where its troubles are but relics of history.
The Facebook group will serve as a temporary hub whilst the SAUTI website undergoes a thorough overhaul. To obtain a PDF of this journal, please send an email request to stanfordsauti@gmail.com.
Editorial Board, 2008/09 Volume V:

Consulting Editor-In-Chief Emeritus
Eugene Adogla

Editor-In-Chief
Dithapelo Medupe

Financial and Production Manager
Peter Kariuki

Publicity and Marketing Manager
Christine Mhongo

Associate Editors
Lauren Hall-Lew, Ato Ulzen-Appiah and Elaine Windrich

Assistant Editors
Iberia Elster, Maryam Garba, Thomas Igeme, Kwadwo Osei-Opare, Omotola Sunmonu,
Abiy Teshome, Hiyabel Tewoldemedhin and Anna West

---

Table of Contents

Editorial Note / Page II

Violence in a Peaceful Land / Sarah Kleinman / Page 1

A Personal Narrative / Chinere Nwabugwu / Page 13

The Africa Bag / Dithapelo Medupe / Page 15

Entertainment Briefs / Ato Ulzen-Appiah / Page 16

Bogobe / Kesaobaka Modukanele / Page 20

Islam in the Educational System / Jhanvi Shriram / Page 21

Nigeria and the sex we don’t talk about / Tola Sunmonu / Page 25

(1) / Blair Laing / Page 28

The Glorious Divorce / Kwadwo Osei-Opare / Page 30
Dear Reader

Thank you for taking time out of your undoubtedly busy schedule to read this fruit of our labor.

On the front cover of this volume is a picture of the world at night. This picture is metaphorically representative of the essence and mission of SAUTI-Stanford Journal of African Studies in three ways.

Firstly, the relative darkness of Africa is representative of the continent’s less-than-ideal developmental state, a situation that is explored across several thematic and geographical dimensions in this volume.

Secondly, the picture is simultaneously reassuring; the mere fact that Africa lags behind the rest of the world reassures the Afro-optimist that the continent could rise to giddy heights in its bid to attain development, once the continent’s dormant resources are optimally exploited. While this is definitely a possibility, there is a need for groundbreaking solutions to the obstacles that have blocked the path to Africa’s developmental renaissance. This volume has its fair share of prescriptions for some of the malaises occasioned by these obstacles.

Finally, the mixture of light and darkness so beautifully encoded in the aforementioned image captures the current evolutionary alignments taking place within the SAUTI sphere. With this volume, we bring down the darkness on the biannual nature of the journal while illuminating the new dawn of the journal, a dawn that begets the annual incarnation that is SAUTI’s future … an incarnation that is bigger, richer and better in all dimensions, not least in instructing connoisseurs on the rich and multifaceted complexity that is Africa.

It is my sincere hope that this journal, while marking an ending, will be an adequate means of ushering the SAUTI family into a new and better and era.

Happy Reading!
Violence in a Peaceful Land

Why Ethnic Conflict Erupted in Kenya Following the 2007 Presidential Elections

By Sarah Kleinman

Introduction: Ethnic Violence in a Peaceful Land

On December 27th, 2007, Kenya held its presidential elections; by December 28th, violence had erupted in a country that was formerly perceived as being a beacon of peace, stability, and economic growth in East Africa. After generations of relatively peaceful coexistence among Kenya’s various ethnic communities, widespread violence engulfed Kenya’s villages, towns, and cities when incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was voted back into office. In the two and a half months after the election, over one thousand civilians were killed, and thousands of Kenyans fled their homes and relocated to refugee camps in and around Kenya. Since ethnic heterogeneity and inequality had existed in Kenya for many years without much disturbance of the normal social order, what led Kenya’s people to mobilize along ethnic lines at this particular moment in time? What factors are constantly at play in Kenyan society, predisposing Kenyans to mobilize based on ethnicity; and what factors turned mild inter-group animosity into Kenyans drawing machetes on one another and burning each other alive in churches?

Kenya is a striking example of a country in which ethnic violence seems to have erupted out of conditions of relative national prosperity and stability and inter-group coexistence. Three days after the national elections, Jeffrey Gettleman, reporter for The New York Times, wrote: “Now, one of the most developed, stable nations in Africa...has plunged into intense uncertainty, losing its sheen as an exemplary democracy and quickly descending into tribal bloodletting.” Gettleman goes on to assert that the election tapped into “an atavistic vein of tribal tension that always lay beneath the surface in Kenya but until now had not provoked widespread mayhem.” This assessment leads to the present question: Why ethnic conflict at this particular moment in time?

A variety of social movement theorists have formulated arguments as to what are the most important societal forces that lead to the emergence of collective action. These theories shed light on the events in Kenya, but their efficacy as explanations for why social groups mobilize may also be evaluated on the basis of the situation in Kenya. Analyzing change over time in Kenya and analyses of the violent eruption of the months after the election, I will assess the relevance of a variety of social movement theories to the Kenyan case. My research will analyze a particularly violent and sudden outburst of ethnic violence to contribute to an already rich scholarship on the emergence of social movements so that the international community can better anticipate and counteract disruptive mobilization along ethnic lines.

Before analyzing the relevant literature in social movement theory based on historical and contemporary forces at play in Kenya, an overview of ethnicity and demography in Kenya will provide a contextual foundation.

History, Demography, and Ethnic Relations in Kenya

Beginning around 2000 B.C.E., Cushitic-speaking peoples from northern Africa moved to the land now called Kenya. By the 1st century A.D. Arab traders began frequenting the Kenyan coast, and by the 8th century, Arab and Persian settlements lined Kenya’s coastline. Meanwhile, Bantu-speaking peoples, now the majority of Kenya’s populations, were migrating into the region from more central parts of the Africa continent. The Luo people, now constituting 12% of Kenya’s population, descended from early agricultural and herding communities in western Kenya. Since their move across the country from western Kenya, this group has developed competitive relationships with several other ethnic groups, including the Nandi, Kipsigi, and Kisii, whom they have fought for access to water, cattle,
and land. Pre-colonial East African society was “dynamic, multifaceted, and flexible... characterized by a large number of different and interlocking societies.” Between the desert-dwelling Nuer, nomadic Maasai, hydraulic agriculturalist Songo, various societies of herders and farmers, Islamic imperialists, metropolitan Yoruba, and a variety of other ethnic groups each with particular regional and economic niches, Kenya’s pre-modern history is defined by great heterogeneity and fragile coexistence.

Kenyan history in the modern era is characterized by a series of colonial powers exploiting the coastline for its strategic location along the Indian Ocean. By the turn of the 16th century, Portuguese explorers had penetrated the Kenyan coast, their primary objective being to take control of the Arab-run spice trade in the Indian Ocean. During the 17th century, Omani Arabs expelled the Portuguese from Kenya’s coastline and placed Kenya’s African tribal groups under closer scrutiny. The Arabs held fast to their regional power until, in the late 19th century, the British outlawed the slave trade and enforced their directive through superior naval power, reducing Arab power and control along the Kenyan coast. When Germany instilled a protectorate over the Sultan of Zanzibar’s coastal possessions in 1885, followed by the arrival of the Imperial British East Africa Company in 1888, official European colonialism ensued. During this period, Kenya witnessed an influx of Indian peoples as skilled laborers in the British-led construction of a cross-country railway; these workers remained in Kenya and formed the core of several distinct Indian communities. After World War I, Lieutenant Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck led German military forces in guerilla warfare against the British in East Africa. To combat the Germans, the British had to mobilize Indian Army troops and recruited large numbers of porters to transport supplies into Kenya’s interior by foot. The recruiting and mobilizing of over 400,000 Africans to do back-breaking work for the British Army with the Carrier Corps politicized the African populations and intensified colonial authority.

During the first half of the 20th century, British and other European farmers began settling Kenya’s interior fertile highlands, gaining significant wealth from farming coffee and tea. In order to assure their economic prosperity in the highlands, the British created ethnic divisions among Kenya’s tribal groups in the region. Cranton writes, “The image of the victimized Dorobo became an important element in the British justification of the creation of the White Highlands in Kikuyu-dominated areas of central Kenya.” By the 1930s, over 30,000 white settlers lived in the highland region and had excessive political powers because of their relationship to the colonial administrators and their farming wealth. This area was previously home to over one million Kikuyus who, in European terms had no formal land claims; however, this ethnic group asserted their rights to the land because of their centuries-long presence and control in the region. The British instituted policies to disadvantage the Kikuyu in the highlands: they placed a hut tax on Kikuyu itinerant farmers, banned the growing of coffee by non-land-owners, and granted decreasing amounts of land to Kikuyus in exchange for their labor. These policies of discrimination led the Kikuyu ethnic group to migrate in large numbers to Kenyan cities. In the process, the Kikuyu ethnic group moved into territories formerly controlled and claimed by other, less powerful or numerous ethnic minority groups.

In response to social problems associated with mass migration, land loss, and colonial pressure, Kikuyu political organization and power grew rapidly in the 1920s. By 1952, the Kikuyu ethnic group, under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta and other dynamic group members, instigated a movement against British Rule that has come to be called the Mau Mau rebellion. In response to the widespread insurgent activity by Kikuyus, the British declared a state of emergency in Kenya from October 1952 to December 1959. Further politicizing ethnic relations in Kenya, the British colonialists incorporated African troops, including the King’s African Rifles, into their counter-insurgency efforts. The British killed over 20,000 Mau Mau insurgents and detained around 150,000 more under force, placing them in detention camps. Although the revolt was quelled by massive British military force, and the Mau Mau were decisively defeated militarily, this revolt was critical because it led the British to “concede paramountcy to the African majority [Kikuyu] in their colony.” Because the Kikuyu were the most successful of Kenya’s people in organizing against the British, and because they later mobilized at the polls in the greatest numbers, the Kikuyus “won the first fruits of independence,” quickly coming to dominate post-independence political and economic activities in Kenya.

One of the legacies of British colonial rule was this institutionalization of Kikuyu dominance, but the colonial presence in Kenya also led to an intensification of the salience of ethnic identity for many of Kenya’s groups, particularly because of the colonial’s “divide and conquer” strategy of direct rule. Since colonialism, administrative and ethnic unit
boundaries in Kenya’s provinces and districts are largely coterminous, which has “fostered ethnocentrism or tribalism at all times.” British colonization of Kenya displaced the African population to ethnically carved out “native reserves” after their lands had been alienated for European occupation. Africans in Kenya became victims of the colonial legacy of divide and rule. After a bitter and explosive struggle for independence that pitted Africans against the colonialists, rather than Africans against Africans, it seemed as if all Kenya’s ethnic groups would unite under their common national identity as Kenyan citizens. However, over time, ethnic boundaries became increasingly salient and divisive. In less than two years of the country’s independence, “Kenyan citizens retreated into their ethnic pigeonholes as Kikuyu, Lio, Luhy, Kamba…wearing the same badges as they had worn during the independence struggle.”

In the words of Sangai Mohochi, Kenyan national and Stanford University professor, “Ethnic definitions and difference have always characterized Kenyan society. When you introduce yourself in Kenya, you are not just a person, you are a person from a specific tribe.” The African population of Kenya consists of 42 distinct tribes that cherish their own values and customs, even when lumped into larger ethnic groups that were largely created and institutionalized during the British colonial administration. In Kenya, the existence of self-conscious collectivities lays the foundation for inter-communal interactions. Rothchild claims that the boundaries defining ethnicity in Kenya have acquired “a tenuous, self-sustaining quality… which can endure only if no major change in the configuration of intergroup power relations occurs.” However, Kenyan society, like so many others, is a dynamic and changing setting in which groups encounter one another in different ways at different times; therefore, the boundaries defining the salience of ethnic identities in Kenya can not possibly remain fixed. It is only with the fluctuating nature of ethnic boundaries in mind that the question about why ethnic violence erupted at this moment in time can be answered. But first, a summary of recent political events will set the stage for an analysis of social movement theories and their relevance to the Kenyan case.

Contemporary Political Landscape

Until late December 2007, Kenya maintained a remarkable degree of stability despite changes to the political system and regional instability. In the context of East Africa, Kenya has for decades been perceived as a country to which refugees fleeing turmoil and violence in their respective countries can move and be relatively safe from persecution or oppression. According to Kenya expert John O. Oucho, for several decades, “Kenya was an island of peace and tranquility in the disturbed waters of persistent conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa....” Since Kenya was declared a Republic on December 12th, 1964, the government has instituted cross-party parliamentary reforms revising the oppressive laws inherited from the colonial era, contributed to generally credible national elections, and improved public freedoms for Kenya’s citizens. The 2002 peaceful transfer of power from Jomo Kenyatta’s Kenya African National Union (KANU) to the current president Mwai Kibaki’s National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), a multi-ethnic coalition of eleven Kenyan political parties, was a watershed moment in Kenyan history, which the world viewed as a sign of Kenya’s democratic stability and progress.

