SYMBOLIC SYSTEMS 150:
Computers and Social Decisions (3 units)
Spring Quarter 2001-2002, Stanford University
Instructor: Todd Davies
Background on the Internet and Democracy (4/10/2002)
Characteristics: old versus new media
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Old media: one directional (mass media); slower; more established
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New media: bidirectional (exchange); faster; more convenient for user,
more dynamic, more global, more difficult to control/regulate; easier to
filter; cheaper at the margin; personalization
Some observations
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20th century media (broadcasting): one-to-many, with little opportunity
to talk back; tended to draw people away from each other - authoritative
rather than interactive
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Also some positive effects - broadcasting government proceedings in some
countries, for example
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Television and movies increase focus on images, 2-dimensional. "The medium
is the message" - McLuhan; point ignored in early persuasion research of
the 1950s
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"Old" media in many ways anti-democratic - increased power of a few ruling
over the many across vast distances
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Internet and new media provide new possibilities for decentralized social
decision making, dialogue, and dissemination. Will this potential
be realized?
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Barber - 3 possibilities: Panglossian - complacency, Pandoran - caution,
Jeffersonian - hope
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Rheingold - need for people to be able to come together based on affinity,
with technologocical and social infrastructure that supports the "public
sphere"
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Sunstein - danger of narrowcasting, selective exposure, group polarization
Failures of democracy in the U.S.
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Failure of representative government to reflect the will of the people
(e.g. health care, gun control) - may sometimes be seen as failure of "tyrrany
of the majority" (e.g. free speech, separation of church and state, guns?)
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Popular misconceptions (e.g. foreign aid, overhead costs of private versus
public health insurance, wealth and income inequality)
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Failure of plebiscites seemingly in the interests of the majority, e.g.
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Prop 217 in California (1996) - 51% voted against restoring a slightly
higher marginal tax rate (10-11% instead of 9.3%) on the top 1% of income
recipients, even though 99% or residents would experience no tax increase
and it would raise needed revenue for public services
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CA Proposition 186 and Federal health care reform - 1994; Prop 186 (Single
payer health insurance for all Californians) lost by a large margin, and
even 42% of the uninsured voted against it
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Education and prison bond votes from 70s to 90s favored more costly incarceration
instead of spending on schools
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Success of popular initiatives limiting individual rights (e.g. CA Props
187 - 1994, 209 - 1996, 227 - 1998, 21/22 - 2000)
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"Sledgehammer" effect - overly broad legislation (e.g. Prop 13 - 1978,
rent control in San Francisco)
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Rapid rise in wealth/income inequality in u.s. since ~1977, tax changes
that benefit the wealthy or better-off (decline in top tax bracket from
85.5% in the late 50s to 26.7% in 1989; for median family rose from
9.06% to 24.3% during the same interval)
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Rise of supranational institutions that subvert local democracy (WTO,
IMF/World Bank, Hague protocols?)
Some systemic causes of democratic failure
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Criteria other than popular support often predominate in legislatures:
pork-barrel deals, influence-buying, preservationist bias (e.g. defense
spending after the Cold War)
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Representation, concentration of power distort incentives - more true the
greater the concentration of power
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Distance of government from localities
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Size of the polity
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Economic inequality can perpetuate itself through disproportionate influence
on outcomes
Some approaches to these problems
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Past approaches (term limits, motor voter legislation, vote-by-mail)
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Campaign finance reform (soft money ban; but see Buckley vs Valeo - 1976)
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Electoral reform
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None of the above (NOTA) - failed in CA in March 2000
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open primaries
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alternative voting systems (instant runoff, proportional representation)
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Lottery government (Phillips and Callenbach)
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Participatory democracy
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Deliberative democracy
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Fishkin, Luskin, and Jowell - deliberation changes people's minds, sometimes
dramatically and lastingly, if they are exposed to opinions of a random
sample of citizens
Biases in mass media - the standard progressive view
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Increasing control of broadcast and print media in the hands of a few conglomerate
entertainment companies (see http://www.thenation.com/special/bigten.html)
- result of deregulatotory legislation
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U.S. unique in extent of private broadcast media control - even PBS has
commercials (roots in 30s decisions about radio - McChesney book)
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U.S. also has most economic inequality among rich countries
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Corporate controlled media bias reporting because of
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lack of separation between corporation's interests and news reporting (e.g.
Time's Man of the Year 2001, cross-promotion) - must answer to stockholders,
maximize profits
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influence with politicians through contributions, opportunities for access
(including as commentators)
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internalized values of well-paid media employees
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desire for exciting news stories, but underlying stability
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geared toward well-off customers, bring in more money
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threats of lawsuits by corporations (e.g. movie The Insider)
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Good reference: Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political
Economy of Mass Media - institutional analysis; problem is structural rather
than due to the values of people who are interested in reporting the news
- those who don't go along have a hard time keeping their jobs
Some problems with the standard view
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Public has shown little interest in alternative media even when it is widely
available (e.g., KPFA's ratings have not grown much despite its availability
throughout the bay area)
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U.S. is in many respects more democratic, less paternalistic than the "egalitarian"
countries of europe - more referenda, less secrecy, more free speech; and
europeans often move rightward when popular voice is heard
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Widespread belief in u.s. that media are biased toward being too liberal,
not too conservative
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