Sample Explication Paper on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Chapter 5

Instructions:  Explicate Aristotle's arguments in Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Chapter 5.

       In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Aristotle's arguments in Book 2, chapter 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics.  Aristotle in this chapter tries to establish what a virtue is and proceeds roughly as follows.  He assumes that virtue is something in the soul and that there are only three kinds of things in the soul.  He then gives several subsidiary arguments designed to show that virtue is not identical with the first two of the three kinds of things in the soul.  He then infers that virtue is identical with the third kind of thing in the soul.  I shall argue that Aristotle's arguments in this chapter are, with only minor modifications noted below, valid.
       Aristotle opens this chapter by saying that "we must inquire into what virtue is" (1105b19) and at its end claims that virtue is a state (1106a12).  So the conclusion of the whole argument is: Virtue is a state.
       In the first paragraph, Aristotle makes the following argument that sets his strategy for the rest of the chapter.
  (1) Things found in the soul are of only three kinds: passions, capacities, and states. (Premise, 1105b19-20)
  (2)  Virtue is a kind of thing found in the soul. (Implicit or supplied premise)
  Therefore, (3) virtue is a passion, a capacity, or a state. (1105b20-21)
Aristotle here only explicitly asserts (1) and (3) (and note that he signals that (3) is a conclusion that he draws ("since" . . .  "must be", 1105b19 and 20)).  But (2) is an obvious premise to supply and from (1) and (2), we can validly infer (3).  I also note that although "only" does not occur in the text, we must supply it in (1), since otherwise the argument is invalid.  (The reason for this will become clearer shortly).  In the rest of the first paragraph, Aristotle offers characterizations and examples of passions, capacities, and states.  Although this information helps us better understand what Aristotle is talking about, it is not necessary (with the exceptions noted below) for my reconstruction of the argument's structure.
       In the second paragraph, the strategy of the rest of the chapter becomes clear.  Having established (3), Aristotle will proceed to offer subsidiary arguments to show that virtue is not a passion and that virtue is not a capacity.  Once these two claims are established, Aristotle can validly infer his overall conclusion, that is, that virtue is a state.  We can now see why Aristotle must claim that there are only three kinds of things in the soul.  If he had claimed that, e.g., there are at least three kinds of things in the soul, this would leave open the possibility that there are four or more kinds.  In this case, showing that virtue is not identical with the first two kinds of things in the soul would not allow him to infer validly that virtue is identical with the third.
       Let us now consider the first of these subsidiary arguments.
  (4) We are not called good or bad on account of our passions. (P, 1105b30)
  (5) We are called good or bad on account of our virtues. (P, 1105b30-31)
  Therefore, (6) virtue is not a passion (1105b29).
From (4) and (5), (6) validly follows.  (Aristotle here seems to be relying on the principle that if a and b are identical, then whatever is true of a is true of b and vice versa.  Since (4) and (5) tell us that something is true of virtues that is not true of passions, we can conclude that they are not identical.)  The structure of the rest of Aristotle's subsidiary arguments is the same, with one exception.  Two of the other three arguments that Aristotle makes to show that virtue is not a passion maintain the previously examined form and do not contain any implicit premises.  However, Aristotle states, in an argument to differentiate passion and virtue in order to show that virtue is not a passion, that we feel anger and fear without choice.  From these two examples of passions, we must infer that Aristotle means to include all passions as things that we feel without choice so that passions can be contrasted with faculties.  So, here we supply the implicit premise:
  (10)  We feel passions without choice. (P)
From this premise and the premise that virtue is or involves choice, we can validly conclude that virtue is not a passion.
       In the fourth paragraph, Aristotle shows that virtue is not a capacity.  Aristotle employs the same strategy as before, except that, in this case, one must supply implicit premises.  In the first argument in this paragraph, Aristotle claims that “we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions” (1106a7-8).  First, the definition of capacity as the capacity for feeling the passions must be established so the connection between this statement and the word “capacity” can be made. This is the only statement made explicitly in the first argument of this section, but from it we must glean that we ARE called good or bad, praised or blamed, for our virtue.  If we supply this premise, then we have maintained the form of the argument and can validly conclude that, because of these differing qualities, virtue is not a capacity.
       For the second argument in the fourth paragraph, another implicit premise must be supplied.  Let us consider the only statement made explicitly by Aristotle, the first two premises in this second subargument.
  (20) We have the capacities by nature. (P, 1106a9)
  (21) We are not made good or bad by nature. (P, 1106a9)
To be able to conclude validly that virtue is not a faculty from these two premises, we must supply the premises that we are made good by nature if and only if we have virtue by nature and that we do no have virtue by nature.  Once we supply these premises, the argument proceeds as follows.
  (22) We are made good by nature if and only if we have virtue by nature. (Implicit premise)
  (23) We do not have virtue by nature. (from 21, 22)
  (24) Therefore, virtue is not a capacity. (1106a7)
From (20), (21), (22), and (23), (24) validly follows.  Aristotle has validly established that virtue is not a capacity in the fourth paragraph.
       Once Aristotle has shown that virtue is not a passion or capacity, he has proven it to be a state: “If, then, the virtues are neither passions nor capacities, all that remains is that they should be states” (1106a11-12).  Aristotle’s arguments are valid if the above implicit premises are supplied.  I have given a reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument in Book 2, chapter 5 of Nicomachean Ethics and shown how Aristotle establishes what virtue is.

Reconstruction from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5

Objections to Aristotle's Argument