Although as of December 2007, President Kibaki was unable to institutionalize the sweeping constitutional reforms he promised Kenya’s citizens during the 1992 elections, democratic space has expanded in some respects during Kibaki’s presidency. In the words of Professor Sangai Mohochi, “Although I do not support him, President Kibaki did quite a bit to increase democracy through reforms to the media, giving all ethnic groups room for cultural expression, and increasing opportunities for all Kenya’s citizens.” In 2003, Kibaki accepted the AAI African National Achievement Award from the Africa-America Institute on behalf of the Kenyan government; this honor recognized his and the Kenyan government’s efforts to move the young country “toward a peaceful democratic transition for their nation following 40 years of authoritarian rule.” Unlike during the presidency of Daniel Arap Moi (elected unopposed at Kenyatta’s death in 1978), Kenyans finally enjoyed a great deal of freedom of expression and association, and they no longer had to fear harassment by security agents under Kibaki’s rule. In an interview on ABC PrimeTime with Peter Jennings in November 2004, Bill Clinton identified Kibaki as the one living person he wished to meet “because of the Kenyan government’s decision to abolish school fees for primary education.” Not only did Kibaki introduce free primary education, but his government initiated the policy of heavy subsidies for secondary and tertiary education. Among other reforms, these enabled more ethnic groups to participate more comprehensively in Kenyan civic and political life.
The 2007 Contested Presidential Election

Despite Kibaki’s accomplishments in increasing the democratic space and rights of all Kenya’s citizens, pre-election polls exposed that his presidency was threatened by the main opposition party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), and its leader Raila Odinga. Polls predicted a close ODM victory over Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU). As the election results started coming in, Odinga had a slight and then substantial lead; however, as the government’s Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) continued to count the votes, Kibaki closed the gap and then overtook his opponent by a substantial margin. This surprising turn of events led to skepticism from Kenya’s citizens, and there were largely substantiated claims by international observers that the election was rigged by Kibaki’s party. Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, chief European Union observer, stated: “The presidential elections were flawed.” A number of Western observers corroborated that “Kenya’s election commission ignored undeniable evidence of vote rigging to keep the government in power.” As it became clear that the election was not fair, the country broke out into widespread protests and rioting openly discrediting the ECK for its complicity in the illegal procedure. Almost immediately, Odinga declared himself to be the “people’s president” and true victor of the election, and he called for an immediate recount and Kibaki’s resignation.

The protest activity quickly escalated into unprecedented violence and destruction of property, largely targeting ethnic Kikuyus, the group of which Kibaki is a member, living outside their traditional settlement areas. Although the violence may have been politically motivated, there is no doubt that certain ethnic groups, particularly the Luo and Kalenjin, were selectively attacking Kikuyus purely on the basis of ethnicity. After three days, police reported that 40 people were killed in Nairobi, and 53 were killed in Kisumu, a major base of support for Odinga’s ODM. In response to violence targeting their ethnic community, some Kikuyus retaliated, specifically directing their violence toward ethnic Luos and Kalenjins. The ethnic character of the violence was intensified as police forces intervened, primarily in defense of the victimized Kikuyus, which some interpreted as ethnic protection or favoritism expressed by the government. On January 3rd, police used tear gas and water cannons to quell a protest conducted in Uhuru Park by Odinga supporters; which led Kenyan Attorney General Amos Wako to assert, “The level and nature of the violent protest has never before been witnessed in our country and is quickly degenerating into a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions.”

As of early March, 2008, approximately 1,500 Kenyans had been killed by machete-wielding gangs and over 600,000 people have fled their homes and are living in refugee camps both in Kenya and in neighboring countries. The once-stable country experienced what some observers called “a complete breakdown of law and order.”

Theoretical Analysis: Social Movement and Collective Action Scholarship

In order to understand how the ethnic conflict arose in Kenya after the contested 2007 presidential elections, an overview of a few dominant theories of social movement emergence will provide a framework for analysis. Each of these theories presents a set of factors believed to be fundamental in determining when and where collective action will emerge.

*Ethnic Divisiveness Leading To Mobilization*

Donald Horowitz argues that ethnic conflict is pervasive throughout the world not because of material or economic interests, but rather because groups mobilize based on the fear of domination by other groups. Although he argues that the salience of ethnic identity is fluid, Horowitz suggests that, at least in part, “ancient hatreds between groups pro-
duce conflict,” and fear of political or economic subordination leads groups to mobilize along ethnic lines. In new nation-states like Kenya, Horowitz argues that religious, class, or national identities that states invoke to supersedethat ethnic identities have not established themselves or made ethnicity any less salient. Therefore, it would be the fear of domination, and ultimately even expulsion or extinction, that lies at the heart of Kenya’s ethnic conflict. Although ethnic heterogeneity and occasional divisiveness may characterize Kenyan society, this theory is insufficient in determining why, after years of peaceful coexistence without any mobilization to this scale, conflict erupted.

Societal Strain Leading To Mobilization

Charles Tilly’s "breakdown theory" states that social movements are by-products of rapid social change and disruption offset by wars, economic regression, natural disasters, and other destabilizing forces. Thus, disturbance of normal life leads to mounting grievances; grievances create increased inter-group tension; this tension is then expressed in social movement activity. Critics of this strain perspective argue that societies are rarely in a state of equilibrium; normalcy is, in fact, often defined by conflict, instability, and grievances. Furthermore, there is little evidence to support a causal relationship between grievances and collective action.

Competition for Resources Leading To Mobilization

In The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict, Susan Olzak (1991) proposes that the likelihood of ethnic conflict emerging in a given social context increases when two or more ethnic groups within certain boundaries find themselves competing for the same resources—particularly jobs and housing. “Competition theory” scholars identify forces related to modernization that increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict, including urbanization, increased organization, expansion of secondary and tertiary economic sectors, expansion of the political sector, and emergence of supranational organizations. As a relatively new independent democracy, Kenya was undergoing many of these processes over the decades preceding the 2007 elections. Consequently, this framework may help determine why ethnic violence suddenly surfaced in Kenya, a state previously defined by ethnic heterogeneity and relative stability.

Political Opportunities Leading To Mobilization

“Proponents of the “political process model” view the timing and relative success of social movements as largely determined by the opportunities afforded to actors who might be inclined to mobilize. As institutional structures shift and the ideological frameworks of societal elites change, aggrieved populations recognize and respond to new opportunities for collective action. If opportunities are introduced, weaker groups that were formerly excluded or oppressed may take the opportunity to challenge more entrenched authority systems.

A related “resource mobilization” theory states that movement emergence is directly related to the availability of resources to support collective protest activity. The key proponents of the political opportunities and resource mobilization theories recognize that collective action—ethnic-based or otherwise—results from a complex and broad range of facilitative factors and general causal dynamics. However, they argue that “a certain expansion in political opportunities is certainly among the most often noted features of successful social movements and revolutions.” In the Kenyan case, this theory is related to the non-dominant ethnic group’s ability to act on mobilization intentions, but it too may not comprehensively explain why violence erupted in December 2007.

It is beyond the scope of this study to enumerate and evaluate every theory of social movement emergence, but the few outlined here are sufficient to illustrate the breadth of contextual factors that can lead to mobilization. It is important to emphasize that movement emergence is dependent not only upon internal features, such as goals, organization, and adherents. In fact, all movements “grow out of and are embedded in a particular sociohistorical context,” such that external or exogenous factors require elaboration if a movement’s emergence is to be fully understood.

Kenya’s Ethnic Eruption: A Case Study of Dispositional and Igniting Forces

Kenya is an ethnically heterogeneous society, composed of a variety of African tribes, Ar-
abs, Indians, and European, among others. The largest group by population, the Kikuyu, only constitutes 22% of Kenya’s 36.9 million people; other major ethnic groups, including the Luhyas, Luo, Kalenjin and Kamba each constitute between 11 and 14% of the total population. In addition to being highly fractionalized, ethnic boundaries are fairly salient for the peoples of Kenya. In the words of Professor Sangai Mohochi, “If you cannot tell what tribe a person is from by his or her name, then you ask. It is not necessarily a judgment; it is simply how we define one another in Kenya—how we organize our society.” In such an ethnically differentiated society, it is no surprise that group mobilization often forms along ethnic lines. Oucho points to this feature of conflict within Kenya over time: “In such an ethnocentric set up, animosity among Kenyan peoples, provinces and political parties has had considerable ethnic overtones, with ethnic undercurrents shaping conflicts.” However, the fact that the environment in Kenya is highly ethnicized is a constant; therefore, it cannot explain the occurrence of violent mobilization along ethnic lines at particular moments in time. Other forces must be at play within and around Kenya that led civilians to pick up their machetes and attack their neighbors on December 27th, 2007.

It is critical to differentiate between what I will call dispositional and igniting factors. Dispositional factors are those that make Kenya vulnerable to mobilization along ethnic lines at any given moment; they predispose communities to define their collective action on the basis of ethnic identity rather than, for instance, socioeconomic class or political affiliation. Igniting factors, on the other hand, are those that come into play at a particular moment in time, coalesce with more constant dispositional forces, and lead to the emergence of social movements.

One variety of dispositional factors is that a number of scholars and reporters have highlighted as causally related to the outbreak of ethnic conflict in Kenya is related to grievance. These factors include ethnic fractionalization, Kikuyu political and economic dominance, income inequality, and poverty. The first dispositional factor is the ethnic divisiveness that is a legacy of the British colonial “divide and conquer” policies. As with many other colonies, particularly in Africa, the British solidified existing ethnic delineations and created new boundaries in many cases in order to strengthen their hold over the territory. The British instituted an administrative structure of provinces and districts that “slotted either similar or different ethnic groups in the respective administrative units to which either the groups belonged willingly or which they resented.” Moreover, the British “institutionalized ethnocentrism as a way of life:” recruitment of armed forces, employment in various sectors of the economy, and the national administrative structure were all characterized by ethnic-based policies. This politicization of ethnic difference—referred to as the “invention of tradition” or the “creation of tribalism”—increased the salience of ethnic identity for Kenya’s various peoples and led to significant challenges as the people of Kenya attempted to unite under one common national identity during their struggle for independence. Thus, in the words of Kenya expert John Oucho, “Jigsaw puzzles of ethnic enclaves still exist as a form of diversity in a delicate unity.”

Another legacy of British colonialism is the rise to political and economic dominance of the Kikuyus in the immediate post-independence era. As mentioned previously, the British administrative policies, as well as the success of the Kikuyu-based Mau Mau Rebellion in forcing the British to reconsider their policies, led to an immediate transfer of power to the Kikuyu ethnic group. Bienen (1974) argues that this “accelerated thrust for Kikuyu participation and domination in the country” is the single most important legacy of British colonialism in Kenya. The domination of the ethnic Kikuyus who constitute only 22% of Kenya’s population, is an important dispositional factor that makes Kenya vulnerable to ethnic conflict. Although the Kikuyu population is not 45-90%, the percentage range determined by Collier and Hoefliger (2004) as indicative of “ethnic dominance,” their argument that the dominance of a single ethnic group over all others leads to increased vulnerability for ethnic conflict may, at least in part, characterize the conflict in Kenya. The dominance of the Kikuyus has been a feature of Kenyan society since the advent of independence in 1963. As early as the mid-1960s, non-Kikuyu Members of Parliament and civil servants raised complaints about the unchecked power of the Kikuyus. Gertzel (1970) writes, “It was the contemporary issues and conflicts directly related to Kenya’s economic development that raised these fears of dominance by one tribe in all aspect of Kenya’s life: in government, commerce, and business.”

