OIL & WAR:A NEW DIMENSION TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
By
Alain Lillie, Gabe Lowenkroan
Wars
have been fought throughout the history of mankind. Some have pitted ideologies against each other, others have
warred over boundaries, and some have been fought in the name of religion. As the world enters the new millennium, it
is entirely possible, if not probable, that history's list for the most common
causes for war will be expanded as nations battle for a vital natural resource:
oil. It is certainly true that a valid
argument can be made that countries have already
battled for this natural resource.
However, events such as the CIA led coup in 1953 to rid Iran of its
prime minister who resisted western oil corporations in his nation or the Gulf
War could pale in comparison to the battles waged when nations finally realize
that oil is not an inexhaustible resource.
The basic claim of this paper, then, is that oil could be an salient
source of conflict in the modern international community. To defend such a claim, a three prong
approach will be used. The first
section will build the foundation for this argument by looking at the
disturbing societal attitudes and misperceptions in the United States regarding
the world's supply of oil. From there,
the dangers of worldwide overpopulation and the industrialization of third
world countries will be discussed. The
third and final section will examine China's present oil situation and discuss
how this situation could eventually lead to military conflict.
PART I
In 1973 and again in 1978,
Americans responded to the call to lessen their dependence on natural
resources, namely oil. The Arab oil
embargo in 1973
demonstrated the power that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) held in dictating oil production and pricing. As oil prices quadrupled, the pocketbooks of Americans were hit
hard at the gas pumps. To mitigate the
effects of the oil embargo and the recognized dangers of dependence on foreign
oil, Americans began to car pool, they reduced their miles driven, and
generally they rallied behind the concept of "Project Independence,"
an effort to end reliance on imported oil.
The nation's policy makers responded as well. In 1975, Congress approved higher fuel efficiency standards and a
national highway speed limit of 55 miles an hour. The war between Iran and Iraq in 1978 prolonged the oil crisis
until the mid-eighties. In 1986, oil
exporters flooded the market in response to OPEC's failure to meet its
production quotas in the face of weak demand.
In turn, oil prices plummeted, all but ending the conservation efforts
and gains of the seventies and early eighties.
Americans have virtually
forgotten about conserving energy, especially oil. Sure, car pooling continues, but now it is in response to commute time, not to a reduction of
gasoline usage. Furthermore, car
pooling seems to be a dying breed as well.
This is best illustrated on any highway near a major metropolitan area. It is not uncommon to see vehicles in the
car pool lane moving along swiftly while the single-driver automobiles in the
other three lanes could best be described as stuck in a quagmire. From 1970 to 1995, annual mileage traveled
per U.S. vehicle, perhaps due to the middle-class' massive migration to the
suburbs, increased 16% to 13,000 miles per year. As for "Project Independence," when was the last time
you heard, read, or viewed on television that it is imperative that all
Americans reduce their oil based energy consumption? The policies enacted during the oil crisis period have also been
all but eroded. In 1995, Congress
repealed the national speed limit, thus allowing states to set speed limits as
high as 75 miles per hour. And while the
efficiency for U.S. autos has improved greatly (the average miles per gallon
for new cars rose from 15.3 in 1975 to 24.9 in 1995), mpg has actually been
falling since 1991.1 Moreover, a loophole in efficiency standards helped pave
the way for the phenomenal popularity of gas-guzzling pickups and sport utility
vehicles.
Of course, these new
"family vehicles" would not have gained such extraordinary popularity
if gasoline prices were not so low. A
major factor for low oil prices is the perception that the world is seemingly
gushing with oil. In response to the
oil crises in the 1970s, conservation efforts, new technologies to extract
greater amounts of oil from each field, and the conversion by industry to
alternative fuels led oil production to exceed its demand, thus lowering the
prices and creating the appearance of abundance. Unlike most politicians, consumers, and, of course, the oil
industry, two highly respected oil geologists, Colin Campbe and Jean Laherrere,
believe that this perception of plenty is not only incorrect, but dangerous as
well. They concluded in a 1998 article
that industry has already found about 90% of the crude oil in the world and
that "conventional oil will begin to decline sooner than most people
think, probably within ten years."2 While these alarming predictions have
attracted their fair share of criticism, few in the scientific community
disagree with the crux of the argument: the world's supply of natural crude oil
is not inexhaustible.
