Scenario 1. The danger of disintegration has passed (extrapolatory forecast)

It is impossible not to notice those peculiarities of political development in Russia that distinguish it from the USSR and suggest as a great probability the preservation of territorial integrity.

All the republics, without exception, struck out together against the authority of the former Soviet Union Center. A completely different situation exists in Russia. Here, krajs and oblasts express their growing discontent with the political privileges of the ethnic entities. In addition, in the aftermath of the disintegration of the USSR, Russia has already experienced the enormous difficulties that arise as a result of a break in traditional economic relations, the establishment of customs agencies and political barriers, and sharp increases in transportation tariffs when moving from one "independent" state to the other.

The union broke up during the height of the ethnic movements, but by 1993 there was a general decline in ethnic separatism. It proved its ineffectiveness in state management, its inability to stabilize the economy and, most important, its inability to ensure political stability in the new states. Under these conditions, the ruling elite in the republics swayed in the direction of the union and federal authority, considering that, after the end of the dual authority, it had become clear to them whom to bet on in Moscow.

The changing attitudes toward federal authority on the part of the leaders of the republics and the simultaneous development of the idea of civil consent as the basic political doctrine of the Kremlin – all this contributed considerably to the [possibility of the] signing of agreements between the Center and the republics on the differentiation of authority, which have severely dampened the separatist mood in the republics.

The prospects of preserving the integrity of Russia, in large measure, are connected to the peculiarities of its ethnic composition. The Russian Federation, unlike the USSR as a whole, is fairly ethnically homogeneous. Ethnic Russians make up 83% of the population of the country. In more than half the country's regions (49 of them), their specific weight in the overall composition of the population varies from 85% up to 98%. In another 25 regions, they make up more than three-quarters of the population.

The non-Russian population of the Federation is rather non-homogenous. The majority of it (approximately two-thirds) is comprise of the so-called "diasporal minorities" (Ukrainians, White Russians, Poles etc.), living in foreign states or outside the territory of their republics in the Russian Federation; the leaders of ethnic movements, associations of countrymen, and ethnic communities similar in their ethno-political expectations do not ask for any more than the creation of cultural autonomies.

The titular nations, residing within the borders of their ethnic territories, make up less than 5% of the population of the Federation, and only they are capable of advancing claims of secession from Russia.

It would be easier for those republics located in Russia's outlying areas to secede. This means that, in the worse-case scenario, Russia might only "crumble" from the edges, but not break up.

Undoubtedly, A. Prazauskas is correct in claiming that "with the exception of the overseas territories and the cases of external military intervention, not a single ethnically homogeneous state has broken up in modern times. There is no reason to think that Russia would become the first such example.

Scenario number 2. Further erosion of the Federation in its southern outlying districts (Chechnya as a source of separatism).

Today's Chechnya is, de facto, independent of Russia, as neither the Constitution nor the laws of the Russian Federation are in force in its territory.

Can an "independent Chechnya" inspire other republics?

Strictly theoretically, it is possible to postulate this idea: Chechnya, separated from Russia, is somehow getting richer, and thus in some sense invites the others to follow to suit. This situation is almost unimaginable, as the prospects for simply restoring the economy in the near future, or even some kind of stabilization of life in Chechnya, are rather problematic.

The very conditions that helped the Chechen forces supporting Djokhar Dudaev and his close colleagues to achieve military success will interfere with any attempt to establish an atmosphere of peace; namely, they are the existence of military settlements and an armed population. Given the current state of destruction, these particular conditions will lead to criminal activity, including areas outside the Chechen Republic.

Even now, the level of incursions on neighboring territories is increasing. I am convinced that none of the present Chechen leaders is interested in allowing a considerable portion of the population to act capriciously. They are for keeping the militarized freebooters under control. But it is difficult to appease their own field commanders, to suppress those who only yesterday comprised the elite and the nucleus of the armed forces. Dudaev could not do it, and there is no guarantee that his successors will be able to handle such demilitarization and disarmament. At the same time, the presence of these freebooters creates insurmountable obstacles to any reorganization plans of the Chechen Republic and engenders serious dangers for its neighbors, especially the for the various peoples of Dagestan.

Under these conditions, when anti-Chechen sentiments grow in the neighboring republics, the probability that Dagestan or any other republic of the Northern Caucasus will voluntary join Chechnya or that they might follow in its footsteps is very low.