The Kikuyu’s dominance has led to economic inequality, partially real and partially imagined, along ethnic lines in Kenya. Many believe that the recent ethnic conflict can be reduced to an expression of economic frustration by Kenya’s less prosperous but almost equally populous Luhyas, Luos and Kalenjins. A Nairobi-based academic interviewed by

“If you cannot tell what tribe a person is from by his or her name, then you ask. It is not necessarily a judgment; it is simply how we define one another in Kenya—how we organize our society.”
BBC News posited this view, saying that the violence is “really about deep, long-running income inequalities in Kenya.” Kenya reporter Jeffrey Gettleman rearticulates this economic grievance perspective, saying that the 2007 election simply provided an opportunity for Kenya’s less successful non-Kikuyu tribes to “vent their frustrations against them.” Although the 2007 post-election violence was unprecedented in terms of its magnitude and pervasiveness, this was not the first time Kikuyus have been the victims of ethnic-based violence. In 1969, when a Kikuyu supporter of President Kenyatta assassinated the Luo politician Tom Mboya, Luo mobs attacked Kikuyus, sparking reciprocal violent reactions from Kikuyus. This violence led to mutual expulsions of the ethnic “other” from areas in which they constituted the minority. Sporadic ethnic clashes also occurred in July of 2007 between Luos and Kikuyus. The Kenya Red Cross Society asserted that these were “mostly related to the forthcoming general elections in December 2007,” and the clashes “led to displacement of people, injuries, loss of lives, damage to property, and theft of livestock.” According to Ouchot, “The two groups have a sustained positive conflict, which, however, turns negative whenever any explosive event erupts.” This rivalry between the two most populous of Kenya’s ethnic groups may follow the Horowitzian model and reflect a mutual fear and distrust among members of these groups; more likely, however, is that the rivalry is a result of a competition over political and economic resources—a competition that Kikuyus have been winning for over forty years.

A logical corollary of Kikuyu political and economic dominance is the exclusion, perceived or real, of other ethnic groups from Kenyan civil life. Maurice Odhiambo Makoloo, author of “Kenya: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples, and Ethnic Diversity,” summarizes this perspective:

**Minorities and indigenous peoples in Kenya feel excluded from the economic and political life of the state. They are poorer than the rest of Kenya’s population, their rights are not respected and they are rarely included in development, or other participatory planning processes.**

This undercurrent of resentment towards Kikuyus is referenced by a variety of scholars and reporters in assessing recent events. For instance, Makoloo asserts that members of Kenya’s minority groups are “aware of and resent being treated differently and having fewer opportunities.” An Associated Press writer calls Kikuyus a people “who are resented for their long-running domination of politics and the economy.” Ouchot writes, with reference to Kikuyus, “Ethnic groups that are more wealthy, better educated, and more urbanized tend to be envied, resented, and sometimes feared by others,” arguing that the basis for these feelings is the realization that one group holds a dominant position in the system of stratification. Whether real or perceived, the sense of exclusion that some argue leads to resentment among Kenya’s non-Kikuyu peoples may have predisposed them to mobilize based on ethnicity.

Others have argued that the grievances discussed above are only part and parcel of a deeper, more profound dispositional factor: widespread poverty, not necessarily based on ethnic inequality. After a visit to Nairobi’s slums in the heat of the violence, BBC News reporter Fergal Keane noted the striking character of the violence as poor-versus-poor. She concludes that “the tribal issues are only the symptom. Go into the muddy, filthy lanes of Kibera [Nairobi slum] and you find something approaching root causes.” Although Kenya is a regional hub for trade and finance in East Africa, the country has been burdened by corruption and a dependence on a few primary goods whose prices have remained low. The International Monetary Fund has suspended Kenya’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Program on multiple occasions, and the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita remains extremely low despite the perception of Kenya is a beacon of economic prosperity in Sub-Saharan Africa. The GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, was $1,600 in 2007. Compared to the United States (2007 GDP per capita was $46,000), Kenya’s economic situation is obviously quite dismal. Strikingly, despite that Kenya is looked to as an economic success story, when compared to other undeveloped Sub-Saharan African countries like Zambia (GDP per capita is $1,400) and Lesotho (GDP per capita is $1,500), Kenya’s still fairly relatively poorly. The latter comparison illuminates that Kenya’s people continue to suffer under conditions of true poverty. Keane asserts that all people in Kenya are victims of the government: “This population has seen successive governments rob billions from the public purse in well-documented scandal.” Whether the economy is stratified along ethnic lines or simply devastating for all Kenyans, these factors may predispose Kenyan groups who conceptualize themselves as unfairly disadvantaged to be vulnerable to mobilization.

The above dispositional factors have created a set of grievances for various populations in
Most importantly, the political use of ethnically engineered violence to acquire land is a vital finding between politics and land in Kenya. The centrality of land as an object of primal desire necessitating violent acquisition imputes significantly on the economic foundation for political power in Kenya.

Movement of population groups into and out of the Rift Valley has clearly strained communities living there, and it forces different groups to compete over the same set of resources. Particularly in a country like Kenya where each ethnic group occupied its own economic niche until colonialism led to group migration and competition for resources, large-scale population movements can disturb the natural order of society. Another population trend in Kenya that predisposes the country to ethnic-based violence is urbanization. From 1962 to 1989, the number of urban centers in Kenya tripled in Central, Eastern, Coast, and Rift Valley Province and increased phenomenally in Nyanza and Western Provinces. Although urbanization characterized many ethnic groups in the late 18th century, it was particularly characteristic of the Kikuyu population. Discriminatory policies introduced by the British settlers to remove Kikuyus from their land in the Valley led this group to migrate in large numbers to the cities. By the turn of the 21st century, Kikuyus constituted one-third the population of Nairobi even though are only approximately one-fifth of Kenya’s total population. As Nagel and Olzak (1982) argue, “Inter-ethnic contact in urban settings appears to activate rather than mitigate ethnic boundaries, enhancing existing ethnic differences and creating new ethnic identities.” As Kikuyus migrated into cities already occupied by other ethnic groups, including the Luo, linguistic and cultural boundaries were solidified as these groups began competing for jobs in the same economic sectors. In the context of urban environments, such ethnic markers “provide a convenient and opportunite basis for urban ethnic organizational development, even where these differences had little or no meaning in the countryside.” Oucho adds that it is the permanence of the Kikuyus’ migration into cities that leads to “much wrath from their host communities” against the Kikuyus. Although population movements such as these may strain societies and increase competition, they have been occurring in Kenya over the past half-century and, therefore, cannot entirely explain why violence erupted in 2007.

An issue closely related to population movement as well as competition for limited resources concerns what Professor Mohochi called “undeniably the most important issue in the current ethnic conflict in Kenya:” access to land. Analyzing the results of a variety of fact-finding missions to Kenya to ascertain the foundation of collective action and conflict in the mid-1990s, the International Commission of Jurists found:

Most importantly, the political use of ethnically engineered violence to acquire land is a vital finding between politics and land in Kenya. The centrality of land as an object of primal desire necessitating violent acquisition imputes significantly on the economic foundation for political power in Kenya.

Although these studies were conducted to analyze the root causes of ethnic conflict in the 1990s, the constancy of land as the most important resource in the eyes of Kenyans is relevant for the contemporary conflict as well. Land in Kenya is not only important as a source of food and cash income for rural peoples; it is an important social asset in Africa because access to land is often a symbol of membership in a particular descent group or rural polity. Maintaining one’s access to land validates one’s membership in a group, and vice versa. In a BBC News article about the Rift Valley, Doyle concludes, “The current political dispute is fuel for the smoldering embers of a land dispute which has existed for decades.”
While in the pre-colonial era most Kenyan tribes owned land communally, white settlers alienated it from indigenous peoples in the land-grab of the colonial period. This land alienation intensified the problem of population density, which increases competition and grievances, and it forced many of the landless farm laborers to migrate or become squatters on the farms where they worked, which increased societal strain and competition. The legacy of the land settlement plan, enacted upon Kenya’s independence, is one more important factor that predisposes Kenya’s communities to mobilize along ethnic lines.

These forces that predispose Kenya to ethnic conflict emergence are related to grievances, societal strain, and increased competition, mostly pointing to a lack of opportunities for Kenya’s non-Kikuyu groups. However, forces related to increasing opportunities for Kenya’s ethnic groups are perhaps even more important to understanding why ethnic-based violence erupted at this particular moment in time. For instance, although Kenya’s GDP per capita is quite low, even compared to other African countries, the economic growth rate had been steadily increasing over years preceding the 2007 election. In 2000, Kenya experienced negative growth; however, when Kibaki was elected in 2002, his administration began an ambitious economic reform program and resumed cooperation with the IMF and The World Bank. By 2003, growth had risen to 1.4%; by 2005, the growth rate reached 5.8%. The growth rate in Kenya climbed to 6.3% in 2007, largely due to Kibaki’s economic reforms. Moreover, Kibaki introduced the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and the Public Officers Act in May of 2003, which both reduced the prevalence of corruption in Kenya’s government. Furthermore, there has been an introduction of secondary and tertiary economic sectors over the past few years, which reflects one of Nagel and Olzak’s (1982) arguments: that modernization leads to an expansion of these economic opportunities, which leads to economic competition among groups, which can make a society more vulnerable to ethnic conflict. The fact that the country’s worst bout of ethnic violence occurred during a period of rapid economic growth indicates that perhaps increasing economic opportunities, rather than grievances related to poverty and competition, can predispose a population to social mobilization.

In addition to increasing economic growth over the past few years, it is widely believed that President Kibaki, although he was unable to institute all of the political reforms his administration promised upon his election in 2002, has widened the democratic space in Kenya. During President Kibaki’s 2003 visit to the White House, President George W. Bush outlined some democratic features of Kibaki’s administration:

President Kibaki’s election last December showed Kenyans and Africans and people throughout the world the power of the ballot and the benefits of peaceful, democratic change. The President won a mandate for reform, and he is moving ahead with an ambitious agenda: redrafting Kenya’s constitution, liberalizing its economy, fighting corruption and investing in education and health care.

As a result of his efforts to achieve democratic reform, to combat HIV/AIDS, to increase freedom of the press, and to improve transparency, accountability, and responsiveness in public service delivery, Kibaki accepted the Global Prize for Progress in Governance, a UN Public Service Reform Award, on behalf of Kenya in February of 2007. The fact that political opportunities seem to be increasing for all of Kenya’s ethnic groups during Kibaki’s multi-party, coalition administration indicates that discrimination, inequality, and tribal vengeance were certainly not the only forces fueling ethnic mobilization in December 2007. The evidence suggests that ethnicity became most salient, leading to an unprecedented degree of violence, at a time when previously-aggrieved groups had more access to political power than ever before. Professor Mohochi said he believes the Luos, Kalenjins, and others must have mobilized “because they started to realize the power of their own votes—the power they had to determine the direction of Kenya’s future unlike ever before.”

Furthermore, increasing political opportunities may have also been igniting forces in this case because the Luo-led opposition party was actually predicted to win the national election. Even before the presidential election, the ODM opposition party won 99 of 210 seats, incumbent Vice President Moody Awori was replaced, and fourteen of Kibaki’s top ministers lost their seats to ODM party affiliates. This opening in the political structure, with non-Kikuyu ethnic groups filling the holes, certainly had some influence on the propensity of these groups to mobilize along ethnic lines when the flawed election results dictated a Kibaki victory.

Simultaneously, ethnic entrepreneurs took advantage of the changing political opportunities to further solidify ethnic boundaries among Kenya’s populations and intensify the
inter-group animosity that fueled the mobilization. Results from a variety of studies concerning “land clashes” in Kenya in the mid-1990s, the International Commission of Jurists found that it is political and economic elites that “emerge as the manipulators and ultimate beneficiaries of violence.” Susan Olzak refers to the process of ethnic elites attempting to be more “authentically ethnic” or more sensitive to the needs of their particular ethnic group than their opponents as “ethnic out-bidding.” When ethnic elites try to out-bid one another, the rhetoric and reality of ethnic violence may escalate over time. Shortly after violence erupted in Kenya, reports emerged that incriminated ethnic entrepreneurs, or leaders from both pro-government and pro-opposition camps, for planning and encouraging the violence. On January 13th, Nick Wadham reported that “interviews with politicians, humanitarian aid workers and dozens of people on both sides of the conflict suggest that much of the violence…was planned beforehand and highly organized.” Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Chairwoman Muthoni Wanyeki told the Associated Press: “They [ethnic mobs] are working in groups of 10 to 15 people in shifts. … They are being paid 500 (shillings, or $8) per burning (a home) and 1,000 per death.” On January 24th, Human Rights Watch investigations indicated that after the elections, opposition party officials and local elders organized the ethnic-based violence in the Rift Valley. Georgette Gagnon, acting Africa Director at HRW, said: “We have evidence that ODM politicians and local leaders actively fomented some post-election violence…. One Kalenjin preacher in Eldoret told HRW that on the morning of December 29th, a local ODM party official called a meeting to say that “war had broken out in Eldoret town, so the elders organized the youth into groups…and they went to loot [Kikuyu] homes and burned them down.” HRW officials claim that in many communities, ODM party affiliates arranged frequent meetings following the election to organize and facilitate the violence unleashed by gangs against ethnic Kikuyus.