Since most, if not all,
geologists agree that it is only a matter of time before the world's supply of
crude oil runs out, the United States must take bold new measures to reverse
its increasing consumption of oil. One
such measure is for the U.S to implement a substantial gas tax similar to those
in Western Europe and Japan. France,
for example, levies a tax of $2.84 per gallon to effectively curtail fuel
consumptions The United States, in contrast, averages about a 38 cents per
gallon tax. Certainly France's lower
consumption rate can be attributed to its mass transit system, but nonetheless,
France's petrol tax serves not only a bulwark against energy waste, but also as
a reminder that oil is a vital resource that is exhaustible. The time
has come for the United States to substantially raise the price of gasoline,
thus forcing a shift from oil, and not just imported oil, to alternative energy
resources.
In addition to significantly
reducing the billions spent on imported oil, a significant gas tax, perhaps $2
per gallon, would fund the research and development necessary for the continued
advances in developing affordable alternative energy sources. For example, the cost of ethanol fuel was
reduced from $3.60 a gallon to $1.00 in a period of about fifteen years. Advances were also being made with other
types of biofuels, solar, fuel cells, and nuclear sources of energy until the
drastic cuts made by Congress in the 1980s.
The development of new energy sources would also create new industries
and jobs. According to Joseph Romm, a
former Energy Department executive in charge of efficiency programs, contends
that a revolution in energy made possible by nearly two decades of U.S.
investment is on the verge of creating an international market with annual
sales in excess of 800 billion.4 Also, with tax breaks and capital improvement
incentives, these new industries could implement the gradual conversion to new
fuel sources for such industries as aviation, trucking, and mass transit. The United States has always been a leader
in technology, and must continue to use its scientific expertise in finding
affordable alternative energy sources to direct the world, and especially
developing nations, away from the disturbing trend of oil dependence. A gas tax, therefore, would provide the
funding necessary for such advances. Of
course, selling this new tax increase to the American public and corporate
America will prove to be the ultimate challenge.
This challenge will be
especially difficulty for several reasons.
First, the promise of jobs depends on the new advances in alternative
energy sources, and new these new advances depend on funding for research and
development. In other words, the gas
tax must first be approved before new jobs will appear, thus the probability
that Americans will invest in "future" jobs is unlikely. Second, the proposed tax will face enormous
political pressure from the oil companies, automakers, energy-intensive
industries, and consumer groups. This
point is best illustrated by President Clinton's "BTU tax." His
proposed tax that would have significantly increased the prices on all fossil
fuels; however, it met all the above mentioned opposition and was ultimately
shelved. Third, while the gas tax has
far reaching implications regarding the environment, economy, and national
security, the initial outcry will be at the gas pumps. The love affair Americans have with the
automobile is well documented. From
1970 to 1995, the total number of cars and trucks on U.S. roads skyrocketed
from 108 to 200 million.5 Fourth, the middle-class will oppose the tax, arguing
that the burden of progress will once again have been placed on its
shoulders. And while the tax revenue
could, in theory, be redistributed back to those in need, the initial effect of
the tax would pose an immediate burden on the middle-class. Fifth, and perhaps the most difficult
obstacle to overcome, is that Americans are inherently
opposed to any tax hike whatsoever.
Regardless of the daunting challenges facing such a tax, it is not a
matter of whether such a tax will be
imposed, but rather when. Contending that oil supplies will
eventually tighten, Romm recently said: "Ten years of 15 years from now,
people will be desperate to take action."6
PART II
While America's nonchalant
attitude towards oil conservation is alarming, East Asia's projected industrial
explosion and the energy required to sustain it is also cause for concern. This is not intended to place all the blame
on one region; however, East Asia, and particularly China, serves as an
excellent example to illustrate the energy concerns associated with the effects
of a rapidly expanding population and continued industrialization growth. This region's population, notably China and
India's, is the fastest growing, and, obviously, with population growth comes
the expanded need for energy and resources.