We cannot rule out that, in due course, the Chechen leadership will come up with a plan for an aggressive military expansion into Dagestan, where the Chechen armed forces could get support from local Chechens and other ethnically and spiritually similar communities (Russia's ability to neutralize such a threat quickly and effectively is somewhat questionable). However, the assumption seems more probable to me that, in the foreseeable future, Chechnya will not be ready to capture other territories, as it will be very preoccupied with finding solutions for its rather complex internal problems.

Today this republic truly strains under the burden of its independence. The national consolidation did not last long with Chechen society. As soon as the fear of an external enemy, Russia, disappeared, conflicts between the various regional, clan, political and military groups immediately appeared and intensified within the republic. A strategic effort toward a solution to this problem is the development of an intra-Chechen dialogue as a basis for consolidation of the population of Chechnya, as well as the signing of an agreement between the federal authority and the Chechen Republic, specifically defining the Republic's status.

Scenario number 3. Erosion of the federation as a result of growing Russian nationalism and maniacal "great-power" chauvinism.

The detonator of the outbreak of Russian nationalism could be the marginal groups of the Russian population. These groups include first the representatives of the Russian diaspora in the "near abroad." The level of discontent engendered by the display of real and imaginary national discrimination is much higher here than it is in Russia; on this basis, a special species of nationalism is developing in a number of regions of the former Union – initially in the Crimea, in Northern Kazakhstan, and in Transdniester. This is the rise of Russian irredentism, a movement to annex these territories to Russia. It is on the irredentist movement that the national-chauvinist organizations place their bets. In the case of an open conflict occurring in the above-mentioned regions between the Russian irredentist and nationalist movements of the titular nationalities, a natural mechanism of ethnic solidarity can automatically come into play which, as the experience of many newly independent states shows, is quickly distributed through ethnic associations, especially under the aggravating conditions of the socio-economic crises.

The Russian refugees from the conflict zones (there are about 1.5 million people, concentrated largely in the most conflict-prone area of Russia, in the Northern Caucasus) could be the source of increasing international pressure and growing Russian nationalism. In addition, among the refugees there is a large number of people sharing a radical nationalist orientation..

Perhaps the greatest danger of an explosion of nationalist sentiments comes from a unique subgroup of the Russian population, the Cossacks, and especially their militarized factions in the Northern Caucasus, where they come into direct contact with other armed groups, particularly the Chechens.

Thus, in the case of sharp deterioration of the ethno-political and economic situations in Russia's neighboring states of the NIS and an increase in the mass of refugee flow, the strengthening of Russian irredentism, or in the deterioration of the economic situation in Russia and the development of separatist tendencies provoked by it, one could expect outbreaks of nationalism coming from both the Russian and non- Russian population.

It is impossible to exclude the expansion of the "nomenklatura nationalism." By the term "nomenklatura of nationalism," we refer to the ideology of that segment of the former political elite (as a rule, those of the second and third echelon) that today is making its comeback to the governing bodies in Moscow, as well as those political figures in the regions who, being in power since 1991, have ceased to be ashamed of their nationalistic views, proclaiming them openly.

These groups are not only the bearers of Soviet stereotypes and prejudices (anti- Western, anti-Semitic, anti-Islamic sentiments, etc.), but are also pragmatically interested in the continually growing nationalistic mood in society. It allows them, first of all, to shift the blame for their own mistakes in management onto their predecessors, the politicians who responded to "Gaidar's call," and whom they accuse of having betrayed Russia's national interests for the benefit of the West; second, to lobby for the interests of that group of entrepreneurs who are interested in state protectionism under the pretext of protecting against Western influence the "true Russian entrepreneurship"; third, to defend themselves against possible competition from foreigners, from encroachments on their place in the world of officialdom, and in some cases from criticism, under the pretext that they are being criticized for being "true to the national idea."

The increasing influence of national populism is eloquently shown in the comparative analysis of the electorates of different political parties elected to the State Duma in 1993 and 1995. If in 1993 it was possible to say that the "Democratic" voters and the "Communist" voters or the "Zhirinovsky camp" were polar opposites based on their ethnic platforms and the specific weight of their ethnic prejudices, then today we have to say that the differences have, in this respect, disappeared. Supporters of any political party with any particular unique political programs are observed to have practically the same levels of xenophobia and national close-mindedness.