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Kant Argument Reconstruction- Groundwork of the Metaphysic
of Morals, Section I, 4:394
First section: Transition from common rational moral cognition to
philosophical moral cognition
There is nothing it is possible
to think of anywhere in the world, or indeed anything at all outside it,
that can be held to be good without limitation, excepting only a good
will. Understanding, wit, the power of judgment and like talents of the
mind, whatever they might be called, or courage, resoluteness, persistence
in an intention, as qualities of temperament, are without doubt
in some respects good and to be wished for; but they can also become extremely
evil and harmful, if the will that is to make use of these gifts of nature,
and whose peculiar constitution is therefore called character, is not
good. It is the same with gifts of fortune. Power, wealth, honor, even
health and that entire well-being and contentment with one’s condition,
under the name of happiness, make for courage and thereby often also for
arrogance, where there is not a good will to correct their influence on
the mind, and thereby on the entire principle of action, and make them
universally purposive; not to mention that a rational impartial spectator
can never take satisfaction even in the sight of the uninterrupted welfare
of a being, if it is adorned with no trait of a pure and good will; and
so the good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even
of the worthiness to be happy.
Some qualities are even conducive
to this good will itself and can make its work much easier, but still
have despite this [Ak 4:394] no inner unconditioned worth, yet always
presuppose a good will, which limits the esteem which one otherwise rightly
has for them, and does not permit them to be held absolutely good. Moderation
in affects and passions, self-control and sober reflection are not only
good for many aims, but seem even to constitute a part of the inner worth
of a person; yet they lack much in order to be declared good without limitation
(however unconditionally they were praised by the ancients). For without
the principles of a good will they can become extremely evil, and the
cold-bloodedness of a villain makes him not only far more dangerous but
also immediately more abominable in our eyes than he would have been held
without it.
The good will is good not through
what it effects or accomplishes, not through its efficacy for attaining
any intended end, but only through its willing, i.e. good in itself, and
considered for itself, without comparison, it is to be estimated far higher
than anything that could be brought about by it in favor of any inclination,
or indeed, if you prefer, of the sum of all inclinations. Even if through
the peculiar disfavor of fate, or through the meager endowment of a stepmotherly
nature, this will were entirely lacking in the resources to carry out
its aim, if with its greatest effort nothing of it were accomplished,
and only the good will were left over (to be sure, not a mere wish, but
as the summoning up of all the means insofar as they are in our control):
then it would shine like a jewel for itself, as something that has its
full worth in itself. Utility or fruitlessness can neither add to nor
subtract anything from this worth. It would be only the setting, as it
were, to make it easier to handle in common traffic, or to draw the attention
of those who are still not sufficiently connoisseurs, but not to recommend
it to connoisseurs and determine its worth.
(Tr. Allen Wood)
Argument Reconstruction:
Note that an argument reconstruction involves careful reading, re-reading,
and dissection of the passage. The reconstruction must be revised multiple
times before it becomes a coherent, valid, and successful extraction of
the author's argument. The following reconstruction has been re-worked
several times; it was not in the form below on the first attempt.
1. Talents of the mind can be extremely evil and harmful if they stem
from a will that is not good. (P)
2. Qualities of temperament can be extremely evil and harmful if they
stem from a will that is not good. (P)
3. Gifts of fortune, including happiness, can be extremely evil and harmful
if they stem from a will that is not good. (P)
4. For talents of mind, qualities of temperament, and gifts of fortune
to be evil and harmful, it is sufficient that the will behind them is
not good. (from 1, 2, 3)
5. Therefore, the good will is necessary to make talents of the mind,
qualities of temperament, and gifts of fortune good. (from 1, 2, 3)
6. Talents of the mind, qualities of temperament, and gifts of fortune
require the presence of something else to be good. (from 4)
7. Things that require the presence of something elseto be good are not
good without limitation. (P)
8. Therefore, talents of mind, qualities of temperament, and gifts of
fortune are not good without limitation. (from 6, 7)
9. Moderation in affects and passions, self-control, and sober reflection
are good for all sorts of purposes if they stem from a good will. (P)
10. Moderation in affects and passions, self-control, and sober reflection
even seem to constitute a part of the inner worth of a person. (P)
11. Moderation in affects and passions, self-control, and sober
reflection can be evil and harmful if they stem from a will that is not
good. (P)
12. For moderation in affects and passions, self-control, and sober reflection
to be evil and harmful, it is sufficient that the will behind them is
not good. (from 11)
13. Therefore, moderation in affects and passions, self-control, and sober
reflection are not good without the presence of something else. (from
12)
14. Therefore, moderation in affects and passions, self-control, and sober
reflection are not good without limitation. (from 13, 7)
15. A good will is necessary to make moderation in affects and passions,
self-control, and sober reflection good. (P)
16. Talents of mind, qualities of temperament, gifts of fortune, moderation
in affects and passions, self-control, sober reflection, and the good
will are the only good things. (P)