Many experts predict that worldwide population will increase anywhere
between 9-12 billion by the year 2050, with China accounting for about 1.5
billion of this growth alone. With
these population estimates in mind, a passage from University of California
(Berkeley) Professor John P. Holden presented at the Symposium of Population
and Scarcity in 1991 becomes particularly pertinent:
When energy is
scarce or expensive, people can suffer material deprivation 'and economic
hardship. When ii is obtained in ways
that fail to minimize environmental and political costs, these too can threaten
human well-being in fundamental and pervasive ways. The energy problem today combines many of these syndromes: much
of the 'World's population has too little energy to meet basic human needs ....
and the sociopolitical risks of energy supply (above all the danger of conflict
over oil and the links between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons) are growing
too.
With natural oil reserves
expected to dwindle within 10 to 50 years, the critical question is where will
the oil come from? Again, China's
growth warrants concern. Michael May, a
Professor of Engineering-Economic systems at Stanford University, projects that
China's consumption "will range from 10 to 20 percent of the world total
by mid-century."7 Further complicating China's energy policy is that the
decision-making process is divided among various political and private groups
with differing viewpoints. This is
particularly important when decisions must be made on how China will handle the
massive demand for oil that will come from its mushrooming population, increase
of automobiles on its roads, and new factories needed to fuel its emerging
industry. The projected increase of
five to sevenfold of China's energy consumption during the next fifty years has
led its decision makers to search for new sources of natural oil within its own
boundaries. China's domestic oil supply
is a matter of debate. May explains
that the proven reserves in northeast China were much smaller than anticipated
and production from these supplies is "peaking or has peaked."8 If
indeed China's reserves are already tapped, or nearly tapped, it will have to
continue its reliance on the more than ninety countries it currently imports
petroleum products from. The danger
with this, of course, is the stability and geography of these exporting oil
countries.
If the world's oil supply is
indeed limited, what measures will powerful nations go to secure their
share? In all probably, once the most
powerful nations realize that the world's oil reserves are rapidly diminishing,
the competition for these scarce resources will intensify and lead to increased
tensions between the states that have the much sought after resources within
their geographical borders and those who do not. What makes this particularly troubling is that about half of the
world's oil comes from within the borders nations in or around the Middle East, Central Asia, and the
Caspian Sea. The problem with this
concentration of the world's oil reserves is obvious: These regions have a long
history of unrest and internal conflicts.
The Middle East has had recent wars in Iran and Iraq; Central Asia has
had nearby wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan; and, of course, these nations involved
with these conflicts are all in close proximity of the Caspian Sea. For the world's largest powers to depend on
such a volatile region for a crucial energy resource is a very dangerous
policy. What happens if China's
emerging industry is suddenly jolted by a sharp price in crude oil? What happens if China is wrong about the oil
supplies it believes is within its boundaries?
It is very difficult, if not impossible, to stop the machine of
industrial prosperity once it begins.
If China proceeds to rely on oil imports as its major source for energy,
then its dependence on oil from these regions, just as is the case for the
United States, will increase the likelihood of tensions building between an
expanding industrial giant and a host of other countries. Unless China, as well as the rest of the
world, realizes the dangers associated with oil dependence and a sense that it
is inexhaustible, the likelihood of war increases.
PART III
This third and final section
examines China as case study of the potential link between the need for oil and
the threat of conflict. Specifically,
it looks at the economic, financial and geopolitical implications of China's
search for new oil reserves in the South China Sea and whether China's thirst
for oil could become a source of potential Asian conflict in the 21st
century. The basic argument of this
section is that the need for oil is one important security variable that must
be taken into account when evaluating the possibility of conflict within a region and
throughout the world.
