Economic Analysis of Domestic Violence
Most economists, when studying the economics of a family unit, study cooperative families. An example of a non-cooperative unit is a family with domestic violence, one of the most widespread crimes against women. In a paper titled, “An Economic Analysis of Domestic Violence”, Amy Farmer argues that level of violence in a family decreases when the women receives greater income and support from outside the marriage. This seems to support the hypothesis that increased financial empowerment of women will lead to decreased levels of violence in abusive relationships.
The paper elaborates with economic analysis on the how women’s income contributes to this decrease. The rationale provided is that when a woman’s income increases, so does her consumption. This makes the significance of each purchase less, and because each purchase is less meaningful to the woman, the husband is less able to inflict violence on her for a given transfer. They are still unsure as to whether the husband’s income factors into this model. They also say that as women’s alternatives to violent marriage improve, so does the violence they face.
According to the paper: “Men are assumed to indirectly receive positive utility from inflicting violence while women get negative utility from having violence inflicted upon them. A woman stays in the relationship as long as her relationship utility exceeds that of her utility outside the relationship, her threat point. A man may choose to make transfers to the woman to increase her marital utility and, therefore, keep her in the violent relationship. The comparative statics derived from the noncooperative model provide some clear predictions on the determinants of violence in an abusive relationship. An increase in the woman’s income is predicted to decrease the amount of violence.”
Although this is a lot of economic jargon, it is interesting to note the economics behind the concepts that we discuss in domestic violence. The woman stays often because staying provides some better options than leaving. Oftentimes, these benefits are monetary, and that’s where the economics come in. This idea that the abuser keeps the victim in the violent relationship by “making transfers…to increase her martial utility” is also very interesting. It seems to highlight the control aspect of an abusive relationship and the extent to which the perpetrator will go to keep the victim in a place of subservience.
According to the study, women who have better economic opportunities outside the household tend to be more likely to leave violent situations. Additionally, a study by Tauchen showed that among women who choose to stay, those with higher incomes will experience less violence. This seems to support the sociological model of domestic violence which sees domestic violence as a result of the inequality of women. They argue that “Wife abuse happens because it can happen. If women have more alternatives then it can no longer happen.”
Using this economic analysis, the paper argues that “The model…assumes that services affect the level of violence only as an exogenous variable which increases a woman’s threat point. However, if the threat point of the woman is unknown to the man, she may use services to signal to him that the violence must decrease or she will leave the relationship. Use of services such as shelters, help-lines, police intervention or the court system may be a way for women to send the appropriate signal. This analysis could explain why so many women use services only to return home or drop charges in a few days.”
I had never thought about reasons for women leaving or staying in a domestic violence situation on the basis of economics. It would be interesting to see how well this theory applies to correlations of the wealth of a country and rates of domestic violence. I would also like to see if other forms of leverage that women may have, besides monetary leverage, could also contribute to this negative correlation with domestic violence.
Farmer, Amy, and Jill Tiefenthaler. 1997. An economic analysis of domestic violence. Review of Social Economy 55: 337-58.