These elites took advantage of the fact that changes to the political structure offer an opportunity to manipulate ethnic boundaries and encourage their increased salience. The influence of ethnic elites in organizing and facilitating ethnic violence in Kenya reflects components of resource mobilization theory in addition to the political process model. According to several Kalenjin men interviewed by HRW, ODM leaders were urging residents to contribute money to purchase automatic weapons. In one case, an ODM councilor candidate provided a lorry to ferry a group of youth to burn Kikuyu homes in a neighboring community. Resource mobilization scholars might argue that as soon as ethnic elites made resources available to civilians, their propensity to mobilize was ignited. Although some evidence suggests this theory may be partially validated, in light of all the other evidence, I find it to be limited at best in explaining the outbreak of ethnic mobilization in Kenya.

Nonetheless, the entrepreneurial character of leaders’ manipulation in this case has certainly played a role in igniting ethnic conflict. References to elite ethnic entrepreneurship have been built into the language of journalists in every stage of the post-election violence. One BBC World Affairs reporter wrote, “This displacement [of ethnic minorities by Kikuyu elites in the Rift Valley]—or more accurately the historic resentment that politicians can extract from it—is part of the root of today’s violence.” Another BBC News reporter wrote, “After witnessing at first hand the hatred of Hutu militiamen for Tutsi civilians in Rwanda I understand only too well how real or imagined ethnic difference can be whipped up by unscrupulous leaders.” From a strategic perspective, ethnic entrepreneurs are stimulated to consolidate or solidify ethnic identity because of the consciousness of the political advantages of a shared identity. “The political opportunity afforded by ethnic networks is easily exploited for political support.” For example, most ethnic groups in Kenya associate relative prosperity among ethnic Kikuyus and Kalenjins to real or imagined favors derived from the political advantages of having Presidents Kenyatta and Moi, respectively, in power. Therefore, scholars from the International Commission of Jurists argue, “There is vociferous sentiment regarding groups who feel they have not ‘eaten’ while resenting the ‘have eaten’ groups and at the same time mobilizing themselves to attain political power as a way of finding an ‘eating place.’” This process escalates ethnic competition, which leads to heightened ethnic animosity. Evidence from Kenya suggests that this kind of “each-group-for-itself” rationality leads ethnic elites to coordinate their members to act against other groups if necessary to gain power.

Evaluating the Theoretical Frameworks: Towards a New Theory of Social Movement Emergence

As the evidence above illustrates, none of the social movement emergence theories posited in the theoretical framework section of this paper can fully explain the outbreak of inter-
group violence organized along ethnic lines after the December 2007 presidential elections in Kenya. Certain elements of each theory likely played a role in either predisposing Kenyan ethnic communities to mobilize based on ethnicity, or by sparking conflict in the context of prevalent ethnic undercurrents. Even components of Horowitz’ somewhat outdated version of ethnic conflict emergence theory present themselves in Kenya’s ethnic dynamic; however, I strongly believe that journalists and scholars alike have overemphasized the role of mutual fear or distrust in determining the emergence of conflict in Kenya and elsewhere. Although historical and demographic trends may have led to some degree of ethnic animosity in Kenya, these groups have coexisted relatively peacefully for decades without any outbreak of conflict even close to this scale. There was no drastic change in these groups’ perceptions of one another in 2007. The only shift that could be related to Horowitz’ ideas is an increasing perception of threat felt by the Kikuyu community in response to the increasing political power of non-Kikuyu groups in Kenyan national politics. This threat, whether perceived or real, could have led the Kikuyus to intensify the salience of their own ethnic boundaries in response. However, this theory still fails to explain the emergence of violence because the Kikuyus were the victims—the targets of Luo and Kalenjin violence—when movement activity first emerged in late December. Thus, Horowitz’ model barely contributes to the explanation of why violence erupted and why then in particular.

Aspects of the breakdown and strain theories seem to play a larger role in determining why ethnic communities in Kenya mobilized after the election results were revealed in December. Population and demographic shifts have brought groups that formerly occupied independent niches into contact with one another, especially in urban areas and in the fertile Rift Valley. This increased inter-group contact led to competition for resources—primarily land and employment opportunities. Furthermore, the perceived dominance of the ethnic Kikuyus in Kenyan political, social, and economic life is one grievance that may have intensified “resentful,” less dominant minority groups, like the Luos and Kalenjens, to intensify the salience of their ethnic boundaries in preparation for the election. Strain factors associated with modernization, including urbanization and expanding economic sectors, seem to have played a role in making Kenyan society vulnerable to conflict emergence. However, again, these societal breakdown theories are not sufficient in isolation to explain why violence erupted following this particular national election. Although protest activity and small-scale ethnic clashes have emerged during elections in the past, the scale of the violence in Kenya immediately following the 2007 election was of a different character entirely. Factors associated with the disruption of normalcy in Kenya are, therefore, insufficient in explaining why Kenya exploded in widespread violence in this particular moment. The limitations of strain, breakdown, and grievance arguments in explaining the Kenyan case are reminiscent of the early scholarly critiques: societies are almost never in a state of undisrupted normalcy, and grievances are constantly present; therefore, to use either strain or grievance as the impetus for collective action is to ignore the question of timing altogether.

More than societal breakdown or ethnic fractionalization arguments, competition theory seems to characterize recent events in Kenya. But again, as a theoretical framework, the competition argument in isolation cannot account for why violence erupted on such a massive scale after the 2007 presidential elections. To but sure, population movements, an expansion of secondary and tertiary economic sectors, and an increased mixing of ethnic groups particularly in urban areas led to increased competition over economic resources, especially land and jobs. Simultaneously, a widening democratic space in Kenya encouraged competition over access to political power. Particularly as the competition between Kibaki’s party and the opposition ODM intensified in the last few days leading up to the election and during the counting process, the two ethnic groups affiliated with their respective parties—the Kikuyus and the Luos—must have experienced a sense of intense competition for political power. But why, then, was it the Luos and Kalenjins that mobilized, and not the Kikuyus who a competition theorists might see as equally if not more threatened by the encroachment of other ethnic groups into their political space?

This question leads to an evaluation of the next theoretical proposition: that increasing political and economic opportunities lead to mobilization. Of all the theories evaluated thus far, this framework appears to have played the most significant role in leading to the ethnic-based violent eruption immediately following the elections. The fact that the in 2007 both economic and democratic growth characterized Kenyan society meant that non-dominant ethnic groups were experiencing increasing access to meaningful participation in economic and political activities. Unlike almost all the other factors mentioned previously, increasing economic and political opportunities are relevant to this particular

Furthermore, the perceived dominance of the ethnic Kikuyus in Kenyan political, social, and economic life is one grievance that may have intensified “resentful,” less dominant minority groups, like the Luos and Kalenjens, to intensify the salience of their ethnic boundaries in preparation for the election.
moment in history. Before Kibaki was elected president in 2002, economic growth was negative, corruption was rampant, and the government was determined to exclude all members of society who did not belong to their ethnic group from the political process. Kibaki’s coalition government, committed to promoting democracy, human rights, and economic expansion, drastically changed the availability of political and economic opportunities to non-Kikuyus in the immediate pre-2007 years. Moreover, the political process model provides the best framework for interpreting the critical role played by ethnic entrepreneurs in this election and the subsequent outbreak of violence. Not only did Kibaki’s administrators in the ECK unfairly count the votes, but evidence shows that ODM party leaders planned the violent reaction against Kikuyus, organized the mobs, and even provided resources to those who mobilized. These ethnic elites recognized the changing political environment and reacted to it, manipulating ethnicity as a motivating factor in the process. Therefore, the opportunity theories have the most relevance to the Kenyan case of the theories posited above.

Although each of the theories presented in this analysis has elements that played a role in the emergence of ethnic conflict in Kenya, clearly none of them is sufficient as a comprehensive explanation for why Kenya erupted into violence in December 2007. A more accurate and holistic theory of social movement emergence would have to take all of these factors into consideration as this case study of violence in Kenya, although far from comprehensive given its limited scope, points to components of each theory as forces that either predisposed various groups to mobilize along ethnic lines or ignited movement emergence. In-depth case studies must provide a foundation for further research in the arena of social movement emergence because it is only when one analyzes a multitude of variables and features of a given society that all of the forces at play—whether subtle undercurrents or igniting events—emerge as influential in a society’s propensity to erupt in ethnic conflict.

Although the literature is extensive in this area, a more comprehensive theory of social movement emergence has yet to be postulated. Further research to address this theoretical gap is necessary as societies around the world continue to erupt into conflicts leading to deaths, displacements, and humanitarian crises. It may be impossible for researchers to produce a conclusive interpretation of why movement activity emerges at particular historical instances. However, any progress will be useful in informing and advising governments, international actors, and policy makers on what actions should be taken to avoid violent eruptions similar to that in by Kenya after the 2007 presidential election.
A Personal Narrative

By Chinyere Nwabugwu

In life, men and women who achieve success are those who are clear about their goals in life. Among other things, as Dwight Eisenhower once put it, vision is an integral quality of a great man. Having a vision means seeing a clear picture of the future you desire for yourself. Setting targets alone does not ensure the achievement of goals; deciding on how to reach these targets is also an essential part of success. A person of vision is clear about his/her ambitions and strategizes how best to achieve them. This implies planning ahead for future success which often demands making difficult yet very necessary decisions without limiting one’s self. Indeed, visionaries are those who not only set their target high and clear but also have their objectives well-defined and achievable. Due to the fact that plans can be affected by unforeseen circumstances, versatility and flexibility are important tools for successful planning.

Efforts to secure a bright future through meticulous planning often involve forgoing current leisure for future pleasure. Your efforts are driven by your definition of success; what you desire to see happen. Frequently, your ability to dream big will be persistently tested by obstacles but holding true to your vision of what you want for your future will shape your behavior and actions and help you overcome all surrounding impediments. My late grandmother, who was my inspiration, is a testimony to this fact – her story is the epitome of how your vision can shape your thinking and actions leading to ultimate success in life.

My grandmother; the Late Princess Victoria Nzewi, was the daughter of the Late Igwe I of Nnobi, a town in Anambra State, Nigeria, His Royal Highness (HRH) Solomon Ezeokoli. She grew up in Nnobi. The common societal practice during her childhood was to educate male children and marry off the females at a tender age. Sure enough, HRH Igwe I of Nnobi was wealthy enough to afford foreign education for his sons – he sent them off to school in faraway England. Conversely, my grandmother was withdrawn from school and married to a headmaster; she went on to have a total of about twelve children. Unfortunately, when her children were still young, her husband passed away. Tragic as it was, my grandmother did not succumb to despair but pressed on in order to provide her children with decent living conditions. Shortly after her husband’s death, my grandmother picked up her pieces and began to “dream”. Though she had more female children, she envisioned that every one of her children would successfully gain a university education. She was determined that the girls would have a fair chance at education.

The odds were stacked against her and, given her situation, it seemed impossible. In spite of being a single mother, she was driven by her objective and ambition for her children and relentlessly soldiered on with renewed determination. Grandmother started a bakery venture which grew quickly and eventually extended to the distant town of Onitsha. She toiled and labored so that her children would have it better in life than she did. I learned that people commented that she was strong and worked like a “man”. That did not deter her; if anything it spurred her on and kept her moving. She succeeded in putting the first two (twin) children through school and continued until all her surviving offspring became university graduates. Today, all her surviving children – six females and one male – are successful practitioners in the fields of medicine, dentistry, pharmacy and food technology, among others ...

Grandmother, a humble lady with no education, had the courage to pursue her vision. She had a clear picture of what she wanted and worked towards achieving it without compromising her morals and integrity. On December 19th 2000, my grandmother passed on. At that time, I was a secondary school student. I was deeply saddened at her death especially because I performed exceptionally well in school that term and was excited about making it home to tell her of my success. I knew she would be so proud of me. I remember on one occasion, a few years before her death my parents visited her in her Nnewi home and read her a letter I had written telling her that I had ranked top in my class that term. As my parents read it to her, tears trickled down her eyes. I believe my letter caused her to remember her own success stories and the fact that her hard work had paid off. I remain thankful for the moments I shared with her and for the knowledge, inspiration and willpower that she
instilled in me. Her life was exemplary and she taught me that I could achieve anything I wanted and that the only limitations that exist were in the mind.

Today, I celebrate this powerful woman, this mentor of mine who stayed strong and firm amid many odds and hurdles. She was a woman of faith, which translated into the driving vision that enabled her achieve her coveted ambitions for her children. She taught me so much and I am grateful. Her story is one that will inspire young African women.