Much has been written about
China's emergence as a potential energy power.' Yet, despite its large coal and
oil reserves and its huge untapped potential for hydroelectricity, China became
a net energy importer in 1990 when
its primary energy production of 672 million tons of oil equivalent (mtoe) fell
short of its consumption of 677 mtoe. Since 1993 China has been struggling to
simply maintain its current level of oil production. With a rapid growing population and economy, however, maintenance
of existing levels will be insufficient to meet the nation's energy needs. As a result, China has been targeting a
great deal of offshore exploration in the South China Sea. As we shall see, it is this area of
exploration that could stand as a potential source of conflict. In order to understand fully understand this
danger, however, it is first necessary to further explore China's precarious
energy situation.
CHINA'S CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
China is on track to become
further dependent on oil importation.
This is due to a lack of new proven
oil reserves, a shortage of funds for investment, and falling domestic
productivity. To compound the problem
domestic oil consumption has been rising at an annual rate of 8% between 1990
and 1993, while production has rising by an average annual rate of less than 1%
during the same period." In 1994, 74% of China's crude oil output came
from just three aging oil fields in the coastal areas of the north-east. The north-east offshore sector produced
another 6%. In total, 80% of China's oil output originated from
fields near the north-east, many of which have already peaked." Put
simply, China is quickly sapping away its proven oil reserves. Faced with declining oil reserves China is
under increasing pressure to find new reserves. "If present trends continue," Salameh warns,
China's shortfall will have
risen to 2.06 million barrels per day by 2000."
Furthermore, while China
sucks out much of its proven oil reserves, the country's demand for oil only
increases. Salameh has identified a
1.42 oil/gross domestic product (GDP) coefficient for China over the last 20
years. Put simply, this ratio means
that every 1% increase in China's GDP roughly produces a 1.42% increase in oil
demand. China's fast growing population
and economy, then, requires the state to secure more and more oil at a time
when proven supplies of such oil are becoming more and more depleted. Indeed, the magnitude of this danger can not
be over stated. In the absence of new
reserves and drastically increased oil importation, an 8% annual growth rate
would exhaust China's oil reserves in 20 years, while a 10% growth rate would
exhaust them in 19 years."
As these figures suggest, if
China's economic growth rate continues at its current pace (8-10%/year), it
will become one of the world's largest oil importers after the US and
Japan. This could have a tremendous
impact on global oil supplies, somewhat similar to the impact that the rapid
economic development of Japan and the newly industrialized countries has
already had on the international oil markets.
In 1979, political unrest in Iran led to the emergence of the Spot
Market in Rotterdam. Panic buying of
crude oil, especially by Japan, forced the price of oil $44/barrel. Despite currently low prices for oil, the
global oil demand is poised to increase more than 1 million barrels/day (mbd)
in the next 10 years (assuming the Asian economic crisis does not significantly
worsen). With this increase in demand
will come a significant increase in price.
Aware of this looming situation China has undertaken to find new sources
of oil so that it can head-off growing dependence on expensive and potentially
undependable foreign oil.
THE PROBLEMATIC SEARCH FOR OIL ON THE TARIM BASIN
In its drive to find new oil
reserves, China has been targeting its onshore exploration on the Tarim Basin,
the largest of three Basins located in the Xinjiang autonomous region in the
north-west corner of the country. As we
will discuss below, China has focused its offshore exploration in the South China
Sea. According to the Canadian Energy
Institute the Tarim Basin is the largest under-explored oil basin in the
world. Unfortunately, any oil there is
covered by uncommonly harsh terrain.
The Tarim is bordered on three sides by mountains. Shifting dunes, reaching 70 story’s high in
some places, can entrap even sturdy desert trucks. When the winds pick up, the sand can bury equipment within
minutes and reclaim paths that took days to clear. Trapped under these harsh realities, however, lie vast potential
oil reserves estimated at 147bb, or six times China's current proven reserves!