17. Therefore, a good will is necessary to make all goods things good.
(from 5, 15, 16)
18. A good will is either good because of its effects or is a good will
is good because of its willing. (P)
19. It is not the case that a good will is good because of its effects.
(P)
20. The good will is good because of its willing. (from 18, 19)
21. The good will is good in itself. (from 20)
22. The good will does not need the presence of anything to be good. (from
21)
23. Therefore, a good will is good without limitation. (from 7,
22)
24. Therefore, the only thing that is good without limitation is the good
will. (from 8, 14, 16, 23)
Explanation:
The first step in reconstructing
any argument is finding the conclusion. Reading this passage, we
see that the conclusion is the first sentence. Kant states that
the only thing that is good without limitation is a good will. The
first sentence is a strong claim, made right from the start, and upon
examination we see that the rest of the passage is defending this claim.
Having established the conclusion,
we next need to figure out the basic structure of the argument for this
conclusion. The first paragraph consists of sentences which list
qualities that we generally think of as good, and Kant states that all
of these things can be evil and harmful if the will behind them is not
good. It also states how a good will makes these things good.
The second paragraph is similar to the first, in that it tells us of other
characteristics that are generally perceived to be good, but that these
characteristics can also become extremely evil without the basic principles
of a good will. The third paragraph makes the point that a good
will is not good because of the effects it has, but instead good in itself.
So, in the overall structure, the first two paragraphs list qualities
and rule them out as good without limitation. By showing us that
all of these qualities are good with limitation, Kant is trying to exclude
these things from the category ‘good without limitation,’
so that only the good will belongs in that category.
Next, after observing the general
structure, we piece the argument together. In the first paragraph,
Kant deals with ‘talents of the mind’, ‘qualities of
temperament’, and ‘gifts of fortune’ in the same manner,
stating that each of these things can be good for many purposes, but can
also be evil and harmful if the will behind them is not good. We
then combine these three attributes into one category, and assert that,
for them to be evil and harmful, it is sufficient that the will behind
them is not good. Changing this statement into its logical equivalence,
we find that the good will is necessary to make these other qualities
good. Kant then explains how the good will goes about making these
other things good.
In the second paragraph, Kant further
uses this same technique, although now he tries to articulate characteristics
that compose the inner part of a person and so perhaps have a better chance
at being good without limitation. Kant is hoping that if he shows
that these characteristics are good only with limits, then he will have
shown that the good will is the only thing that is good without limitation.
Kant claims that moderation in affects and passions, self-control, and
calm reflection can be good or bad things, and are therefore only good
if there is something else to make them good. At this point, we
must supply the premise that things which require are the presence of
something else to be good are not good without limitation (as above, in
the previous paragraph). Once we add that premise, it follows that
all of these things (moderation in affects and passions, self-control,
and calm reflection) are only good with limitation.
The third paragraph makes the point
that a good will is not good because of what is accomplishes, because
of its external effects, but good in itself. To make this argument
a valid one, we must state that the good will is either good because of
its effects or because of its willing. Kant explicitly states that
a good will is not good because of its effects, so we can conclude that
it is good because of its willing. We can supply next the premise that
a good will is good in itself and, from this premise, can draw the next
premise that the good will does not require the presence of anything else
to be good. We have previously stated that things which don't require
the presence of anything else to be good are good without limitation,
so we can conclude that the good will is good without limitation. Now
that we have established that the good will is good without limitation,
we can conclude that it is the only thing that is good without limitation
by drawing on the sub-conclusions that exclude all other qualities form
the category of ‘good without limitation’.
Sample Paper on Kant's Groundwork, Section
One
Objections to Kant's Argument in The Groundwork,
Section One
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