As individuals, we must not let the circumstances and situation around us limit our dreams. The moment we stop dreaming is the moment we die. I chose to come to the United States to receive my education among the very best and to strive to do my very best. It has been a privilege. Like Mary Kay Ash says; “if you can dream it, you can achieve it”. Indeed your attitude in life determines your altitude in life. Dream big and set your eyes high up the ladder; that is the only way you can climb it and move on to your target goal. I know my grandmother would be very proud of my accomplishments ...

*Today, I celebrate this powerful woman, this mentor of mine who stayed strong and firm amid many odds and hurdles. She was a woman of faith, which translated into the driving vision that enabled her achieve her coveted ambitions for her children. She taught me so much and I am grateful. Her story is one that will inspire young African women.*
The Africa Bag

By Dithapelo Medupe

To an untrained eye this is just a bag
This is not just a bag

To the poor African economic or political refugees this bag is a lifeline
Every other bag is too expensive
This bag allows them to carry their belongings in a dignified manner

To the rich Africans this is a shameful bag
They will never be seen dead carrying it
This is not just a bag

In Botswana it is called the Zimbabwean bag
Poor Zimbabweans lug it back and forth across the border between the two countries
The bag comes to Botswana empty and returns to Zimbabwe empty full

In South Africa they call it the Botswana bag
Poor Batswana lug it back and forth across the border
The bag comes to South Africa empty and returns to Botswana full

In Nigeria they call it the Ghana-must-go bag
When times were hard in Ghana, Ghanaian lugged it back and forth across the border

This bag is made in China
And duly used in Africa
It stands to testify that Africans may scorn each other from time to time
Wrongly look down upon each other even
But when times are rough for one African country
Their neighbors will not turn its people away with empty
Zimbabwean-Botswana-Ghana-must-go bags

This is not just a bag
It is The Africa bag
It carries the spirit of Africa across the artificial boarders set up to divide Africans
It should serve to remind Africans that despite the boarders we are still one

Explanation

At Stanford I am privileged enough to interact with other students from all corners of Africa and learn about their countries on a deeper level. During these interactions I found out about the affordable bag widely used across Africa that is the subject of this poem. Wherever the bag is used across the continent, it evokes similar themes and emotions. This poem explores how a simple thing like a low priced bag can tell the story of a people.
**ENTERTAINMENT BRIEFS**

By Ato Ulzen-Appiah

**BELOW:** The late Miriam Makeba, a veritable icon of South African music and liberation, strutting her stuff. (Credit: Studio Eridisa)

**ABOVE:** Nigerian R&B duo P-Square. The pair - who are identical twins - scooped awards for best video and best group act at the recent M-Net Channel O Awards. (Credit: Museke)

**MUSIC**

The year 2008 saw the return of Africa’s Grammies, the Kora Awards. Though the nominations have been known for close to a year, the awards ceremony will finally be held in late 2009. However, MTV Base Africa organized the first ever MTV Africa Music Awards (MAMAs). The big winner was Nigeria’s D’Banj who took home the award for best male artiste. Kenya’s Wahu was awarded best female musician while Nigeria’s P-Square, arguably the biggest African act at the moment, won best group. P-Square picked up the best video and best group awards at MNET’s Channel O Music Video awards as well. Other big winners at the Channel O awards were Ikechukwu (Nigeria) for Best Male, Mozambique’s Lizha James for Best Female, and Zimbabwe’s Buffalo Souljah for Best Ragga Dancehall and Best Newcomer.

MTV Base Africa continued shelling out music video shoots for African musicians throughout the year. The beneficiaries were Kenya’s Wahu for her ‘Little Things You Do’ collaboration with Uganda’s Bobi Wine. South Africa’s Bleksem also had a video shot for his ‘Wena Uthini’ track with Dama do Bling (Mozambique). We also saw an East-West project when Ghana’s Kwaw Kese and Tanzania’s Professor Jay united for a remix of the former’s ‘Who Be You’. Olu Maintain’s ‘Yahooze’, which was probably the most popular African song in 2007, also benefitted with a remix featuring Ghana’s Rap Doctor, Okyeame Kwame. These efforts are coming at a time new African music is thriving across the continent and upcoming artistes are finding it easier to make their music popular outside their own countries.
One monumental album that made waves in 2008 was Mokobe’s ‘Mon Afrique’. The Malian rapper, originally a part of the group 113, featured many African music legends on his debut album. They included Salif Keita (Mali Forever), Amadou et Mariam, Youssou N’Dour, Viviane Chichid (Safari), Oumou Sangare, Sekouba Bambino, Fally Ipupa (Malembe), Tiken Jah Fakoly, Seun Kuti, DJ Lewis (Bisou) amongst others. Mokobé Traoré also received the Best Afro Carribean album at the 2008 Trophees De La Negritude – held in memory of Aimé Césaire – in recognition of artistic achievements in the African Diaspora in France. He also was honoured with a major Malian national award, Chevalier de l’Ordre National du Mali.

One of the most recognized African groups, LadySmith Black Mambazo, was the lone African triumph at the 51st Annual Grammy Awards. They won the best Traditional World Music Album for “Ilembe: Honoring Shaka Zulu”. It was their third award, after picking up Grammys in 1987 (Best Traditional Folk Recording) and 2005 (Best Traditional World Music Album).

Senegal’s Youssou Ndour missed out on a Grammy but a documentary about him won the audience award at the 2008 Sao Paulo International Film Festival for best Foreign Documentary. “I bring what I love’ was written, directed and co-produced by Elizabeth Chai Vasarhelyi. The movie chronicles events surrounding the release of Youssou’s ‘Egypt’ album, in which he tried to shed Islam in a positive light. It was highly successful abroad but generated a lot of controversy in his home country of Senegal.

One of Africa’s premier songbirds, Miriam Makeba, passed away in 2008. Miriam Zenzile Makeba was affectionately called Mama Africa and the Empress of African song. She became the first African musician to win a Grammy for Best Folk Recording together with Harry Belafonte for ‘An Evening with Belafonte/Makeba.’ She also became the first black musician to leave South Africa on account of apartheid, and was heavily involved in the fight against it.

FILM

The Pan-African Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou (FESPACO) is the most well-known film awards in Africa. It is a biannual event held in Burkina Faso. The most
The 2009 edition of the FESPACO awards (The 21st installment) was organized in March and dedicated to the famous Senegalese director, Ousmane Sembene, who passed away in 2007. The top prize, l’Etalon Yennega d’Or (the “Golden Yennega Stallion”) was won by ‘Teza’, a film by Ethiopian director Haïlé Gerima. South Africa’s ‘Nothing But the Truth,’ directed by Rod Lurie, won the second prize (Silver Stallion). The Bronze Stallion went to ‘Mascarades’ by Lyes Salem (Algeria). The host country was not left out as the Oumarou Ganda Prize (for the Best First Film) was awarded to Missa Hebie for Le Fauteuil.

South Africa’s entry for Oscars, ‘Jerusalem’, picked up a number of awards. Rapulana Seiphemo won the Best Actor award, while the movie took home the awards for Best Photography and Best Editing. ‘Jerusalem’ was directed by Ralph Ziman. Morocco’s ‘Adieu Mères’, directed by Mohamed Ismail, was awarded Best Editing and Best Music. Sana Mousiane from Morocco won the Best Actress award for her role in ‘Les Jardins de Samira’. ‘Sektoù (They Have Stopped Talking), by Khalid Benaisa (Algeria) won the Best Short Film while Best Documentary went to Leila Kilani’s Nox Lieux Interdits (Our Forbidden Places) from Morocco. The Best Screenplay award was won by ‘L’Absence’, directed by Guinea’s Mama Keita.

The world’s third biggest movie industry comes out of Nigeria under the name of Nollywood. Nigerian films have become very popular in Africa and in the Diaspora. Films marketed through Nollywood have become well distributed and its VCDs and DVDs can be found in many African shops abroad as well as online broadcasts through Youtube amongst many other websites.

The African Movie Academy Awards, which has roots in grand Nollywood. The 3rd edition took place in Bayelsa, Nigeria in April 2008. Ghana’s ‘Run Baby Run’ was the big winner, taking home four awards. Directed by Emmanuel Apea Jr, it touches on the drug trade in Ghana. It also picked up the awards for Best Screenplay (Emmanuel Apea Jr and John Apea), Best Child Actor (Evelyn Addo - ‘Nina’), Best Director and Best Film. The movie also recently won the best narrative film at the 17th PAN AFRICAN FILM FESTIVAL-PAFF (Programmer’s award). Edward Osei-Gyimah’s Kwame won the Best Narrative Short at the PAFF as well.

Nigerian film, ‘Iranse Aje’ scooped awards for Best Indigenous Actor (Adebayo Tijani) and Most Outstanding Actor Indigenous (Ayo Akinwale). Doris Simeon won the award for Most Outstanding Actress Indigenous for her role in Onitshi (Nigeria). ‘Stronger Than Pain,’ directed by Tchidi Chikere, also garnered two awards. Nkem Owoh, famous for his lead role in ‘Osuofia in London’ won the Best Actor lead while his wife in ‘Stronger Than Pain’ won the Best Actress Lead. Izu Ojukwu’s ‘White Water’ also won multiple awards. Evergreen Joke Silva was awarded Best Supporting Female, while the movie won the awards for Best Sound (New Haven Studio), Best Cinematography (Chigozie Nzonwanne) and Best Upcoming Actors for O.C Ukeje and Hoojo. Another Izu Ojukwu movie, ‘Across the Niger’ won a couple of awards – Best Special Effects and The Heart of Africa.

Emeka Ossai won the Best Supporting Male Award for his role in ‘Check Point,’ another Nigerian movie. Uju Okeke picked up the Best Upcoming Actress award for her role in ‘Mission To No Where’ (Nigeria). Best Art Direction went to New Jerusalem, directed by Ifeanyi Onyeagbor. The Best Music award was picked up by Okey Okoh for ‘Mirror of Beauty.’

Mugisha Donald’s ‘Divizions’ was awarded a Special Jury Prize and also the award Best Editing. Another multiple award winner, ‘Princess Tyra,’ is a movie from the Venus Productions’ stable that brought us ‘Beyonce – The President’s Daughter’ (arguably the most popular African movie in recent memory). Princess Tyra took home Best Costumes (Samira Yakubu) and Best Make-Up (Joyce Mensah). It was directed by Frank Rajah Arase. Another Ghanaian movie, ‘Not My Daughter,’ directed by Cosby Bikpe, won the Best Documentary (Short) while South Africa’s ‘Do You Believe in Magic,’ directed by Daniel Roth, won Best Documentary.
The 2009 edition of the Africa Movie Academy Awards took place in early April. Wanuri Kahiu’s ‘From a Whisper’ (Kenya) picked up a number of awards, including Best Picture, Best Director and Best Screenplay, Best Original in Soundtrack, as well as AMAA Achievement in Editing - ‘From a Whisper’ is based on real events surrounding the US Embassy bombing in Kenya on August 7, 1998.

Litha Booi and Lungelo Dhladha from South Africa’s ‘Gugu and Andile’ took home the awards for Most Promising Actor and Actress respectively. ‘Gugu and Andile’ was adjudged by Best Film in African Language. The Best Performance by an Actor in a Leading Role went to Farouk Alfashawi for his role in ‘Seventh Heaven’ (Egypt) while Funke Akindele took the Actress version for her role in ‘Jenifa’ (Nigeria). The Supporting roles awards were picked up by Joel Okuyo Prynce from ‘Battle of the Soul’ (Uganda) and Mercy Johnson from ‘Live to Remember’ (Nigeria).

Burkina Faso’s ‘Lolo’ was on the winners’ board for Best Animation. Best Documentary (Short Subject) was won by ‘Coming of Age’ (Kenya) while ‘For the Best and for the Onion’ (Niger) & ‘Malcom’s Echo’ (Nigeria) were joint winners for Best Documentary. AMAA Achievement in Sound went to ‘Seventh Heaven’ (Egypt) while AMAA Achievement in Art Direction was picked up by Nigeria’s Michelle Bello for ‘Small Boy’. Richard Chukwuma from the same movie won Best Performance by a Child Actor.

‘Live to Remember’ (Nigeria) picked up AMAA Achievement in Make-Up while ‘Battle of the Soul’ (Uganda) won AMAA Achievement in Visual Effect. AMAA Achievement in Cinematography went to ‘Cindy’s Note’ by Izu Ojukwu (Nigeria) while AMAA Achievement in Costume went to ‘Arugba’ (Nigeria). The Special Heart of Africa Award for Best Films from Nigeria was also won by ‘Arugba,’ directed by Tunde Kelani.