Although production in the
Tarim Basin now accounts for only a fraction of China's total oil output, its
potential is obviously huge. And China
desperately needs oil. For while coal
provides 3/4ths of the nation's energy needs, the situation, as already
discussed, is rapidly changing a the economy surges ahead a double-degit growth
pace. As a result China has altered its
policy in the Tarim and has begun to allow multinational oil companies to begin
exploring the expensive region (the area's harsh conditions make the cost of
exploration prohibitive). Chinese
officials seem to realize that China can not develop the region fast enough by
itself.
One problem, however, is capital.
Since 1989 $1.lbn in bank loans has financed China's exploration in the
Tarim. Interest payments alone total
$104 million/year, not to mention new investments. Another problem is that China lacks the technology to explore and
develop such a complex terrain. The
wells are the deepest in the world. The
geological formations are also very complex (faulted), creating hard-to-find
pockets of oil. All of these factors
combine to make the Basin very expensive to dig in - assuming that the oil can
be found at all. Even with foreign
assistance, then, China realizes that the Basin is not an adequate solution to
the nation's sort term oil needs. As a
result, China has also spent a great deal of time, money and energy
investigating the offshore sites of the South China Sea.
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Currently, it is believed
that the South China Sea contains on oil reserve approaching 8bb; not an
insignificant amount, but far less than the 147bb hidden beneath the Tarim
Basin. This total for the South China
Sea, however, excludes the potentially rich areas that are implicitly defined
as by China as part of its continental self jurisdiction, but that are not
treated as such in the United Nations' Law of the Sea Treaty (November 1994). Other areas in the South China Sea claimed
by China have also been excluded as a result of disputes over sea
boundaries. Indeed, this disputes are
of great concern to China.
While experts disagree about
the size of the potential oil reserves in the disputed territories surrounding
the Spratly archipelago in the South China Sea, China is confident of the
existence of a very large reserve. It
was reported by the China Geology
Newspaper in May 1989 that surveys by the Chinese Ministry of Geology and
Mineral Resources indicated the presence of an estimated 130bb in the region,
or 5.5 times China current proven reserve." This compares with 112bb for
Iraq, which is ranked second after Saudi Arabia in terms of proven
reserves. Although this estimate has yet
to be independently verified, it is not hard to see why China has begun to look
with to the South China Sea with such hope.
So then, this is the
position that China is in: It possess a very large and fast growing
economy. This size and high growth rate
requires a prodigious amount of oil.
The country's proven oil reserves are insufficient to keep pace with
this high rate of growth. The Chinese
government has identified two areas that may be able to augment the nation's
oil reserves. One of them, however,
(the Tarim Basin) is still somewhat inaccessible due to the huge cost of
drilling in its tough terrain.
Unfortunately for China, the other major source of oil it has identified
(the South China Sea) is outside of the nation's recognized international
authority. The situation could be ripe
for conflict.
CHINA'S ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND SECURITY POLICY
China's influence will grow
over the next decade or two as its economic power continues to develop. According to Salameh, "some analysts
project that, by 2008 China's economy could become the second largest in the
world after the U.S."" Furthermore, China's economy could even
surpass that of the US by 2103, although others do not believe that this could
happen until 2020. All, however, seem
to agree that China can sustain growth rates of 7-10% per annum, implying a
doubling of its GNP growth every 7-10 years.
Indeed, there is little
doubt that China's economic power will affect the other Asian nations and will
bring about a remarkable shift in the international balance of power. There is no reason to believe that China is
an exception to the historical rule of thumb that countries with powerful
economies become political and militarily powerful as well. A positive link exists between China's
economic success and its security policy.
This has been demonstrated in recent years by China's enhanced capacity
for projecting power in and throughout the South China Sea in pursuit of its
territorial and maritime claims.
Economic success has enhanced Beijing's ability to support a major
build-up of its armed forces, in particular it Navy in the South China Sea.
The South China Sea holds a
special place in China's strategic and economic thinking because of the
prospect of discovering and exploiting valuable crude oil and natural gas
resources, which could, in turn, make a major contribution to continuing
economic development.
But economic success could
also act as a powerful constraint on Chinese security policy. will and
economically powerful China risk upsetting its neighbors in South-eat Asia over
the South China Sea when it is trying to attract investment and secure markets?
