Stanford University
SYMBSYS 129: Neuroscience and experience Winter 2006 |
"Neuroscience and experience" Even before Descartes, and exemplified in Burtons (1632) Anatomy of Melancholy, attempts were being made to explain even relatively complicated subjective states like depression on the basis of the neuroscience of the day. While such attempts may now seem to us to be laughably naïve, it is actually an open question whether we are not ourselves guilty of premature closure on this topic. In particular, some of our current neuroscience may be superceded; similarly, the recent attempt to bootstrap a new science of consciousness from diverse findings in neuroscience and psychology in the past decade has been considerably delayed by the restatement in new guise of old questions such as whether the world external to us is an illusion, or indeed unreal. This course is above all an attempt to provide tools to talk and think about these issues and does not presume to give ultimate answers. At the level of individual neurons as that of the concerted action of groups of neurons, it considers alternatives to the standard paradigm such as resonate and fire, and how the subthreshold oscillations ubiquitous in the brain may be exploited for neural computation. It then goes on to consider the relatively certain knowledge we have about neural representation of the individual sensory worlds and multimodal mapping. Theories of consciousness and evidence for them, including pathologies of conscious perception like Capgras, which compels the patient to consider his next of kin and friends to be imposters pretending to be the real thing, are then introduced. With this equipment, we then consider the history of theories of the mind, and consider whether there are historical universal that give us clues, however tantalising, as to who we are. |
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Meeting Time & Place | |
11 am Tues. and Thurs. - 208 |
To access the course website (registered students only): |