FROM THE IMAGING DIARIES:

LEFT: Archbishop Desmond Tutu addressing students of the newly opened African Leadership Academy during a private audience on February 6, 2009 as part of celebrations marking the Grand Opening of the Academy. The Academy seeks to develop leaders for the African continent and drew its 97-student inaugural class from 29 countries and 4 continents. More information on the Academy and its mission can be found at www.africanleadershipacademy.org. (Credit: Eugene Adogia)
Bogobe

By Kesaobaka Modukanele

Half naked children
Wobble water-filled clay gourds atop their heads,
Hands stretched out high
Fingers curled around the rims
Gripping firmly,
Their bulged, ashy bellies
Rumble with hunger.
With steady rhythm,
their earth sunken feet
trek the narrow pathway accurately,
preserving water,
The main ingredient of
Bogobe, a meal
Grandma will churn to thickness tonight.

Notes

Bogobe is sorghum meal, a type of stiff porridge common in most African countries. It is normally served with relish of any kind, like beef, chicken, mutton, and or morogo (dark green leafy vegetables), and or soup. It can also be eaten as cereal with milk and sugar.

Mophane is a species of tree found in North Eastern Botswana. It serves as a habitat for Mophane worms that are also edible, and its wood is a very good source of fuel.

A young man
Lifts his axe to heights,
Chops a Mophane log
Which he grips tightly between his ankles.
His African velvet skin
Shines with thick sweat
Sweet darkness of melted chocolate.
Golden sunbeams strike
His flexed muscles
Shimmering like polished bronze
As he chops wood:
Upon which cooks
Bogobe, a meal
Grandma will churn to thickness tonight.

Little girls chase a hen
Their petite thighs and
Knicker-covered behinds
Stride readily as they
Pounce on the helpless creature,
scrawny hands stretched afore.
Chuckles and cheers,
Symphonize with the hen’s
Squawking for its own life.
The hen paves the yard
With a trail of red-brown feathers,
Pasting them to the earth with wet droppings.
Secretly, the girls compete
To catch the hen:
A delicious relish for
Bogobe, a meal
Grandma will churn to thickness tonight.

Finally, the family sits around a fire
Each holding his leaf decorated bowl
Plunging fingers into the hot porridge
Telling stories
Enjoying this
Bogobe, a meal
Grandma churned to thickness tonight.
Islam in the Educational System

Funding Sources and Policy Making in Kenya

By Jhanvi Shriram

Madrasas, Qu’ranic schools, Islamic schools: when these terms are mentioned in an educational setting they turn the atmosphere tense. In Kenya, the Ministry of Education is struggling to keep tabs on these schools. Should the government shut these schools down and try to make Islamic families send their children to standardized government schools? How can the government distinguish the Islamic extremist schools from the peaceful religious Islamic schools? What are the roles of the government and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in the maintenance of Islamic schools? I will first examine different sources of funding for policies that improve and try to mainstream Islamic education in Kenya. Then I will examine sources of funding that support the more conservative Islamic education. Finally, I will analyze how these different sources of funding affect policy aimed at improving Islamic schools.

Finding information about funding sources for Islamic schools in Kenya has proved difficult. There are large organizations and obscure individuals, such as Shaikh Muhammad Ali Mwanboga who created a chain of Islamic schools on the coast of Kenya. Mwanboga has, “never hidden his interest in contributing to the establishment of a Muslim state” (DeWaal 164). It is alarming that Mwanboga has an extensive network of 40+ schools that function with the ideology of creating an Islamic state within Kenya. In Mwanboga’s defense, his network is sometimes “seen as a counter against the Christian crusade, and is intended to halt what its founders commonly perceive as the state wanting to ensure the dominance of decadent western values” (Salih 15). There is an overwhelming Christian influence on schools and lifestyles in Kenya, and by providing an alternative education and value system, Mwanboga could be seen as expanding the young minds of Kenya.

Operating on a similar linear thought is the Young Muslim Association (YMA) of Kenya, started the year after Kenya gained independence in 1964. The YMA is a registered charity in Kenya and donates to projects that benefit the Muslim community. In 1968, YMA created a major project that continues successfully today: the Garissa Muslim Children’s Home. GMCH brings Muslim orphans from the furthest reaches of Kenya to the center to educate them (YMA). Interestingly, the organization was created to counter the actions of the Catholic social workers in the late 1960s and early 1970s in northern Kenya. At that time there was a political conflict that caused many Somali Muslims to come to northern Kenya, and the YMA believed that the Catholic social workers were trying to convert the Somali Muslims to Christianity. Aided by the Kenyan government the YMA created secular schools and a supportive religious community to protect the Islamic environment. The YMA provided funds for infrastructure (schoolhouse, books etc.,) while the government brought in teachers and made sure the secular Kenyan primary school curriculum was being used in the schools. Still, the schools ensure that prayers are said, fasting is observed and extra Islamic lessons are provided for the students. The Islamic education teachers sometimes come from Madrasas and are paid separately by the YMA.

The intriguing relationship between the YMA and the Kenyan government could be the cause of an initiative started by the Kenyan government called the Islamic Integrated Education Program (Manani). After meeting with leaders in the Muslim community, the Kenyan government was able to create the Islamic Integrated Education Program (IIEP) that integrates the national curriculum with the curriculum in Islamic schools. The benefits are theoretically supposed to reach Islamic children on the coast of Kenya and those on the northern border shared with Somalia. However, Graph 1 shows that these two regions have low primary school attendance rates. The Coast and North Eastern region of Kenya have the lowest levels of primary school attendance.

Mwanboga has, “never hidden his interest in contributing to the establishment of a Muslim state”. It is alarming that Mwanboga has an extensive network of 40+ schools that function with the ideology of creating an Islamic state within Kenya.
The question that remains after interpreting this graph is whether the government is measuring primary school attendance rates in Madrasas that have the Islamic Integrated Education Plan (IIEP). If they are not measuring the rates of attendance in these schools then one could argue that the Islamic children are getting educated but are just not on the radar of the Kenyan government’s data collection centers. On the other hand it is possible that even with the IIEP the attendance rate is low and this is a sign that the government must re-investigate the efficiency of schools in these regions. The coastal and North Eastern regions of Kenya have also traditionally been poorer than other parts of the country and it is possible that many families just don’t send their children to school.

**ABOVE: GRAPH 1 showing primary school attendance rates. LEFT: GRAPH 2 showing percentage of children out of school. BELOW: TABLE 1 shows the major donors to Kenya’s educational budget between 2002-2005. (Sources: Graphs 1 and 2: Kenya National Profile by the Education Policy and Data Center; Table 1: Education for All – Fast Track Initiative: Kenya 2007 Report)**

Graph 2 shows the percentage of children OUT of school. The percentage of girls and boys out of school is about equal but the percentage of rural children out of school is far greater than that of urban children. North Eastern Kenya and the Coastal areas are very rural.

The Kenyan government has had a focus on primary education for a long time. Education appears many times in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and highlights the theory that: With more education comes more consumption, with more consumption comes a boost to the economy. The government also acknowledges a problem of governance and enforcement of policies and is trying to address this issue to make sure that government corruption doesn’t affect access to primary Education. The United States ranks
among the top financial supporters of the Kenyan government as well as the International Development Agency (IDA), a branch of the World Bank that lends money (See Table 1).

Implementation and efficiency of a policy is dependent on who is funding the policy. Organizations or individuals that fund a policy control the amount of money donated, access to the money and the conditions the receiver must follow in order to use the money. Essentially the original policy makers have little to no control over the end implementation of their policy when they seek external funding. External sources of funding are key players in the policy game for without them implementation of a policy would be difficult and no government would be able to manage their country. Donors play a very important role in developing countries because they are essentially making an investment in these countries when they give money. Their reward will be an improved economy and a stronger trading partner and ally. Policy is not a one-way game and donors usually expect something in return for the money they put into a country. This expectation forces developing countries to produce statistics of success, especially if they hope to request another donation. The statistics game makes it even more difficult to really assess the efficiency of a program.

The US government seems to want the focus to be on girls’ education and the Kenyan government so far has been willing to oblige. The percentage of girls and boys in school is roughly equal now, but the percentage of rural children in school is far behind that of urban children. The Kenyan government must address the concerns of their main financial donors and so an emphasis has been placed on other issues in education (i.e.; girls education, higher education, etc.). These issues are no less important than making sure Islamic children get a secular and religious education but they do attract more funding than Islamic education. The US and IDA should play a larger role in studying and recommending an education plan for Islamic children in this region of the world. The best way to protect Islamic Kenyan children from falling into the trap of dangerous ideology and the perpetual cycle of poverty in their underdeveloped regions, is not to take away their religious education, but to also provide them with a secular standardized education. These types of education are not mutually exclusive.

By putting conditions on the funding they provide, external sources (whether they are organizations or individuals) can have serious impacts on the Kenyan education system. The conditions can be positive (bringing up the enrollment rates of girls) and negative (inhibiting the transfer of funds to the next big problem). One could argue that educating Muslim girls is a huge problem. One might say that, indirectly, funds for girls’ education would reach Muslim girls and improve enrollment rates and Islamic schools. Unfortunately this line of thinking does not take into account a cultural fact: Muslim girls and boys are taught in separate schools (Bakari 313). Even if the funds did make it to Muslim girls it would not improve the schooling system for Muslim boys.

Right now, none of these large donor organizations are willing to put up a large sum of money to improve the Islamic education system in Kenya. Currently most of the funding for these schools comes from private donations or Islamic NGOs. Many of these local NGOs “have developed a sophisticated network for fund-raising activities, with frequent visits to Saudi Arabia, USA and Europe where they maintain contacts with transnational Islamic NGO foundation organizations” (Salih). Some of these funding sources should be looked into to make sure they are not promoting a fanatical or extremist version of Islam. The US and Kenyan government should put their focus on improving Islamic schools so they don’t let a generation of children lose out on a basic education. The education provided by the Islamic schools does not prepare the children to enter a mainstream university and this hurts their ability to compete in the marketplace. The Islamic community supports these students by hiring them into their businesses (DeWaal 166). This practice alienates the Islamic society and separates them from mainstream Kenyan businesses and schools.

Many of these local NGOs “have developed a sophisticated network for fund-raising activities, with frequent visits to Saudi Arabia, USA and Europe where they maintain contacts with transnational Islamic NGO foundation organizations.” Some of these funding sources should be looked into to make sure they are not promoting a fanatical or extremist version of Islam.

So far, policy created by the Kenyan government to deal with Islamic schools has been fairly lax. The Islamic Integrated Education Program (IIEP) is dependent on funding from the Kenyan government, YMA and the US Government. The Islamic schools get funding from private sources and they get enough funding to maintain their curriculum the way they want it. The IIEP as a policy is subject to the interests of many different organizations and this could possibly limit its effectiveness. On paper it seems like a great solution but in practice it may not actually be carried out. Unfortunately I could not find a study that measured the effectiveness of the IIEP as a policy.

Even if the IIEP was shown to be an effective policy it still does not eliminate the isolation of the Muslim community in Kenya. The schooling system and curriculum puts Muslim
students at a disadvantage to their Kenyan peers. Two regions that need a tremendous amount of focus are the North Eastern region and the Coastal region of Kenya which have a high Muslim population and are very rural. These two factors put the region at risk for low primary school enrollment in mainstream Kenyan public schools. How can current policy be made more effective to address these issues?

Getting external funding is a part of the process and cannot be avoided. The most important thing to do is to support the more efficient policy through whatever funds possible. In this case the IIEP plan should be supported and promoted to counter the growth of Madrassas that don’t have a mainstream curriculum in addition to religious studies. The Kenyan government should be wary of funding sources for Islamic schools. The government should create a system to monitor progress of Islamic schools. They should focus on the primary education of Islamic children because this is the most critical period in a person’s life. What they learn during this period of life stays with them forever.
Nigeria and the sex we don’t talk about ...

By Tola Sunmonu

What I have to say is extremely important, and I am extremely passionate about it, thus I will deliberately be presenting it slowly. I want to make sure that this articulately conveys my feelings, from the glaringly obvious to the minute details that I have not even fully comprehended.

Nigeria, I am disappointed in you. You must immediately assume that I am going to give a typical, but relevant rant about our lack of infrastructure or the lack of sound leaders or many of the countless problems racking our home. I have always been a fan of attacking a problem from the core and not the easily erodable surface. During this trip, I have identified many core issues, many pertaining to the Nigerian psyche that, understandably, lacks hope, has become content with failure, lethargic, and looking for an ‘easy way out.’ However, this is understandable, even pardonable, given the examples set by our leaders and the years of neglect the country has suffered from. Please do not think I am not concerned about these issue, if I was not, I would not be dedicating my summer and life trying to solve them.