The answer to that question will be
determined by the balance of power in post-Deng China and also by China's need
for foreign investment and technology.
China's thrust for oil means that the development of the oil sector will
be given top priority over other energy sectors of the economy in investment
plans. This will entail an estimated
investment of more than $15bn in the Tarim Basin and the South China Sea. However, the size of this investment is so
substantial that some observers doubt whether China could muster the necessary
resources on its own.
ASIAN CONFLICT AHEAD?
Oil wealth beneath the South
China Sea is fueling an expensive arms race in South-east Asia. Other conflicts, such as those between South
and North Korea, or China and Taiwan, could also contribute. However, it is China's need for oil and its
claim of sovereignty over the South China Sea that is a major cause for concern
among the five other claimants of the Spratly Islands. The most potentially explosive conflict
could be between Vietnam and China over the oil exploration concessions in the
Spratly archipelago. Every nation
touching the waters between Japan and the Strait of Malacca has either
announced or begun a major weapons build-up, fearing that post-Cold War
withdrawal of the US and collapsing Russia will bring long suppressed
territorial and maritime claims to a boil.
China is spreading alarm by
claiming the Spratly Islands for itself. named after a ninteenth-century
British whaling captain and claimed in whole or in part by China, Taiwan, the
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, the Spratlys, which consist of
hundreds of barren shoals and sandbanks are spread over 181,300 sq meters far
out in the South China Sea. Many of them
are under water at high tide and even the largest of them are inhabited only by
a small number of military personnel.
The Spratlys are a valuable strategic prize not only because of their
potential oil and gas deposits, but because they lie along major shipping lanes
and fishing grounds.
In January 1995, the Chinese
Navy built a cluster of huts on Mischief Reef, a Philippinies-claimed part of
the Spratly island chain, allegedly to shelter errant Chinese fisherman. This marked the most southernly projection
of a Chinese presence and the first seizure of territory claimed by a member of
the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN). Southeast Asian nations with claims on the Spratly archipelago
are thus nervous about China's move into the Spratly water. They fear that the 'fisherman huts' are
makers not only of China's claim to possible future oil and gas deposits, but
also of Beijing's ultimate goal of making the South China Sea a Chinese lake.
China says that its claims
to the Spratlys are based on 'historical use' the fact that Chinese ships have
for centuries plied the seas around the Spratlys and the Parcaels, a chain of
islands further to the north. In the
past few years, South-east Asian nations have watched with growing alarm as
China has developed a potent navy with which to back up its somewhat weak
claim.
Among the nation's most
suspicious of China's intentions is Vietnam.
When circumstances have permitted in the past, China has been willing to
use force to advance its territorial and maritime interests in the South China
Sea. Military force was first used in
1974 against Vietnam to seize the Paracel Islands, which Vietnam had claimed
and partially occupied for years. China
used force again in 1988 and 1991 to seize control of a total of 15 islands
claimed by Vietnam in the Spratly archipelago.
Honoi fears Beijing has sin-Lilar designs for the rest of the
Spratlys. The Paracels are potential
stepping stones to the Spratlys, which lie 560km to the south. In August 1993 the Japanese press reported
that the Chinese have built an airfield on Woody Island in the Paracels group.
Vietnam occupies some 20
islands and reefs in the Spratlys, more than any of the other five
claimants. It wants to protect the
status quo until some final resolution can be reached through negotiations. It hopes to soon have added leverage against
China: in July 1005 Vietnam became the seventh member of ASEAN, three of whose
members (the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei) also claim part of the islands. Like Hanoi, ASEAN is growing more suspicious
of China's South China Sea intentions and Beijing's naval buildup. Vietnam
maintains that the Paracels Islands and the Spratlys are Vietnamese
territory. Barring a negotiated settlement
in the Spratlys China may soon have what it considers its historical right.
The dispute over the
Spratlys also threatens to embroil Indonesia, which has traditionally acted as
a broker between rival claimants.