Nigeria, what really troubles me is the caliber of our men. Before I continue, rest assured, these are not the rantings of an angry black Nigerian woman who has faced nothing but trauma at the hands of Nigerian men. This blog is from a well informed woman, who has had the opportunity to meet some spectacular Nigerian men, who have motivated me to this point, providing me with strength in various areas of my life. Unfortunately, the few rotten eggs bring these men down, let me explain ...

I am well aware that in every working environment from Nairobi to New York, the issue of female sexual harassment and all the other unpleasantities that fall around and under that category occur. But America is not facing a power crises, the White House is not spilling over with politicians recklessly stealing billions of dollars from the poor. America can feed herself; it is not facing serious prospects of extinction by the year 2025. Nigeria cannot afford to waste time, we need to be pushing this country into a new era. But incredulously, the so called movers and shakers, the people who have been given the responsibility to transform Nigeria into the paradise that she is meant to be are ‘preoccupied’. These men fail to see beyond their lustful desires, going as far as hiring personal assistants that do not arrange meetings with African leaders to solve our crises, or keep them on track to accomplish their tasks by providing them with the environment to produce innovative solutions. No, these men are simply glorified pimps, and I repeat, their assistants are simply working hard, ensuring that these men have a constant flow of young girls to meet their insatiable lustful desires.

I have always admired the confidence of Nigerian men but there is a thin line between confidence and disrespect. Boldly, these old men prey on young women, making their intentions extremely clear, using their power and often ill-gotten wealth as a lure. Tell me, wouldn’t you expect that at conferences geared at nation development, that these men in high positions of power would be more focused on what is at hand, than trying to bed a young girl? It is saddening that adults are making fools out of themselves in the vain attempt to secure a fleeting sensation. Do you know how many men, how many Nigerian men, I have lost respect for? Do you know how many have left a sour taste in my mouth as I stared at them amazed at their boisterous display of their lack of dignity. Nigeria, in the space of one hour, three men lost an opportunity to really do their jobs and make a difference in this country. Why? Because they were more concerned with lustful desires than lucrative development. Three men saw the potential in our initiative, but made subtle suggestions about the objectives of our partnership.

Your first response may probably be, “that is a shame, but that’s just how things works.” Point taken, but I refuse to accept that. I refuse to accept that at the age of eight I should...
have to bear older men making explicit sexual advances on me to the degree that they are arrested and thrown in jail. I refuse to accept that at the age of eleven a teacher attempts to ‘teach’ me things that I am too young to know. And should we accept it as a school principal, a reverend father, attempts to make me sit on his lap in a dark office? YES, it is a shame but this is NOT how it should work! I am lucky that I have always been taught to speak my mind so that none of these ‘predators’ had, have or will ever get a chance to take advantage of me. But, what about the other girls? What will happen to my daughter? My nieces? The ones who are too meek to speak up...Nigeria what is happening, what has already happened and what will continue to happen?

I did not come to Nigeria with idyllic notions of perfection. I fully understood that I would have to fight. I have to prove that my youth is a virtue not a vice, I have to prove that, my accent notwithstanding, I AM Nigerian, I have to fight to not be JUST my father’s daughter, but a bright girl with an vision. But Nigeria, I did not think I would have to fight tooth and nail simply to uphold my dignity. In a male-dominated environment, I knew I would have to push and fight my way to just be heard, but I refuse to be looked at like a young ambitious whore. I do not walk like a prostitute, I do not talk or act like a whore, therefore it seems blaringly obvious that I am not one.

As I stated earlier, I like to delve into the roots of problems so let me take you to a deeper layer. As you may have guessed, from a young age I have become accustomed to the routine dance of having to ward older men off. It has become a very well refined skill of mine if I may say so myself. So what you may be wondering, and indeed what I have been wondering, is why do my latest experiences trouble me so much? After all, you might say that it is more understandable for a forty year old man to hit on a nineteen year old than an eight year old; both are pathetic, but one is clearly pedophilic. I have already mentioned, I am angered that it is an epidemic amongst men in power who should be helping to rebuild our nation.

Nigeria, the problem is far deeper than what meets the eye. There is a mentality that is passed from one generation to another, I can see it slowly seeping into mine. To be blunt—the average Nigerian man believes that the average Nigeria woman is stupid; there is a subconscious lack of respect. I can already see you shaking your heads and disagreeing with me, but let me explain. It is a very subtle, but disastrous. A Nigerian man, like most men, sees an attractive women and thinks about her in a sexual way. No crime there right? He approaches her, tries to talk to her. Still, this fits into a normal code of conduct. Now let us examine this scenario that man is forty and the girl is ten years old; it happens! I think no one will disagree when I say that this forty year old man believes he has a chance with this ten year old girl because he is under the impression that this young girl is naïve, impressionable, and easily controlled. The logic for his action seems understandable. Now, ten years later, he approaches a twenty year old girl with an almost identical attitude; he is explicit, not charming. He makes his intentions less than subtle. He believes it will work. Why? He has a subconscious assumption that he is smarter, wiser, and more powerful, and therefore sees no need in beating around the bush. He will eventually end up with his prize. He believes this twenty year old still possess the naivety of that ten year old. When I turned a man in power down, he looked straight into my eye, saying, “that is what they all say.” No surprise, he made two or three more advances, before finally getting the message. However, that statement alone shows the impression this man and his colleagues have of young women.

The more I ponder this hypothesis, the more evidence I find to reinforce its veracity. I am sure many Nigerian women have heard the incongruous line: “can I have your number, I just want to be your friend.” To which I often reply: “you saw me for the first time in your life, moreover, we both know that your first thought was not ... hmm, she looks like a nice friend. It was probably more along the lines of hmm I would like to get her in bed.” Clearly, this new potential ‘friend’ knows his real intentions, but thinks that you are naive enough to fall for it. When a professional man, whom I have just met in a professional setting, picks up the phone to invite me to spend the weekend with him, he already assumes I will be ignorant enough to agree. Nigeria, we know that we are smart, our men are smart, they will not try if they are not somewhat convinced that they will succeed.

You may say that all I have said is true of any man but quite frankly I do not care about every man. In a country like America, if a man merely approaches an eight year old girl with sexual intentions, action will be taken. In Nigeria what do we when a thirteen year old is having a sexual affair with a thirty year old? Do we talk about it? No. Do these men face the penal repercussions? Of course not. Will they do it again and again? It does not
take a genius to figure that one out ...

Nigerian men, please start to value Nigerian women for what we are. We are beautiful, some would even say stunning. We are smart. We are ambitious. We are real women. We are not just sex on legs. In 2008, I should not be asking Nigerian men, my own men, to respect us. I will not accept this outrageous behavior, I will not succumb to it and you already know I will continue to fight it.

By the same token, Ladies, Nigerian Ladies, Young Nigerian ladies, you are more than your bodies. Sex is not your ticket; if you think sleeping your way to the top is your best and only strategy, then you are not ready for success. Your illicit actions might get you to the top momentarily, but without any respect do you really expect to be heard? Do you really expect to stay there? Do you really even believe that your brain, not ‘brain’, is your greatest asset? I cannot place all the blame on men; there are women out there who obligingly close the loop. The men have tried it and been successful. Wouldn’t any person continue to do something which they know they have been successful at in the past? It is human nature, it is logical. However, women, can we stop giving them their high success rates?

Nigeria, I have expressed my feelings and I am no longer angry. Nigeria I am sad, Nigeria I am worried. I beg you, can we get it together please? Can we become focused and deal with our real problems at hand? Again, at the risk of sounding crude, Nigeria is too talented, too rich, too significant to be turned into a jàgà jàgà republic over something as trivial as sex.
By Blair Laing

My name is:
I live in the South Kivu Province of Congo, outside Bukavu.
I was

My name is:
Esperance.
I was 10.
Band of Hutu.
Night.
Two years.
Two?
They left - me - for dead.

My name is:
Honorable.
There were five.
And the gun barrel.
They took: turns.
bro I am ken.

My name is:
Euphrasie.
I was working in the fields.
First,
stiiicks.
Then knivvvvvves.
I don't know how long.

My name is:
Pascaline.
They found me in the bush (((hiding,))
My 11 month old daughter.
De(story)ed.

My name is:
Ombeni.
I was sixteen.
Pregnant.
They
It
me open.
My baby -
died.
I didn’t.

My name is:
Claudine.
I was
strapped
to a tree.
Gang gun inside.
They
pulled:
the trigger.

My name is:

I am one
of 42,000.
I am

one

About the poem

This is a poem about the rape and genocide that women face in Congo today. It was inspired by a
New York Times article, which then led me to read more about the situation. The women and their
stories are, for the most part, true, although I have taken some liberty in rearranging and expounding
upon them. The 42,000 a statistic taken from The Guardian that says that over 42,000 women
were treated for serious sexual assaults in the South Kivu province in 2005 alone.

I wrote this poem to help speak for these women who can not or will not speak for themselves. I hope
that spreading their message, even one person at a time, will teach people about the terrors of the
world and inspire them to do something about them.
Towards The Creation of Four Countries Where Two, Chad and Sudan, Currently Exist

By Kwadwo Osei-Opare

Introduction

"With [me], no northerner, no Muslim would bow his head to a Southerner...The fight against the south would continue to the finish." - Hissène Habré, Former President of Chad, 1982-1990.

Chad and Sudan are in turmoil. Since Chad’s independence from France on August 11, 1960, and Sudan’s independence from Britain on January 1, 1956, the Northern Arabic Muslims have ruled over the Southern Black Christians and animists, subjecting them to various forms of discrimination. These discriminations are not abating in the near future, but are increasing. Southerners in both countries have tried to gain basic freedoms and rights, but have been unsuccessful. Moreover, people have perished in the attempts to attain those rights and freedoms. Furthermore, the long-standing civil wars between the North and South have caused millions of deaths in Chad and Sudan. Unfortunately, this is the reality in Chad and Sudan. Although the present reality is dire, scholars in Chad and Sudan, and Northerners in both countries want Chad and Sudan’s unions to succeed. In a sense, when it comes to Chad and Sudan’s geopolitical boundaries, these scholars and northerners are idealists and romantics. They hope that the populace will get along, believing that their idealistic goals, although contradictory to the bleak realities facing Chad and Sudan will somehow reconcile; however, these paradoxical entities have not reconciled and will not. This paper will seek to reconcile the reality and ideology present in Chad and Sudan by proposing to partition Chad and Sudan, thus creating four states were two currently exist. It is important to note that Chad and Sudan’s divisional structure is almost identical, thus the premises for separation will apply interchangeably to both countries. The three reasons for separation are: first, secession will end the civil wars within both countries. Second, partitioning both countries will stop discrimination, and loss of civil liberties, while giving the people self-determination. Third, Sudan and Chad are arbitrarily delineated countries, created by colonialism and violence.

Argument For Unity

Before advocating secession, it would be helpful to examine people’s attitudes and rationales for maintaining the status quo. The first reason given by anti-secessionists to maintain the status quo is the belief that the world’s current geopolitical borders are permanent, timeless, and God-given features, which should not be altered. However, this thought pattern is averse to historical evidence. History reveals that borders are arbitrary and not permanent, and thus are subject to change and alteration. An instance of this phenomenon is Yugoslavia. It is now Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Borders alter; it is a fact we have to accept and not dismiss.

The second anti-secessionists argument is that Chad and Sudan are melting pots, and because they are melting pots, they are in the process of forming distinctive Chadian and Sudanese identities. Professor Elafath A. Salam, at the International Islamic University, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, articulates the anti-secessionists melting pot argument, stating: “the congested cultures of Sudan [and Chad would form] bubbling melting pots that would eventually simmer into an invigorated and uniquely Sudanese [and Chadian] bloods” (Salem 36). It suggests that the varying ethnic groups in Chad and Sudan will synchronize and create distinct national societies. However, the conception of a nationalist society is a pretext for one culture, the Northern Arabic Islamic culture, to engulf the Southern African Christian culture. Thus, the romanticized melting pot theory is divorced from reality, and is a disguise for Northern absorption. Professor Arou of the University of Khartoum sheds light on this development. He notes that the identity, which is supposed to form in Chad and Sudan, is “a [Northern] theocracy,” where “Islam will be the hallmark of the state.”

Kwadwo Osei-Opare was born in Mampong, Ghana. Soon afterwards, he moved to the Transkei, South Africa; shortly after Nelson Mandela ascended into the presidency, Kwadwo moved to Pretoria, South Africa. He lived in Pretoria until 2002, when he moved to Newark, New Jersey. Kwadwo Osei-Opare is currently a sophomore at Stanford University and is a history major. After Stanford, Osei-Opare hopes to attend law school, and subsequently prosecute war criminals. An avid Manchester United supporter, Kwadwo is hoping/praying that Manchester United accomplishes the impossible this year, by winning the ‘quintuple.’ Besides his zealous, border-line insane, support of Manchester United, Osei-Opare is an avid reader of The New Republic and London Review of Books.
(36). Thus, the intended goal is not to create distinct Chadian and Sudanese cultures, but to fashion Islamic states; however, this vision has not materialized because of vigorous Southern attempts to maintain their culture.

The non-secessionists, realizing that the Southerners were engaged in attempts to thwart plans to create Islamic identities and preserve their own identities, interjected that “for some groups that pot would understandably bubble more slowly. The Southern Sudanese [and Chadians], for example, would retain distinctions in language, custom, and religion, but only for some time” (34). This insertion was clever, but it counteracted their position. It allowed them to base their argument on the future, but it also highlighted the fact that they were not intending to create distinct Chadian and Sudanese cultures, but Northern Arabic Islamic ones. This deduction leads to an idea of Southern inferiority and Northern supremacy. The idea of Northern supremacy emanates from the fundamental principle that the South, and not the North, will succumb to the Northern customs. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to assume that the Northern culture will be the hallmark of the state, without an assumption of Northern supremacy. However, the belief in one’s supremacy is dangerous, and often leads to violence and discrimination. This occurrence is a fundamental problem in Chad and Sudan, and a problem that only exists when various and opposing factions are involuntarily bound.

Patchwork Societies

Colonialism arbitrarily created Chad and Sudan; this placed antagonistic factions together, making it difficult from the outset to create a peaceful society in Chad and Sudan. Professor Azvedo of the University of North Carolina, an expert on Chad, concurs that it is almost impossible to create a peaceful coexistent society in Chad and Sudan. He argues that what complicated matters in Chad and Sudan was the “intrusion of trans-statal and trans-ethnic Islam from the east and the north.” The intrusions, in the 1800s, formed “unstratified societies into clearly delineated solidarities based on religion and slavery, reinforcing two violent pulls, Islamic and non-Islamic, free and enslaved” (Azvedo 19). Azvedo claims that Northern invasions removed any hope of peaceful coexistence. Additionally, I assert that colonialism did not create these divisions, but it further exacerbated them. Salam concurs with analysis. He asserts that “Sudan [and Chad] retain rather clear, long-standing ethnic distinctions which are operative in the country’s social and political life, and which show every evidence of persisting” (Salam 34). He alleges that these divisions are long-standing, and will continue to endure. I agree with this assessment. Furthermore, a means to stop these divisions and antagonisms should be presented; the manner in which to do so, would be to separate Chad and Sudan along those precise ethnic, geographical, and religious divisions. However, leaving the countries in their current status quo embraces the ideological assumption that the peoples within both countries will eventually live harmoniously. Unfortunately, this supposition is divorced from reality. The reality is, these two countries retain clear social distinctions, which will not abate in the near future.

The big question, which looms over Chad and Sudan, is why these two countries with deep underlying factions have remained intact. Professor Salam provides an answer to this strange circumstance. He contends that the factions are “held together by the minimum amount of necessary common loyalties” (33). Salem does not define these common loyalties, but he proposes they exist. I suggest these loyalties are violent arms and colonial rule, which are tenuous links at best. Furthermore, colonialism has already being broken, leaving violent arms the last nebulous link to still be breached. Consequently, Chad and Sudan are not assimilating into nationalist configurations, but are retaining their time-honored divisions; and while the two countries are currently intact, they will soon cede.

Chad and Sudan’s failure to give civil liberties to its citizens will cause their disintegration. In both countries, Northern Arabic Muslims have denied Southern African Christians civil liberties. I assert that these civil liberties are entitled to all humans, and that those who do not have them should do everything in their means to attain them. If secession irreversibly means attaining civil liberties, then it is a means that should be utilized.

Civil Liberties

The Southern Sudanese are within their rights to seek secession, in order to gain their denied civil liberties. As Dr. Francis Madding Deng, representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, recalls, the first discrimination policies against the South came between 1953 and 1955, when out “of the 800 posts previously held by the colonial powers, only eight would go to the Southerners” (Deng 94). This indicated to the South

“Sudan [and Chad] retain rather clear, long-standing ethnic distinctions which are operative in the country’s social and political life, and which show every evidence of persisting”
that the North would rule the country, without Southern opposition and interference. Allowing the North to administer national policies favoring their projects, towns, and facilities, while discarding Southern towns, schools, and hospitals. This sparked deep unrest in the South. What further strained relations was the fact that the “Arab-led Khartoum government reneged on promises to southerners to create a federal system.” The proposed federal system would have given Southerners autonomy and civil rights; however, the North rejected from the pledge. Consequently, an avalanche of prejudices against the South followed, forcing the South to seek secession to overturn their unpleasant fortunes.

Similarly, Chadians reserve the right to secession if it results in their acquisition of civil liberties. In 1960, analogous to South Africa after apartheid rule, the black majority, the South, headed by President Tombalbaye, came into power. Tombalbaye embittered by Northern and French treatment during colonialism, consequently created policies that disenfranchised the north. As Azvedo asserts, Northerners received very few lower to middle level few governmental posts, they fell into the hands of the Sara, a Southern tribe (Azvedo 92). Knowledge of remedial governmental involvement triggered serious Northern concerns. Further Southern governmental discriminatory policies justified Northern fears, resulting in one thousand Northerners to seek sanctuary in Libya. Those who remained united to form the National Liberation Front (FROLINAT) to attain justice, prompting demonstrations throughout the country. Again, I argue that Northerners were entitled to secession because their civil liberties were denied.

Indeed, reconciliatory attempts were made between the North and South, however they failed. In 1973, the military overthrew President Tombalbaye in an attempt to create national harmony. However, as Professor Azvedo states, their intervention “turned out to be no more than old wounds dressed in less colorful gauzes, veering Chadian politics from one violent ethnically exclusive autocracy to another” (100). These superficial colorful gauzes are Southern and Northern leaders. The old wounds they keep creating are the denial of civil liberties to opposing ethnic groups. Since the military’s removal from power in 1978, Northern rulers have amassed and remained in power, effectively turning the tables on their Southern counterparts. From 1978 until this day, the Northerners have deprived the Southerners of their rights. Similarly, I contend that analogous to their Northern counterparts before them, and the Southern Sudanese that the Southern Chadians have the right to secession, because their civil liberties have been denied.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia is an example of what awaits a state that denies its ethnic populations civil liberties. Vladimir Gligorov, a Serbian economist, and son of the first elected Macedonian president, remarks upon Yugoslavia’s dissolution, he contends that “Yugoslavia broke up because [the] different nations that had composed it struggled for power in order to secure the basic political goods: freedom, rights, equality, [and] justice” (Gligorov 53). Gligorov asserts that the ethnic populaces struggled to attain basic civil liberties. Moreover, because they could not attain them, they sought secession. Similarly, Gligorov’s comments concur with my premise that when an ethnic population is denied its rights - justice, equality, and freedom - that group must do whatever is in their means to attain them, even if it means seceding. He further asserts the premise that a state that does not provide these liberties awaits dissolution.

Gligorov concluded, “In the end, such a state [that] could not supply its subjects with a sense of justice, [which] it even constantly increased the sense of injustice and deprivation; accordingly, it [can] not be seen as legitimate. That was the fundamental problem of Yugoslavia” (58). Because Yugoslavia could not guarantee its people justice, it was illegitimate; furthermore, because it was illegitimate it dissolved. In addition, I assert that the Yugoslavian case pertains to Chad and Sudan. Similarly, Chad and Sudan are illegitimate because they fail to give their citizens rights. Moreover, because neither is legitimate, secession is permissible. Unfortunately, when secession is denied violence follows.

**Civil Wars**

By partition Chad and Sudan into four states, the international legal dynamics of the situation irreversibly alter. This shift from two countries to four countries will decrease the violence in the region. The reality of the situation is, since they attained independence, civil wars have been a constant feature in both countries, resulting in more than two million deaths, and a further four million displaced. Foreign powers have not interfered in these conflicts because they have claimed to uphold the principle of national sovereignty. For example, as Professor Azvedo states, “the French simply looked on, claiming to uphold the principle of non-interference in Chad’s internal affairs” (Azvedo 112). His comments infer
that in their current geopolitical boundaries as Chad and Sudan, the international community will not intervene to stop the civil wars because such military action will invariably mean meddling with the host government’s sovereignty. It is not to argue that foreign countries do not condemn the violence, or attempt to stop it diplomatically. However, it points out that with the current international mentality, no military interference will be forthcoming in Chad and Sudan. Yet, I contend that if Sudan and Chad are split, and four independent countries exist were two once where that the foreign powers will intervene. For instance, if the Northern country of Chad attacked the Southern country of Chad, it is no longer a civil war, but an international conflict. Moreover, because it is an international conflict and the sovereignty of the Southern country is in jeopardy, the international community will intervene in that hypothetical case for the very same reason it refuses intervention now, which is to uphold the sovereignty of a nation. Thus, by separating both countries, by default, the civil wars end.

The violence in Chad and Sudan has aggravated deep divisions already present between the North and South. Azvedo inserts, “The civil war had tragic and lasting consequences, intensifying the regional and religious hatred between the north and south (Azvedo 106).” His statement alleges that the wars did not create the divisions and animosity in the country; but solely exacerbated it to intolerable levels. Before colonialism, these groups could not live together. Colonialism simply amplified these divisions by uniting them under arbitrary banners of Chad and Sudan. The violence resulting from these unions demonstrated the paradoxical understandings of the anti-secessionists, whose ideology romanticized a peaceful union between the two factions under the post-colonial banners of Chad and Sudan, compared to the reality of the situation, which the civil wars demonstrated that these antagonistic groups could not live together, and that they should not be living together.

Conclusion

Yet, the four-state solution is not perfect, and there are drawbacks to it. In the four state proposal, conflict within the region might simply shift from its present religious, geographic, and ethnic lines to socioeconomic ones, pitting the wealthy against the poor. Furthermore, violence might erupt during the actual separation between the North and South with Northern attempts, for economic reasons, to maintain the current status quo. If such a scenario happens, violence will invariably follow. However, the amount of deaths resulting from this, will not equate to the high levels of violence present in both civil wars. Today, attempts to reconcile the reality and ideology in Sudan is under works with a deal to grant Southerners secession in 2011. Furthermore, this deal should be forthcoming in Chad as well. The reality is, Chad and Sudan are in dire straights. Hence, it is time to bury the current turmoil in Chad and Sudan, and usher in a new era of four states. An era that reconciles romanticism and reality, an era that allows parents to indoctrinate their children with their customs and beliefs, without the fear that those same beliefs will be used as an excuse for armed militia to kill them. Buddha murmurs, “Better than a thousand hollow words is one that brings peace”; I bring one: apportionment.

Hence, it is time to bury the current turmoil in Chad and Sudan, and usher in a new era of four states. An era that reconciles romanticism and reality, an era that allows parents to indoctrinate their children with their customs and beliefs, without the fear that those same beliefs will be used as an excuse for armed militia to kill them.
Violence in a Peaceful Land


Islam in the Educational System


Bakari 313-316 is a paper written by Rayaya Abdalla Issa


Education Policy and Data Center: Kenya National Education Profile Education Policy and Data Center. April 10 2008. (pp. 2 and pg 4)

Manani, Henry Kemoli Accelerated Learning; New Opportunities for Children at Risk Seminar Kenya Institute of Education. November 2007 (pg 6)


or online:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/18/world/africa/18congo.html?_r=2
&pagewanted=1&sq=congo&st=cse&scp=2&oref=slogin
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/nov/14/congo.chrismcgreal

The Glorious Divorce

SAUTI

The word Sauti - Swahili for voice - captures the spirit of the Stanford Journal of African Studies. Sauti is committed to ensuring that student voices are heard both within and without the Stanford community. Through the reproduction of research compilations and personal narratives of field experiences, we seek to highlight critical African issues, to ignite meaningful discussions and to invoke calls to action. Although Africa gains most of its global attention by virtue of its 'problems' and 'needs', the continent possesses troves of opportunity. It is our aim to present a balanced view of the continent, juxtaposing the ills that bedevil Africa with the awe-inspiring events and developments that are primed to propel the continent into an era where its troubles are but relics of history.