Indonesia officials were mystified when certain Chinese maps featured a
dotted line around the Spratlys, which encompass Indonesia's Natuna gas field.
What makes the dotted line
particularly disturbing for Indonesia is that Pertamina, Indonesia's state oil
company, and the US oil giant Exxon agreed to develop the Natuna field in a
$35bn deal signed at the end of 1994, after 14 years of negotiations. The gas field is estimated to have reserves
of about 1,274bn cubic meters, making it one of the world's largest.
Meanwhile, Pertamina is
negotiating with various oil companies to dispose of 39% of its 50% stake in
the Natuna gas field. While China's
claims have not scared off any of the negotiating parties, which include the US
company Mobil and Japan's Mitsubishi and Mitsui, concerns still remain. The hope is that China will clarify its
claims before parties start to discuss financing the project.
Should China succeed in
achieving sovereignty over the South China Sea it will be able to extend its
jurisdiction right up to the territorial waters of the countries surrounding
the sea. This will allow China to control
the maritime heat of South-eat Asia.
This prospect is disturbing not only for those states that dispute
China's territorial and maritime jurisdiction, but also for other Asian powers
such as Japan, India, Thailand and Indonesia.
None of China's South-east Asian neighbors can begin to match China as
an emerging naval power. At this point,
no one can say for sure whether China's current attempts to expand its
influence reflect aggressive intentions or are simply natural consequences of
rising power.
For the time being, however,
while not conceding any point of principle over sovereignty, China could adopt
a long-term, two-pronged strategy of full engagement with its South-east Asian
neighbors in pursuit of its economic interests and a creeping piecemeal
acquisition of unoccupied territory in the South China Sea.
Still, the threat of
conflict is real. China threw down the
gauntlet, in a sense, on 25 February 199w when it passed a law asserting
sovereignty over the Spralty, Paracel and Senkaku Islands and other specks in
the South China Sea, and warned it would defend them. But Japan told China bluntly that the Senkaku Islands were
Japanese territory. Since then,
Malaysia and the Philippines, as well as Vietnam, have reinforced their troop
strength on the Spratly archipelago.
The ASEAN claimants have
pursued a policy of engaging China since 1990 to dukes international
cooperation and joint development.
China has adamantly refused to discuss its territorial but has indicated
its willingness to consider joint exploration of resources. So far, however, there has been no such
joint development and China and Vietnam are pressing ahead with oil exploration
in these contested waters. Under these
conditions the risk of military conflict is high: China has indicated that it
will give naval protection to private exploration companies.
Consequently, China's thirst for oil joined with this mix of overlapping territorial disputes, the continued build-up of military forces in close proximity to each other and the history of China's use of force in the recent past against Vietnam could give rise to the use of force. Furthermore, bilateral disagreement between China and its South-east Asian neighbors, particularly Vietnam, could easily be used as an excuse for territorial disputes to escalate in this contested area.
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, when one
thinks about the causes of international conflict oil is not the first thing to
come to mind. Indeed, popular history
has focused much more upon ideologies and religion than energy sources such as
crude oil. As this discussion has
attempted to show, however, this view is very incomplete. The rise of industrialism in the 20th
century has made oil the life blood of modern life. As countries continue to grow and/or industrialize the need for
oil only increases. Unhappily, though,
the world's supply of oil is not limitless.
Although the international price of oil is currently quite low, this
situation will not last indefinitely.
Most of the world's leading oil-using nation realize that they must look
to a time when currently proven/cheaply-accessible oil reserves have been
depleted. As a result, these nations
must make plans to secure oil well into the future. Seizing such oil by force stands as one possible policy for the
world's most industrialized ( and militarily powerful) nations. It is not yet possible to suggest with
certainty that this route will be taken by any particular nation. It is, however, time to realize that oil
security must be tracked as one important variable when analyzing sources of
conflict. As our discussion of China
and the South China Sea situation should make clear, oil insecurity can make
difficult situations even more tense.
This lesson has applications far beyond South-east Asia.